Digital ID

Rebecca Long Bailey Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Westminster Hall

[Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford) (Lab)]

This is a watershed moment for our country, and not a good one. The argument for digital ID is that it will help tackle illegal working, but sadly the evidence does not stack up. Across Europe, nations with long-standing ID card systems—Germany, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Greece—have not seen reductions in irregular migration as a result of ID cards. In fact, some have larger shadow economies than our own. Estonia, the poster child for digital ID, actually has a bigger underground economy than Britain. Assuming that this new system will somehow suddenly make rogue employers obey the law, when they have ignored the paper checks for some time, is for the birds.

That argument aside, the real fear here is that we will be building an infrastructure that can follow us, link our most sensitive information and expand state control over all our lives. The Minister must understand why people are concerned. This policy does not arrive in a vacuum. It sits alongside a worrying pattern: the accelerated roll-out of facial recognition, attempts to weaken end-to-end encryption, and data laws that strip away privacy protections.

We must remember that Britain has no constitutional right to privacy. Parliament can, in a single vote, grant or remove protections that people in other democracies take for granted. When we think of building a nationwide ID system capable of linking health records, education data, housing history and even information about crimes that people have suffered, we should stop, because once that architecture exists, any future Government could misuse it, and we would have very little power to stop them.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

My constituents in Stratford-on-Avon are deeply concerned as well. Does the hon. Member agree that if millions of people need to rely on a Government-built identity tool to access work and services, the risks of data and privacy breaches and of errors will be considerable?

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[Rebecca Long Bailey]

I completely agree. We have seen the consequences of reckless data sharing already. All too often, migrant victims of domestic abuse, rape and trafficking have been frightened to report crimes because police forces routinely pass on their information to immigration officers. The harm is real: the offenders go unpunished and communities are less safe.

Even if we set aside the civil liberties concerns, there is a basic practical problem here: UK Governments, of all stripes, do not have a good track record of keeping our data safe. The number of serious cyber incidents is rising year on year. Critical institutions from the British Library to the Legal Aid Agency to the One Login platform have already been criticised for major security flaws.

[Sarah Edwards]

My constituents have also raised concerns, particularly around cyber-security. One of my constituents was told by the DWP that they were defrauding the child benefit system when they were not, because they had had data stolen. I am concerned that our Government systems need to be far better, so that if such a thing happened, someone could demonstrate that they were the genuine holder of that data.

[Rebecca Long Bailey]

My hon. Friend is spot on, and we all have constituency stories that replicate her experience.

Finally, there is the question of exclusion. As we have heard, millions of people in Britain do not have reliable digital access, and millions more do not have the basic digital skills required to navigate systems like this. Introducing mandatory digital ID risks shutting people out of work, housing, healthcare and public services, so I urge the Minister: for the sake of our rights, our safety and our democracy, drop this plan.