Nusrat Ghani
Main Page: Nusrat Ghani (Conservative - Sussex Weald)Department Debates - View all Nusrat Ghani's debates with the Cabinet Office
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved.
I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft statutory instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the GRU Volunteer Corps. Threats from foreign powers and their proxies have grown in scale and complexity, and we have just had a debate about one of the areas of the world from where these threats emanate. Designation is a powerful tool for disrupting state bodies and those acting in concert with them, and it sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling foreign power threat activity globally. The Home Secretary has determined that the three bodies are involved in foreign power threat activity, so we propose to designate them under this new power.
Before I give more detail on the bodies in question, it is worth setting out the legislative basis of the decision. For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is involved in foreign power threat activity, as defined in the National Security Act 2023. The definition of “foreign power threat activity” covers the most serious offences in the Act, including espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. It also covers broader activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety when carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. If that test is met, the Home Secretary must then consider whether designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. She will take account of considerations such as foreign policy and the impact on human rights.
Once a group is designated, it is a criminal offence within the UK’s jurisdiction to support, assist or obtain material benefits from that designated body, and the penalties for such offences are imprisonment for up to 14 years and/or a fine. Where an individual commits certain espionage conduct or sabotage for a designated body, this can attract sentences of up to life in prison. Designation therefore enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt designated bodies more effectively. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-Government advice. A decision to designate is only taken after great care and consideration, and it must be approved by both Houses.
I turn now to the bodies in question, starting with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is well established; indeed, we have literally just debated it. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, and Jewish and Israeli communities globally. The IRGC Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors, and influence operations that are designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has involved threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC also supports militant groups overseas, and has been associated with cyber-attacks and other state threats that are actively aligned with Iranian state objectives.
I will move on to the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right. The IMCR has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and to Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March. Sitting behind the IMCR are members of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed attacks across Europe by the IMCR. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress, and they have a profound effect on the communities affected. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and the interests of the United Kingdom.
On the GRU Volunteer Corps, Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom extends far beyond conventional military action. The Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force or a loose collection of volunteers. It is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service. These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU, and they are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion.
We are seeing a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture; it reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom. In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London on behalf of the Wagner Group, another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state, and which is proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have been absorbed into the so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the UK.
With the House’s consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her reasonably to believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity, and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy intent on harming the United Kingdom or our interests. We will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil.
This debate is a significant moment, because this is the first use of a new power introduced by this Government to answer an urgent need. We are taking action because the three bodies in question, in their different ways, pose a threat to our country, and because designation is a necessary and proportionate response to their activities. With that, I commend the regulations to the House.
Al Carns (Birmingham Selly Oak) (Lab)
As Russia becomes increasingly boxed in in Ukraine, it looks towards horizontal escalation. I welcome today’s announcement and the move to proscribe some of these groups. The IRGC, GRU and the SVR—multiple different organisations—are seeking ways to undermine our democracy, using physical, electronic, financial, diplomatic and a multitude of other avenues to try to undermine the right to self-determination, the centrality of democracy in the western world, and, importantly, the way in which we govern.
As we move towards an increasingly fractious and dangerous period of time with Russia and in the middle east, will the Minister, in her summing up, say what more we can do to clamp down on hostile state disinformation, Russian disinformation in particular, on social media?
James MacCleary (Lewes) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats will support the regulations, which are welcome if somewhat overdue. We have argued for years that the IRGC should face much tougher action here in the United Kingdom. Despite successive Governments recognising the threat, they did not act until now, so the regulations are very welcome indeed.
The IRGC is central to the Iranian regime’s repression at home and its destabilising activities abroad. It is backing proxy groups targeting dissidents overseas and poses a direct threat to people here in the UK. The new designation powers recognise that modern threats extend far beyond conventional warfare. Espionage, cyber-attacks, foreign interference and intimidation carried out on behalf of hostile states all threaten our national security.
I also recognise and welcome the designation of the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and Russia’s GRU so-called Volunteer Corps. However, designation alone is not enough, so will the Minister tell the House what additional resources are being provided to ensure that the powers are properly enforced? How will the Government identify and prosecute those acting on behalf of those organisations here in the UK? I also hope that the Minister can say more about protecting those at risk. Members of Britain’s Iranian diaspora and our Jewish communities deserve confidence that the measures will deliver real protection.
The regulations should from part of a wider strategy. Hostile states increasingly rely on cyber-operations, disinformation and political interference. Britain must continue to strengthen our resilience and work closely with our allies to meet those threats. The regulations are a welcome step, and the Liberal Democrats support them.
I call Mark Sewards for the final Back-Bench contribution—not on a five-minute speaking limit but with 60 minutes of debate left.
Mark Sewards
The right hon. Gentleman tempts me, but I am not going to take the offer.
The IRGC is a direct threat to the safety of the British-Jewish community. We have known that for a long time, and unfortunately the evidence has stacked up as the years have rolled on. We have seen Hatzola ambulances, which served the whole community, not just the Jewish community, set ablaze; we have seen synagogues and community centres firebombed; and we have seen Jewish people stabbed on the streets of Golders Green. It is past time that we designate the IRGC as the threat to this country that it is.
I am reminded—especially today of all days, after the Prime Minister’s final Question Time—that it was the Prime Minister who went to the Jewish community in April and made two promises: first, that the legislation would be brought forward in the King’s Speech and prioritised; and secondly, that he would use it to designate the IRGC. I am so pleased that today, after his final Prime Minister’s Question Time, he has fulfilled both promises.
I am eternally grateful for the work that the Prime Minister did to transform my party. I think back to 2019 and the worst defeat that we had suffered since 1935 and remember feeling that my party may never come back. But the Prime Minister turned it around, made us face the public, rid us of the poison of antisemitism and delivered the second-biggest majority of my party’s history.
As I make the short journey over to the parliamentary Labour party office to nominate my right hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), in the spirit of unifying behind out next leader, to succeed the Prime Minister—assuming this debate is done by 6 pm— I place on record my thanks to the person who delivered this historic Labour majority, and who is directly responsible for my job and the jobs of many of my colleagues. After all, serving as a Member of Parliament is the greatest privilege in the world, and I will always be grateful to the Prime Minister for that.
Mr Sewards, you have left many minutes on the clock for a change.