Courts and Tribunals Bill

Debate between Nick Timothy and Linsey Farnsworth

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Nick Timothy]

I will not give way.

Of course, when the Justice Secretary’s predecessor, the Home Secretary, commissioned Sir Brian Leveson to conduct a review of the criminal courts, she knew what she was doing, because in an earlier review Sir Brian had already said that jury trials should be restricted, with magistrates deciding the mode of trial and appeals made to a circuit judge. Perhaps the Justice Secretary sees this, like the early release scheme, as another hospital pass from his predecessor, who like the hardened criminals she let out of prison early, got out of the MOJ before facing the consequences of her actions. If he does think that, he should not feel that he has to go ahead with it.

Yet here the Justice Secretary is today proposing not only what Sir Brian Leveson recommended, but an even more radical change. He is telling the House that he has no choice but to rush this very serious legislation through Parliament at breakneck speed. The Bill was published less than two weeks ago, after no consultation at all, and today he is already asking hon. Members to approve its Second Reading. He is allowing only five days for Members to scrutinise the Bill line by line in Committee. That is less than the Government allowed for the Railways Bill, the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill and the Pension Schemes Bill. It is about the same time the House once spent scrutinising the Salmon Act 1986, which introduced the offence of handling salmon in suspicious circumstances. It is less time than the 44 debates, statements and urgent questions this House has heard on Israel, Palestine and Lebanon since the election.

We are not talking about legislating to recognise the sentience of crustacea or regulate travelling circuses; we are talking about a fundamental change to our constitution, the operation of our courts and the rights of our people. In the words of His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, this Bill is

“one of the most radical and revolutionary events in English legal history. Yet it has not appeared in any manifesto; it has not been put out for consultation; it has not been recommended by Leveson”.

He says that it

“has been ‘published’ with virtually no notice to anyone”.

What arrogance, Madam Deputy Speaker—what a disgrace!

If this Bill had been the subject of consultation and this Justice Secretary had spent any time listening to judges, lawyers and the public, he would know that it will fail on its own terms. He says that it will deliver justice for more victims, but in Canada and Australia—jurisdictions he cites as an inspiration—judge-only trials have seen more acquittals than jury trials. Indeed, the impact assessment predicts that fewer people will go to prison as a result of these changes. That should be no surprise: asking judges sitting alone to take responsibility for depriving somebody of their liberty is far more onerous than asking 12 fellow citizens who can discuss the evidence, argue the case and share the burden between them.

A corresponding danger to justice is posed by the proposals to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to two years and to limit the right to appeal their rulings. As the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) said earlier, no fewer than 40% of appeals against verdicts and 47% of appeals against sentences issued by magistrates are successful. Incredibly, the Justice Secretary seemed to suggest just now that these figures are not a cause for concern, but a cause for celebration.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

On appeals against magistrates’ rulings, is the shadow Minister aware—as I am, through my experience—that appeals are essentially a retrial in the magistrates court, and that many appeals are successful simply because the victim cannot face giving evidence for a second time and being retraumatised? Defendants will use that to retraumatise the victim all over again, particularly in circumstances where there is domestic abuse.

[Nick Timothy]

I do not accept that characterisation of magistrates courts. If that were a true cause for concern for the hon. Lady, this Bill would perhaps try to address what she says, yet it does not.

The Government’s claims about what the Bill will achieve are hopelessly confused. The Justice Secretary leans heavily on Sir Brian Leveson, who says that limiting jury trials will save 20% of court time, but there has been no modelling to justify this number, and Sir Brian has admitted that it is little more than a guess. When challenged by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), the Justice Secretary said,

“We will…publish our modelling alongside the…Bill”.—[Official Report, 3 February 2026; Vol. 780, c. 109.]

Yet no modelling worthy of the name has been published. The impact assessment takes Sir Brian’s guess and uses it as the median estimate. This is fiction masquerading as science.

The Criminal Bar Association calls the impact assessment “meaningless verbiage”, “total gibberish” and something that

“would make the script writer of ‘In the Thick of it’ wince with embarrassment”.

It concludes:

“If anyone can make any sense of this, please get in touch.”

If the Justice Secretary wanted to accept that invitation right now, I would be willing to give way to him—but he does not.

The Government have overstated the length of trials for cases in scope of the proposed change by more than 100%. The better estimate has been made by the Institute for Government, where researchers have listened to judges and lawyers and understood that only 20% of Crown court time is spent trying either-way offences. Of course, half of those cases will remain jury trials because the likely sentence is above three years. The cases in scope therefore take up only 5% to 10% of Crown court time, so even if they could be tried 20% faster, it would save only 1% or 2% of court time.

[Nick Timothy]

My right hon. and learned Friend is exactly right. I was planning to turn to that point, because the Bill creates a problem not only in the burden of time it creates, but in the politicisation of our judiciary.

The Bill does create new time burdens. When juries deliberate, judges do other work in court, including on other trials. If judges deliberate instead, the court time used to hear other cases is lost. Because a defendant’s right to a jury trial will depend on the likely custodial sentence if he is found guilty, if the Bill becomes law, a judge will, for the first time, be needed to first conduct a hearing to determine the likely sentence. The Bill says that the parties involved should make representations; in cases with several defendants, the judge would need to hear from all their representatives and the prosecutor, taking up hours of time. There is more: defendants often plead guilty after the plea and trial preparation hearing, but before trial. In these cases, the sentencing judge—possibly not the same as the allocating judge—will have to hear the submissions all over again.

Then there are the reasons for conviction or acquittal, as my right hon. and learned Friend has just said. Juries do not have to provide reasons, but the Bill says that judges must. That will inevitably take many hours per case—time that right now is used to try cases.

[Linsey Farnsworth]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Nick Timothy]

I will make some progress.

This opens up new risks. The publication of judges’ reasons is likely to lead to more appeals and more court time being taken up. As questions are posed about judges’ reasons, we are likely to see the politicisation of judges and judicial appointments—something that will be made worse by the blurring of our adversarial model and the European inquisitorial role of judges. Under our model, judges are entitled to intervene and seek further information to help the jury with their assessment; in a judge-only trial, where the judge inevitably takes on a more inquisitorial role, those interventions and requests will inevitably be portrayed as the display of bias.

This will be made worse when it comes to the role of the judge in deciding on the admissibility of evidence. A judge usually sees all manner of material that is prejudicial to the defendant but deemed inadmissible, which does not matter when it is a jury who decides innocence or guilt. When a judge sees prejudicial material and deems it inadmissible, however, it will be difficult for anybody to believe that the information was simply erased from their mind. Judges may be professional and fully committed to their impartiality, but they are not superhuman.