UK Amphibious Capability

Rebecca Pow Excerpts

Tuesday 21st November 2017 Westminster Hall

[Ruth Smeeth]

My hon. Friend has pre-empted the next paragraph of my speech. Why on earth, having spent £7 billion on new aircraft carriers, would we use them in this way? It is a waste of capability and an appalling use of the cutting-edge platform we have just built. As importantly, they do not have the capacity to carry or launch amphibious landing craft, and their holds are not designed to meet the specific requirements of the Royal Marines with regard to kit and platforms. They also cannot be used independently of the fleet and, as I think we are all aware, they cannot be deployed very quietly.

[Rebecca Pow (Taunton Deane) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is making an extremely powerful point, which makes me ask why we would cut the services of one of the finest forces in the world. I particularly want to mention 40 Commando in my constituency. These personnel are so important in humanitarian efforts. They recently went to the Caribbean to help with the disaster that occurred after the hurricanes. What was crucial was their fleetness of foot, being able to get in where there are no ports and being able to land helicopters where no one else could, with the amphibious equipment. No one else could go, so does the hon. Lady agree that we must think very long and hard before we cut a force as incredibly important as this?

[Ruth Smeeth]

I could not agree more. Our Royal Marines work day in, day out—40 Commando and all the others—to ensure that we are where we need to be, helping our allies as well as protecting the nation.

To return to my speech, when using the carriers, our troops would have to be deployed by air. Although it may make sense to deliver the first wave of troops quickly by air, that has its limitations. First and foremost, it is impossible to infiltrate enemy territory by stealth by means of military helicopter. Troops may also need heavy weapons, vehicles, fuel, food and ammunition, which cannot be delivered in sufficient quantity by our current complement of helicopters. In more intense conflict, armoured vehicles, artillery and even a few main battle tanks may be required. Unless there is a convenient port close by, the armour and logistical support must be delivered over the beachhead even if in a second wave after the helicopter-borne troops have secured the area. In the words of Admiral Sir George Zambellas:

“Nobody in the world of complex warfare, especially for an island nation that delivers force from the sea, thinks that a reduction in the sophisticated end of amphibiosity is a good idea.”

Another option, which has been floated for some time, concerns proposed cuts of 1,000 Royal Marines. I feel immensely privileged to have had the opportunity to visit our Royal Marines around the world and even to have sort of taken part in their Arctic training in Norway, or at least what they allowed me to pretend to do. [Laughter.] The hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mrs Trevelyan) can stop laughing at me now.

I have seen at first hand the Royal Marines’ extraordinary courage, ability, focus and fortitude. They are truly an elite fighting force. However, what really stood out for me and, I am sure, for anyone who has spent any time with them is the mindset that they bring to their role. “First to understand, first to adapt and respond, and first to overcome”—that is the mindset of the Royal Marines and it is reflected in their extraordinary ability and versatility.

It is no wonder that the Royal Marines are disproportionately represented in the ranks of our special forces. In fact, the Royal Marines constitute only 4.5% of defence infantry but produce 46% of our special forces recruits. It is clear that making any cut to this life force of the UK special forces would make no military or economic sense. It has been suggested that as the threats we face as a country have changed, the need for these sorts of capability has diminished. I do not dispute that we must be ready to adapt to new threats and challenges. It is absolutely true that cyber-attacks and asymmetrical warfare open up whole new theatres of war, for which we must be prepared.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Mr Gray, I am grateful to be called in this important debate, which relates to one of the most important capabilities in our military armoury: amphibiosity. I congratulate the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Ruth Smeeth) on introducing the debate so well.

We are really here today because of the strong rumours that the Ministry of Defence is considering deleting the landing platform docks, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, from the naval inventory. The reason behind that, which seems in effect to be an open secret, is that the Navy top level budget, or TLB, is over-programmed and the First Sea Lord has been asked to come up with savings within his TLB.

I shall return to the budgetary challenge at the end, but the first thing to say is that the Queen Elizabeth carriers, highly capable ships though they are, cannot act as a replacement for the LPDs and do not have their highly specialised capability. Although the carriers could launch marines over the beach by helicopter, either Chinook or Merlin or both, the carriers do not have docks and therefore cannot host landing craft, which would be needed to bring the heavy equipment of a marine commando on to a perhaps hostile beachhead. If we abandon the LPDs, we are in effect relying on a friendly port to be available if we are to land a marine commando or, indeed, 3 Commando Brigade on the shore. It may be a convenient planning assumption to believe that a friendly port will always be available, but that may not necessarily always be the case.

In fact, history teaches us an important lesson about the need to maintain this capability. In 1981, the Nott defence review advocated deleting the Invincible-class aircraft carriers and the assault ships, HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, from the naval inventory. At this stage, I have a small confession to make. Following the announcement of the Nott review, as a precocious 16-year-old, I wrote a letter to the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in 1981 in which I argued that we should not sell our aircraft carriers to Australia because—I still remember the words—as history shows us, we never know when we might need them.

As we all know, in 1982, when the Falklands crisis blew up from almost nowhere, it was only because we still had our carriers and their Sea Harrier aircraft and the amphibious assault ships, Fearless and Intrepid, that we were able to mount an opposed amphibious assault and successfully recapture the Falkland Islands. No doubt very many intelligent people wrote very articulate staff papers that contributed to the 1981 review and a great deal of intellectual energy was put into the argument that we could do without these ships—but they were all wrong. Maintaining that amphibious capability should be an important part of our national armoury, and NATO’s as well, so what is to be done?

I believe that the alternative option of trying to cull 1,000 Royal Marines would be a grave mistake. The Royal Marines are some of the most elite infantry in the world and are, in effect, tier 2 special forces. We also derive around 40% of our tier 1 special forces, the Special Air Service and the Special Boat Service, from the Royal Marines. Not only do the Royal Marines have an incredibly proud history, having recently celebrated their 350th anniversary; they also have tremendous utility, and I can see no defence advantage at all in getting rid of 1,000 of the best maritime infantry in the world.

[Rebecca Pow]

The Royal Marines are also extremely good value for money. That has to be included. They comprise 4.5% of armed forces personnel—whereas the Army is 57%—and from that we generate 46% of the special forces badge manpower.

[Mr Francois]

I believe they are extremely good value for money and extremely capable, but this still brings us back to the problem of the naval TLB. As the previous Secretary of State was keen to stress, we have a rising defence budget, which is due to go up 0.5% each year in excess of inflation. That being the case, some of that uplift in the budget should be earmarked to the naval TLB, in order to ease the pressure and avert cuts to either the amphibious capability or the Royal Marines.

My final point is one I made to the former Secretary of State when he appeared before the Defence Committee last month, namely that given the furore that would likely result from trying to delete the LPD and our amphibious capability, and the relatively moderate savings this measure would generate, politically the game is not worth the candle. I humbly offer the same advice to his successor and to the Minister.