(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberMadam Deputy Speaker, may I wish you, the Minister and the House a happy new year?
The Bill returns to the House at a very important moment for the country’s economy and our financial services industry. We have just come to the end of the transition period with the European Union, and we are of course in the teeth of the battle against the virus. Against a background like that, the business of legislating can seem even more prosaic than usual, and perhaps that is even more the case with a Bill such as this one. It is a mixed bag of measures dealing with everything from onshoring various EU directives to the length of the term of office for the chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority. Some of it is a necessary consequence of our withdrawal from the European Union, and other parts look as though they have been sitting in the Treasury waiting for a legislative home, like policies hoping for a passing bus.
I want to focus on the amendments tabled in the name of the Leader of the Opposition and then turn to some of those tabled by my right hon. and hon. Friends. The first amendment I want to speak to is our amendment 1 on the UK’s net zero commitments. The Bill sets out, in schedules 2 and 3, a list of things that the regulators have to have regard to in the exercise of their new and expanded functions under the Bill. It talks of international standards and competitiveness, yet nowhere is there a mention of the overarching goal that will shape so much of our economy in the decades to come.
In this place, we have rows and arguments about all manner of issues, but sometimes the things that generate the most heat, if the Minister will pardon me the pun, are not always the biggest or most important issues. Conversely, just because an issue has bipartisan support does not make it less significant, and there is no doubt that the Climate Change Act 2008, as amended by the Climate Change Act (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019, is one of the most significant pieces of economic legislation to pass in this country for many years.
To achieve our net zero goals will require wholesale change in many walks of life. The briefest of looks at the Committee on Climate Change’s report on how this should be done shows what the main areas will be. On energy, we need to find replacements for fossil fuels, we have to invest in the shift to hydrogen and we are still trying to make carbon capture and storage a practical reality. On transport, the transition to battery power will have to proceed at an ever-increasing pace. On housing, we need not only to build new zero-carbon homes, but to retrofit millions of existing homes with zero-carbon heating systems. Agriculture, food production and even the clothes we wear—all these things will undergo big change, and all of them will require significant financial investment.
The UK financial services sector has a huge role to play. In seeking a post-Brexit role, what better long-term mission could there be than empowering the change that we need to make to preserve the planet for future generations? This is not just my view—the Chancellor himself has said as much. In his statement on the future of financial services, given two months ago from the Government Dispatch Box, he not only announced the first green gilts, but said he wanted to see
“the full weight of…capital behind the critical global effort to tackle climate change”.—[Official Report, 9 November 2020; Vol. 683, c. 621.]
Yet this Bill, which empowers the regulators in so many other ways, is totally silent on that issue. The Minister says we might do it in the future. [Interruption.] He says from a sedentary position that we will do it in the future. He has an opportunity to do it today—he could just accept the amendment. What is the point of waiting until the future to do this, as he has indicated he will, when there is an amendment that does not seek to add any new commitments but simply to make this part of the remit of our financial services regulators?
There are many reasons, as my newly ennobled—if that is the correct word; newly honoured, perhaps—hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) said, to say no to amendments, but “not invented here” is one of the worst if the Government have indicated they are going to accept it.
The Government say they want the UK to be the centre for green finance globally, but their first legislative outing on this sector since we left the European Union says nothing about mandating the regulators of the industry to make that part of their mission. As I said, our amendment does not seek to add to the commitments on net zero that the UK has already made, which are already set out in legislation and enjoy the support of all sides of the House, but to make these part of the remit of the regulators that shape our financial services industry. There is already a move towards greater environmental investing from investment funds and from consumers who want to invest in this way, and there is a desire for these products, so why do the Government not back that up by making it part of the regulators’ remit?
We know that these commitments cannot be met without large-scale investment. To anyone who says to just leave it to the market if there is an investor desire, we also know that it cannot be done by the private sector alone. This will take both the private sector and the public sector working together and pulling in the same direction. It is in that spirit that we put forward the amendment. We ask for something that has bipartisan support, is in line with the post-Brexit goal for the sector as set out by the Chancellor himself and will make it easier for the country to achieve its commitments.
Further to that, we are also asking for something that the Minister said in recent minutes that the Government will do at some point anyway. We very much hope that, between now and six o’clock, the Government will reconsider and accept the amendment, which they said they agree with and will bring forward in some way themselves at some point.
Just two weeks ago, the House approved the post-Brexit trade and co-operation agreement, but for financial services this is basically a no deal agreement. The references within it do no more than repeat standard pledges of co-operation in every free trade agreement. The Prime Minister himself acknowledged that, for this sector, he did not achieve as much as he hoped. Indeed, within a few days of the agreement, £6 billion-worth of euro-denominated share trading shifted from London to European exchanges—an immediate response to the new situation.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the way the Government approached the Brexit negotiation means that there is literally no incentive for the EU to agree equivalence arrangements, because the lack of them means exactly what he just pointed out—jobs and trading formerly done in London migrating to the EU? Does he also agree that, in this new environment, any move by the Government to give the City a competitive edge is likely to lessen the chances of progress on equivalence in the EU, and the market access that comes with it? That is another threat to jobs in the City and to tax revenue for the Exchequer.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that this throws into sharp relief the claim that we hold all the cards. It also throws into sharp relief the debate about divergence, as that remains undecided. The fact that the agreement approved by this House two weeks ago did not cover financial services in any meaningful way was not an accident; it was a choice that the Government made. Step by step, the Government abandoned any attempt to prioritise the market access that the financial services sector, and indeed services in general, had until the end of last year. I remind Conservative Members of the Chequers paper published in 2018, of which they may have more or less fond memories. It acknowledged that on this issue,
“there will be more barriers to the UK’s access to the EU market”
than there are today. On equivalence regimes, it said:
“These regimes are not sufficient to deal with a third country whose financial markets are as deeply interconnected with the EU’s as those of the UK are. In particular, the existing regimes”—
that is, the equivalence regimes—
“do not provide for…institutional dialogue…a mediated solution where equivalence is threatened by a divergence of rules or supervisory practices”.
That which was deemed insufficient by the Government two and a half years ago has now become the height of their ambitions, and even that has not yet been achieved. With each step back from what they aimed for before, the incentives to shift funds and people become bigger.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI asked some questions about this matter in relation to clause 27, so I do not intend to speak again.
The powers are necessary to prevent not only exploitation that might pose some systemic risks to the financial system, but catastrophic loss to UK investors due to rogue investors or investments. Regulators are reluctant to use the more draconian end of their powers, and there is little evidence that they actually go there.
Is the Minister satisfied that the practical effect of the changes will be that the FCA is determined to use those powers, if need be? It seems to be reluctant to go to the stage of closing firms down. That would be a huge decision that may involve considerable disruption. Is he convinced that the FCA has the resources, the aptitude and the determination to do that if necessary?
To some extent, this is illustrated by the fact that the enhanced sentence was in a 2015 report but we are only just legislating for it now. Five years later, we are still only talking about a sentence that is highly unlikely ever to be used, based on the past record—the Minister just quoted it himself. I wonder whether he might increase the confidence that some of us have that this is being tackled in a coherent way—we will get on to some of this later—by talking about the fragmented supervisory system and what he is doing to help bring that together so that the fragmented regulation of this whole area can actually be done more coherently, so that we can get enforcement on abuse. We all know that, prior to the big bang in the City, this was all done informally anyway, by gentleman in their clubs. It seems to me that we never really got a grip, after the big bang, in dealing with that informal networking that goes on, where a lot of the gaps and a lot of the potential insider dealing actually lurks. Perhaps he could give me a little bit more confidence about that.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI just have a question about these policy statements. We have been through quite a lot about how the FCA will designate, compel and continue the submission of information and all the rest of it. What role do these policy statements play in all of that? Is the policy statement simply putting into law a requirement on the FCA to say why it has acted as it has, or is it, as part of what I think is behind some of the stuff in these clauses, insulating the FCA against the threat of legal action because of the possible effect on contracts? Is this a nice to have, best practice or is it something that helps to protect the FCA against the threat of litigation, which has been a thread through this discussion?
Obviously, this is a very technical area, to say the least. I just want to ask a couple of questions so that I can get my head round how the FCA will use the power. We have different regulators who could make different determinations as to what constitutes benchmarks going forward, and yet those benchmarks write contracts worth trillions of pounds and dollars into the future. Any arbitrage opportunity in the way that those contracts work could make some people very rich and ruin others. This will be decided as one goes along. Some of these contracts are being made, but some are already projected into the future.
To ensure that markets are not distorted and the potential for nefarious profit by some with insider information is minimised, we need reassurance about how the FCA will perform the task, particularly in its interactions with the other regulators. I am not sure what the Government’s intention is, apart from saying they are going to liaise with other regulators. Is it the Government’s intention that these benchmarks ought to be similarly designed and defined across different regulatory jurisdictions, since this is almost a currency, or are we seeking divergence here as well in order to perhaps increase our chances of being the place where some of this business is written?
Perhaps the Economic Secretary could reassure me on that, because the FCA’s powers are pretty strong, but what is the intention? That might be in all of the many consultations, which I confess I have not read, so it might be set out there. If the Minister could put a little more on the record, we might at least have some certainty there, not least for Pepper v. Hart purposes.
I just want to ask the Economic Secretary a question to ensure that we have properly understood the clause. All through this part of the Bill, we have talked about the different timescales in different clauses, and here we have another, which extends the transition period for benchmarks with third-country administrators until the end of 2025.
For my clarity, and perhaps for that of colleagues, will the Economic Secretary clarify whether the measures are different—I think they are—from the five and 10-year timescales in clauses 9 and 12, relating to the FCA designating what the hon. Member for Glasgow Central called zombie LIBOR? Is this five-year period about something different or does it relate to that?
Having debated this matter for a couple of hours, I am not sure that we have resolved it. My feeling is that we are leaving quite a lot to the FCA. I hope that the clause minimises the risk of harm. We have talked a lot about the risk of litigation, but there is also the risk of harm to those who have entered contracts based on LIBOR in good faith. The Government and regulators are trying to move away from that system for reasons that we understand are to minimise harm to those who signed up in good faith, but I suspect that there is still a fair bit of work for the regulator to do to ensure that that is the case.
Will the Economic Secretary share with the Committee the intention behind the extension to 2025? He said that it was to create certainty—I can understand that. Is the intention to transition to something different—the new third-country regime—after the extension, or is it to develop and introduce it earlier if it looks like there are advantages to doing so? I know that I am asking him to gaze into the future, but this will be in the Treasury and regulators’ work list and they will presumably schedule it at some stage. Does he expect the creation of a third-country regime to be difficult or quite easy? Are the Government thinking of basing it on the existing regimes or diverging from what we are used to? Will he give us a little more information about how the Treasury intends to proceed with this piece of technical but very important work.
We will come on to their reaction. It is extraordinary that a sector this important has been relegated so far in the Government’s priorities. It is absolutely extraordinary that in these final days of renegotiation this is not front and centre. We just need to look at the employment, the investment and the tax revenues, and the role that the sector can play in global standards. Yet it has been relegated by the Government to an outcome that they admit is inferior and which, right now, they have not even been able to achieve.
All we can legislate for here is what we do. The fact that it is not front and centre of the negotiations right now speaks volumes about how far we have drifted from talk of achieving all the same benefits and securing a free trade zone from Iceland to the Urals—do hon. Members remember that? All of that has gone.
That is the OBR’s estimate of the additional cost of a no-deal scenario, on top of the already long-term hit in the deal scenario. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to set that out.
The fact that this has happened slowly over the past couple of years, and maybe the fact that the industry has become weary of arguing about it—as, perhaps, have all of us—should not disguise the importance of what has happened. It is important to set that out and to put these clauses in perspective. The Government chose to relegate the importance of UK financial services industries in the Brexit negotiations. Having made that decision, they then relegated financial services even further by aiming for an outcome that they openly admitted was inadequate, and they have not even been able to achieve that outcome. That is the context of these clauses.
I have a few questions on the details of the regime being established by the clauses. First, how does this relate to the Chancellor’s statement on financial services on 9 November? The clause and schedule 9 set out a country-by-country approval system for equivalence decisions, but in his statement on 9 November the Chancellor said that he was publishing a set of equivalence decisions for the UK and the EEA member states—those member states who still have access to these passporting rights, even though they are not EU members. Clause 24, as I said, implies a country-by-country process. Does the Chancellor’s statement mean that in policy terms, the equivalent recognition has already been given to all EU and EEA member states? Is that for all the financial products that are produced to which such equivalence might apply—that is, those traded on a cross-border basis?
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI apologise, Dr Huq; I shall try to speak up.
There are many fine-sounding statements about ESG principles on corporate websites. Some of the toughest money management companies in the world are now telling us that it is no longer just about quarterly or annual returns, but about long-term sustainability. We are told that investors do not want to be making money on the back of poor governance or shoddy or illegal working practices; they want their investments to be in companies and projects that are sustainable for the long term and are run in the right way.
With your indulgence, Dr Huq, I will illustrate that with an example that has been in the news recently. I want to consider what these corporate statements were worth in the case of the clothing firm boohoo. When The Sunday Times exposed the shocking conditions in boohoo’s supply chain back in July, including paying workers in the supply chain well below the minimum wage and serious fire risks in the factories in which the clothes were made, the company commissioned an independent review of the supply chain. That was chaired by Alison Levitt QC; she reported in September. She found that the allegations about the supply chain were
“not merely well-founded but substantially true”.
On the corporate governance side of things, her findings were damning. Her report says:
“No member of the Board I interviewed mentioned that the responsibility for what is happening in the supply chain derived from the duty of the company’s officers to act in the best interests of all the shareholders.”
In other words, the board did not understand that it was not in the interest of their own shareholders to allow a supply chain in which these illegal practices were taking place. Ms Levitt was effectively concluding that the board did not know it was their duty—or that if they did know, they did nothing about it.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the lack of effective enforcement is also an important factor in boards’ thinking that the risk may be worth taking? Lack of effective enforcement has been a feature of the last 10 years, as enforcement authorities have been starved of funding and retreated further and further from the frontline, where these practices are going on.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The point I am making in moving the amendment is that, although there are arguments to be made about enforcement and minimum wage inspectorates and so on, there is another side to the issue: the considerations for investors in these companies and the role of regulators. That is what the amendment is about.
Following Ms Levitt’s report, my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall) wrote to all of boohoo’s main shareholders—the list reads like a “Who’s Who” of blue-chip City firms: it includes Jupiter, Fidelity, Invesco, BlackRock and Standard Life Aberdeen. None of those firms—with one notable exception, which I will come to—has taken meaningful action. They talk about engaging and following the situation closely, but only one has actually followed through. All the firms have on their websites very fine-sounding statements about ESG, corporate governance, social considerations, sustainability and so on—indeed, some have set themselves up as champions of those causes.
Let me come to the exception to the rule on that list: Standard Life Aberdeen. It has sold all its shares in boohoo and is clear about why. In a letter to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West, the Standard Life Aberdeen chairman Sir Douglas Flint says that the firm had been concerned about the supply chain for some time and that
“Our patience with the company’s responses on the issue had been diminishing during the last year. That patience evaporated this summer with the company’s response to the media allegations and that is why we took the decision to sell our remaining shareholding.”
Standard Life Aberdeen is run by serious people. It is a very reputable, important financial management firm and it has decided to act in accordance with its ESG principles and wants to uphold them. What the story shows is that too many companies do not and that often it is just words.
Our amendment seeks to put some regulatory force behind the upholding of these principles. Firms say that they want to uphold them, but, as the story shows, too often that is not the case—action is wished away with talk of engagement and monitoring the situation and all the rest of it. The amendment would make the regulator have to have regard to the exploitation of workers and make upholding high social and governance standards a hallmark of the UK financial services industry. In that way, we would not just depend on good people such as Sir Douglas Flint and on companies that are the exception to the rule; we would send a clear signal to the whole investment industry about the kind of response that we want to see. Otherwise, the fear must be that, although there will be plenty more warm words and mission statements, they will be of little comfort to someone working in an overheated factory and earning £3 or £4 an hour—about half the minimum wage—and that, when the story is exposed and the exploitation is no longer hidden, the investors in the company that is ultimately responsible will not do anything about it.
I ask the Minister to imagine the signal that such a regulatory duty could send. Not only would there be a minimum wage law, as there is now, but the UK’s supercharged, empowered regulators would have social and governance considerations at the heart of what they do.
We have had many debates about standards and what would happen in the UK after Brexit on this issue. Time and again, the Prime Minister has said that he does not want a race to the bottom: he wants the UK to uphold high international standards and there is absolutely no reason to think that our departure from the EU should be any threat to rights of work or any considerations like that. This amendment is a chance to prove that and put it at the heart of financial regulation.
The truth is that companies are much more likely to take such considerations seriously if their investors are tapping them on the shoulder and saying, “Why aren’t you doing that?” It is clear that Standard Life Aberdeen tried to do the right thing for a time with boohoo and eventually got so exasperated that it divested itself of its shares in the company. That is what we want to see more of from major investors and shareholders. It is not happening enough at the moment. The fine words on corporate websites are not matched enough by that kind of action.
Adding what is in the amendment to the regulators’ “have regard to” list and the accountability framework in the Bill would send a powerful signal about the character of post-Brexit financial services. That is why we have tabled it today.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am a softly spoken and moderate man; it has not always done me good, but I am on track here at the moment.
I want to respond to the Minister’s reasons for advising us not to press the amendment. I talked at the beginning about three pots of amendments, and it strikes me that there are really two or three pots of reasons why Ministers say no to amendments. The first is that the amendment is wrong or not competently written in some way. Pot two is that it has completely misunderstood the Bill and therefore is not just incompetently written, but actually wrong in its intent. Pot three is to say that it is covered anyway. Usually, if somebody is not going to say yes to an amendment, it falls into one of those categories. The Minister has gone for pot three today. He has not really argued that the amendment is wrong in its content or that there is anything wrong with the way it is written; he has argued that this kind of thing is covered anyway. There is a problem for us in accepting that.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a fourth one, which is to say, “This should not be on the face of the Bill; we are going to do it, but we are going to put it in secondary legislation,” which of course is unamendable and usually rammed through this House in a way that makes scrutiny even harder?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps there is even a fifth one, which is, “Wait for the consultation on something else.” The problem with going for pot three and saying the amendment is covered anyway is that that concedes that it would be completely harmless and there would be nothing wrong if it were accepted. The Government are, in effect, agreeing with its intent and saying they will do it.
I do not really have substantial questions at this stage, because schedule 2 sets out the detail, and I think we will probably have an extensive debate on it.
The clause inserts a new part 9C into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which forms the legal basis for the new regime that the Bill introduces for investment companies. We have been talking about the minimum amount of capital required. We have covered some of that, although we will get further into it when we come to the Basel 3.1 bits.
Will the Minister say a bit about remuneration policies? That is another issue that will be regulated. We know from what happened in the financial crash and the build-up to that bubble that remuneration policies formed a key part of the bad incentives that created the behaviour that caused the crash. How will the Government be dealing with the regulators about remuneration? What will the principles be? Getting the right incentives for remuneration is a key driver for behaviour, and behaviour is a key driver for activities in that area, as we know only too well. If we did not know that from 2008, we would know it from the Wall Street crash in 1929. It is part of a set pattern. How will the Government ask the regulators to deal with that issue?