Iranian Nuclear Programme

Neil Parish Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Westminster Hall

[Neil Parish (Tiverton and Honiton) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I thank the hon. Member for Dudley North (Ian Austin) for obtaining the debate.

The Prime Minister said of Iran in 2012:

“The Regime’s claim that its nuclear programme is intended purely for civilian purposes is not remotely credible.”

I am not convinced that too much has changed since. The Iranians still do not allow IAEA inspectors to see sites or to see what centrifuges there are. How many do they have? What are their intentions? It is a simplistic thing to say, but if their intentions are honourable and they have nothing to hide, why do they not let the inspectors in to see exactly what they are doing? I do not make any apologies for that simple question.

I agreed entirely with what the hon. Member for Dudley North said about claims that the only alternative to an agreement is war. He rightly said that is nonsense, and I would turn it around. If we—the international community—sign a flawed agreement with Iran, that will most definitely lead to war, for the simple reason that Iran will produce a nuclear weapon. Many of the states in the middle east—not just Israel—will want to follow suit, and all that we will have will be a huge proliferation of nuclear weapons in the middle east. Are we all, including the Americans, going to sit back and let that happen, when the Iranian President still will not recognise the state of Israel, and would prefer it to be written off the face of the map? What sort of language is that, and what sort of world are we living in?

I said in a Westminster Hall debate last week—on 16 June, at column 14WH—that it is dangerous when a US President is coming to the end of his second term of office and is looking for a legacy. It may be simple to sign up to a legacy of having reached an agreement with Iran, but if that is not worth the paper it is written on—and it probably will not be—the approach is wrong. I have great respect for the Minister, for our British Government and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and for all the work that we do around the world, but we must keep our eyes absolutely open. Iran has form on this issue, going all the way back to 2004. While Iran was busy negotiating an agreement with the EU, that allowed it more time to carry on producing more enriched uranium. That is the whole game, and it is why this debate is timely.

We must pause until we can be certain that we have an agreement under which we can go in and see the facilities, completely unfettered. It is absolutely right, if Iran wants to further its nuclear power, that it should be allowed to do so—I would be the first to say so—but I find it difficult to believe that that much uranium is being enriched just for a nuclear programme. That is where we are all being far too naive. I look forward to hearing the Minister and the shadow Minister sum up this debate; I do not think there will be many political differences between them. In my view, we must not have any political differences on this issue. If we are to be taken seriously by the Iranians and sort out the situation, we must present a united front to them.

Before any agreement is signed, we need to get into Iran to see what is being produced and ensure that it is being used for civilian purposes and nuclear power, not weapons. I repeat what I said at the beginning: if we do not get this right, we will regret it, because it will lead to huge problems and action will have to be taken. We in the international community must decide whether to sign a flawed agreement, brush everything under the carpet and allow Iran to increase its amount of enriched uranium—which will lead eventually, in however many years, to a nuclear weapon—or take more action now, however uncomfortable it might be, to sort out the situation so that we do not find ourselves in that position further down the road.

We must also be careful about ISIL, those dreadful people who are committing huge acts of terrorism and atrocities across the region. Again, whatever co-operation with the Iranians there may or may not be, we must not let that cloud the issue or the need to take firm action. I have every faith in our Minister. I am sure that he can sort out the whole situation, and I look forward to hearing him sum up.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr Amess. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dudley North (Ian Austin) on securing this debate. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) and for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter) for their contributions, and the two Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen for theirs.

It will be no surprise that I am unable to speculate about quite a few details, because negotiations are continuing in Vienna today. Although all questions asked during the debate were perfectly reasonable, many can only be answered if and when there is a final agreement between the E3+3 and Iran. At present, there is an interim agreement—the so-called Lausanne parameters—and ongoing negotiations. The Foreign Secretary is in Vienna today to take forward conversations with the Iranian negotiators, having met his five counterparts a few days ago.

I can tell the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) that throughout this process, which it is fair to say has commanded broadly bipartisan support under successive Governments, Foreign Office Ministers have sought to keep Parliament informed about negotiations, and we will certainly continue to do so. I expect that, in the event of a final agreement being reached, a statement to Parliament will be made by the Foreign Secretary or another Minister, so that Members have the chance to see the detail of what was agreed.

When we and our E3+3 partners and Iran agreed the key parameters for a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme on 2 April, we set ourselves a deadline for reaching a final deal. That deadline passed on Tuesday, as hon. Members mentioned, without an agreement being reached, but that does not mean that the process has definitively ended in failure. It demonstrates our resolve not to be hurried into an unsatisfactory agreement on the substance, including on the vital technical details—I accept what Members from all parties said about consideration of the technical details being essential to any judgment about the nature of a final deal, should one be secured. It is important that all sides have the assurances they need and that we get those details right. We have to be confident that any deal is verifiable, durable and addresses our concerns fully. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman: substance is the key to this, not any particular question of timing.

All parties remain committed to achieving a deal. Nobody wants another long extension, so the interim agreement—the joint plan of action—has been extended for seven days to allow negotiations to continue.

Just over two weeks ago, the House debated these issues, and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), replied on behalf of the Government. I have picked up from this debate, as I did from the record of the previous one, that hon. Members in various political parties are concerned about the detail and worry that Iran might be granted too many concessions.

Although I cannot give a running commentary on the detail of the negotiations, I reiterate my strongest possible assurance on behalf of the whole Government that we will not do a bad deal. Any deal must achieve the Government’s prime objective of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. That means more than just a verbal or written commitment: it means the inclusion of detailed undertakings by Iran that are sufficient to give us confidence that their nuclear programme will be entirely peaceful. Anything less is completely unacceptable.

We have an historic opportunity to find a solution to a long-standing source of tension, instability and global concern that, if unresolved, will undoubtedly threaten our security and that of our partners. In a week when we have seen tragic violence and bloodshed in the wider region, we should reflect on how much progress we have made towards reaching a solution through peaceful, diplomatic and negotiated means. A great deal is at stake—for this country, for our partners and for the people of Iran.

Let me give a bit more detail on the parameters within which we hope to agree a deal and its implications for Iran, for the region, and for the UK. In addressing the Lausanne parameters, I hope that I will answer at least some of the questions and concerns raised during this debate.

The parameters for a deal agreed in Lausanne are a sound basis for what could be a very good deal that is durable, verifiable and addresses our concerns about proliferation. Under the Lausanne interim agreement, Iran’s enrichment capacity, enrichment level and enriched uranium stockpile would all be limited, and the facility at Natanz would be Iran’s sole location for enrichment.

Hon. Members mentioned research and development capability. Iran’s research and development on centrifuges will be carried out under the Lausanne parameters, based on mutually agreed details relating to scope and schedule. When I say “mutually agreed”, I mean agreed not just by Iran, but by Iran and the six international partners with whom it is negotiating. The Lausanne deal also requires the Arak heavy water research reactor to be redesigned and modernised to exclude production of weapons-grade plutonium. Taken together, these measures will ensure that Iran’s break-out time—the time taken to produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear device, should Iran ever attempt to do so—will be extended to at least 12 months.

A robust and credible regime for monitoring compliance by Iran will be put in place under the Lausanne parameters. Iran would need to implement the modified code 3.1 and the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to use the best modern monitoring technologies and have enhanced access to sites to make sure that if Iran ever tried to break out towards a nuclear weapon, the international community would be alerted and have sufficient time to respond.

[Neil Parish]

What faith have we that this agreement, which should deal with enhanced access to nuclear sites in Iran, will happen? We have had agreements like this before, but still have not had access to the sites.

[Mr Lidington]

I want to say a little bit more about access in a few moments, but to answer my hon. Friend directly, questions about access and verification lie at the heart of the detailed negotiations going on today. Unless we and our partners are satisfied that the IAEA will have the access that it believes it needs, there will not be a final agreement.