(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Lady is right that the protection of whistleblowers is vital. I will be frank: we need to find the right measures and means to do that. She has highlighted the current debates and thoughts on the issue. We need to find the right balance. Whistleblowers play an integral part in these matters, and she will hear additional points on the subject later in my speech.
I do not want to dwell too much on whistleblowers, but the Bill does not address the Official Secrets Act 1989, so there is an absence of a public interest defence and all the bits around that. What is the logic of not addressing all those aspects in the primary legislation?
I will answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question very specifically. He is right about the public interest defence, on which the Law Commission has recently opined. We are not bringing forward reform of the OSA 1989, mainly because we recognise that the issue is complicated, not straightforward. If it were straightforward, we would be able to deal with it in the form of a clause. However, there are various sensitivities. For example, in situations where there may have been wrongdoing or where we think there is a public interest in disclosure, it is about finding the right balance; a public interest defence is not always the safest or most appropriate way to bring that matter forward.
We are not shy of the issue and are certainly not ignoring it, but it is important that we focus on ensuring that individuals can make disclosures safely, which means protecting them through safeguards and proper routes. That work is still under way, and we need to go through it in the right way.
That is exactly what I said.
While these considerations are important, we should also reflect on the fact that the Bill is informed by extensive public consultation. It is informed not just by the work of our counterparts in the Five Eyes and other countries, and by legislation that has been introduced by others, but by our evolving work with our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Those agencies are at the heart of the application of this work. They will be the ones who will be leading the enforcement, putting the laws into practice and dealing with the practicalities of this work. The Bill also builds on the difficult and necessary work undertaken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), who corralled the unprecedented international response to the barbaric Salisbury attacks. This Bill is a culmination of much of the work that she set in train, and we have also been in discussion with her about this Bill as well.
We should not forget that, in response to the Salisbury outrage, the UK expelled 23 undeclared Russian intelligence officers. Twenty-eight other countries and NATO supported us, resulting in one of the largest collective expulsions ever—of more than 150 Russian intelligence officers. That led to the degrading of Russian intelligence capability for years to come, and we have more cause than ever to be grateful for that today.
The National Security Bill completely overhauls and updates our espionage laws, which date back to the second world war—in some cases, to the first world war. It also creates a whole suite of measures to enable our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to deter, detect and disrupt the full range of modern-day state threats. The Bill includes a range of new and modernised offences, alongside updated investigative powers and capabilities. Those on the frontline of our defence will be able to do even more to counter state threats. Additionally, the Bill will prevent the exploitation of the UK’s civil legal aid and civil damage systems by convicted terrorists by stopping public funds being given to those who could use them to support terror.
I now turn to specific measures in the National Security Bill. The foreign power condition provides a clear approach to determining whether offences or aggravated offences are being carried out for a foreign power, or on their behalf, or with the intention of benefiting a foreign power. Many of the offences introduced in the Bill apply only when the foreign power condition is met and it prepares us to face tomorrow’s threats as well as those that we face today.
We are comprehensively updating the laws that deter and disrupt espionage, as well as enhancing the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence services to investigate and prosecute those who spy on behalf of foreign states. We have already had cause to strengthen visa screening of Chinese academics and researchers in sensitive areas of research, and to step up engagement with our higher education and research sectors to alert them to the threats and risks of Chinese espionage. Three reformed offences in the Bill will combat the modern threat from state-linked espionage and related harmful conduct.
One of the UK’s greatest strengths is that we have absolutely world-leading research and innovation, but as we have seen too often it is the target and subject of hostile activity by foreign states. A new offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets will help us to respond to that threat more effectively. It will specifically target the illicit acquisition or disclosure of sensitive trade, commercial or economic information by foreign states, as the value of these is directly linked to secrecy. The offence will apply only where the foreign power condition is met and will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison.
The Bill will also make it a criminal offence to aid the UK-related activities of a foreign intelligence service. This, too, will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. That means that, for the first time, it will be an offence to be an undeclared foreign spy working in the UK. We know that foreign intelligence services can have malign intentions: for example, as the US and UK set out in April 2021, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, has been behind a series of cyber-intrusions, including the extremely serious December 2020 hack of SolarWinds, the American software company.
The Bill will reform the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information. Where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct
“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and…the foreign power condition is met”,
they could now face a life sentence.
I am curious about the use of the word “prejudicial”, which I reread several times this morning, rather than “damaging”, which appears in other legislation. How is “prejudicial” to be defined where conduct does not actually cause damage?
Definitions are important, of course, but on a case-by-case basis much of the work will link to the activity and the intelligence that is provided about the individual. All sorts of elements could come together to make that case. As I have touched on, much of this will be done on a case-by-case basis; it will be based on intelligence, on the conduct of the individual involved, on the impact they would have on our national security and on the threat they pose.
The Bill will create two offences relating to access to prohibited places—sites that are vital to our national security. One will require a person to be acting for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK; the other, which carries a lesser sentence, applies to unauthorised conduct. There are sensitive sites that are particularly vulnerable to threats from foreign powers. We need greater scope to respond to new tactics and particularly to technology. The Bill will give us that ability.
There is a serious threat from state-linked attacks on assets, including sites, data, and infrastructure critical to the UK’s safety or interests. The sabotage offence will likewise apply where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK and where the foreign power condition is met. It, too, comes with a maximum sentence of life.
Starting on 27 February last year, at least 17 different Chinese-linked threat actors simultaneously took advantage of flaws in Microsoft Exchange. They were able to access email accounts, acquire data and deploy malware. The attacks affected more than a quarter of a million servers worldwide. Victims included the Norwegian Parliament and the European Banking Authority.
It is completely unacceptable for the integrity of our democracy to be threatened by state threats. In January, I made a statement to the House about an individual who knowingly engaged in political interference activities on behalf of the Chinese Communist party and targeted Members of Parliament for a number of years. As I said in January,
“this kind of activity has recently become more common, with states that have malign intentions operating covertly and below current criminal thresholds in an attempt to interfere with our democracy.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2022; Vol. 707, c. 23.]
The individual in question had links to the United Front Work Department, which is part of the Chinese Communist party, and had not been open about the nature of these links. Meanwhile, China has sanctioned critics of its regime, including Members of this House. That is not remotely conducive to open and honest discussion made in good faith.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend for his question. He highlights the appalling nature of what we see. That is not peaceful protest at all, but threatening and intimidating. He will know only too well, as someone in public life, the implications of that. He asks directly about the Bill. Serious disruption prevention orders will help hugely with that, which is why the Bill is so significant. Protesters have routes to have their voices heard, and with that better routes and avenues to change policy, and they know that.
A free society does not tolerate interference in our democratic free press, and in the printing or distribution of our newspapers. As we know, we have also seen that in the last few years. Nobody civilised would dream of stopping someone getting to work or children going to school, let alone blocking ambulances. I am afraid we have seen all those examples all too frequently. So we will not be deterred from backing the police and standing up for the law-abiding majority, and that is what this Public Order Bill does.
First, the Bill introduces a new offence for locking on and going equipped to lock on, criminalising the protest tactic of people intentionally causing pandemonium by locking themselves on to busy roads, a building or scaffolding. Locking on can be an extremely dangerous and disruptive tactic. Protesters locking on from great heights place at risk not only themselves but police removal teams. I spent a great deal of time with specialist, highly trained and equipped police removal teams. The tactics they are experiencing are heavily dangerous and, as we touched on, drain a significant amount of police time and resources.
On the offence of locking on, the Bill states:
“It is a defence for a person charged…to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for the act mentioned”.
If their excuse is that they were trying to stop the destruction of a historic building or to protect a site of special scientific interest from destruction, would that be reasonable? Would that be a defence of the purported crime of locking on?
The right hon. Gentleman naturally raises the type of questions that will also be brought up in the Bill Committee. To use a recent example, which he may be familiar with, during the High Speed 2 work, specific sites and all sorts of significant places were targeted under the guise of environmental concerns. The Bill has to, and should, take such considerations into account in terms of police commitments, the level of violence and the serious disruption that some of these tactics also bring.
Secondly, we are strengthening the security of our transport networks, oil terminals and printing presses by creating new criminal offences of obstructing major transport works and interfering with key national infrastructure.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will make progress. I have taken plenty of interventions, and I am conscious of the protected time for subsequent stages.
This Bill also toughens up the enforcement of financial sanctions, making it easier for the Treasury to impose significant fines. Even where it has not imposed a fine, the Treasury will have the power to publicly name those who have breached financial sanctions. That will both sanction them and deter others, and we are expanding the information-sharing powers to help the Government shine a much brighter light on malign actors who abuse the financial system. Of course, all this will be a major boon to the Treasury’s ability to clamp down on financial sanctions breaches, and that work will be done with the financial institutions, our economic crime tsar and across the Government. We have to work with the financial sector, too.
We are, of course, working closely with the devolved Administrations on this legislation. The Bill contains provisions relating to the register of overseas entities and unexplained wealth orders, which engage devolved powers in both Scotland and Northern Ireland. We are moving together as one country, and I am confident that we can rely on their support as we continue to expedite legislative consent. I emphasise that we are doing this together in lockstep, and I am grateful to all colleagues across the DAs for their support.
The Government have consulted and engaged widely on the measures in this Bill. The new property register has been designed carefully, drawing on extensive discussions, to balance the need to clamp down on misuse while protecting the ease of doing business. The unexplained wealth order reforms have been designed in close consultation with law enforcement agencies such as the NCA, the Crown Prosecution Service, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and, of course, the Serious Fraud Office. We have also engaged widely with representatives of the accountancy, financial and legal sectors, and with others. Colleagues have raised the issue of enablers many times, and enablers are at the forefront of much of our work.
The Treasury will engage and consult on updated civil monetary penalty guidance for financial sanctions before the reform comes into effect. We are acting decisively, but we are getting the balance right. I urge both sides of the House to support this Bill and to work with us on some of the technicalities in how we kick dirty money out of our country and make it harder for Putin and his associates by bringing this into legislation so that we can operationalise it as soon as possible.
Not just yet.
As I have said, further measures are coming shortly in other legislation and some of them will take more time to be developed.
(4 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. Friend is absolutely right. The pledge that we made to the British public is that the British Government will be in control of our new immigration system. He is also absolutely right that our aspiration is for a high-wage, high-skill and highly productive economy, and that is what we are working to deliver.
The Secretary of State has made great play of quadrupling the seasonal agricultural pilot scheme from 2,500 to 10,000 people. At a push, that would just about—maybe—fill the shortfall in Scotland, but it comes nowhere close to the 100,000 seasonal workers required across the UK. Let me ask her this: how many thousands of tonnes of food and vegetables need to rot in the fields before she is dragged back here to apologise for this dog-whistle nonsense and to rip it up?
I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s tone and the point that he has made. We have been very clear about this: we are growing the pilots. The pilot was established 12 months ago—let us say 12 months ago—and we have now announced that we are quadrupling the seasonal agricultural workers’ pilot. [Interruption.] Yes, to 10,000. That is quadrupling the scheme. At the same time, he will have heard that we are calling on business, and on all sectors, to invest in technology to increase wages and to increase productivity. That is something that we, as a nation, need to do collectively across all sectors.