UK Military Action in Iraq: Declassified Documents

Peter Dowd Excerpts

Wednesday 13th December 2023 Westminster Hall

[Neale Hanvey (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (Alba)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of UK military action in Iraq and declassified documents from 1998.

By way of introduction, I pay tribute to Declassified UK, and in particular its co-founder and editor, the journalist and author Mark Curtis, who has provided an invaluable public service by shining a light on declassified British documents from 1998 at the National Archives. The documents, which run to over 900 pages, reveal what actually went on behind the scenes when the UK Government decided to take military action in December 1998 in what became known as Operation Desert Fox: the four-day bombing campaign in Iraq from 16 to 19 December 1998 by the United States and British militaries. This is important in and of itself, but also because it was the precursor to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Before I turn to the key findings from the declassified documents, let me recap the human cost of military action in Iraq. This House will forever remember the sacrifice of the 179 British servicemen and women, as well as the 23 British civilians, who lost their life during the conflict in Iraq. Yesterday, I joined the War Widows Association for its Christmas gathering; I pay tribute to its secretary, my Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath constituent Sue Raw, and to the amazing women and men who have lost a loved one during a conflict, or as a result of the lasting consequences of conflict.

In addition, there is also the horrific human cost of the war in Iraq. A research study published in The Lancet in 2006 estimated that more than 655,000 Iraqis had died as a consequence of recent wars. In November 2006, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 1.8 million Iraqis had been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 1.6 million were displaced internally. As recently as March 2023, the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University estimated that 1.1 million Iraqis are still displaced internally or live as refugees abroad. According to an April 2014 report in The Guardian, the war cost the British taxpayer £9.6 billion. Doubts over the legality of the invasion of Iraq have done irreparable reputational damage to the western world, including the United Kingdom, throughout the middle east and among Muslim populations both at home and abroad.

I turn to the key findings from the declassified documents in relation to discussions involving, and advice given by, the then Foreign Office legal adviser, the Solicitor General, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary for Defence and Overseas Affairs.

On 12 February 1998, the Foreign Office’s legal adviser, Sir Franklin Berman, wrote to his Department’s senior civil servant. He said that

“the only valid claim to employ force (in this case) is under the authority of the Security Council…my view is that a new resolution in suitable terms is a sine qua non.”

He added:

“The Ministerial Code requires Ministers to comply with the law, including international law…I cannot believe that Ministers would wish to order British servicemen into action unless their legal advisers were able to assure them that it was legally justifiable.”

The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was again told of the Foreign Office view two days later, on 14 February, in a meeting with the then Solicitor General for England and Wales, now Lord Falconer. Referring to the UK’s invasion of Egypt over Suez, Lord Falconer told Tony Blair that in the Foreign Office

“some lawyers argued very strongly that it would be the first time since 1956 that the UK had used force without the backing of the Security Council resolution”.

Lord Falconer stated that some lawyers

“might feel strongly enough to resign”,

as they might be expected to implement decisions

“that they believed were incompatible with international law”.

Five days later, on 19 February, Prime Minister Tony Blair, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and the then Defence Secretary, now Lord Robertson, attended a briefing by Chief of the Defence Staff Sir Charles Guthrie and Air Marshal John Day on

“targeting plans for operations against Iraq”.

The minutes note that the Chief of the Defence Staff

“mentioned that he was worried about the legal side; he hoped this could be sorted quickly”.

The minutes then state: “The prime minister”—Tony Blair—

“noted that the legal advice was that securing another”

Security Council resolution “was preferable.” They added:

“The prime minister concluded that…he did not want to have everything depending on securing a further Resolution”.

What on earth did he mean by “everything”? What exactly had he committed to? We know that Tony Blair had been told by then—in a communication entitled “The Legal Use of Force”, from Michael Pakenham, deputy secretary for defence and overseas affairs, to John Holmes, principal private secretary to the Prime Minister—that a further resolution was essential, not preferable. Tony Blair’s statement in the minutes of the meeting with the Chief of the Defence Staff implies that he would be prepared to use military force without such a resolution. That is unlawful, yet that is exactly what happened as events transpired.

One note in the bundle of papers, which is undated but likely to be from February 1998, appears to be from officials in advance of a meeting between Tony Blair and Attorney General John Morris. This note suggests that Tony Blair pressed Morris to legally justify the use of force. The “Speaking Notes for the Prime Minister: Iraq—The Legal Position” reference Morris’s memo of 14 November 1997 and say that it “helpfully indicated” there could be “exceptional circumstances” in which the use of force could be justified without a Security Council statement. The note then says:

“I trust that you can confirm now that my description of what would constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’ is correct”.

However, Morris’s memo clearly states the following:

“Such a situation has not yet arisen; and even in such extreme circumstances, the UK could expect to be questioned closely about the legal basis for its resort to military force. The Government would need to have the strongest factual grounds for such action.”

This advice from Attorney General John Morris makes it clear that a Security Council statement was “an essential precondition” to using force.

In July 1998, Michael Pakenham, deputy secretary for defence and overseas affairs, wrote a confidential note entitled “The Legal Use of Force”. That was sent to John Holmes, principal private secretary to the Prime Minister. In it, he said that the Foreign Office legal team were continuing to advise that

“the bottom line remains that in most foreseeable circumstances, a Resolution of the UN Security Council is required before the use of such force can be authorised”.

He added that

“acting against UN principles or without”

UN Security Council resolutions

“may in the short term meet…immediate need but is in the long term wholly contrary to our interests”.

The communication also states:

“the advice given by the FCO legal team, and closely followed by the Law Officers, is that there are certain fundamental rules which any Government must follow, and tests they must meet, before authorising the use of force by our Armed Services. Without such tests being met, there would be a very real risk of members of the Armed Services being subject to criminal prosecution.”

In summary, the then Foreign Office legal advisers stated that the

“only valid claim to employ force”

was under the authority of the United Nations Security Council. The Solicitor General warned Tony Blair that there were lawyers who might resign rather than have to implement decisions “incompatible with international law”. It is absolutely clear that neither the Foreign Office’s legal adviser nor the Solicitor General was willing to advise that military action was legally justifiable.

We have evidence of the then UK Prime Minister pressing the then Attorney General to provide a legal justification for military action. If that was not concerning enough, we also had the Chief of the Defence Staff stating that he was worried about the legal side. Crucially, the deputy director for defence and overseas affairs offered absolute clarity that

“the bottom line remains that”

a UN Security Council resolution is required before the use of force can be authorised. In fact, the communication sent to Downing Street makes it clear that the Prime Minister’s office was told that that was essential.

On 14 November 1998, Tony Blair authorised the strike on Iraq, but UK and US forces were stood down at the last minute, when Saddam Hussein agreed to permit weapons inspections. Just before Iraq’s climbdown, Tony Blair held a meeting with the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, the Defence Secretary, now Lord Robertson, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Charles Guthrie, in which he affirmed:

“The time had now come for military action to be taken against Iraq.”

According to the minutes of that meeting, there was no consideration of legality, except that it was agreed to justify the use of force

“not because he [Saddam] was in technical breach of UN Resolutions but because he posed a real and imminent threat to peace and security in the region”.

As Declassified UK has stated:

“This was a de facto acknowledgement that the threshold demanded by Britain’s legal advisers—new Security Council authorisation—had not been met.”

On 16 December 1998, the US and UK struck Iraq in a wave of air attacks. Almost 100 sites were attacked by US and British aircraft and cruise missiles from US navy ships and B-52 bombers. General Peter de la Billière, a former head of the SAS who commanded British forces in the 1991 Gulf war, questioned the political impact of the bombing campaign.

It is clear from the declassified documents that Tony Blair misled Parliament. When he announced military action to Parliament on 17 December 1998, he said:

“I have no doubt that we have the proper legal authority, as it is contained in successive Security Council resolution documents.”—[Official Report, 17 December 1998; Vol. 322, c. 110.]

But that was clearly misleading, as he had been consistently advised—by the Solicitor General, the Attorney General, the Foreign Office legal adviser and the deputy secretary for defence and overseas affairs—that further UN authorisation was required for the use of force. Thus, British officials justified their action by claiming that other UN resolutions previously passed in 1998 revived the authorisation to use force provided in resolution 678, a remnant of the Gulf war, passed eight years earlier in 1990.

Since the other resolutions did not explicitly authorise the use of force, the UK argument was a spurious one. Of the 15-member Security Council in 1998, only three members supported the action: the US, Japan and Portugal. Five years later in 2003, the UK and US relied on the same resolution, 678, to justify their subsequent invasion when they again failed to secure a further Security Council resolution for the use of force.

These files from 1998 suggest that Tony Blair was motivated more by maintaining relations with the US than by upholding international law—something of which he was again culpable in 2003. On the same day, President Clinton told Tony Blair during a phone call that military action against Iraq might have to be used. Blair replied, saying that he agreed and that Mr Clinton

“could count on our support throughout”.

That commitment of support was not underpinned by international law.

On the point about Saddam Hussein being unwilling to co-operate, Tony Blair said:

“we would have to enforce our will”,

adding,

“even if there were some differences between us on the legal front”.

According to Declassified UK,

“Blair was intimating to the US president he was prepared to override British legal concerns”

and obligations.

On 14 February 1998, as Washington and London were close to striking Iraq, Blair told Solicitor General Lord Falconer:

“it was inconceivable that we would refuse the Americans the use of the base at Diego Garcia. At the very least this had to be legally possible.”

So far, the Government have not declassified all files relating to this period. They have kept secret several of the Iraq files from the Prime Minister’s office, which cover the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999. Can the Minister explain why these documents have not been put in the public domain and when we can expect publication? The files do not appear to contain the minutes of the meeting between Prime Minister Tony Blair and Attorney General John Morris. Can the Solicitor General confirm whether that is the case and whether the minutes will be published in full, and if so, when?

These declassified documents show that Tony Blair was determined to take military action against Saddam Hussein in 1998, against explicit advice and in the absence of sound legal arguments or justification. They show that Tony Blair dismissed legal objections to his 1998 bombing campaign. That was the direct precursor to his stance on the invasion of Iraq five years later in 2003, which was also deemed illegal by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, when he said of the war in September 2004:

“From our point of view and from the charter point of view it was illegal.”

Indeed, it was the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw who privately warned Tony Blair in 2002 that an invasion of Iraq was legally dubious, stating that

“regime change per se is no justification for military action”,

and that

“the weight of legal advice here is that a fresh…mandate may well be required”

from the UN. Those words chime with, and are foretold in, the declassified documents that I have highlighted.

I want to place on record my appreciation to parliamentarians who have raised similar concerns in the past, including former Labour MP Dennis Canavan, the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), and the SNP’s Margaret Ewing and Jim Sillars. I recall that Margaret Ewing questioned the Prime Minister directly in the House at the time, and in 2016 Jim Sillars called for a retrospective Iraq war crimes Act to be passed by the Scottish Parliament. It was the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) who stated:

“The second Iraq war was started to liberate the Iraqi people. Instead, it shattered their country. It was intended to stabilise the middle east. Instead, it destabilised the middle east.”—[Official Report, 14 April 2016; Vol. 608, c. 530.]

He deserves credit, as does my own party leader, the right hon. Alex Salmond. Mr Salmond was right when he said:

“Through the long debates on Iraq, many of us suspected that the Prime Minister had given commitments to the American President which were unrevealed to this House and to the public. The Chilcot report outlined these in spades. The famous phrase

‘I will be with you, whatever’

will go down in infamy in terms of giving a commitment.”—[Official Report, 30 November 2016; Vol. 617, c. 1531-1532.]

In both instances—in 1998 and in 2003—we know that Tony Blair received legal advice warning that military action was illegal; and, in both instances, he ignored that legal advice and went on to authorise the deployment of British service personnel. Blair pressed officials, in particular the Attorney General, to provide legal justification for the use of force. He received none, but he did it anyway.

Blair misled Parliament by claiming that a legal basis for military force without a UN Security Council resolution existed, when in fact it did not. The consequences have been devastating for Iraqis, for the region and for military personnel and their families. Lives lost in the theatre of war are well understood, but the lives wrecked by the trauma of conflict are less easily quantified, yet every bit as real. I heard such stories yesterday when speaking to the war widows. Such loss and devastation is met with great courage by those affected, but every person’s loss should surely be based on a lawful instruction.

How can it be that a Prime Minister who prosecuted two wars against lawful advice and instruction has been rewarded with a knighthood? It is an insult to every single life lost; it should be withdrawn forthwith and a path to full justice secured. Governments should not lie to go to war, and the truth must now be told.

[Peter Dowd (in the Chair)]

I intend to call the Opposition spokesperson no later than 5.40 pm. Hon. Members should bear that in mind when making interventions.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General (Robert Courts)]

It is a great honour and pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this evening, Mr Dowd. I thank hon. Members and right hon. Members who have been kind enough to welcome me to my role. I look forward to working with them on this issue and many others, and to serving the House in this role. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and I know each other well from maritime matters already, and I am confident that we will have, as ever, the constructive relationship that the House would expect.

May I start by also extending my commiserations to all those who have been affected—families, friends, British personnel and civilians? We deal with enormously sensitive and tragic historic matters here, and while we will talk about some of the detail of disclosure matters and decisions that were taken, we should never lose sight of the fact that, at the beginning and end of the story, are people whose lives have been irrecoverably changed, and in some cases ended. I know that the House will join me in recognising that.

The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Neale Hanvey) secured this debate to discuss the declassification of documents arising from UK military action in Iraq in 1998, and indeed the action itself. He has opened a number of matters before us regarding the merits of that action. Of course, I have to start by saying at the outset that these are historic matters that have been subject to exhaustive and detailed examination in other places, as he will know and to which I refer him. These were matters for many Administrations ago, and not ones that this Government can comment on in the merits. Today, I would like to deal with some of the issues around the disclosure of the documents, which are things that I, as Solicitor General, can comment on. I hope to be able to offer some constructive comments there, and then invite the hon. Gentleman to assist me in some other areas.

I would like to deal with some of the process of the declassification of historic records and to discuss the convention relating to Law Officer advice, which is relatively understood but departed from in some circumstances, such as the ones that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned. I will also mention some of the changes that have been made post Chilcot. Of course, Chilcot’s terms of reference did not include the area that the hon. Gentleman specifically refers to today; none the less, coming afterwards there were some changes in the way that Parliament and Government approach those matters, and I will address some of them today.

In relation to UK military action in Iraq in 1998, certain documents, including advice from Law Officers, have been declassified and released to the National Archives. I understand that the hon. Member has shared a link with the Department, which covered some documents that he wanted to discuss today. My understanding is that those particular documents have in fact now been declassified and are now open for public review—I think that is the case and I am grateful to him for confirming it. The catalogue goes through an updated process, and I think that is the position with those documents now.

The hon. Gentleman asked me to comment on why some specific documents were not available. I apologise that I am not able to give him the answer to that right now, but if he were to write to me and draw my attention to the specific documents he referred to, I will be able to give him an answer and either point him to where they are or give him an explanation of why I cannot. Of course, it is for the Cabinet Office, rather than the Attorney General’s Office, to take a view on whether documents should be disclosed, and whether in full or with redactions for any reason. I make that request and offer at the outset; I hope to be able to give him some assistance.

I will make some comments on the framework for disclosure, which may be of assistance. The Public Records Act 1958 placed Government Departments under an obligation to identify public records with historic value and to make arrangements for their permanent preservation. It imposed a duty to open these records after the passage of 50 years. That 50-year rule was reduced to 30 years by the Public Records Act 1967 and further reduced to 20 years by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Departments may retain records, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 placed a duty on Departments to justify whether records transferred to the National Archives should remain closed to the public. However, the general rule is that material that is 20 years old becomes public records.

There have been a number of bespoke bodies responsible for the physical housing of this material, but since 2008 it has been the National Archives. As I have mentioned, there is a framework based on the exemptions for disclosure. That is contained in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and determines whether material transferred to the National Archives should be open to the public.

There are several exemptions that are not time-limited. Those include: national security; defence; international relations, or information provided in confidence by other states or international organisations or courts; the economy; criminal investigations; parliamentary privilege; health and safety; and environmental information. A number of those exemptions will require the Department that owns the information to carry out a balancing exercise as to whether it is in the public interest to disclose that material. That requires consultation across Whitehall and other bodies, and the outcome of that test is subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, who is advised by the Advisory Council on National Records and Archives.

There is a separate scheme—the security and intelligence instrument—which is approved by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and which governs information relating to the security and intelligence agencies. That information is retained in the relevant Departments, and information retained by way of the instrument has to be re-reviewed every 10 years. Regardless of how retentions or disclosures are made, anyone is able to challenge such disclosures or retentions by submitting a freedom of information request to the National Archives for closed material or to the originating Department for retained material. I hope that has been helpful to the House with regard to the procedure for the disclosure of such records and gives an overview of the position.

The second point that I would like to spend a minute or two on is the Law Officers’ convention; I know that the House will be familiar with it, but it is worth rehearsing in a little bit of detail. Some of the aspects that the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath has been speaking about do indeed refer to legal advice that was given at the time, or even to the advice of the Law Officers. In this case, some of that material, as he knows, is available in the National Archives.

As a general rule, there are clear and well-understood reasons for not disclosing legal advice, and there are specific considerations around advice that is given to the Government by Law Officers. They may not be relevant to the context or background of this debate—which is about a historic matter and in any event that advice has been published—but, simply for completeness, it is usual practice that advice given by Law Officers and the advice that has been sought, or indeed the fact that advice has been sought, is not disclosed. That is the Law Officers’ convention and that is reflected in the ministerial code. The fact that Law Officers have or have not advised must not be disclosed outside Government without their authority.

It is only in narrow circumstances that that convention has been waived, and that has been with the consent of the Law Officers. As the hon. Gentleman knows, perhaps the clearest example was the legal basis for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I know that the House will understand that the very clear reason for the convention is that, as with any client-lawyer relationship, it is to enable the Government to seek legal advice in private without fear of adverse inferences being drawn from the content of the advice or indeed from the fact that advice has been sought in the first place. It means that the Government are not discouraged from seeking advice in certain cases, or pressured to seek advice in inappropriate cases, and it protects that relationship, as with any client-lawyer relationship.

The third point that I will spend a few moments talking about, before I leave some time for the hon. Gentleman to respond, is on Chilcot. There have been a number of changes after Chilcot, which of course was a major inquiry after the 2003 invasion. Operation Desert Fox is outside the scope of the Chilcot terms of reference, but the report does cover the use of military force by the UK and US in Iraq in 1998, including documentary evidence and witness testimony, so some matters can be dealt with in there. If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will not go into the details that were discovered in terms of the merits, but there have been a number of changes since. There is a Chilcot checklist to support decision making, the National Security Council was established to help with the decision-making process, and Law Officers have to be consulted in good time. There are a number of ways in which the situation has changed since the time he talked about.

The hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Richard Foord) asked me about the Cabinet manual. A convention has developed that before troops are committed, the Commons is given the opportunity to debate the matter, which the Government have acknowledged in the past. Although the general convention remains as it is, there has been some amendment of points since then.

I apologise for running over slightly, Mr Dowd. I want to leave the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath some time to respond, but I hope I have dealt with the questions he wanted me to; he can of course come back to me if not.

[Peter Dowd (in the Chair)]

The hon. Gentleman has 30 seconds if he wishes.

[Neale Hanvey]

Thank you, Mr Dowd, for your assiduous chairmanship. I thank all Members for their contributions. They have been very reflective and quite helpful. I want to pick up on a few points that were made. First, I thank the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) for his sincerity and passion, and his comments on the bravery of service personnel—

[Peter Dowd (in the Chair)]

Order.