House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Bill

Philip Davies Excerpts

Friday 6th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir George Young]

I do not think that the amendment is necessary. Some of the concerns expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch do not arise. He was worried that the code of conduct could be changed and then find someone guilty, but that cannot happen under the existing code. Moreover, when we went around this course before, the Standing Orders were changed soon afterwards. The key thing, however, is that peers already know what is right and what is wrong under the code of conduct. We are not changing the code of conduct; all we are changing is the penalties. I do not see how the scenario my hon. Friend outlined could arise, because the question of conduct is wholly unchanged by the Bill and, indeed, by his amendment. We are just giving the other House some additional sanctions, which it wants in order to deal with conduct and extend the period of suspension beyond the lifetime of a Parliament. My hon. Friend conceded that that was logical. We are also giving it the ultimate power of expulsion for behaviour that is beyond the pale. Again, that cannot be applied retrospectively under clause 4.

[Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend seems to be glossing over the retrospective nature of the punishments, which is also covered by this group of amendments. If somebody committed murder and we brought back the death penalty, I am sure my right hon. Friend would agree that they should not face the death penalty because at the time they committed the murder the death penalty was not in place. His Bill, however, seeks retrospectively to change the punishments for breaching the code of conduct and he appears to be glossing over that.

[Sir George Young]

Clause 1(4) states:

“A resolution passed by virtue of subsection (1) must state that, in the opinion of the House of Lords, the conduct giving rise to the resolution…occurred after the coming into force of this Act, or…occurred before the coming into force of this Act and was not public knowledge before that time.”

The Bill does not allow for double jeopardy. Any previous investigation into an alleged breach would, of course, have resulted in the behaviour becoming public knowledge, as it would have been reported by the committee at the time of the original investigation. Given those assurances, I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch will agree that his amendments are not necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendments 7, 8 and 10 to 12 address the potential retrospective provision of the Bill. The Bill allows the House of Lords to expel or suspend a Member for misconduct that took place before the Bill was passed if it was not public knowledge until after the Bill was passed. That means that the House of Lords will not be able to revisit misconduct that has already been dealt with. The Bill therefore does not allow for double jeopardy, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire made clear a minute ago.

[Philip Davies]

One issue that has not been resolved is what constitutes “public knowledge”. Is it something that is known widely and has perhaps appeared in the mainstream media, so people have had a good opportunity to know it? Alternatively, could it be something that is hidden away in a blog somewhere, which in theory is in the public domain, but which nobody has much of an opportunity to know about? What “public knowledge” means is a bit woolly because these days, with the internet, most things are out there somewhere.

[Joseph Johnson]

The application of the power is wisely, in the Government’s opinion, left to the judgment and discretion of the House of Lords. Amendments 13 and 15 would require “public knowledge” to be further defined. The Government consider that that would be likely to lead to more difficulties than leaving it in broad terms. The Bill allows for

“the opinion of the House of Lords”

to be given so that each case may be taken on its own merits, rather than attempting to fix the phrase “public knowledge” as a legal concept.