Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Rebecca Paul and Jess Brown-Fuller

Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

No, I’m okay.

I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.

I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.

People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.

What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.

I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Am I right in thinking that the hon. Member agrees with me that, when we are trying to legislate for what the most complex part of our justice system—families—that is an incredibly hard job? We all know from personal experience that the one thing that binds us all is that we have a family; we might disagree on whether they are good ones or bad ones, and whether we get on with them or not, but we all came from somewhere, and they are complicated things.

Across the House, we all share the desire to ensure that we recognise the complexity of family relationships and protect those most vulnerable in our society by making sure that people do not have the right to still have contact with their children when they have done things that mean that they absolutely should not. However, we also recognise that systems are abused, and we see that in all directions; people will always find ways of getting around systems, or of using the criminal justice system to retraumatise or to hold on to some form of control. Does the hon. Member therefore agree with me that, while what we are trying to do here is really complex, we are all doing it for the right reasons?

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with the hon. Member. I appreciate the fact that she has tabled these amendments and that she recognises that it is not easy to strike this balance, particularly when we are trying to address abuse and alienation cases and it is sometimes hard to know what situation we are dealing with.

We are trying to come up with a system that protects as many people as we possibly can, but I think we also have to acknowledge that it will never be perfect. If anyone thinks that we can change one bit of law and then all of a sudden nothing horrible will ever happen again, I am afraid to say that these awful things will always happen, and things will always go wrong. It is about trying our best to have a framework that gets the balance right.

I will stop there—I have probably made my point. This has been a really good debate, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about some of the points I have raised.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Rebecca Paul and Jess Brown-Fuller

Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq.

I speak in support of amendments 23, 39 and 24 which, taken together, would do something simple but important: they would build a measure of flexibility back into the clause, so that jury trial is still available where the cause of justice requires it. The Minister should think carefully. As drafted, the clause creates a very blunt regime: unless the court predicts a sentence of more than three years, the trial is to be conducted without a jury. The amendments would go a small way towards softening that rigidity and making the system less arbitrary, more proportionate and hence more just.

With the amendments, two different Committee members take two different approaches to delivering the same outcome of additional flexibility in the clause. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, is broad in nature, setting out an additional condition for jury trial when needed to ensure natural justice, whereas the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden takes a more granular approach to the problem by listing the specific circumstances that might warrant the need for jury trial, again to ensure fairness. Both approaches seek to achieve the same thing.

I will speak to each amendment in a little more detail, starting with amendment 23. Clause 3 is currently built on one single condition for preserving jury trial in relevant cases: whether the defendant is likely to receive a sentence of more than three years if convicted. Amendment 23 would change the wording from “the condition” to

“one or more of the conditions”.

This is the gateway to allow amendment 24, which lists various conditions, to work.

The amendment matters because it opens the door to a more sensible approach, in which sentence is not the only thing that counts. That is exactly the right approach. When we deal with a constitutional safeguard as important as jury trial, the Committee should be wary of a system that turns entirely on a single mechanistic threshold. Human beings and criminal cases are not that neat, and Parliament should not pretend that they are. The amendment is therefore modest, tidy, entirely sensible and the necessary first step to add judgment, flexibility and common sense to a clause that has far too little of all three.

On amendment 24 and its list of conditions, the Government’s model under the clause is to ask the court at an early stage to forecast the sentence that would likely be imposed if the defendant were convicted. If the forecast is more than three years, there is a jury; if it is not, there is none. That is far too crude a test to bear the full constitutional weight that the Government want to place on it. The Bill itself exposes the weakness in the logic, because although the allocation decision turns on a prediction about a sentence above or below three years, the Bill also expressly states that nothing prevents a court sitting without a jury from later imposing a sentence of more than three years. In other words, even the Bill recognises that the initial prediction may not tell the whole story; if that is so, why should that prediction be the sole basis on which a person loses the right to jury trial?

Amendment 24 is so worth while because it states that in deciding whether a defendant should still have a jury, the court should not only look at the likely sentence but be able to consider whether: the defendant is of good character; they have previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence; they are treated as rehabilitated; conviction would cause significant reputational or professional harm; the gravity or complexity of the case might increase; and other exceptional circumstances. That does not strike me as radical. It is simply an attempt to make the law reflect reality and be less prescriptive. Additional flexibility makes for better outcomes.

One of the strongest parts of amendment 24 is the recognition it gives to good character and to those who have not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence. I raise this because the Government’s crude threshold risks producing perverse results. The people who may be hit hardest by clause 3 are precisely those who are newer to the justice system, those of previous good character and those for whom a conviction would be utterly life-changing.

The Bar Council illustrated the point starkly in written evidence with the example of a 19-year-old student charged with possession with intent to supply after a small amount of Spice was found in their room—I am sure Members will remember my reciting that specific example in Committee on Tuesday. Because they are of good character, the likely sentence under the guidelines may be low enough that they lose jury trial altogether, even though the charge could destroy their future. Meanwhile, someone with previous convictions may be more likely to cross the sentencing threshold and so keep the right to a jury. That is exactly the sort of absurdity that amendment 24 tries to avoid.

That is wholly consistent with the broader critique of the Bill. Conservative Members have repeatedly argued that the Government are treating this as an administrative exercise, when in fact people’s lives are at stake. The shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), put it clearly on Second Reading when he said that the Government were proposing to remove fundamental rights

“without a mandate, without a case and without any evidence”.—[Official Report, 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 207.]

The Opposition also challenged Ministers on taking away jury trial for offences that cost defendants their jobs, their homes and their families. Amendment 24 responds precisely to that point.

I note the inclusion in amendment 24 of cases in which the defendant would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected. That is important because the seriousness of a case cannot be measured by custody alone. A sentence of under three years can still destroy a person’s livelihood, strip them of professional standing, end a career built over decades and permanently alter family life. The Government keep speaking as though anything beneath their threshold is somehow low level. The Opposition have rightly made the point that even where a sentence is below three years, the consequences can be catastrophic. Amendment 24 simply recognises that reality.

There is an obvious point of fairness here, too. If the state wishes to prosecute a person in circumstances where conviction may ruin their livelihood or reputation for life, it is hardly excessive to say that jury trials should at least remain available. That is an ancient constitutional right and the Government should, even now, think very hard before removing it.

I also support paragraph (f) in amendment 24, which deals with cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity might increase. Again, this is simply common sense. Criminal cases often evolve, evidence changes, witnesses come forward, and issues that initially looked straightforward become anything but in the crucible that is the courtroom.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The hon. Lady is making an excellent point about the complexity of cases changing throughout. A legal professional recently shared with me the story of what was an assault case, but the victim passed away during the trial, so they are now dealing with hearing evidence of potential brain trauma injury. Does the hon. Lady agree that that case deserves the complexity of a full Crown court trial because the case has changed as the trail has developed?

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with the hon. Lady. She has set out a good example of the type of things that happen in reality. Life is not tidy, and unexpected things happen. As we look at the Bill and whether a sentence is over or under three years, it is easy to think in simple terms but, in reality, people who work in the justice system—I have not done so, but I have spoken to people who do—understand the movement and flexibility that is required. That is why amendment 24 works really well by taking that into account. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who drafted it, clearly has real-world experience of what actually happens in a courtroom.

The Bill already recognises elsewhere that there can be a relevant change of circumstances requiring the court to revisit allocation, so the Government’s own drafting accepts that these matters are dynamic rather than static. If that is so, why would we not want to build in a bit more foresight at the front end as well? Paragraph (f) in amendment 24 is not some wild departure from the structure of the Bill; it sits comfortably with the Government’s own recognition that allocation decisions can become unsound as a case develops. It is simply a more prudent and realistic approach to cases in which the true seriousness may emerge only over time.

Finally, the reference in amendment 24 to “other exceptional circumstances” is extremely important. No statute, however carefully drafted, can predict every factual scenario. That is especially true in criminal justice, where the facts and human consequences of a case can vary enormously. A residual exceptional circumstances test is therefore not a weakness; it is a mark of maturity in the law. It recognises that Parliament should not force judges into injustice. If the Government truly believe in justice rather than mere throughput, they should have no objection to preserving a narrow, exceptional route to jury trial where justice plainly demands it.

Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, deals with the alternative, broader approach to building flexibility into clause 3. It is an especially important amendment because it puts the issue in the clearest possible terms: those of natural justice. The amendment says that a trial should still be conducted with a jury where the defendant demonstrates that to be tried without one

“would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”

That is an extremely modest safeguard. It would not wreck the clause; it would merely build in additional protection through allowing an element of judgment to decide the mode of trial. It would not restore the right to a jury trial in every either-way case; it simply says that where the injustice is plain, a jury trial must remain available. I struggle to see how any Government serious about fairness could object to that.

This is an issue of paramount importance on our side, and I hope on the Government’s side too. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle tabled amendment 39, as well as amendments elsewhere in the Bill—in relation to clause 1, in relation to reallocation under clause 3, and in relation to clause 4—to seek to protect natural justice. We will keep making these points. If Ministers insist on creating judge-only routes, they must at the very least accept a residual safeguard based on natural justice.

For all the reasons I have outlined, I support amendments 23, 39 and 24. They would deliver the additional safeguards needed, so I urge the Government to adopt either the Opposition’s amendment or the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Rebecca Paul and Jess Brown-Fuller

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

I will speak about the Liberal Democrats’ opposition to clause 1. The main reason why clause 1 should not be included in the Bill is that it fundamentally transforms the relationships that defendants have with the justice system. It is really important to make it clear that we are talking about defendants who have entered a not guilty plea, rather than the language that has been used this morning.

In particular, clause 1 removes the defendant’s ability to object to summary trial in the magistrates court—a process that is streamlined for swift justice and should be reserved for less serious cases. In his independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson recommended removing the right to elect a Crown court trial for certain low-level either-way offences that carry a maximum sentence length of two years or less. The Bill would remove the right to elect Crown court trial for all either-way offences. Concerns have been raised publicly about that, including the quality of justice, the capacity of the magistrates court and the fairness of applying this retrospectively.

Magistrates courts also face an increasing backlog, which is currently at 379,000 cases. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, alongside a huge drop in the number of magistrates over the past 20 years—from 28,300 to now 14,600. I am very aware that the Government are embarking on a journey to try to bring more magistrates into the system, but as they increase the number of magistrates, there are also magistrates leaving the system, so it is a real struggle to increase the number.

Removing the power of defendants to elect will increase the workload of the magistrates court, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Many in the legal profession have made that point. It would also be unfair to apply this change retrospectively. Consent is the appropriate basis for the most serious cases to be tried within a summary process. Changing the provision for more serious offences—to be clear, we are talking about things like possession with intent to supply, unlawful wounding and sexual assault—risks miscarriages of justice, as more serious cases would face summary trials in higher volumes, with reduced rights of appeal.

[Rebecca Paul]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. It is a pleasure once again to be locked up in a Bill Committee with the Minister. It has been a while, and I am feeling nostalgic; it is wonderful to be here with her again. Maybe one day we will be on the same side—that would be nice, wouldn’t it?

I will speak against the clause in its entirety and in support of the amendment. I start by thanking the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for her powerful contribution. What she is doing is incredibly brave. It is not an easy thing to be sat on the Government Benches with a different view. I really hope that everyone will listen to what she had to say, because I think she was balanced in her approach: she was critical of the previous Government, and did not pull her punches on where she thinks the issues arose, but she suggested some good measures and made good points that we could adopt to address the backlog. That is the one thing that we all agree on in this room: we all want to address the backlog. We can rake over the past all we like, or we can look forward and do the right thing for the British people.

Clause 1 is an egregious clause that seeks to remove one of our fundamental rights. It seeks to remove the right of an adult defendant charged with a triable either-way offence to elect for Crown court trial instead. Instead, the mode of trial will be determined solely by the magistrates courts. In practice, that means that defendants who currently have a right to trial by jury—the right to be judged by their peers—will no longer have it.

The Government have suggested that this unprecedented change to our justice system will impact only those accused of shoplifting and other petty crimes, but that is not the case. It impacts those accused of an either-way offence where the sentence would be for up to three years in prison—three years. It will impact people charged with causing death by careless driving, committing fraud, sexual assault or actual bodily harm, and many other serious offences. Those are not minor or petty by any stretch and can be life changing for everyone involved. Removing the right to jury trial for such crimes is not a minor tweak to our justice system; it takes a sledgehammer to it.

Trial by jury is an English institution, which has served for centuries to ensure that justice is done. No justice system works if it is not accepted and respected by its people. It is vital that we remember that before making changes. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater on an ideological whim is an irresponsible act. Dispensing justice is not just another process with checkboxes; it impacts people’s lives irrevocably. Decisions about how our system operates should be taken carefully and responsibly in recognition of that, and should allow an element of flexibility in the approach to get the right outcomes. That is what the amendment seeks to add.

I urge the Government to tread carefully before throwing away something that has worked for hundreds of years, and that the British people value and respect. The common-sense determination of 12 citizens is often exactly what is needed to ensure fair justice. They are not jaded or desensitised to crime, because they have not had to sit through it day in, day out for years on end. They have not seen over their whole career the worst of humanity. They are from all walks of life, bringing diversity, and often compassion and understanding to the process. The Government can of course force the change through with the numbers they have, if they so wish, but I urge them to reflect on whether that is truly the legacy that they want.

The planned limitation of the right to trial in the clause is justified by the Government as a necessary measure to get the Crown court backlog down. They defend this extraordinary restriction of our rights by arguing that the changes put victims first and at the heart of the justice system, but I remind the Government that before any verdict, there are no victims and offenders, only defendants and complainants. In this country, we are innocent until proven guilty. Justice is not just about victims; it is also about fairness for the accused, too.