Submarines and Frigates (Plymouth)

Penny Mordaunt Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Westminster Hall

[Oliver Colvile]

That debate is certainly above my pay grade, but my understanding is that there is a shortfall within the defence budget, and that needs to be sorted out sooner rather than later. What is important is that we must contain public expenditure. It must be reduced, and that is part of the general thrust of what we inherited and must try to deal with.

The principal issue of the level of defence spending is not affordability, but deciding political priorities. If the events in the middle east continue, I firmly believe that our defence budget may have to be reviewed. During the past 13 or 14 years, there has been real uncertainty about Devonport’s future both as a dockyard and as a naval base. Let me make it clear that I am not suggesting that Plymouth should take precedence over Portsmouth, Faslane or Rosyth, but I am arguing that Ministers should not put too much reliance on one naval port for surface ships, and another for submarines. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has already said that we should avoid putting all our eggs in one basket. However, I want to challenge the previous Government’s plans to base-port both aircraft carriers, all the Type 23s, all the Type 45s and eventually the new Type 26s in Portsmouth, and to move the submarines currently based in Plymouth and the submarine school at HMS Raleigh in Cornwall to Faslane.

Last October, when I asked my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to confirm that Plymouth Devonport will continue to play a major role in the defence of our country and will remain a premier naval port, he replied:

“I can absolutely confirm that.”—[Official Report, 19 October 2010; Vol. 516, c. 817.]

In all fairness, he added that both Plymouth and Portsmouth would have to face some challenges. We in Plymouth are up for that, but we are worried that if the previous Government’s plans are implemented, there will be a real threat that Devonport will be left with just three amphibious assault ships and five survey vessels.

I am grateful that the strategic defence and security review confirmed that Devonport will retain flag officer sea training, and deep maintenance work at the dockyard, and that the city will host the amphibious capability through 3 Commando Brigade, which is currently in Afghanistan. However, I am worried that the decision to move the seven Type 23s from Devonport to Portsmouth was taken at a time when the four Type 22s were expected to stay in service for at least another few years. That could make quite a difference to the balance of UK base-porting, and could do enormous damage to the skills base in a city and region where both skills and wages have traditionally been low. If the Government allow Devonport dockyard’s waterfront work to decline, they could make it difficult for Babcock, or its successor, to retain and attract the skilled work force needed to refit our nuclear submarines and surface ships. In my opinion, such a collapse in a service that provides unparalleled value for money could have an impact on whether Babcock is able to deliver economies of scale. That in turn could see greater costs for the Ministry of Defence and the taxpayer, and lead to a reduction in competition.

[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. He may expect me to go in to bat for Portsmouth, but I add my support to his call for all three naval bases to remain open and viable. One of the millstones around the neck of both Plymouth Devonport and Portsmouth is the amount of the defence budget that is spent on maintaining historic buildings. There are about 200 such buildings in Portsmouth’s naval base and, as in Plymouth, although there is no shortage of developers who want to take over those buildings, they are restricted by the MOD’s current procurement protocols. If we want both bases to be able to wash their faces, that issue should be a priority for both the MOD and the Treasury.

[Oliver Colvile]

I agree we should make sure that we use what moneys are available, and spend them on delivering ships, sailors and the kit needed by our armed services to do their job. Later in my speech I will speak further about some of the ways in which one might manage the estate, and I thank my hon. Friend for her contribution.

If all work associated with basing the Type 23 frigates at Plymouth was transferred to Portsmouth, it is likely that the relevant skills and experience would transfer with it. Such a loss could make it difficult and expensive to recreate that frigate expertise back at Plymouth if it is subsequently decided to base some of the new Type 26s at Devonport in the future. Moving the Type 23s would leave Devonport very much as a nuclear dockyard, unable to make use of its additional work force capacity, should submarine work be in a trough.

I welcome the building of the new Type 26 frigates, but I would like to see more of them and more landing platform docks once public finances become available. Ideally, I would—needless to say—like the Type 26s to be located in Devonport. The UK maritime sector takes a great interest in the evolution of Type 26s and the global combat ship programme as the Navy’s next—and only—major surface combatant proposed to replace Type 23 and 22 frigates. Most hon. Members who represent royal naval garrison towns, including my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt), recognise the significant potential for the export of that platform, and it rightly lies at the heart of the coalition Government and the MOD’s agenda. Although the sector recognises that BAE Systems has the lead in the ship design and ultimate build, the industry—and we as taxpayers—look to the Government to help ensure that the rest of UK industry gains opportunities to provide the ships with key systems and equipment. We must ensure that other defence contractors are able to make changes to the equipment provided as and when necessary.

Having looked at a number of ships over the past year, I am aware that there is a tendency for pieces of equipment to be bolted on to current frigates and destroyers. No doubt that is also true for submarines and aircraft carriers. The approach I suggest will help maximise export opportunities for the UK, which in turn will deliver much needed growth and create new jobs. Although UK exports of ships have been challenging for some years, the maritime sector’s suppliers of systems, equipment and services have maintained an active export drive that could clearly benefit from further association with this flagship programme.

I understand the argument for moving submarines from Plymouth to Faslane because of the depth of the loch and access to the Atlantic on the west coast of Scotland. I recognise that Faslane has genuine merits, but I feel that the Navy should have submarines based in more than one location. Plymouth has a practical and convenient natural harbour to complement Faslane. When service families are relocated from one part of the country to another, there are always costs. However, whenever I look at arguments about location and the associated costs, I become aware that all Departments, including the MOD, have weak information about their unit costs. It is a matter for the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office to pursue with vigour and vim.

I do not want to concentrate too much on Devonport’s geographical location, but its position on the western approaches means that it is within easy reach of the necessary training area. It was of little surprise that the previous Conservative Government decided to transfer flag officer sea training from Portland to Devonport in the mid-1990s. If the seven Type 23 frigates were moved from Plymouth to Portsmouth, they would regularly have to travel 150 nautical miles to participate in any training exercises.

Fresh water from the Rivers Plym and Tamar means that the Sound is permanently flooded, and the channels are kept from silting up. Plymouth Sound is not subject to the same amount of commercial traffic as the Solent. Although a terrorist could potentially sink a ship in the Sound—as they could in the Solent—by placing all our frigates and destroyers in Portsmouth, we could run the risk of bottling the vast majority of our surface ship fleet in one port without easy access to the channel. Portsmouth is a busy commercial port, which, with increased traffic, could make naval shipping movements more complicated and hazardous.

I will conclude by talking about the social impact that would be faced by Plymouth and the sub-region should there be a further reduction in the Royal Navy’s presence. Over 38% of the city’s employment depends on the public sector, not including the 5,000 people who work in the dockyard, which is also dependent on defence contracts. The city council, working with trade unions and other interested parties, has commissioned work from Plymouth university to quantify the impact that a further downgrading of Plymouth as a naval base and dockyard would have on the local benefits bill should there be a further loss of skills and jobs. Once that report is ready I will, if I may, brief the Minister on it so that he is aware of some of its findings.

That is not the only piece of work the city is undertaking. As many hon. Members know, Plymouth has an excellent, dynamic university with a fine reputation for marine science research and engineering. It is a global centre for maritime activity and has an historic dockyard and dramatic waterfront. I am currently working with the dean of the university’s business faculty, the editor of the Western Morning News and the council to identify ways in which Plymouth can create a cluster of maritime industries. I am delighted that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister recently wrote to the editor of the Western Morning News to voice his support for that initiative and encourage the dean and the editor to explore ways of making greater use of land that may become available once the base-porting strategy has been finalised. That land-management initiative could deliver further savings to the MOD and ensure that more money is available to be spent on equipment and troops—especially important at a time when the defence budget is under such pressure. I would welcome the chance to brief the Minister on that work once it has been completed. An enterprise zone to deliver that maritime cluster would be most useful.

Whatever decision is made on the base-porting of frigates, destroyers and submarines, I would be grateful to be told the timetable so that we in Plymouth can make the necessary plans to accommodate any changes. As a country, we must place greater emphasis on defence within Government spending than we currently do. We must recognise that we cannot do everything, and we should make our contribution to NATO through an air and sea power capability that reflects our history, geography and wider interests. The Royal Navy should be a central part of that, and I believe that Plymouth can play an important and cost-effective role in helping to make that contribution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

I will try to be as non-partisan between the services as possible but, following the hon. Lady’s provocation, I cannot resist pointing out that the Navy would have been an even quicker responder to the Libyan crisis had we not decided shortly before that blew up to take our last remaining aircraft carrier out of service. I have raised that issue a number of times, particularly with the Foreign Secretary, who on the most recent occasion informed me—I am sorry that he has such a low opinion of my knowledge of things nautical—that an aircraft carrier would not have been necessary because a Tornado could not be flown from it. I am reassured to know that the Government are well aware of which aircraft can fly from aircraft carriers and which cannot, but I do not hesitate to say that if we had had an aircraft carrier in commission when the events in Libya blew up so unexpectedly, I would have bet the farm on the fact that that particular warship—an aircraft carrier—would have been the first to be dispatched to the Mediterranean in response. It is very unwise to make decisions in peacetime, and still more unwise to make decisions when we are involved in not one but two conflicts simultaneously, that will bind us rigidly into circumstances that we might regret when the strategic situation changes as unexpectedly as it almost always does.

Let us consider the position with regard to frigates and submarines. I have never hesitated to say that the 1998 strategic defence review was a well thought-out document. The problem, as we know, was that the plans it outlined were not fully funded, although at least one had the feeling that a theory was being set out, which meant that some sort of balance was understood and some sort of flexibility was retained. We did not take the view that because our circumstances in the world were more limited in terms of the interventions we could make, we should reshape our defence forces in such a way that we would be incapable of responding to an unexpected crisis as we had responded in the past.

At one point during the years of the Labour Government, a naval base review was carried out. My hon. Friend the Minister will recall that we, as the shadow defence team in opposition, were adamant that it would be most unwise to rely on only two naval bases in the entire country, one of which would be in Scotland and the other in either Portsmouth or Devonport. In particular, we had regard to the argument put forward so eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport in his introduction to the debate: if we put all our eggs in one basket, or all our ships in one or two ports—one at one end of the country and one at the far end from that—we will be in danger of the basket of eggs getting smashed or the ships getting bottled up. We therefore argued strongly for retaining the ports at Devonport and at Portsmouth, and it would be a grave mistake to change that argument now. If we believe that it is strategically wise, strategically necessary and, I would say, strategically essential to continue to have the potential to use both Devonport and Portsmouth as naval bases in the future—I can never emphasise enough that we cannot predict the future—it follows that we must spread out our assets to ensure that both ports remain viable. I have no prejudice as to which assets should be in Portsmouth and which should be in Devonport, but some assets should be in each of the two ports.

The Labour Government took office in 1997, and when their SDR was undertaken we had a total of 35 frigates and destroyers. The deal done in the SDR was that in return for the great future promise and asset of two large aircraft carriers, the number of frigates would be modestly reduced from 35 to 32, and the number of attack submarines—nuclear-powered, but not nuclear-armed—would be reduced from 12 to 10. We know what happened over the years: the number of frigates went down successively from 35 to 32, as predicted, and then to 31 and 25. If I remember correctly, at the last count the figure had gone down to 19. It is true that during that period six new Daring class—Type 45 —destroyers came into play, and they are, of course, much more powerful, potent and potentially lethal, so one could argue that they are a much better deterrent than the destroyers they replaced. However, one should fight shy of getting into the position that Geoff Hoon, the then Secretary of State for Defence, got into of saying that because a new warship is so much more powerful than the warship it replaces, the number of “platforms”, as they used to say—the number of ships to the rest of us—becomes irrelevant. That is not true, because no matter how powerful a warship is, it can be in only one place at any one time. Unfortunately, but necessarily, the activities of the Royal Navy often have to take place in many places simultaneously. At the moment, we are considering what we should do in relation to events in Libya.

There is something else that slightly bothers me: I lost count of the number of times that Conservative spokesmen said in opposition that although we could not be sure whether we would spend more money on defence until we saw what the books actually said about the economics, we would definitely keep expenditure on defence in line with the commitments undertaken. I often stood up and said that we would need either to spend more on defence or to reduce our commitments. In reality, as we know, we are very stretched indeed as a result of the ongoing commitment in Afghanistan, and we now find ourselves suddenly with an additional commitment in Libya. After some prodding, the Foreign Secretary conceded that its cost, on which I was rather aggravatingly pressing him, would be met from the Treasury reserve, but all signs are that the commitment to a Libyan no-fly zone will not prove decisive in ousting Colonel Gaddafi, even though it may prove, and arguably has proved, effective in preventing him from initiating the wholesale mass slaughter that he was not only ruthless enough but stupid enough to announce to the world that he intended to visit on the citizens of Benghazi.

If those two statements are true—first, that the no-fly zone will not be enough to oust Gaddafi and, secondly, that it will nevertheless be effective in limiting the massacre of innocent civilians, which was our purpose for intervening—the logical consequence is that the commitment will go on for a considerable time. The Government will have to think hard about what they are prepared to spend on defence.

The Government cannot meet the costs from Treasury reserves indefinitely. We all know what then happens: we tend to get ourselves into the situation encountered by Tony Blair, who said towards the end of his time as Prime Minister that spending on defence had remained roughly constant at 2.5% of gross domestic product throughout the decade of Labour rule, but then added the crucial words, “if the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan are included.” In other words, the cost of those two wars was effectively being counted as part of our basic expenditure on defence. Such a thing will always happen.

The Government must think clearly about whether to put the economic case at the top of their agenda or whether to put up there instead the ability to intervene, as we have intervened in Libya. They cannot have it both ways. Many countries, including in Europe, would doubtless love to be able to intervene to stop massacres in Benghazi, but they do not do so—or not more than minimally—because their simple view is, “Well, we’re very sorry but we’re too small, too ineffective, too weak and too poor, and we cannot afford to maintain the armed forces necessary to do that sort of thing.” That is fair enough.

[Penny Mordaunt]

My hon. Friend makes a case for flexibility and options versus the economy, but it is worth remembering that we need a strong Navy with the right number of platforms to protect trade, our fuel security and our fibre-optic cables. Our economy depends on the Royal Navy.

[Dr Lewis]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, which takes my argument forward exactly as I intended. The key point is that the things that she outlines are constants. Those requirements of a strong Royal Navy will carry on regardless, even if we were not involved in those additional conflicts. It really worries me that if we continue to be driven by every crisis that pops up in other parts of the world, whether or not we have what is commonly described as a dog in the fight, something else will have to give. Unless we see a genuine increase in resources and in the priority given to defence, if we continue to take on roles such as the worthy one of trying to intervene in Libya, something will have to give, and it is precisely the sort of core functions to which my hon. Friend adverts that may suffer.

If we cap the defence budget, we might have to sell off or mothball vital defence assets, or not introduce new assets that had been planned for, but I am concerned that whenever a crisis pops up in another part of the world, we want to be at the forefront and to punch above our weight. There will be only one outcome of that approach: our very limited defence resources will be used up in dealing with these ad hoc crises, which are not of our choosing, but then one day, when we face an existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom, we will not have the assets necessary to defend ourselves. I predict that there will be attempts to derail the renewal of the nuclear deterrent on the grounds that we are so stretched in other conventional areas that we cannot afford to build those submarines.

That is not a subject for this debate but, with your indulgence Mrs Brooke, may I say that I am particularly alarmed about the Trident Commission? The commission is orchestrated by a well-known anti-nuclear group called the British American Security Information Council, and is funded by such anti-nuclear bodies as the Ploughshares fund and the Joseph Rowntree charitable trust but, nevertheless, such distinguished people as two former Secretaries of State for Defence—my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and Lord Browne of Ladyton—have agreed to sit on it. What will the commission come up with? In my opinion, it certainly will not come up with a recommendation for the like-for-like replacement of Trident. What will it say? Will it say, “We’d better not have continuous at-sea deterrence,” or, “We must join up with the French”? Whatever it says, I bet that the root of its argument will be the statement that we cannot afford to continue with a properly self-sufficient strategic independent nuclear deterrent. If so, future generations may have cause bitterly to regret the sort of arguments that have been put forward when we one day find ourselves vulnerable as a result of that omission.

How does that relate to base-porting? It is simple: during times of economic stringency, it is vital to conserve defence assets. Whatever final decision my hon. Friend the Minister and his colleagues make about what should be based at Portsmouth or Devonport, one point is vital. Something must be based at each of those two ports so that their viability is retained, because we might need those naval bases one day not simply to allow us to intervene in wars of choice, but to safeguard ourselves against an existential threat to the United Kingdom itself.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

It is wonderful that the hon. Gentleman can still come to the support of his former boss, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath, after the devastation he wreaked on the country.

[Penny Mordaunt]

Does my hon. Friend the Minister agree that, in addition to the deficit that we inherited, it was the web of incompatible programmes that made the strategic defence and security review a particularly difficult exercise to carry out? Does he also agree that if there is any justification for not having a carrier strike force in the short term, it is that the SDSR has drawn a line in the sand and we are now preparing for the future? To do that, we need to look at maintaining three Navy bases in this country.

[Mr Howarth]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The SDSR sought to reflect the position that we found ourselves in. The hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View was perfectly right to refer to the Treasury. Inevitably, the Treasury had an influence on the SDSR. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport made the point at the start of the debate that government is a question of priorities. This Government is not a Conservative Government; it is a coalition Government and the priorities were set by the Cabinet. The good news is that the Ministry of Defence took a lesser hit than many people imagined it would, and that is in large measure thanks to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who ensured that the MOD did not fare as badly as some people had feared.

My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East said that he wants me to be robust, and I will be. He is absolutely right to say that we face a dangerous world. That is what we said when in opposition, and the world is just as dangerous—if not more dangerous—than it was then. However, the cupboard is bare and we have had to allocate our resources as best we can. He also made the fair point that the 1998 strategic defence review was itself never fully funded, and therefore last year, when the Chancellor came to allocate the Budget across the Departments, the Ministry of Defence was hobbled by the fact that it was already underfunded for what it was trying to do—we took a double hit, one might say. These are challenging times, and the SDSR has had, and will continue to have, an impact on all areas of defence, but I can assure my hon. Friend that we are determined to maintain a strong and capable fleet that preserves our long and glorious naval tradition.

Nowhere is there greater evidence of that than at Devonport, which is the largest naval base in western Europe, stretching along four miles of coastline. The naval base and the associated dockyard employ approximately 12,000 people and are an important part of the local economy. The dockyard has been privately owned since 1997, and operated by Babcock Marine since 2007. Babcock also manages naval base support services in Devonport. Devonport contributes to the UK’s defence capability through its vital role as the only facility in the UK able to carry out the deep maintenance of submarines, and it undertakes the long overhauls that all submarines must undergo at least once during their service life. As well as that unique role, it carries out valuable work on the support and maintenance of complex warships, and is a centre of excellence for sea training and for the UK’s amphibious capability.

Babcock Marine, along with BAE Systems Surface Ships, is one of our key maritime industrial partners, and the Department works closely with it to ensure that Devonport and the other naval bases and dockyards have the level of work they need to sustain them, ensuring that critical skills, such as high-end design, systems engineering and combat systems integration are not lost, and that we continue to maintain the ability to carry out such work in Britain.