(8 years, 8 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Research is ongoing, not least through the European Aviation Safety Agency, but the levels of OP concentration in situations where no fume event has occurred—which have been measured widely—have been found to be no greater than they are in this Chamber or any domestic location. They are very small background levels, as one would expect. Particularly given the sensitivity of some of the testing that can now be carried out, it is not difficult to find OPs almost anywhere.
As a toxic mechanism for the reported illnesses was found to be unlikely, a nocebo effect was considered a plausible alternative explanation for the symptoms. A nocebo effect can be defined as a detrimental effect on health produced by psychological or psychosomatic factors—for example where a subject develops symptoms as a reaction to a situation that he or she perceives as dangerous or hazardous. However, neither option could be proved beyond doubt given the available data; but we know that the nocebo effect happens in other circumstances. I hesitate to give this example from my own experience, but when I was a child my mother would serve us a cooked breakfast and after we had finished she would say, “I hope those sausages were all right. They were well past their sell-by date,” and one felt a feeling in one’s stomach. It is not the same thing, but it shows how psychological effects can pass into physical effects. That is one of the theories put forward by the scientists looking at the matter. The nocebo is an established psychological and medical situation.
The Minister is being generous with his time this afternoon. What I want to know is what is behind the research. What about the cumulative impact of constant exposure to instances of gases being released into the cabin?
I am going to come on to the frequency of fume events. I think none of the toxicologists or other scientists involved in the projects consider that there is a risk in the normal background level of chemicals in an aircraft cabin. As I have said, those are similar to the levels found in any other setting in the UK. The fume events are what we need to look at, and I will be discussing a little more evidence that I have been given about the frequency of those events.
As a toxic mechanism could not be categorically ruled out as the cause of the symptoms, the Committee concluded that more research would be beneficial. It stated, however, that it would be necessary to balance the likelihood that the further research will usefully inform further management of the problem against the costs of undertaking the research. There are various aspects of the issue to take into consideration, including the results of the research that has been undertaken and the unpredictability and rarity of the fume events. I said I would have some information on that. The Civil Aviation Authority operates a mandatory occurrence-reporting scheme and, contrary to what we may have heard during the debate, the CAA is determined that every type of occurrence should be reported. Indeed, if airlines do not report instances, questions are asked about whether their culture is a good one.
When I was a member of the Select Committee on Transport we visited the CAA and were given a list of the sorts of reports that came forward, which included things that people might not see as relevant, such as both pilots eating the same sandwich. That would be an issue if there were a food poisoning incident. Even what might seem trivial and unimportant incidents must be reported, and there is a culture of reporting in the airline industry, not least in the case of fume events, which people are well aware of.
I am advised that if a fume event occurs it is apparent to everyone on the aircraft. The smell of the oil is absolutely apparent to people. As I mentioned, there is a culture of reporting in the CAA and the aviation industry—which, incidentally, we would like to spread to the health service, where near misses and potential accidents are often not reported. Its reporting culture ensures that the aviation industry is one of the safest in the world.
That is the crux of the debate. The reality is that it may be possible to detect a serious fuel event; but what about a minor one, where there is slight leakage into the cabin?
A lot of air quality monitoring has been carried out on aircraft. The problem is that fume events are relatively rare and therefore there has not been the ability to pick one up during one of those monitoring situations.
Under the CAA’s mandatory reporting scheme, the trigger for a report is an event that is considered by the crew to be a
“safety-related event which endangers or which, if not corrected or addressed, could endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other person.”
None of the flights where fumes and smells were reported in post-flight questionnaires met those criteria; they are the ones that we actually tested. However, I have some data from the CAA on the number of those reports where smells have been reported in the cabin. We heard from the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde that he had been given the figure of about one in 2,000 flights. We heard from the hon. Member for Heywood and Middleton (Liz McInnes) that it is about one in 100. The evidence that I have is that in the last decade we have seen annually between 282 and 471 reports of smells or fumes in the cabin. The last year that we have report numbers for is 2014, when there were 426.
However, it must be emphasised that up to now, reports of fumes have included all causes of smoke, odour or fumes, both internal and external, and not just incidents of bleed-air contamination. The CAA estimates that a maximum of 10% of those incidents reported are regarding bleed-air contamination—in other words, less than one a week—and therefore it has not been possible as yet to have testing equipment on an aircraft when one has happened. I hope that that puts into context the frequency with which these situations occur.
I would like to press the Minister a little further on this issue, because it is very important. The fact that detection equipment is not available or not placed on aircraft means that we are moving to subjective measures of whether an incident has occurred. Is it not vital that we first do the correct monitoring in order to understand how big, small or frequent these incidents are, and then go on to take action? I do not think that the reports to which the Minister is referring are satisfying us that that empirical evidence is available.
I could not agree with the hon. Lady more. I am laying out what research has been done and what information we have to date. That is why it is very important that EASA makes further progress. Indeed, we are keen to find out what research is happening around the world. Because of the international nature of the aviation industry, it is the Government’s view that an international approach to any future research investigations would be appropriate.
(9 years, 2 months ago)
General CommitteesFor the avoidance of doubt, the regulations will apply to UK ships anywhere in the world.
We are keen, as the hon. Member for Blackpool South said, to ensure that knowledge of these regulations is spread widely. Indeed, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has issued notice to mariners about all the amendments made at the Manila conference, not just the one before the Committee today.
It is right that we should monitor compliance with the changes to the regulations. In the event of an incident, one of the first courses of action would be to breathalyse the crew and the master of the ship if there is any suggestion that alcohol may have been involved. Companies themselves will of course notify their staff of the changes. Indeed, many companies already have an alcohol and drug monitoring policy, and in many cases have zero tolerance to alcohol.
Does the master of a ship have any additional responsibilities for ensuring that crew comply with these regulations?
Obviously, the master of a ship is the primary person on board a vessel who will be able to pick up whether members of the crew have an alcohol problem. If it is company policy not to have alcohol on the ship, disciplinary action can be taken through a crew member’s terms of employment if alcohol is discovered.
How will the master of a ship be able to fulfil those responsibilities?
The master of a ship is charged with complying with all regulations that apply to vessels at sea. If it is a UK-flagged ship, he will be responsible for ensuring compliance with the regulations. If other members of the crew are concerned about the captain, they also have a responsibility to draw that to the attention of the ship’s owners or, possibly, the first mate or chief engineer.
The hon. Member for Blackpool South talked about the review period and asked whether we will consider taking unilateral action earlier should it be necessary. Of course, all matters are kept under review, but I consider it important that we act internationally wherever possible, to avoid confusion. The measure under consideration is about setting an international level.
I recently visited the marine accident investigation branch, which provides comprehensive reports. I read a number of those reports in preparation for this Committee, including on the incident in Belfast that I described. The marine accident investigation branch is keen to ensure that, if alcohol is involved in an accident, it will be in the report and lessons will be learned. I do not consider the amendment to be in the category of burdensome red tape. Indeed, we are merely changing the levels that already apply.
The hon. Member for Blackpool South talked about commencement. The section of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 that applies to limits for non-professional mariners has never been commenced. Public consultation on the matter in the 2000s highlighted specific problems with applying the section to leisure crafts where the duties of those on board are ill-defined. Much can be done by means other than national legislation. For example, the Royal Yachting Association, supported by my Department, has promoted among pleasure boaters the message that alcohol and water do not mix. At local level, harbour authorities can manage any problems identified by working with user groups and hire companies, for example to agree codes of conduct. If necessary, they may utilise any powers they have to make byelaws or general directions.