Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Neil Shastri-Hurst and Catherine Fookes

Friday 16th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I will make a little progress, if I may.

In respect of new clause 2, those who have had the privilege of meeting a young person living with a terminal illness will know that they often display a maturity and a depth of understanding far beyond their years. To deny them the opportunity of a considered conversation about their future upon reaching adulthood is not an act of compassion, in my view; it is to abandon them. It is to leave them isolated, navigating a complex and deeply personal journey through the filter of online forums, rather than in dialogue with trusted, qualified professionals. We owe them better than that.

[Catherine Fookes]

My constituent Noah was diagnosed at 16 with an inoperable brain tumour, and he has said he would like the right to choose:

“The thought of being locked in unable to communicate is not how I want to spend the last months of my life. To end my life on my terms when the time comes would give me comfort.”

Noah does not want to be infantilised; he wants to be treated like the adult that he is. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that the Bill will give him that protection?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. That is a very powerful personal story from Noah, who I think reflects the maturity of many young people when dealing with these challenging issues.

By imposing, in effect, a statutory gag in this one area, new clauses 1 and 2 risk infantilising terminally ill patients, creating a chilling effect on communication at the very moment when clarity and compassion are most needed. If anything, new clauses 1 and 2 may result in harm to patients, forcing them to suffer in silence, unaware of lawful options simply because they do not know how to ask.

Finally, I turn to new clause 9, which presents a number of issues. In the first instance, subsection (1) would permit there to be, in effect, two different standards of proof. That must be legal nonsense. The boundaries of any legal test or hurdle must be clear. A failure to do so creates a great deal of uncertainty. Furthermore, the proposal to shift the standard of proof from the civil to the criminal, requiring panels to operate on the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, is deeply inappropriate. The balance of probabilities is the cornerstone of medical and civil decision making. To adopt a criminal threshold risks freezing the entire process, creating a very risk-averse system.