(2 days, 4 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI think I have been clear that every law available should be used—potentially, more could be passed—to properly prosecute, challenge, shut down and stop anyone inciting hatred on the basis of race, religion, sexuality or whatever it might be. I cannot find any better set of words to make my revulsion at those crimes clearer, and I show my absolute support for any enforcement agency or Government of any political persuasion that brings forward workable laws to clamp down on those unacceptable criminal behaviours, full stop.
I will just finish this point, then I will be delighted to give way to my hon. Friend.
The point I am trying to make is that bits of legislation that we are asked to consider sometimes have unintended consequences, and that there is a risk of someone being offended by something that does not pass the reasonability test in this Bill. Outside the well-defined areas that go into the criminal, part of free speech is the right to offend on certain levels.
The hon. Lady is right to bring the Committee’s attention to that which is already laid down in statute. I think that perhaps where the misunderstanding is coming in—the Opposition are trying to test this—is whether the new reasonability test will deliver perverse results in a tribunal. Probably nobody sitting in this room would expect that to happen, but it could supersede that which is already set down and create a new precedent.
I should probably make reference to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests: I am an unpaid trustee at the Index on Censorship, which may be relevant to this debate.
I do not think anybody here is a free speech absolutist. My hon. Friend is trying to test scenarios, but he is in no way talking about issues such as incitement of hatred, which are already criminal matters. We are talking about the codification of things that may be subjective in the light of the law of unintended consequences.
To bring some colour to the conversation, I thought I would make reference to a recent Independent Press Standards Organisation ruling. I cannot imagine that that was ever the kind of ruling that was intended at the time that IPSO was created. Gareth Roberts, who sometimes writes for The Spectator, was writing about a third party who had, in turn, written about issues relating to gender, and referred to them as
“a man who claims to be a woman”.
That person then complained to IPSO, which ruled that it was not wrong as a statement of fact, but still upheld the complaint on account of its being a prejudicial or pejorative reference to that person. I do not think that that is the kind of thing that was ever intended when IPSO was created, but it is the type of example that we may be talking about right now. I would love to know what my hon. Friend thinks about that.
My hon. Friend highlights an issue that would come down to a subjective test, so “reasonableness” could mean something very different in different tribunal settings and to different individuals casting judgment on any such complaint. That goes to the absolute nub of what we are asking the Government to reflect on. Is the test strong enough? Is it workable? Is it operable? Will it actually produce perverse outcomes?
I understand the point the hon. Gentleman is making. However, in the examples he gave he has shown exactly why there is a need to ask the Government to doubly rethink the way in which the original Bill is drafted to ensure that some of those areas are covered off so that the reasonability test is clearer and people do not find themselves on that proverbial sticky wicket for innocent reasons. We tabled the amendment—we fully accept it does not cover everything and every eventuality—because it is our job as the Opposition to highlight cases which in turn highlight areas where the Bill may be deficient and where it needs a little surgery to ensure that it achieves what the Government are trying to achieve, rather than creating many loopholes and perverse outcomes. I have probably spoken for long enough on this group of amendments.
Will my hon. Friend give way just one more time? I have an excellent example that I would like to share.
How can I say no to the offer of an excellent example from my hon. Friend?
It has just been drawn to my attention that the Health Secretary is the subject of an official complaint to the Labour party for his jokes about the former Transport Secretary at The Spectator party last week because his comments were considered “bullying and uncomradely” according to the complaint. That may be another example of this kind of subjective test.
(2 days, 4 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Mr Stringer. I welcome the Bill, and this clause is a really important part of it. We are introducing the clause to improve the workplace treatment of individuals who suffer harassment. Before the lunch break, we heard an interesting interpretation of the legislation, but sadly, it was not correct in all places, and I would like to go through some points made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire. As part of that, I will reflect from the beginning that the Fawcett Society has found that 40% of women have experienced workplace harassment, and women who are marginalised for other reasons, such as race or disability, face an increased risk of and different forms of harassment, including sexual harassment in the workplace.
This clause is a vital part of the legislation, because we know—we heard this in evidence a few weeks ago—that harassment does not always come from a fellow employee or an employer. Quite often, it can come from third parties, particularly in some of the sectors that the Opposition seek to exclude with their amendment. We heard particularly from UKHospitality about the impact of third-party harassment in the hospitality sector, and I have shared my experience of being harassed in the workplace while working in the hospitality sector as a 15-year-old. This is really important. My example was only one—frankly, there will be thousands of examples—and I know that my experience as a young man will be very different from the experiences of women working in hospitality up and down the country.
As we enter the Christmas party season, we will see a massive increase in workplace harassment—not just sexual harassment, but other forms of harassment. This is perhaps where we got into some confusion this morning. There are different types of harassment, and the type that we talked about in particular this morning was harassment under the Equality Act 2010. That has a very specific definition, which will not be changed by the proposed legislation, despite what the shadow Minister said. A different test will be applied to that definition in terms of when it might come into play, but the definition of harassment will not change. Therefore, for something to be harassment, it must be unwanted conduct relating to somebody’s protected characteristic and create an offensive environment, or one that degrades, humiliates or embarrasses individuals.
The hon. Member for West Suffolk tried to introduce a few examples around the free speech argument, but those did not support the argument that he tried to make. The Independent Press Standards Organisation found that there was no harassment in the Gareth Roberts case. It found that there was a lower form of conduct in relation to clause 12(i) of the IPSO code of practice, but there was no harassment.
I have absolutely no intention of correcting the record, because the record will be correct. I think the hon. Member misunderstands my point, which was not to say that in that case the conduct was an example of harassment; I am fully aware that the IPSO ruling said that it was not harassment. My point was about the laws of unintended consequences. When IPSO was established, I do not think anybody thought that there would be cases such as this, where a journalist would be penalised by IPSO for saying something that IPSO acknowledges was a statement of fact on the grounds that it may be offensive.
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but the fact is that in these circumstances, the definition in the Equality Act is clear. There is already an abundance of case law on what constitutes harassment, particularly in relation to the Equality Act, the different types of protected characteristics and the actions required to reach that threshold. The threshold is not just that there is unwanted conduct or that it relates to a protected characteristic; it is about the environment that is created. There is an abundance of case law on that point.
The second example was about my right hon. Friend the Health Secretary, but again it missed the point entirely. We all enjoy comedy, which is a staple of our culture. Jokes are fine unless they start to become unwanted and are aimed at protected characteristics, such as someone’s gender, gender identity or sexual orientation. The other point that that example missed—we spoke at length about comedy clubs, and I hate to raise them again—is that the Bill is not about punters at a comedy club being offended by what they hear on stage; it is about protecting the employees. For somebody to trigger this legislation, the comedian would have to make a joke directed at one of the employee’s protected characteristics. If the club employs a member of bar staff who has a protected characteristic and the comedian on stage consistently and absolutely humiliates them because of it, one might expect the employer to take some reasonable steps, such as not booking that comedian again, so that the individual is not consistently humiliated on a regular basis because of one of their protected characteristics. That is what the Bill is intended to do.
We are not saying that employers are required to stop all harassment in the workplace; that would not be possible. As the shadow Minister rightly said, there will be cases when somebody comes into a bar during a Christmas party, inebriated, having enjoyed far too much free wine, and says something that is offensive and horrifically wrong, and with which we all across this House would disagree. The Bill requires employers to have policies in place to deal with that. We cannot legislate for the unknown. We cannot legislate for serious circumstances that we cannot predict or for every individual who walks into a bar, but we can have policies in place to deal with those things.