Tuesday 7th May 2024

(6 months, 2 weeks ago)

Commons Chamber
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Grant Shapps Portrait Grant Shapps
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I am pleased to reassure my right hon. Friend from this Front Bench that no such delay would be countenanced. Just in the last few weeks we have issued the defence nuclear enterprise Command Paper—[Interruption.] I thought the Opposition Front Bench knew that there was a coalition Government, but perhaps they missed it. Perhaps they also missed the point that my right hon. Friend was making.

Richard Foord Portrait Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)
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I am grateful to the Secretary of State for giving way, and I can offer him the assurance that the Liberal Democrats embrace the continuous at-sea deterrent with four submarines. What is more, the strategic environment in which we were operating in 2010 was very different from that which we see today: the Liberal Democrats made the right call then, and we have made the right call now.

Grant Shapps Portrait Grant Shapps
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You heard it here first, Madam Deputy Speaker. I warmly welcome that commitment, which was not available under the then coalition Government. It is an important moment, and I welcome that commitment from the hon. Gentleman, as I welcome it from Labour.

I gently remind the House that 11 Opposition Front Benchers have voted against the deterrent in their time here, including three members of the current shadow Cabinet, including the shadow Foreign Secretary, the shadow Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Secretary, and the shadow Deputy Prime Minister. The House is right to ask, and the country will want to know, whether that commitment is as firm as we now hear it is from the Liberal Democrats. It will also want to know, even if the commitment is said to be firm, whether Labour is prepared to fund it. Again, it comes back to the 2.5%.

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Martin Docherty-Hughes Portrait Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
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I am glad to be in the Chamber for this debate. It is an important debate; those of us on the Defence Committee would probably say that we do not have them often enough.

I wanted to pick up on a point made by the right hon. Members—my right hon. Friends, I hope—for Warley (John Spellar) and for North Durham (Mr Jones) about the reduction in defence spend, and the discussion we had at the Select Committee recently. As is our duty as a Committee, we challenged the Secretary of State on expenditure, and I wanted to pinpoint one specific issue, which relates to people—at least for us on the SNP Benches, people are the bedrock of a defence policy and posture—and to concerns about defence infrastructure and security, especially for those of us who live around nuclear defence infrastructure. We might not necessarily agree with it, but it is there, so we would hope it is secure at all times.

Coming back to the point that my right hon. Friends made, I wanted to look at some specific concerns about the Ministry of Defence police budget. In 2010-2011, the defence police budget was £154.8 million, equating to £226.78 million today when adjusted for inflation. Right hon. and hon. Members may correct me if I am wrong, but I think there was a Labour Government at that point. However, the budget in 2022-23 was £161.3 million. Leading back to the question posed at the Committee, that is a real-terms reduction of about £65.5 million in the defence police infrastructure over the past 12 years. That is something that Ministers might want to come back to later on.

The shadow Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey), made some comments about the £75 billion, and I share his concern. Like me, he understands that the assumption from the Government is based on a baseline of spend, as a percentage of GDP, that is frozen in cash terms, so without borrowing or extra debt, it comes nowhere near £75 billion. I wish the Government well on that point.

I would maybe want to have a wee bit more of a conciliatory approach to this. There will be at least some consistency from the SNP Benches, which I am sure the Minister will appreciate. Although he and I have different views on the nuclear deterrent, we are at least consistent. It was quite interesting to see someone else getting taken over the barrel for that—it makes a change. On the commitment to Ukraine, the Minister can take it from the SNP that, whoever the Government happen to be this year or next year, say, we will also be steadfast on the support for Ukraine. The right to defend national territory, and the right to national self-determination, are elements of human dignity for any modern nation state and alliance. As I said, the gist of my remarks is in three things: people, place and our partnerships.

Let us talk about the ordinary ranks. That is a term that I find quite problematic. I come from a services family. My brother was a sergeant, and my nephew is in the forces as well—in the “ordinary ranks”. There is really nothing ordinary in serving.

Richard Foord Portrait Richard Foord
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I think the term is “other ranks.”

Martin Docherty-Hughes Portrait Martin Docherty-Hughes
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Let me come to that in a second, but in common parlance, I think they are always called the “ordinary ranks”—[Interruption.] The Minister may want to listen for a wee second. Whether it is “other” or “ordinary”, that type of terminology says nothing about the men and women who served in Iraq, such as my brother; in Afghanistan; out in the Red sea, no matter what happens there—and there is concern that there might be mission creep—or in other deployments such as the joint expeditionary force in Estonia, which I know, as the co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Estonia, that the Estonian Government welcome.

Those ranks deserve more from us—not just from the Government and the official Opposition, but from all of us as parliamentarians. They deserve it that we take them more seriously in the structure of how we support and pay them, and in their entire terms and conditions. I know that there is probably profound disagreement about my approach, which would be an armed services representative body. Although I am saddened that the official Opposition changed their position, if they form the next Government, the SNP would support their new approach, which we think is at least a step in the right direction.

However, I do not think that having a Government appointee represent the armed forces personnel is the right step forward, because the lived experience of members of the armed forces who have been on the frontline needs to form part of an understanding, as with any engagement on terms and conditions with a trade union, for example—although an armed forces representative body from this party is not a trade union and does not have the right to strike our proposals. We have to say to those ranks that we believe they can come together as a collective and have critical engagement with Government and, more importantly, with Parliament more broadly. We need to have that discussion with them; they need to be part of defence policy and posture. They are people we want to send to the frontline to fire a gun or a missile, but technically we are saying to them that we do not believe they have the capability of coming together to discuss and debate collectively their terms and conditions. I find that slightly bizarre.

If we do not engage with those ranks in a more robust fashion, as equals, we will go around a consistent revolving door of reports, as we have seen for years in Committees, especially the Defence Committee. I am mindful of the report produced by the Women in the Armed Forces Sub-Committee—I intimated that I would mention them—which was chaired by the hon. Member for Wrexham (Sarah Atherton), who is not here today. That report was profound. Do I think that if we do not have real engagement with the frontline, there will be substantial change? I have grave concerns that there will not be.

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Richard Foord Portrait Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)
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It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray), and I pay tribute to him as the chair and lead of the all-party parliamentary group for the armed forces. He hosts lots of highly experienced, very senior strategic thinkers from the armed forces as part of that APPG.

I welcome this opportunity to debate UK defence policy at greater length. I have been struck that so far many of the speeches have been about defence capability and equipment, but I was particularly impressed by the comments about the strategic environment. The most senior military personnel in our kingdom talk about strategy in terms of ends, ways and means. It would be a mistake to spend all our time talking about means when they expect the Government and Parliament also to think about ways and particularly ends—the end state that the UK is seeking to bring about. I will focus my remarks more on the strategic environment and the wider security context, and towards the end I will talk a bit about cuts to the regular Army. I will also comment on the suggestions that have been knocking around recently about a citizens army.

I was impressed by the remarks of the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) about the strategic environment. I am glad that in the west we seek to take the peace dividend when we think it is available to us. One thing that stands out about democracies is that when the security environment allows, we try to invest in health and education. It is absolutely appropriate to champion that, but we should also be realistic enough to recognise when times do not allow for that.

We have talked today about continuous at-sea deterrents and the role of the coalition Government in having a Trident alternatives review, which is not to be regretted. In the security context of the time, when Obama was talking about a reset button and we signed a strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia—New START—it was appropriate to be thinking along the same lines as in the 1990s, when the west and the Soviet Union were mutually trying to reduce the threats from our nuclear weapons. As it happens, the events from 2014 onwards plainly proved that we absolutely need to be as strong as possible.

The Prime Minister’s remarks a fortnight ago were interesting. He talked about a new defence partnership between the UK and Germany. I welcomed the fact that he made the announcement in Berlin and the idea that we should have greater interoperability with our allies, but he then fell into this business of talking about putting the defence industry on to a “war footing”. Indeed, that chimed with the Defence Secretary’s statement that we are entering a “pre-war era”. When we throw such remarks around, we need to qualify what we mean, because we know that our adversaries listen carefully to what we say. We do not need belligerent tones and a mismatch between our rhetoric and our capability; instead, we should speak quietly while making ourselves as strong as possible. That is of course what the armed forces are for. “Bello te praepares” was the motto of the Army training regiment when I was there as a platoon commander. We were very much about preparing for war, but we were doing it quietly. It would be sensible for the Defence Secretary to make those preparations as ardently as possible but not in a showy fashion.

If the Defence Secretary’s motivation is genuinely to send a message to Ukraine that we are in this for the long haul and that there is certainty, he will not want to make this a party political issue or suggest that Opposition parties are somehow less supportive of Ukraine. He asked earlier whether we would match the £500 million uplift per year for Ukraine. Yes—we recognise the characterisation of Russia’s westward expansion as a threat to all Europe, so Ukraine can be assured that, regardless of a change of Government later this year, it will continue to receive £3 billion in support from the UK.

The Foreign Secretary said last week, when he was in Ukraine, that Ukraine is free to use long-range Storm Shadow missiles over the border into Russia. I am surprised that that has not come up in our discussion today. That may be because such things should not be done on the Floor of the House, and I very much welcomed the approach of the former Defence Secretary, who would share with Opposition parties, well in advance of the debate, the urgent question or the statement, what he intended to say through his special adviser. That was a way to have such conversations not on the Floor of the House or in such a public fashion. As it is, the strategic communications people in NATO will now have to work all the harder to counter the false narratives and lies that Russia pumps out about Ukraine somehow being a threat to the Russian people, or even Russia being threatened by NATO itself.

From an operational standpoint, that use of missiles makes good sense. Clearly, main supply routes, arms dumps and fuel depots will now be brought within range, but we should remember that the centre of gravity here is the Russian people and their willingness to fight. We know that the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan after 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed. To encourage Russians not to sign up, we need to persuade them that the state of Russia is not threatened by Ukraine or, indeed, by NATO.

On the cuts to the regular Army, I was interested by the remarks of the right hon. Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman) about recruitment and consent. I would point to the issue of consent when we talk about parliamentary approval of military action. I do not believe that Governments were merely seeking top cover when they had a debate in Parliament on the intervention in Iraq in 2003 or on the intervention in Syria in 2013. Rather, they were genuinely seeking to engage with us as representatives of the people to try to get support.

Finally, I come to a proposal that was leaked to a journalist, David Parsley, at the i a couple of weeks ago about a 20,000-strong volunteer force that could potentially train a 200,000-strong volunteer Army. I do not expect the Minister to comment on that or any other leak, but if that is the response from the Government to the pressure they have been under on cuts to the Army, it would not be a sensible approach. The plan talks about an annual spend of some £500 per recruit in training allowances per year for the initial 20,000 ex-forces personnel during peacetime. That amount would not go very far. Service personnel would suppose that the MOD was once again budgeting to withhold blank rounds in favour of commanders asking trainee soldiers to shout “Bang!” We cannot have an Army on paper that does not exist in reality. We need a regular Army of 82,000. We need to reverse the cuts that we have seen in recent years, and we need to build credible armed forces so that we are strong not only in our rhetoric, but in our capability.

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James Sunderland Portrait James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)
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It is a great privilege to speak in this debate. I am not a Minister—to echo the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray)—but I am a former serviceman, and I hope to bring some value, as a practitioner, to what we are discussing.

We know that the first duty of any Government is the defence of their people—that is quite clear—so the need to keep people safe is non-discretionary. Right now we have war raging across Europe, not too far away, and multiple threats are proliferating right across the globe. Given that the international landscape now is probably more dangerous, unstable and incendiary than it has been at any time since world war two, defence spending is absolutely essential. Voters care about their security, and many are nervous about what is happening across the world. Most importantly, it is our duty as politicians to keep them safe.

That is why the Government’s commitment to a defence budget equal to 2.5% of GDP by 2030 is so important, both strategically and politically. As a member of the UN Security Council, the UK’s continued role as a bastion of global rights and democracy can be underpinned only by hard power. It is a reality of history that we may yet be called upon to protect our own security and that of our allies. We know that the Defence Secretary has recently increased military aid to Ukraine, securing an extra £700 million and thereby taking Britain’s total contribution beyond £3 billion—that is a lot of money—so we are doing our bit.

On the 2.5% target, it is extra money, but the issue is what we do with it and how we spend it—that is important—so I advocate for a capability audit right now. The reason I say that is that the extra injection of funds means that we need to work out what we can now do. When I was working at Northwood permanent joint headquarters many years ago, we had this thing called the JOECR—the joint operational estimate of capability and readiness. In my view, with the extra money that we have now, we should be turning all those capabilities that are flashing red to green—in other words, we should plug the capability gaps—and not just on land, at sea and in the air, but in space and cyber. Yes, state-of-the-art platforms are fine, and yes, we must procure weapons that we know can beat our adversaries, but it is also about spending wisely and smartly where necessary.

My second point on the 2.5% is that we need to better operate what we already have so that every part of our lexicon works. We must not rely on the exquisite exclusivity that we have spoken so much about; we must ensure that all our platforms work and can be sustained across the battlespace.

In terms of equipment generally, as one part of capability we need to procure what we need and nothing more. It is about strategic lift as well as exquisite exclusivity. If we do not have the ships—the roll-on roll-off ferries—or the strategic lift, including C-17s and A400Ms, to get equipment and people right across the globe, there is no point having the kit in the first place. It is therefore about enabling expeditionary reach. We cannot put boots on the ground if we cannot get the boots there. Plus, Minister, it is about logistic tail, spares, the supply chain, sustainment, defence contractors, delivery and munitions. We must be careful to ensure that if we buy it, we will be able to use it and then fight it through, and it must be sustainable and enduring.

“Platform” is an interesting word. It means the platform on which a capability sits, but what is put on that platform also matters. I therefore favour a modular approach for future equipment programmes, whereby we can apply different degrees of mobility, firepower and protection, but it is the kit that is bolted on and bolted off that really matters, and that is the battle-winning equipment for me. For me, this is about a commonality of platforms, about spares, about logistics, about interoperability and about cannibalisation. If we run out of something, can we get it? With complex platforms and complex supply chains, we cannot, so let us please go for modular and for commonality.

Richard Foord Portrait Richard Foord
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Is the hon. Member aware of the Supacat range of vehicles, which operate in much the way that he has described?

James Sunderland Portrait James Sunderland
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I am very aware of Supacat. I have visited the company, which is in the hon. Member’s neck of the woods. It is a very impressive British company. Yes, we need to do more to ensure that it produces and builds what we need. Let us work with it a bit more on that. As the hon. Member suggests, this is about fewer variants, an easier supply chain, and not having equipment that is too complex to use or to maintain. That is very important: we should keep it cheap, simple and easy.

Let me say a little about NATO. As we know, it is the only show in town. It is the umbrella for European security in the north Atlantic. It now consists of 32 countries, and that is to be welcomed. It has responded magnificently to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. It has galvanised the alliance since the invasion, in a way that Putin could not possibly have conceived. In many ways, it is much stronger because of what has happened. Article 5 is the prize for NATO membership. It has defined Putin’s actions in Ukraine, in that so far he has not attacked a NATO country. Why? He is worried about article 5, and that strategic uncertainty underpins our security in Europe.

However, there are issues with NATO. First, only 18 of its 32 member countries are currently committed to 2% of GDP, and that is not enough. In addition, the five non-EU members—the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey and Norway—contribute 80% of the operating budget, which is outrageous, with 96% of the EU effectively reliant on NATO for its security. That is a stark contrast. Europe must therefore become much more responsible for its own security, and that is non-discretionary.