(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI want the UK to be known as a place of refuge and justice as well as a place of opportunity and freedom. When examining immigration Bills over the years, I have always looked to see where there could be an issue of moral hazard in what is being proposed and the changes being made. In this Bill, my eyes were immediately drawn to clause 62 and to Lords amendment 25. The title of clause 62 is “Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection”. The clause is replete with moral hazards in whatever actions the Government might take. As it happens, I do not think that the Government have got the balance right, but I am also not sure that the Lords amendment is quite right.
My request to the Minister, who is ably managing the Bill, is to continue the conversation with their lordships on this provision, because of the risks of moral hazard. For example, is it really right that we should continue to include taking away this protection from children? Is it right that we should continue to have a provision that someone who in their past has undertaken a crime under duress should be liable to the protections being taken away? The Minister has argued that it is important to define this, so that the issues of public order can be applied, and I see some relevance there, but why is it important to rely so heavily on information that relates to an individual’s past, rather than take into account their circumstances and the potential risk they pose today? That balance has not been struck correctly.
The noble Lords Coaker and Randall in the other place sought to correct that by trying to draw a tighter definition about the risks, stating that there has to be
“an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat”,
but I think they have overcooked it a little bit. It is quite a lot to say that all those criteria have to apply. Between the Government’s present criteria, which rely too much on an individual’s past, and the Lords amendment, which is drawn a bit too tightly about where these protections should be applied, there is scope for the Government to find some ground for compromise. I certainly hope so.
I shall of necessity be very brief. First, I would like to place on record my appreciation of my colleagues in the other place, in particular Lord Paddick, Baroness Hamwee, Baroness Ludford and Baroness Suttie.
I find myself somewhat perplexed about the measures relating to modern slavery because, as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said, the Conservative party has until recently had a really good story to tell on modern slavery. It started with the work of Anthony Steen. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the passing of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and in this context I pay particular tribute to the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May). I saw how, as Home Secretary, she drove this agenda in Government. Believe me, the Home Secretary in the coalition Government was not always an immediate ally for Liberal Democrat Ministers. She had a particular knack for generating tension, not just within the coalition but occasionally within her own party, but she really understood the importance of this issue and drove it forward in a way that I think the party should be proud of. I am afraid that what I see in relation to Lords amendments 24 to 26, coming from people such as Lord Randall—someone with whom, again, I was pleased to work during his time in this House—flies in the face of that work. It undermines the tremendous progress this country and the Conservative party have made.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my right hon. Friend. One other aspect of this is that it has given me the opportunity to have a fresh look at an area of legislation that I have not been as deeply involved in as he has. I might therefore raise some concerns that the Minister might not get from other quarters, with a keen focus on the legislation dealing with modern-day slavery.
I wish also speak in support of amendment 3, tabled in the name of the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). I will be pleased to hear him later expressing his support for my new clause, as I also hope the SNP will. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) for her indication of support. The reason I say that is that my new clause has not been selected for separate Division, and it is therefore important that this House sends a clear and unequivocal cross-party message to the other House, where this issue can perhaps be looked at anew.
I am sure that the House will be on tenterhooks to know, so I can put it out of its misery and tell the hon. Member that I will be more than happy to support his new clause.
I am very pleased to be off those tenterhooks, although I am never very sure what tenterhooks are. They do not sound very comfortable.
New clause 39 provides the Government with an opportunity to achieve their objectives but on a more considerably secure legal footing than their current proposals would permit. The new clause has been informed by the concerns raised by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton. Clause 62 currently seeks to disqualify potential victims of trafficking from the protections afforded under the national referral mechanism. Those protections are important not just as a manifestation of the mercy of our country towards those whose lives have been made wretched by the exploitations of others but to enable more effective prosecution of the perpetrators of such trafficking. Consideration of exclusion from these protections therefore requires careful assessment of the consequences for both those factors. Moreover, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) mentioned, it should be considered in the context of our country’s leading position in international law on human trafficking. That is a position that we should not give up at all lightly.
My first concern with clause 62 as proposed is to ask: where is the evidence? Where is the evidence that access to the national referral mechanism is being abused, and where is the evidence from the Government on the impact of their proposal? My second concern with clause 62 is that it does not appear to address vexatious or unwarranted claims regarding access to the national referral mechanism. That point was also made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green when he was speaking to his new clause. This is the wrong piece of legislation to do what the Government hope is the right thing, but which many of us fear will make the situation worse rather than better. In the absence of evidence for why this is a logical measure to adopt, I am perplexed as to why clause 62 has been drafted in this way.
My concern is also that subsections (3)(b) and (3)(f) provide a very low bar for disqualification based on criminal sentencing. For those, like me, who are not familiar with modern slavery, it may sound odd that there is public interest in supporting people who have committed crimes either here or, more likely, overseas that carry a 12-month sentence—that is the bar—but that public interest is the same public interest as we have in trying to reach the main perpetrators in county lines drug gangs or serious fraud cases.
The public interest is in enabling sufficient evidence to be collated to bring successful prosecutions against the co-ordinators of those crimes, which is where I fear this clause falls short in subsections (3)(b) and (3)(f). I see good reasons in the other subsections and paragraphs for why clause 62 makes sense, but subsections (3)(b) and (3)(f) are clearly very different. I am interested in understanding the Minister’s logic.
Although this is an immigration Bill, clause 62 will largely apply to people already here, including British citizens, who currently make up the majority of victims. Because it refers to the national referral mechanism, most British victims will fall foul of this clause. The data suggests that the vast majority of British victims would fail under the Bill’s disqualifying remit, as the majority of cases involving British victims involve criminal exploitation. Even those who fall under labour or sexual exploitation often participate in criminal activities as part of their exploitation and so may end up being “unworthy” of support. I fear that is not what we are trying to do, and it should not be in an immigration Bill.
Another concern that has been raised with me is that there are currently significant difficulties in bringing prosecutions for modern slavery. As previous speakers have mentioned, with approximately 10,000 potential victims of modern slavery identified in the UK last year and only 238 convictions, it is clear that the process is at risk of being overloaded.
How does it help for there to be new additional legal requirements to investigate the criminal history of each and every potential victim who is seeking access to the national referral mechanism? How on earth will that help? Have we not been here before, more than a decade ago? I do not like to refer back to the bad old days of immigration under Labour, but what a complete mess Labour made of it. The lives of many of my former constituents in Bedford, and the constituents of many hon. and right hon. Members here, were ruined by the Home Office’s processes, and those processes are still not where they need to be. With this new provision on access to the national referral mechanism, the Home Office is at it again, making it more complicated, making it more difficult and, ultimately, making a rod for its own back.
New clause 39 would remove children from the scope of clause 62, which is important. We do not want children to fall foul of other rules and regulations, certainly when it comes to their criminal record or otherwise. Will the Minister address that directly?
The new clause preserves the Government’s power to remove individuals from the UK who pose
“an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat to public order”.
We understand the Government want to make these changes, and there may be good reason for doing so, but let us set the bar higher and let us make it more pertinent so that we do not block the whole system and unduly use immigration law to address modern slavery. That seems a sensible change to make.
New clause 39 would change the wording of the Bill so that a person who claims to have been trafficked improperly will not be treated as having acted in bad faith, which is more in line with the trafficking convention. When a Government seek to conflate effective modern slavery legislation a little too much with immigration law, it is important that we refer to the founding principles of that first set of legislation. Let us not be wishy-washy by saying we can make it up as we go along. Let us not import one schedule from one Act and say it will work fine in this Bill, which seems sloppy. It seems much better to place it more firmly and resolutely in international conventions and other aspects of international law.