Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Bill

Paul Scully Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 28th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)]

This is a Bill of two halves, considering that the football is on at the moment, and the contributions that we have heard from Members throughout the House attest to the importance of each of them. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Minister for Regional Growth and Local Government for opening these proceedings by setting out the context and the background of both elements of the Bill. I am also grateful to all the Members in all parts of the House who have participated in the debate. The points that have been raised are really important and I am glad to have the opportunity to respond, first on business rates and then on the measures relating to the disqualification of unfit directors of dissolved companies.

The House has today supported the point made by hon. Friend that the pandemic has unquestionably had a significant impact on ratepayers. This impact has been felt particularly by those in the retail, hospitality and leisure sectors, but also by many other businesses that sit elsewhere in the wider economy. That is why since April 2020 the Government have provided £16 billion of business rates relief targeted at ratepayers in the retail, hospitality and leisure sectors. As announced on 25 March, the Government intend that this will be supplemented by an additional £1.5 billion of relief to be made available to ratepayers who have not been able to benefit from the reliefs already put in place throughout the pandemic. Taken together, that represents an unprecedented package of support that reflects the unique impact of the pandemic on our economy.

These unprecedented circumstances have also tested other aspects of the business rates system, which was created long before covid-19 and was not designed with pandemics in mind. The material change of circumstances process is designed to be used in cases such as localised roadworks. Market-wide economic changes such as those arising from a pandemic can and should be considered only at a comprehensive business rates revaluation. Arguing material change of circumstances cases through the courts could result in years of uncertainty and is unnecessary where we can, as we are doing now, amend the law to ensure that it meets its original intention.

[Sarah Olney]

On what the Minister has said about the material change of circumstances argument not being appropriate in this case, would it not have been appropriate to have made it clear earlier in the pandemic, perhaps as long as a year ago, that it would not be an appropriate route for businesses looking to reduce their rates payment and not a circumstance that could be cited?

[Paul Scully]

A lot of messages can go out and have gone out over the past year so that we can flex in our ability to work with businesses. I think I can boil down my relatively long job title to “Minister for unintended consequences”. We are always trying to make sure that we can flex and get clear messages out to businesses. The hon. Lady makes an interesting point. We have heard a lot about the £1.5 billion and when the guidance will be out. Clearly that is dependent on the passage of this Bill, but we want to make sure that we can work with the LGA and councils to give the clearest guidance so that they can get the money out as quickly as possible. The argument made by Members on both sides of the House is countered by the fact that by not having to go through so many appeals we can speed up the process and get the money out within weeks rather than, in certain cases, if we had to go through the entire process, years. That is why we can provide certainty to local authorities, which rely on income from business rates to fund their vital local services. It is on that basis that the Public Accounts Committee has welcomed the approach taken by the Government in the Bill.

Members have raised questions relating to when ratepayers will be able to benefit from the £1.5 billion relief that was announced on 25 March. We will work with all areas of local government to deliver the new relief scheme as soon as possible, once the Bill is passed, so that local authorities can set up their local relief scheme. The allocation of the £1.5 billion among local authorities will be made according to which sectors have suffered most economically rather than on the basis of temporary falls in individual property values. That will ensure that the support is provided to businesses in the fastest and the fairest way possible.

[Seema Malhotra]

Does the Minister have any clarity at all on the timetable so that local authorities know what to expect and when?

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

The answer is as soon as possible, once this Bill has passed. I am looking forward to working with the hon. Lady in Committee to make sure that we can work through this as quickly as possible. Clearly, work will be done in consultation and conversation with the LGA and local councils to ensure that we can get comprehensive guidance in place. That is how we have been working over the past 14 months with local authorities on the other grant schemes.

Let me briefly cover a couple of quick points. The hon. Member for Manchester, Withington (Jeff Smith) asked whether there will be a blanket ban on MCCs. I can absolutely confirm that there is no blanket ban. On airports, it is a core principle of the business rates system that a material change of circumstances should be used between rate revaluations, so the drop in demand for airports in light of the pandemic is exactly the sort of market-wide economic change affecting property values that can and should only be considered at revaluation. We have been supporting airports with their fixed costs over the past year from the airport and ground operations support scheme. In his recent Budget, the Chancellor announced a further six months of support up to the equivalent of their business rates liability for the first half of the 2021-22 financial year, subject to certain conditions, and a cap per claimant of £4 million.

[Seema Malhotra]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Paul Scully]

I will not give way, but I will happily come back to the hon. Lady if I have not answered her question. I do want to get through a few areas.

Let me quickly turn to the disqualification of directors of dissolved companies. The issue of insolvency funding came up a few times. Clearly, we will be working with the Insolvency Service to ensure that it has the resources to do its job. It employs its finite resources to the maximum effect by prioritising cases in which there has been most harm to the public and the wider marketplace. Clearly, its resources are not limitless.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked about insolvencies. Actually, the number of insolvencies has been at a 40-year low over the past few months because, effectively, in many areas, the economy has been held in stasis. That is why it is so important that, having put £352 billion-worth of support into the economy, we now have 352 billion reasons why we have to get the next bit right—why we have to help shape the recovery through these mitigations. We need to make sure that we continue to flex and continue to extend the support. That is why furlough carries on until September and why we have ensured that the winding-up proceedings have been extended for another nine months as well, so that we can get conversations going with landlords and tenants. It is so, so important to continue these measures.

I am glad that we have had broad support for the measures. In terms of compensation, directors can obviously be held personally liable for debt, and where there are breaches, there is disqualification.

[Peter Grant]

I note the Minister’s comments that directors can be held personally liable, but does he accept that allowing an individual investor or creditor to sue a director at their own risk is very different from a scheme through which the Government or some other body effectively take that legal action on behalf of a group of aggrieved individuals, who individually cannot afford the risk of taking that action?

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point. Let me just answer a couple of his points. He talked about corporate governance and audit reform. That is something that we will legislate on as soon as parliamentary time allows. He referenced a Minister saying that we would adhere to standards that we thought that we could get away with. No, that is absolutely not the case. I did not hear that comment, but I suspect what the Minister said and meant was that we are accountable to the electorate. When I heard about that comment, I thought about my own constituency where I know at least one High Court judge, an insolvency practitioner, lawyers, forensic accountants, civil servants—I have them in my own Department never mind my constituency—and journalists and, boy, will they hold me to account at the ballot box, in my local media and in the national media should it be appropriate to do so. That is that standard to which we expect to work as a Government. I am glad that he also mentioned phoenixing, because this will strengthen the phoenixing legislation as well.

I have noted the helpful contributions made by Members across the House, and I am looking forward to working with colleagues in Committee to make sure that we can get this really important legislation for both of these measures through. The scrutiny that has been provided today is, as always, greatly appreciated. I look forward to discussing this Bill with Members throughout its passage, and I commend it to the House.

[Sarah Olney]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Bill (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Bill:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 8 July 2021.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Scott Mann.)

Question agreed to.

Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Bill (Second sitting)

Paul Scully Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th July 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Navendu Mishra]

Your contribution is quite depressing, but thank you for making it.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)]

Q I am here with my corporate governance hat on, but I am also Minister for Consumers. The issues that you raise about scams are really important, and it is really important that we continue to address that. We just had Scams Awareness Week; we have been raising awareness so that people do not get involved, but it is also important that we make sure that institutions and networks are addressed in these sort of ways.

It is interesting: you talked about the amendment, which actually asks for a single report in a year. Clearly, we want to be managing the situation and making sure that it is effective. In terms of the time that you are looking at, obviously that does not negate the ability for criminal action to be taken; it is to restore directors.

I really want to focus on the Bill itself, and the focus within that and what we are doing positively to try to tackle some of these issues—including on phoenixing, which you started off talking about. I know you talked about lots of other things, and other things that we can be doing and are doing, but do you agree that the Bill adds an extra weapon to tackle phoenixing itself?

Andrew Agathangelou: I certainly do. As I said earlier, it is a significant, valuable, worthwhile step in the right direction. My plea—forgive me; I guess I am repeating myself here—is that we look at the whole ecosystem. For example, why on earth are we not including fraud and so on in the online safety Bill? I know that is another topic, but can you see how, from my point of view, these are all interconnected issues—this is all the ecosystem?

I guess I am saying that Parliament can take one of two views here. You can either deal with this tactical, ad hoc Bill, which is of course worthwhile, in isolation of everything else. However, for goodness’ sake, please do not do that; actually look at the bigger picture here—the interconnected matrices of other issues that Parliament ought to be grabbing by the scruff of the neck and finally sorting out.

[Paul Scully]

I appreciate that. If you look at corporate governance and Companies House reform and all these issues, and indeed at the online harms Bill, I am sure you will have plenty of opportunity to comment on that. As I say, this deals with one specific issue because of the impetus now. That is all I wanted to raise.

[The Chair]

If nobody else has any questions for our witness, I thank you on behalf of the Committee for your evidence, Mr Agathangelou. I am sure the Committee welcomed your frank speaking throughout. Thank you very much.

Andrew Agathangelou: Thank you all.

Examination of Witness

Kate Nicholls gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Hall]

Q We are clearly moved to give 100% rate relief to many businesses with a £16 billion pot. Of course, I understand that some of the businesses you work with and represent will have been disappointed about where the line was drawn, so to speak. I just wonder, notwithstanding the point you made earlier in answer to the question about guidance, whether there is anything you would like local authorities to start thinking about as they start to draw up their own guidance schemes in response to some of the early challenges that have been faced by some of the businesses you will be working with.

Kate Nicholls: We would urge local authorities to work with us to identify themselves where the areas of greatest need are. One of the things that has frustrated a lot of our businesses is that there is a central message from Government, and it is not necessarily interpreted on the ground as fluidly as Government might have hoped. When you look at some of the local authority areas, we have had businesses that are clearly designed to be captured and covered by the support mechanisms that are available, but local authorities have often taken the view that if it is not directly specified in guidance and it is not a named company or a named type of business, they are precluded from using their discretion and being able to provide support to those businesses. That is the frustration that our businesses have had on the ground going forward.

It would be helpful if local authorities could be a bit more permissive in identifying the businesses that they know are hurting at a local level, rather than applying a prescriptive approach that says, “If your name’s not down, you’re not coming in,” or “Here’s a tick, you are covered.” That would help immeasurably in those businesses that tend to fall between the cracks because they are not clearcut: if you are a coach operator, are you a tourist business or are you not? A local authority should be able to understand its local area and know which ones are and therefore need to be helped, and which ones actually managed okay. Those are the kinds of areas in which we would like local authorities to use their own discretion, not wait to be told specifically by Government that they can help those businesses.

[Paul Scully]

Q Briefly, with my hospitality Minister hat on, and following on from that question, Kate, you will remember that Minister Huddleston and I wrote to local authorities asking them to use their additional restrictions grant before they access their top-up. Have you seen any evidence of any local authorities responding to that, either by giving more money to businesses on their books or by widening the base to fill some of the cracks that you are highlighting?

Kate Nicholls: There are a few notable exceptions, but you can measure on the fingers of fewer than two hands the local authorities and businesses we have been able to help that have had a positive response to that request. All too often, the response has been that the grants that we are talking about are closed, there is no more money, and they will get back in touch with the businesses if more money becomes available.

It is incredibly frustrating that you have this disconnect at a central level. We hear what is being pledged, and we hear and understand the work that is being done by Ministers to communicate to those local authorities, but the operators on the ground just get a “No”. Some local authorities have been more creative than others, and some have been more proactive than others, but generally speaking it has been a long, slow process, and it has been very difficult to get money out of the local authorities for the businesses that desperately need it. It has been too slow in being processed. We know, because of the work we are doing we are doing at a central Government level, that it is there and has been made available; it is just not cascading out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Grant]

Q I have one final question. The legislation as it stands would set a three-year time limit on any application for disqualification, starting from when the company was dissolved. What are your views on that three-year time limit? Is too short, too long, or just about right?

Duncan Swift: I have to say, from experience, it is too short. Rogue directors or individuals who abuse the position of director go to great pains to extract all the asset value out of the companies that they are abusing and to provide a false, or certainly incomplete, trail of their actions as directors of the company. As an office holder coming in after the event, it is like pulling together a 3,000 or 4,000-piece jigsaw puzzle when holding only about five pieces to start with. You are having to make inquiries with multiple stakeholders, as well as interviewing the directors and their associates, to start to get the bits of the jigsaw puzzle necessary for a picture of what actually went on, in order to convince a court that what went on was actually a fraud upon the creditors and that the director had not acted properly. Again, from experience, although a relatively speedy pulling together of the jigsaw puzzle and convincing of the court takes three years, there are many cases where it takes far longer.

[Paul Scully]

Q To expand on a few of those areas, starting with the three-year time limit to file a disqualification application, the Insolvency Service or the Secretary of State can already examine historic conduct, but they have three years to file the application for disqualification. Can you expand a bit on what you meant about the court process, which presumably comes afterwards?

Duncan Swift: What I was explaining about the timeline was that for the office holder—whether it be the Insolvency Service or the official receiver as liquidator, or the Insolvency Service coming in to pull together a picture of the company’s financial dealings and the director’s conduct in the course of those dealings—it takes time. In the first phase in particular, it can take two years to get a reasonably complete picture before one can be confident of putting forward an application to court, either for a recovery of assets or, I would have thought, the disqualification of a director in circumstances where that individual may well be using the proceeds of such activities to defend their position, as well as seeking to confuse it to defend against the likelihood of such claims being brought against them.

[Paul Scully]

Q We talked a little about compensation orders earlier, which already exist for insolvent companies. This legislation would effectively extend them to dissolved companies, so that compensation can affect all creditors— individual and classes of creditors. A lot of the stuff you talked about at the beginning related to a wider piece of work that you would like to see on Insolvency Service reform and corporate governance. However, do you find the fact that we are bringing compensation orders within the realm of dissolved companies of benefit to—

Duncan Swift: Forgive me, but my understanding and experience of compensation orders is that they are brought on behalf of a single creditor or a few creditors. I suggest a more comprehensive approach: that the insolvency process that already exists is applied, and if a dissolved company is found to be insolvent, it is readily restored to the register and put through the insolvency process. That will have two consequences: a full investigation by the office holder, who in the first instance of the compulsory liquidation is the official receiver of the directors’ conduct; and for that process to recover such assets that are available for the benefit of all creditors of that company, not only a few.

[Paul Scully]

Q Okay. The other issue I want to clarify is the resource issue that we started off talking about. In some of the conversations that we had with earlier panellists, we were talking about the public interest test and the prioritisation of the cases that were most likely to get a result, frankly. Is it purely a resource issue that you are raising? Is it one of those that is not working as well? Are you saying that the filters may be wrong within those tests? Could you expand on that?

Duncan Swift: All I can go on is the statistics issued by the Insolvency Service on disqualification orders or undertakings from directors for misconduct relative to the total number of corporate insolvencies per annum, and the member feedback that R3 receives. At an anecdotal level, members report that they have submitted serious adverse conduct reports against individuals, only to find that no action has been taken against said individuals by the Insolvency Service. We are not told why. Clearly there is a threshold.

Coming back to the statistics, it would appear that the Insolvency Service is consistently—year in, year out, irrespective of fluctuations in the total number of corporate insolvencies—disqualifying about 1,200 individuals per annum. That suggests to me that there is a resource issue. I am not in a position to ask the Insolvency Service whether that is the case, but that is what it feels like.

[Paul Scully]

Q That is interesting—thank you very much. Obviously, we consulted on this back in 2018, but there is a particular compulsion to do this now, to tackle the most egregious cases of fraud involving the financial support given by the taxpayer throughout the pandemic. Presumably you welcome that, and therefore the drive to get this measure—albeit that it is not as wide as you would like—through now?

Duncan Swift: Yes. As I said at the start, this is a step in the right direction, but unfortunately it does not go far enough.

[Paul Scully]

Q Sure, but going back to the numbers—I know that it is anecdotal so it is difficult to tell—what sort of deterrent effect do you think this will have?

Duncan Swift: I repeat: it is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. Individuals who would choose to abuse the benefits of directorship of limited liability companies are not dissuaded by the prospect of being disqualified—that is my experience and that of the members of R3. A more significant deterrent is that they are not only disqualified but the ill-gotten gains of said actions that led to their disqualification are required to be repaid and recovered for the benefit of those who have suffered as a consequence of those actions. If that also includes criminal liability, so much the better; I am sure that will add to the weight of the deterrent. They are far less likely to do it if they can see the routes to the gains that they obtain from such behaviour being readily recoverable.

[The Chair]

There are no further questions, Mr Swift. We thank you for your evidence this afternoon, and for your flexibility on timing, which we greatly appreciate. That brings us to the end of today’s sitting. The Committee will meet again on Thursday 8 July to begin line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Scully.)

Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Bill (First sitting)

Paul Scully Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th July 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Ms Marie Rimmer (St Helens South and Whiston) (Lab)]

Q Good morning, Mr Pegge. Clause 2(14) states that the provisions

“have effect in relation to conduct…occurring, and in relation to companies dissolved, at any time before, as well as after, the passing of this Act.”

Do you support making these provisions retrospective and, if so, how should the Insolvency Service make use of these retrospective powers?

Stephen Pegge: As I understand it, the support for this measure was confirmed as early as 2018 and it has really been a lack of parliamentary time that has made it difficult for it to be put in place. Given that we are aware of abuse that has happened in the meantime, I support this measure being retrospective. I appreciate that that retrospectivity is not often applied to such Bills, but we are talking about a fairly high evidence threshold and about situations where natural justice would support this measure being made with retrospective effect.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)]

Q It is good to see you again, Stephen. That is an interesting point about the retrospective nature of the measure, given what you were saying about businesses taking on more debt throughout the pandemic. Obviously, the insolvency practitioners will work through things, as you have rightly said, in order of public interest. What do you think they may look to do to give lenders confidence, by approaching the pandemic response finance first?

Stephen Pegge: Clearly, when lenders are undertaking a credit assessment, they will consider both the willingness to repay and the ability to repay, the probability of default and the loss in the event of default. All those could potentially be, and I would say probably at the margin, factors that could be influenced by the use of dissolution as a means of avoiding liability.

Quite clearly, it is very difficult for a company that has been struck off the register to make payments under a loan, so there will be the avoidance of debt in those circumstances. Given that currently there is time and cost involved in restoring a company to the register, the ability then to take this action against directors after the event both to deter and, if the activity should still carry on, to investigate and take action against directors in a more timely and cost-effective way should reduce the ultimate losses to creditors. I think there has been an estimate that creditors could be saved around £1 billion as a result of this measure, which would be significant in terms of credit assessments.

The net effect is the ability to provide more finance with less time having to be spent on assessment up front, on better terms, and in circumstances that should help the recovery. However, I will emphasise, Minister, that this is only one factor and it is all operating at the margin. Nevertheless, it is certainly something that during the past year has become a matter of concern, especially in relation to bounce back loans.

[Paul Scully]

Q It is a complicated scene, as you say, and this is only one part of it. I think you are, therefore, suggesting that strengthening the regime in this way will give further confidence to lenders, and especially SME companies within the supply chains.

Stephen Pegge: Yes, exactly. It will, therefore, be possible to focus more time and support on those who deserve the finance, without the distraction of those who are abusing the process.

[Paul Scully]

Q Finally, what effect do you think there would be on lending if this regime did not come into place or the loophole were not closed? Would there be a chilling effect?

Stephen Pegge: As you say, it is a matter of a chilling effect. It is one other factor that would weigh on finance providers’ minds when making lending decisions. This is a crucial time for lenders to provide finance. If you look at the latest Bank of England figures, for May, which were published last week, some £7 billion of new lending was provided to SMEs.

Latest surveys suggest that high proportions of loan applications are being sanctioned—something like 85%—and we want that to continue. The expectation that this sort of loophole is being closed should build confidence. It will ensure that there is discouragement of bad actors, so that it does not grow out of proportion, which we fear might otherwise be the case.

[Peter Grant]

Q Good morning again, Mr Pegge. I apologise because I think I mispronounced your name earlier because I tried to read it without my glasses on. In an earlier answer, you referred to the retrospective nature of parts of the Bill. You indicated that you supported them. In particular, you referred to the fact that the Government had made it clear since 2018 that the legislation was coming.

Clearly, we are not creating a new offence that was not illegal at the time. We are considering legislation to make it easier for the authorities to act against people who may have committed offences, which I think is an important distinction. Even given that, is there an argument that the retrospective power should apply only to the date when the Government first published their proposals to legislate? Would you still support the Insolvency Service if it wanted to take action in relation to things that had happened in, say, 2015 or 2016? Would you have any concerns about that?

Stephen Pegge: As you say, this is essentially a technical loophole, which the Bill seeks to close. All it does is confer powers of investigation, with significant and rigorous practices in terms of investigation. The risk of miscarriage of justice is relatively limited. I do not have a particular date in mind. The point I was trying to emphasise was that this has widespread support and has had for some time.

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[Peter Grant]

Q You say that you have not heard any such representations from the Insolvency Service. Have you had any such representations from lenders or creditors? They may take a different view from the Insolvency Service if it is their money that is at stake.

David Kerr: Perhaps some in the creditor community would like it to be a six-year period, but I do not think they have argued strongly for it, and I do not think there is a necessarily a case made for that. From a creditor perspective, in an ideal world, perhaps it would be open ended. That may be unrealistic.

[Paul Scully]

Q Thank you for giving evidence, Mr Kerr. Can you talk a little bit more about the deterrent that you spoke about? How much of an impact do you think the measure, and especially the threat of disqualification, will have on providing the necessary deterrence?

David Kerr: The current disqualification provisions act as a deterrent to some extent, because directors know that, in respect of every company that goes into an insolvent liquidation or administration, there will be some inquiry. There is an obligation on the insolvency practitioner to carry out a certain amount of inquiry into the conduct of the directors of those companies and make a report in each of those cases to the Insolvency Service on their conduct. The provisions do not provide for the same report. It will have to be triggered by something else, whether that is a creditor complaint or other information, but it will provide the opportunity for the service to make the same inquiry.

[Paul Scully]

Q You talked earlier about the public interest test and prioritisation. Obviously, we are trying to strengthen the enforcement regime to deal with the most egregious cases of fraud in relation to the financial support that the taxpayer has given throughout the pandemic. In your experience, has the insolvency practice been prioritising this work? As well as having the public interest test, or threshold, has it prioritised approaching the most serious cases at the earliest stage?

David Kerr: Do you mean the work of the Insolvency Service?

[Paul Scully]

Yes. We are talking about Insolvency Service resources. We would have expected the Insolvency Service to prioritise the work that it does on the most egregious cases, and that would indeed be how we would anticipate it moving forward. Have you seen that first hand?

David Kerr: This may not be a direct answer to your question, but the concern of the creditor community might be that, if this provision were used almost exclusively for the purposes of pursuing bounce back loan fraud, perhaps it would not have the wider benefit that could come from it. Perhaps that has to be the emphasis in the short term, but in the long run—it is a provision that was considered worthy of introducing back in 2018, before covid came along—one would hope that it will be of broader use.

Quite how the service will prioritise its limited resources and decide which cases to look at is a matter for it to work out once it gets the powers. One would hope that the cases that come to its attention through the insolvency practitioners’ reports will receive equal attention and that it will not be to the detriment of those cases that these other cases are being pursued.

[Paul Scully]

Q We heard a little bit in the earlier panel about phoenixing. Do you think this measure will help to combat that malpractice, where one company is shut down and dissolved and another takes its place, with the same directors, doing the same business from the same premises with the same staff?

David Kerr: That can happen, whether it is through an insolvency process or a dissolution. To the extent that it has happened through dissolution, the measure plugs that gap, because it is gives the same investigative powers to the Insolvency Service. It comes back to the deterrent point that you made previously. If the service is seen to be taking action in these cases and publicising the fact that it has done so, that will, one would have thought, have a deterrent effect.

[Paul Scully]

Q Finally, in terms of your role in credit management, what do you think this will do for the confidence of lenders and supply chains, in particular SMEs in those supply chains?

David Kerr: Generally, if the system is seen to be working well and those who abuse it are brought to account, then it helps enhance the confidence of those engaged in providing credit, whether it is through loans, trade credit or anything else. In that sense, it is a welcome provision that, if resourced and used as intended, should have the desired effect.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q To follow up on a couple of points, there have been critics of the proposals in this small piece of legislation. From your experience and that of your members, how long can it take for companies that have been dissolved to be restored to the register? In 2019, over half a million UK companies were dissolved but only 33 restored. In terms of the time it takes in practice, what could that look like?

David Kerr: I think the cost issue is the bigger disincentive for creditors that previously might have wanted to take steps to try and get somebody appointed to investigate. The service itself has made the point that there are legal costs and other costs associated with that process, and it would not be practical for creditors to mount that kind of action alone or, in many case, at all, given the amounts of their own debts.

The bigger disincentive is probably the cost and this avoids that. You are right in the sense that if there is a lengthy time process and if it takes several months, that eats into the three-year time limit that we have talked about, so that could be a problem. I think here, with this measure, we avoid that because the Department can have the ability to make appropriate inquiries and take action, without the need to go through that process.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call the Minister.

[Paul Scully]

Q I have just two brief questions, because you opened up and summarised well. The point about funding has come up quite a lot, and I wonder if you could expand on some of your comments. You talked about the public interest test and the prioritisation of the Insolvency Service’s cases, so that it would look at the bigger, most egregious issues first. Obviously, with the number of cases you are talking about, it would also presumably look at the ones where there is a realistic likelihood of a successful outcome, rather just investigating every case.

Dr Tribe: In some writing on this point in relation to Carillion, I suggested the reason that the Insolvency Service might be looking at a large public limited company to bring these mechanisms to bear is because that is a pretty well known, massive liquidation, which has lots of Government contracts linked to it and taxpayer money bound up in its activities. You can see why it would perhaps be appropriate, much as with previous well-known disqualifications, for the Insolvency Service to bring the action or the proceedings if the relevant public interest tests are met. That is because it helps with the agenda of sending out the appropriate messages to the commercial community that you should use corporate vehicles and corporate forms in an appropriate way, and that you should live up to your duties in an appropriate way generally, as well as facing some of the consequences if you misuse the form and harm creditors and other stakeholders.

On the prioritisation point, you could go for good messaging, in the sense of prioritising cases. I suppose that the problem with the bounce back loan scheme and this dissolution issue that we are dealing with is that, as I think one of the previous questions hinted at, the volume of cases could be so great that with prioritisation you will need to have quite a large group of civil servants working on the issue.

As for the question of how likely it is that we might get a result in a case, and therefore whether we should bring proceedings, we have seen recently that once the Insolvency Service’s tests are met, it is wholly appropriate that it should bring these proceedings, even if in due course the result is not what it thought or what its specialist advisers—the QCs and so on who have advised it—would have predicted. Hopefully, the money will be well spent in bringing proceedings, but sometimes we do not get the result for factual reasons, basically.

[Paul Scully]

Q I have a final question. You mentioned Carillion, which you wrote about and studied. Within Carillion and a number of other cases—Carillion is an interesting one, because there are a lot of supply chains in there—as I asked previous panel members, what extra confidence does plugging these loopholes bring to small and medium-sized enterprises?

Dr Tribe: Carillion, because it is a large plc, has messaging on the plc side of our regime, thinking about how directors behave in relation to those types of companies. This perhaps goes back to Mr Grant’s question about group structures—do not use group structures in a way that is problematic. That will be interesting to monitor on what is a live case; I do not want to mull on the facts of that case too closely.

Sorry, what was the second part of your question?

[Paul Scully]

Q It was about the fact that Carillion obviously has a large supply chain within it, and you have been dealing with and writing about cases with complex supply chains. What confidence can this measure to close that loophole give to SMEs in particular?

Dr Tribe: Thanks for that clarification. If we can ensure that any vehicle that is used in any form of creditor relationship with different entities has an individual put-off effect by going down this dissolution route that we have identified, it will hopefully increase confidence in the way people use the corporate form. The more loopholes we can close down that have caused us to think the form is being used inappropriately, the better.

Unfortunately, phoenixing, as we have discussed, has been going on for literally decades, and perhaps in the future we might be back here again with some other problem that has arisen because of nefarious activity.

[Jeff Smith]

Q I will just ask one final question. We have had some written evidence suggesting that the current regime is adequate. If you do not mind my quoting from it, it says:

“Applying the current controls properly, putting dissolved companies into liquidation and publicising that new policy will be a far more effective deterrent...That requires no new legislation at all.”

Do you have a view on that?

Dr Tribe: The trouble is that to get to that liquidation point, you have to go through the restoration stage. I think that submission might have also talked about the idea of restoring an entity to the register and then going through that insolvency route. I think the Insolvency Service did 33 of those in 2019—pre the bounce back loan issue and pre corona, obviously. Each one of those 33 will have cost it court fees, process fees at Companies House and so on, which means there is this extra layer of procedure that it has to get through before it can ultimately investigate the unfitness activity. I think the dissolution reform in this legislation ensures that that extra layer of bureaucracy—getting the companies back on the register, through restoration, then going through the insolvency processes—is cleared out, and we move straight to the enforcement section.

The other problem with restoration is that you perhaps undermine the integrity of the register itself if you take 33 companies off it, but you then want to put them back on because you need to go through the steps that we want for enforcement and so on. It is an interesting point, but I think you have a quicker public protection mechanism process that you can do now that gets you to a less costly enforcement outcome.