UK Accession to CPTPP

Debate between Richard Foord and Liam Byrne

Thursday 22nd February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Liam Byrne]

That is an excellent question. The hon. Lady may have seen a really good report produced by not our Committee, but the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, on 29 January 2024, which makes precisely that point. We need a better way of scrutinising trade agreements. The CRaG structure allows us to delay things, but not necessarily veto them. When CRaG was introduced back in 2010, it was an innovation, because in the past, that was something that Governments did without any scrutiny whatsoever. Now we are in a different kind of world, in which we are signing free trade agreements at, I hope, increasing pace. However, the House will still have to navigate when we want open trade, when we want to de-risk trade, and when we put economic security first and free trading second. These are dilemmas in which there is not an obvious answer. We cannot prejudge the answers to those questions; they will have to be debated case by case. It could well be that a Government will come to the wrong conclusion about that balance between open and free trade and maximising our economic security as a country, and therefore we in this House must be able to apply a brake —put a hard stop—to trade deals that we think are ultimately not in the national interest.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

I represent a rural constituency in Devon. Farmers in the west country were alarmed at the sorts of concessions made in the Australia and New Zealand trade deal. Until yesterday, we thought that the UK and Canada were negotiating a roll-over trade agreement. Canada is a member of the CPTPP and it will be crucial, if the UK-Canada trade talks resume, for the UK to avoid paying twice, because we will want to avoid further market access concessions. Can the right hon. Gentleman offer any reassurance that, through CPTPP accession, we will not open up our markets to unmanageable volumes of produce that will damage British farming and put farming businesses in danger of going out of business?

[Liam Byrne]

The way that we approached our analysis was to look at food standards and whether they would be diminished by our joining the treaty. The Trade and Agriculture Commission looked at three questions, which are talked about in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the report. We reported the Trade and Agriculture Commission’s advice, which was that there would not be a diminution in the statutory protection of food standards in this country, and that we would, in fact, be allowed to reinforce some of those protections.

However, as the hon. Gentleman importantly flags, we are now finding that sometimes the devil is in the detail. Despite having joined CPTPP with Canada, we now appear to be struggling to get in place a free trade agreement with Canada. The Canadian Government are very clear that technical discussions have stopped. I understand that the Secretary of State, or a spokesman for her, told the Financial Times yesterday that discussions were ongoing, but discussions are not trade talks. If discussions were trade talks, we would be having trade talks with the entire world right now, because our diplomats around the world are in constant engagement with their counterparts in different parts of the planet. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to flag that issue. The reassurance that I can give him is that we do not see this treaty lead to a softening of the trade standards that we so treasure in this country.

Ukraine

Debate between Richard Foord and Liam Byrne

Monday 20th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

It is an honour to follow both the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) and the hon. Member for Bradford South (Judith Cummins), who really brought this back down to the individual experience of a terrible war, for which I am grateful.

I am going to spend the next few minutes arguing that we should provide for war and prepare for peace. We in the UK should increase seriously our industrial production for defence—Ukraine’s and our own—while also isolating Russia and seizing diplomatic opportunities when they arise. We could characterise this as better preparation and jaw-jaw. I would also like to identify a couple of events from the last century or so that can shine a light on the situation that Ukraine finds itself facing and that Ukraine’s partners find ourselves facing: the 1915 shell crisis in Britain, and the 1999 withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo.

First, however, let us recall NATO’s role in this war. In Russian propaganda now, Moscow is characterising this as NATO’s war. The Kremlin suggests that the Government in Kyiv is a puppet and that NATO is pulling the strings, but that could not be further from the truth. The provision of arms by Ukraine’s partners, such as the UK, is often a reactive response to requests for support. I give credit to the British Government and credit to the Secretary of State for Defence and the Ministry of Defence for repeatedly stating that this is Ukraine’s war. Ukraine is our close partner and we are supplying Ukraine with equipment and support, but contrary to Russian propaganda, this is not NATO’s war and there is no sense in which NATO is threatening Russia.

However, we are not in the business of subcontracting policy to the Government in Kyiv. We should not be answering each and every request on this reactive basis. There are times when we should be supplying equipment proactively. For example, the British Government announced they would be supplying Warrior infantry fighting vehicles when asked, though the Liberal Democrats had been calling for this in the months prior to that announcement. We should anticipate requests by Ukraine, rather than wait for them to land. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) suggested that there is a pattern of saying no until we say yes, but the UK is rightly stepping up its provision at a time when we know that our allies have moved or are ready to move.

[Liam Byrne]

We may as well try to round out the cross-party consensus that I think is emerging. Would the hon. Member agree that we should be doing everything we can to send fast jets to Ukraine?

[Richard Foord]

I suggest to the right hon. Member that if we send fast jets to Ukraine, it is going to be a symbolic gesture. When he and I visited Kyiv last September, Minister Reznikov was asking for Gripen aircraft, as we have heard in this Chamber today. If we are to do so, it would not be because we have a capability that is particularly useful to Ukraine, but because it would be a symbolic first mover gesture that others can follow.

Another example of this is the provision of main battle tanks once we knew that other countries were at least considering or almost ready to provide them, but we must have greater anticipation of what demand will arise before it takes Zelensky to visit us to make such requests.

We have heard that Ukrainian forces are firing up to 5,000 artillery rounds per day. Ukraine’s partners will struggle to maintain supply at that level from our existing stockpiles, and we are going to need to procure artillery rounds quickly. Just-in-time acquisition might play well on spreadsheets, but it has not played well in relation to our inventories.

There are times when matters of supply really are crucial. Britain found itself short of high explosive rounds in 1915. David Lloyd George was appointed the inaugural Minister for Munitions—a position that, when he became Prime Minister, he gave to his fellow Liberal Winston Churchill, who became Minister for Munitions in 1917—and the creation of a Ministry for Munitions indicated just how serious Britain was in prosecuting the war. I am not for a moment suggesting that we need to promote the Minister for Defence Procurement in such a way, but we do need to co-ordinate the purchase of munitions with our allies, given that we are drawing on the same western suppliers in many instances, and we need to do it on an enduring basis.

We see now that Russia is moving increasingly towards a total war footing, where it is increasingly mobilising the resources of its society and its economy to the war effort. It may have sought to play down the so-called special military operation last February, but it is increasingly having to recognise what it has created following the full-scale invasion. The time will eventually arrive for Ukrainian negotiation, and it should come from a position of strength for Ukraine. When the time comes for negotiation, we should be open to the leverage that Beijing will have with Moscow that NATO nations do not.

To illustrate that, recall how the orders were eventually given for the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. Yugoslavia conceded when it realised that it was isolated. If we think about the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring and summer of 1999, NATO was bombing military sites across Serbia and Montenegro in pursuit of the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces. This followed ethnic cleansing that Yugoslav security forces had perpetrated against Kosovo Albanians. The NATO bombing campaign had gone on for more than 10 weeks, but there was no sign that Slobodan Milošević was prepared to concede and to withdraw Yugoslav military and paramilitary personnel from Kosovo.

The NATO enforcement action seemed to be stuck, and NATO bombing sorties were striking the same targets repeatedly. President Yeltsin played an important role in persuading Milošević to withdraw Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. As Boris Yeltsin’s Balkans envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin communicated to Milošević that Belgrade could no longer depend on diplomatic support from an ally. Chernomyrdin was later to become a dreadful Russian ambassador to Ukraine, and he is rightly very unpopular in Ukraine, but he was successful in persuading Milošević that he had no ally to whom he could turn for support. Milošević chose to consent to the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces only when he realised just how isolated he was.

So let us not be too dismissive of China’s offer before we know what it is. Of course, we should pay careful attention to the speech by President Xi coming up on Friday. It will probably be full of platitudes, and it may offer nothing except a ceasefire based on the current possession by Russian forces of Ukrainian land, in which case it would clearly be completely unacceptable. However, the current statements made by China relate to the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are not there yet, but China may have a role to play in pressuring Russia into its eventual withdrawal from Ukraine.

We would have such a discussion while not being naive about China’s motives. Russia and China have been adversaries, so it might suit China to have Russia and the west depleting their weapons stockpiles in a conflict taking place far away from the Asian Indo-Pacific. However, it does not suit China to have the west threatening consequences against China, as Blinken has warned would result from the supply of arms by China to Russia. Russian people need to know that this is Russia’s war. It is not NATO’s war, nor is it China’s war. We in the UK do need to prepare UK defence now as if this war is our own. We must supply Ukraine so that it can capture more of its territory before it seeks to enter into a ceasefire. At that point, we should be open to recognising the value that Russia’s partners can have in persuading Putin to pull back.

Ukraine

Debate between Richard Foord and Liam Byrne

Monday 14th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

What a powerful speech to have to follow from the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne). I echo the comment made earlier by the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion): this has been a very informative debate. I found the contributions from the hon. Members for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely), for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) really worthwhile listening.

The falling back of the Russian army from Kherson in recent weeks and days presents us with an opportunity to reflect on what the UK and its allies intend will be achieved by our support for Ukraine. To date, our position has simply been that we reiterate our moral and material support, and quite right too. But there have been voices in NATO and here in the UK who have since the spring been urging us to have aims that are independent of those of the Government of Ukraine. I am strongly of the view that as 2022 draws to a close we should not have stated aims that differ from those of the Government in Kyiv.

The Government in Moscow are determined to paint the war as one that Putin did not seek. When addressing the Russian people and extending the mobilisation of Russian citizens, the Russian Government seek to stimulate fear of the west. It has been said several times this evening that the UK supports Ukraine because of our outrage at the invasion, in the 21st century, of a sovereign state that posed no threat to its neighbours. But an additional reason why the UK’s aims and Ukraine’s aims are indivisible is in order to undermine Russia’s claim that this is a proxy war where NATO is using Ukraine to fight on its behalf.

Lord David Richards of Herstmonceux has argued that the UK and its NATO allies should have a grand strategic war aim with a defined end state. He said in April that without such a well-defined end state

“there is a risk that events overtake us in the way that happened in 1914”.

But there are some fundamental differences between now and then. In 1914, the UK intervened directly in support of Belgium and deployed the British Expeditionary Force, whereas NATO Governments have been at pains to demonstrate our restraint by supplying Ukraine with materiel while avoiding the direct involvement of our armed forces personnel in the conflict.

There are perhaps stronger parallels between the situation we see today and the one that arose in 1916, when it had been rumoured that some in the US were seeking to engage Germany and the entente powers in dialogue, with a view to peace. That was at a time when the aggressor was still in possession of territory that it had acquired directly as a result of its aggression. Britain’s then Secretary of State for War, the Liberal Minister David Lloyd George, pointed out that Britain and its allies were only just beginning to see some successes and that negotiating a compromise at that time would serve only to reward aggression. Lloyd George talked about the need to ensure that

“military despotism is broken beyond repair.”

Last week, it was suggested in the press that some voices in the US might have been leaning on Ukraine to alter its objectives. The US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, said:

“We’ve seen the Ukrainian military fight the Russian military to a standstill…Now, what the future holds is not known with any degree of certainty, but we think there are some possibilities here for some diplomatic solutions.”

When questioned about that, the US national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said:

“The United States is not pressuring Ukraine…We’re not insisting on things with Ukraine.”

We should just stand back and reflect that Baron Richards and General Milley have been or are the professional heads of their armed forces, so they have seen enough of war to know that it is a blunt instrument, that it is unpredictable and that it is inferior, in most ways, to diplomacy. They and others are entirely right constantly to ask questions about the NATO grand strategy and whether we might be able to articulate our own end state or see a diplomatic way out.

On this point, I disagree with the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill that safe skies implemented by way of no-fly zones policed by NATO would be the right thing, although that was something Ukraine called for early in the war. I was with him in Kyiv when we heard about the sorts of demands that were being articulated by Ukraine today, and I would agree with him that removing Russia from all of Ukrainian territory was much more along the lines of what is being called for today than anything else.

[Liam Byrne]

I, too, do not believe that there can be a NATO-policed no-fly zone, but what I do believe is that there can be a much a greater supply of air defence weapons that we have and that Ukraine needs.

[Richard Foord]

I thank the right hon. Member for correcting my understanding.

I talked last week to a Ukrainian MP from the sister party of the Liberal Democrats and he told me how we in the west have failed in the past two or three decades to fully understand that the Soviet Union was an empire. He suggested that we never fully appreciated that there was not consent for states to belong to the USSR in the first place and that it had been a Russian KGB-led empire all along, which some in Russia would like to see recreated.

Those are some of the reasons why the west should not at this time seek to have aims that differ from those of the democratically elected Government of Ukraine. Instead, I urge that we act solely in support of our Ukrainian allies. In the 21st century, there is no case for the logic articulated by Catherine the Great when she said:

“I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”