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Nigel Mills
Main Page: Nigel Mills (Conservative - Amber Valley)Department Debates - View all Nigel Mills's debates with the HM Treasury
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe way in which the agreement works means that the tax liability falls due in a country that has signed up, as Ireland has done, partly through its membership of the EU. The tax minimum floor is 15% and it falls due on the activities in that country. The country that collects the tax, first and foremost, will be the country in which the company is headquartered —it might be a UK-headquartered company, for example—but that floor means that with respect to those countries that do not charge 15%, the company is liable for that top-up tax. That is why being part of the group of countries helping to make the rules is so critical. It is not for me to advise the Irish Government or others on how to conduct their own tax affairs—I would not dream of doing so—but it is a member of the European Union, which has set out that directive, and the date is 31 December. I will leave that with the right hon. Gentleman.
I will give way once more, if I may, but then I must make some progress.
The Minister will know that the main motivation for this change is to stop the use of tax havens. Sadly, a lot of our overseas territories and Crown dependencies have a corporate income tax rate below 15%. Have the Government had discussions with those territories to try to ensure that they reform their position, so that they do not have their tax topped up elsewhere, effectively, rather than charging it themselves?
I know my hon. Friend understands that I must not reveal conversations that may have happened with other jurisdictions, and of course it is not for me to comment on how other jurisdictions conduct their tax affairs. However, he is absolutely right that this is about having a minimum floor of tax to prevent the sort of aggressive tax planning that frankly very few people or businesses in the world can afford. It is about ensuring that they pay a fair amount, across the world, so that they are contributing to public services.
I am mindful that the right hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) asked me a question about sovereignty. We have a veto, so we are leading the discussion on this. If we do not like a future proposal, we have a veto: that is a very important part of the international agreement in which we are taking part.
As was announced last year and as the Chair of the Treasury Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin), has set out, the Bill legislates for the abolition for the Office of Tax Simplification. We have taken that approach because what we want, rather than an arm’s length body overseeing simplification—albeit one with some very interesting ideas that I have certainly read carefully and been interested to consider—is a clear mandate to officials in the Treasury and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to put tax simplification at the heart of policy making.
A very good example that will be introduced via the Bill is that the £1 million annual investment allowance limit will be made permanent. This measure allows businesses to write off the cost of qualifying plant and machinery investment in the first year up to £1 million, simplifying the tax treatment of capital expenditure for 99% of businesses.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie). I will start where my hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet (Craig Mackinlay) did: people think that Finance Bills are a little dry, but somebody must have a sense of humour to produce a 456-page Bill and then hide in clause 346 the abolition of the Office of Tax Simplification, probably at the exact time that we really need it. When I used to practise as an accountant, I had a copy of all the tax legislation on my desk. I sense that if I were still working, I would need a much bigger desk for the successive Finance Bills we have had over the past 13 years. Perhaps at some point, we should stand back and think, “Do we really need to keep adding all of this stuff every year? At what point are we going to start taking away stuff that we have now effectively duplicated?” I suppose it would mean that I could work from home, because I probably could not carry all of those books around, so maybe there are some bonuses there.
Much of the technical stuff in this Bill has been pre-consulted on—we have seen it for a long time—and most of it is to be warmly welcomed. I will quickly mention clause 25, which finally sorts out the net pay arrangement for pensions. We have been trying to find a solution for this for quite some years; to put people whose pension scheme has chosen the net pay arrangement, rather than the other way of doing it, into the position that they should have always been in. We have finally found a solution through which HMRC will make it good, which is to be warmly welcomed. I cannot quite see a start date for that in the Bill, though—I hope it is soon—and it would have been nice if HMRC had actually paid some back pay. People who are saving pretty small amounts, who are the ones on the very lowest levels of income, could have had the tax back that they should have been getting for the past decade or so, but perhaps we should not be too greedy.
I want to focus most of my remarks on the pensions tax changes, and then on the corporation tax and the multinational top-up tax. There is a theme in those things: we have some welcome measures, but we end up on a rather haphazard journey to a very strange place where things competing with each other everywhere, and I do not quite have an idea of what we are trying to achieve.
On the pensions tax stuff, we had clearly created a problem through the reduction and freezing of the lifetime allowance. The only solution to a problem caused in that way is to undo what we have done, and it makes sense to scrap that completely. I would have probably preferred to have a higher lifetime allowance and scrap the annual allowance: if we are aiming to limit how much tax relief people get on pensions saving, I am not quite sure why we need to do it on a year-by-year basis when we should probably be more worried about the overall total. It seems a bit harsh to me that somebody who starts a business, scrimps and saves, saves every penny and reinvests it, and finally sells that business for a decent amount now cannot get the same pension as somebody who has been employed for all that time, taking much less risk, because they are capped on the £60,000 they can put in per year and by how many years they can look back. I am not sure what policy objective we are trying to achieve there, but it is welcome progress.
On the Opposition’s reasoned amendment, I am sceptical about the attraction of trying to have different tax regimes for different sectors. It becomes hard to work out which occupations we like and which we do not, and to which we want to give favourable status. Even if we wanted to do it, it becomes hard. Do I want a favourable tax regime for doctors regardless of where they work? I then have to define “doctor” and work out what sort of doctors I want to favour. Do I want it for people who work in the NHS, in which case it would have to include whoever is being paid large amounts, whether finance directors, human resources directors or diversity officers?
It would be slightly bizarre to give a more generous tax regime to a finance director in an NHS trust being paid a large amount of money, but not to somebody owning and running a business, trying to create jobs in the economy. That would be hard to do, and we would have to go through every senior public sector worker, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet did, working out who to include. Even if we did that, how on earth would we work out which organisations to include? Most high-paid NHS staff are not employed by NHS England, but by God knows how many trusts around the country. If we wanted to apply the regime to GPs, too, they all have their own businesses. It would be phenomenally difficult to work out how to do that, if we think about how the lifetime allowance being set that way was causing a problem and driving people out.
My hon. Friend is making some excellent points about the problems of having sector-specific lifetime allowances, which would proliferate and become unbelievably confusing, as he says. We have all made the case about other public sector workers who would be affected by the lifetime allowance. We could introduce a regime where we exempt them one by one and effectively have a regime for all public sector workers, but does he agree that it would be unfair and economically irrational to have a completely separate pension regime for public sector workers and a far more punitive one for private sector workers, who are important for generating wealth in the country?
I agree with my hon. Friend. I remember the anger when I was first elected about people working in the private sector getting a very small pension and seeing the large generosity of the public sector ones that they could never dream of aspiring to. To have a more generous tax arrangement on top of a more generous pension that they were effectively paying for would be hard to sell to people. I think the Government have found a sensible fix on that.
Where has this situation left pension tax policy? We now have a regime where when someone earns the money and pays it into their pension, they do not pay income tax and national insurance on it, and when they draw the pension, they pay income tax, but not national insurance. We are not quite sure we like that. If someone is earning too much—more than £260,000 now—we start reducing the amount they can put in every year from the £60,000 cap down to a £10,000 cap. Then, if someone wants to draw their pension, they can have a quarter of it completely tax-free, even if they do that 10 years before they retire, but now we do not like that either, because that might be too much, so we have capped it at the level of the lifetime allowance that we have just scrapped. What are we trying to do? Added to that is the fact that if I have a defined-contribution pension that I do not draw and leave in my estate, there is no inheritance tax on it. I do not even pick up the tax at that point.
If we stood back and said, “What are we trying to incentivise and encourage people to do by the £50 billion or so of annual tax that we forgo”—or defer, strictly speaking—“on pension saving?”, I am not sure we would design this system. The Government would be well advised to create some kind of commission or review to look in the round at all the various ways we incentivise pension saving and all the ways we tax it and try to work out what a coherent system that people have some hope of understanding would be. I suspect we would get far better outcomes if we did that. I encourage the Government to do that. That would need to be on a long-term, cross-party basis. It cannot be done on a whim every few months.
The danger is that we get to a Finance Bill or Budget and we want a bit of money here, or we have found a little fire we want to put out there, or we want to make another tweak, and we end up building and building more and more strange bits on to this rather ugly looking house until it finally falls over. We should try to get it in some kind of shape before we get into that position.
Moving to the various corporation tax measures in the Bill, I am prepared to accept the rise in corporation tax. Given the fact we bailed out nearly every business in the economy three years ago in the covid pandemic, there is justification for saying that we need to pay those bills, and corporation tax, which businesses only pay when making a profit, is the right way to do that. It takes a little bit of believing to convince ourselves that we can raise the rate that businesses pay on all their future profits—all the fruits of their investment—and that that will not deter investment, but a short-term deferral of when they pay tax by having full expensing will somehow encourage loads of investment, even though they will end up paying the extra 6% on the profit they will earn from the use of new machinery at some point in the future. They will not pay it in the first year, but they will pay more in all of the subsequent years.
My hon. Friend points to an argument that, I have to confess, has perplexed me. People say that raising corporation tax to 25% will not necessarily damage investment or, indeed, British business, but then why stop at 25%? Why is that the appropriate amount? If businesses are impervious to the tax rate and it does not affect their behaviour, why not have 30%, 35% or 40%? He understands my point. They are making a value judgment about where the line of damage is to be drawn, and I think he is quite right that it is hard to think that it will not have some kind of impact.
My right hon. Friend makes a fair point. I guess there is an attraction in that 25% is an easy calculation. We could go for 26%, which Labour had in its manifesto at the last election, and perhaps that could have been a submission. I think it also had a small companies rate rising to 21%, which it does not want to remember these days. I just think that we cannot really have it both ways—that deferring taxes encourages investment, even though businesses end up paying them, but raising them somehow does not. I think we should try to be a bit coherent about what we actually think in that situation.
Again, I have no idea what we are trying to do in giving people tax relief on their expenditure on capital assets. We now have a capital allowance regime that, for most assets, is generally 25% on a reducing balance, unless it is an asset for too long, for which the long-life regime is 4% a year, or it is a short-life asset, such as a computer, when they can choose a different regime over a shorter period of time. Then there is an up-front initial allowance, depending on whether we have one in place, and now we have a 100% initial allowance for a short period, but we do not give any tax relief at all for industrial buildings. If I want to build a new factory to bring some jobs back from China, I need to go through convoluted calculations—such as proving that the air-conditioning in my building is actually a piece of plant and equipment, not a part of the building—which makes huge amounts of work.
Could we just stand back at some point and think about what we are trying to incentivise business to do? I am not actually convinced that many businesses will really be able to use full expensing on large capital expenditure, because they just will not have the profit. It may give them some cash-flow advantage, but they will have the complexity of how much they can claim, and which company a loss gets trapped in to make sure they can use it all around the group. We are just creating difficulty. Most of the large businesses I ever worked with focused on the rate of tax they had to account for in their accounts—of course, having accelerated deduction does not change that—rather than the cash position, which was hugely complex if they were leasing an asset, finance leasing it, hire purchasing it or God knows what. So I would be a little suspicious or cynical about our actually getting the big change that the Government were hoping for here.
I would go back to an amendment I tabled a decade ago, when I said, “Why don’t we just try to move to giving people tax relief in line with their accounting treatment, so if they think this piece of kit has a five-year life and they account for it over five years, let’s just go for that? Why have all this hassle, and all the cost of all these different regimes? Let’s be more generous on the assets you get relief for, and let’s try to simplify it.” I have a feeling that, if we could somehow get to that, it would be more attractive to most businesses than the annual tinkering of saying, “You can now do this and get a bit more”, and no one knows where on earth they are in such a situation. I would recommend that.
On the multinational top-up tax, I actually support it, and I think I argued for it when it was being discussed. I have always been a little bit suspicious of the OECD—I once called it the organisation for excessively complex drivel, and if Members read the causes we have ended up with, they might think it was relatively complex. What I think we have started trying to do on base erosion is to stop people hiding profits in tax havens with very low rates of corporation tax. We generally know where they are and what their rates are. We could have gone back to what we used to have with our controlled foreign company regime, which was a list of naughty countries. If a business had a subsidiary in one of those, it had to go through some extra compliance to prove that real genuine trading profits were arising in that country, rather than that it was hiding passive income that should have been taxed somewhere else.
I think we could have found a way to have a regime that most countries accepted, where we just said, “If you’ve got a subsidiary in one of these naughty regimes then you have to pick up some tax on it,” rather than having dozens and dozens of hugely complex clauses to effectively create a whole new corporation tax range applying to companies in every country in the world, which have to try to work out whether they are paying too little tax or not based on whatever the local tax differentials are on timing and rules, which we then have to adjust for to try to work out whether someone is being naughty or not, when we know damn well a company in the Cayman Islands is paying zero on the £100 million-worth of profit it has salted there, which is what we were after in the first place.
I welcome where we have got to and I accept that if this is the way we have to do it, it is better than not doing it, but surely if anything highlights how complex our corporate income tax regime has become it is the fact that we need to have 150-odd clauses to try to tax income that is being hidden in territories that have a zero rate. It really is almost beyond belief that we have made it that difficult.
We have to remember that a lot of our own overseas territories and Crown dependencies have seen some of the worst behaviours in this area. As it was when we had to have more transparent disclosure regimes, we need to set a lead on this issue to get the rest of the world to follow. If we are not doing it and not encouraging parts of our UK family to do it, there is a fair chance that the rest of the world will think, “Well, if they’re not going to do it, we’re never going to do it.” So we end up moving at the speed of the herd, which will be standing still.
I welcome the fact that we are doing this. It is the right thing. We need to try to find a way of stopping profits being hidden in places where there is absolutely no justification for them being there. A 15% top-up rate is a good compromise. I would hope that most regimes would see the writing on the wall and up their rates to 15%, and not go for dubious reliefs, deemed deductions and so on to try to contrive their way of having a headline 15% but never applying it. Let us just say that this is the way that the world wants to go. This is what responsible ethical business looks like. This is what responsible ethical government looks like. We do not want money hidden where there is absolutely no justification for it being earnt there. We can try to end up not needing all these hugely complicated rules, which UK-headquartered companies might be having to apply to every territorial subsidiary they have, to try to catch some naughty things that they are not even doing in the first place.
Intriguingly, I do not see in the Bill the repeal of our controlled foreign companies rules. If we have a new regime that tops up the tax in every subsidiary owned by a UK group to 15%, do we need all the old compliance rules to stop UK companies hiding their profits offshore? It seems to me that we will end up with a collection of different regimes all trying to do the same thing. Maybe we could find at least a partial simplification to offset the 150-odd clauses here in the Bill.
My concluding remark on these key issues is that I welcome what the Government are trying to do, but at some point we need to stand back and think, “Have we got our tax code regime in a sensible place where we are realistically, and in as understandable a way as possible, trying to achieve these sensible aims; or have we, through quite understandable tinkering, ended up with some kind of hugely complex monstrosity that at some point will fall over and in the meantime is probably not incentivising the things we want people to do or disincentivising the things we really we do not want them to do?”
Nigel Mills
Main Page: Nigel Mills (Conservative - Amber Valley)Department Debates - View all Nigel Mills's debates with the HM Treasury
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Aaron Bell). I agree with everything he said.
I am a little surprised that we have ended up having to have this debate again today. Generally speaking, people who campaign for their own interests and ask for a special scheme for doctors do so because that was their particular area. However, if we stand back and ask how it is possible to make a special scheme for one particular sector work, we quickly realise that it is fiendishly difficult to do. There are all sorts of scenarios where we hit a problem. For example, some people have split careers, spending some time in the NHS and the rest of the time outside it. Others have split jobs where they might be a consultant for a couple of days a week and then spend another couple of days training the next set of doctors as a university lecturer. That puts them in a different pension scheme that is not subject to the same tax regime. They might say, “I have an NHS pension but I’ll pay it all on my other one,” so that would not work. What about people who are not employed by the NHS or any of the myriad trusts and organisations?
I do not want to pick too much on the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), because I have tabled enough in my time to know that they are not always drafted precisely. However, if we use the word “employed” in draft legislation, that cannot be stretched to include a partner in a GP practice, because they are not employed by anybody. If we use the phrase “employed in an NHS organisation”, that cannot be stretched to include somebody working as a locum, because they are a contractor rather than somebody who is employed. There is all manner of people in the NHS family who we want to encourage to stay in work, but this is not how we will achieve it.
I also think that the hon. Lady has chosen the wrong mechanism. This would result in her having a nightmare. As soon as a person who used to be exempt ceased to work more than 15 hours or retired, the lifetime allowance would kick in and clobber them when they drew their pension. I understand her intention, but I suspect that her mechanism of choice would be disastrous.
Having thought through the scenarios, how do we pick a sector and get the right people? Are we trying to help doctors or are we trying to help anybody who happens to be employed by the NHS? As I said earlier, we are basically helping accountants, finance directors and procurement directors—all manner of people who are paid very large amounts by the NHS. I probably do not have the same amount of sympathy for their contribution to public service as I do for that of frontline doctors. It is bizarre to give a tax advantage to an NHS finance director, who gets a very generous pension, and not to an entrepreneur who is trying to grow the economy and create jobs to pay for all of this. That seems to create a huge iniquity.
If we stand back and think about how we want tax policy to work—heaven forbid that the Opposition get into government and try to do this—it would be really hard, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire (Anthony Browne) has said, to go down the route of justifying different tax rates for public sector employees. If we start asking why we are charging them the same income tax and national insurance, we will end up in a horrible world and a very complicated tax regime.
Those of us who have very good public sector pensions should be very careful. Unlike my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Sir Robert Syms), my lack of career success means that I am not worried about the lifetime allowance, including under the old level, because 20 times my pension gets me nowhere near it. Strange situations are being proposed. When I was first elected 13 years ago, a big issue on the doorstep was, “Public sector pensions are too generous. It’s not fair. I work in the private sector, basically paying for that, and I’m going to get a tiny pension. People in the public sector are being paid the same or more than me, and they are getting a massively generous pension. It’s not fair.” The coalition Government’s response to tackling that perceived unfairness was to change the scheme from final salary to average salary. If we load on to that generous, inflation-protected, state-guaranteed pension a more generous tax treatment than that received by private sector pensions, that would recreate that horrible argument.
It is foolish and damaging to go down the route of cherry-picking favoured sectors and giving them different tax treatment from other sectors. It was a mistake to take that approach to judges and to Directors of Public Prosecution, and it would be a mistake to apply it to doctors. The tax system should apply to everybody across the board in the same way. If we want to provide more reward to people, we should do so by pay rather than by tax. That is a far better approach.
I want to address where the Government have ended up. We have a very complicated pensions tax regime where people do not pay tax on the way in or on an annual basis. Instead, they pay tax on what they draw out of the pension when they get to the end, unless they draw out a quarter of it as a lump sum, in which case they do not pay tax on it all. We have chosen a pension model whereby the state pension broadly provides people with subsistence to live on, and if people want more than that, we incentivise them with a generous tax regime so that they can save it themselves. The implication is that a higher earner gets a greater tax incentive because, unlike a lower earner, they save tax at 40% or 45%. They probably pick up a bit more tax at the end, but a large amount of people pay a lower marginal tax rate when they retire than when they are working. That is the system that we have chosen.
We then thought that perhaps that was a bit too generous to higher earners, so we introduced an annual cap and a lifetime cap. Quite why we needed both, I do not know. If we want to limit how much tax relief we give people, we could choose one of the two and still get to the right answer. The Government have now chosen the annual approach rather than the lifetime approach. The problem is that that does not help people whose earnings are not consistent. If someone is earning a relatively high amount at age 25 and then keeps earning it, that system will work very well for them. If someone starts a business that struggles in the early years and they cannot pay themselves a big salary or make big pension contributions, but then finally it is successful and they sell it and make a lot of money, under this new regime they would not be able to put that much in their pension because they would only be allowed to put in 60 grand a year. I think we could have chosen a higher lifetime allowance and not bothered with the annual allowance. That would have achieved a similar outcome, but we have not done that.
To complicate things further, we have decided that if people earn too much, we will start taking their annual allowance off them completely, meaning that they will be able to put next to nothing in a pension scheme. That does not strike me as being a pensions tax regime that incentivises people to save money in the way we want them to or to use it in their retirement. Effectively, as soon as people hit 57, that gives them a tax incentive to take a lump sum before they retire. We are saying, “The more you earn, the better off you are—unless you earn too much, in which case you are being made worse off and put back to where you started.” In order to put out this particular fire, I urge the Government to step back and consider what they are trying to achieve with the £50 billion or so a year of tax we defer—we actually lose the vast majority of it—and what they really want people to do with their pension savings. How can we use the tax regime to incentivise that and make it fair all the way around? We must come up with a coherent tax regime that drives our policy, rather than come back every couple of years, tweak things, find another fire to put out and think, “Well, it’s not quite working how we wanted, so let’s move it around,” and end up in a confused mess.
This should be a warning to us. If we have a confused mess, with different competing objectives, and we do not think about the whole system, we end up with an unintended consequence. The consequence we had was senior doctors retiring far earlier than we wanted them to because we got the pensions tax regime wrong. If we do not fix this, I suspect there will be another unforeseen consequence and we will have to come back and tweak it in another couple of years. Let us do the job properly, have a coherent regime and use the very large amount of money that we invest to drive the behaviours that we want.
I preface my comments with an absolutely fundamental underlying principle of all economic policy. Whatever we are talking about, I think this should be our first, axiomatic ground rule: whatever is right for the Leader of the Opposition should be right for everyone. There is a fundamental principle here, which is fairness, and I will come on to that.
First, though, I want to mention some of the underlying principles of the annual allowance versus the lifetime allowance, because during almost all of the previous Labour Government’s time in office, there was not a lifetime allowance. It was brought in at the tail end of the Labour Government. One of the Government’s concerns about tax relief for pensioners is the need to limit it so that we do not end up creating huge amounts of dead-weight costs for pension relief, particularly for the well paid. That is why we have an annual allowance that limits tax relief.
Nigel Mills
Main Page: Nigel Mills (Conservative - Amber Valley)Department Debates - View all Nigel Mills's debates with the HM Treasury
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is pleasure to speak to amendment 21, which stands in my name. I also want to speak to the amendments on the Office of Tax Simplification, which my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin) tabled and I was happy to put my name to.
In my more naive and mischievous days, I occasionally tabled amendments to Finance Bills that called on the OTS to review elements of tax. The last time I tried that was on corporation tax in about 2014 and the amendment was accidentally passed in the Bill Committee. I say “accidentally” because neither side knew that we were voting for the amendment. We thought we were voting to withdraw it and we had to rewrite history quickly and pretend that the amendment had not been passed. I have not been able to serve on a Finance Bill Committee ever since, or indeed any Bill Committee, so perhaps I could recommend that as a tactic for Members who do not enjoy them as much as I used to.
If we were being slightly mischievous, we could say that 13 years of the OTS has not resulted in a tax system that is a great deal simpler than the one we have now, but that is probably more the Treasury’s fault than the OTS’s. The serious point is that we need to find a mechanism whereby we can simplify our tax regime. It has got ever more complicated, and at some point we will see taxes start to fall over, because the complexity of different policy ideas over time that conflict with one another leaves us with a system that is incredibly hard to follow and to comply with and is putting undue costs on individuals and businesses.
We could, in a rolling programme, find a way of taking out some of this complexity by being a bit clearer in our policymaking about what we are trying to do. Are we trying to raise income? Are we trying to encourage or discourage certain behaviours? Are we trying to virtue-signal? Are we trying to win votes? Sadly, we do all those things at the same time, sometimes in conflicting ways, and end up with a rather strange system.
The amendments I want to speak to are about the global minimum corporate tax. I think I am the lone voice on the Back Benches who likes to speak in favour of this. I remember looking at this issue before I came here. The OECD has spent a very long time trying to find a solution to base erosion and profit shifting. A few years ago, it produced 15 or so ideas that were quite worthy but made absolutely no progress. The Government then introduced the diverted profits tax in the UK to try to tackle this issue on a domestic basis. It would be a terrible signal if the UK, having been one of the countries that signed up to this, now decided that we want to delay implementation and not go ahead with it.
To be fair, no other solution has been found to how we can stop certain large multinationals trying to hide revenue in low-tax jurisdictions that has no commercial basis for being there. We have tried changing transfer pricing rules, we have tried country-by-country solutions, and we have tried more reporting—we have tried all manner of things, but none of them has managed to fix the problem. That is why the two pillars in the most recent OECD deal, while far from perfect, are the best we are going to get. If we do not go ahead with those, we might see some even more radical, less consensual, less well thought-through ideas being brought in. We even see the UN starting to play in this space, and there is a real risk that what it produces may not be consistent with a coherent tax regime.
I am not the biggest fan of the OECD. I once described it as the “Organisation for Excessively Complex Drivel.” If we read the rules that we are putting through today, there is a real sign that it is excessively complex, and that was my motivation for tabling amendment 21. We probably could have found a better way of achieving the same thing, rather than UK-headquartered groups having to go through a very complicated series of calculations for every subsidiary they have in an overseas regime to try to work out whether they have paid the 15% minimum tax, when the headline rate in those countries is 25% or 30%, and it is extraordinarily unlikely that they will not have paid that 15% tax, and there may well have been timing differences that have to be worked through to try to prove that. That will be a huge compliance burden, and it will not add very much. It will not collect any tax, and it will just make these rules look a lot worse than they are.
The purpose of amendment 21 is to offer the Government the chance to extend the power that the transitional, lighter-touch regime we are allowed to use for the first three years of the rules that has been agreed by the OECD and use it for a bit longer, especially if not every country in the world is following our early implementation of these things, to try to avoid us imposing a compliance burden in the UK that will not exist elsewhere. I accept that that is not currently in the OECD agreement.
As more and more countries try to put these rules into their own domestic law, I think we might see them realise how fiendishly complicated they are and start to look for simpler ways of implementing them, so that we can focus on working out where real tax abuse—avoidance and evasion—is taking place and go and collect the tax that is not being paid, rather than having a big compliance burden. There are plenty of precedents for how we can do that in our own tax rules. We had the worldwide debt cap, which we do not need any more, so we scrapped it, but that had a gateway test. Companies went through a simple test, and if it was clear that they were innocent, they did not have to go through the full detail of the rules. I am sure that we could find some way around that. Our old foreign-controlled company rules had a list of territories that were treated as good unless there was any avoidance going on, and we could use a model like that.
I want to touch on why it is important that the UK takes a lead on this. I think it is fair to say that our overseas territories and Crown dependencies have been among those that have behaved the naughtiest around the world in terms of certain tax behaviours that they have encouraged or permitted in their jurisdictions. We are not going to get global progress on this issue if the UK is not at the forefront. If we say we will wait for the pack, half the world will think, “Well, they’re the ones that have been responsible for a whole chunk of this. If they’re not going to do it, we’re certainly not going to do it.” It is important that we are seen to take a lead in tackling this. Getting this right is hugely popular. Our constituents do not want to see large multinational corporations hiding their profits in low-tax jurisdictions. This sort of relatively moderate measure that we are opting into as part of a global deal does not have any sovereignty concerns.