Iran (Proposed Nuclear Agreement)

Neil Parish Excerpts

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Neil Parish (Tiverton and Honiton) (Con)]

It is good to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) for securing this debate.

I want to discuss the principles behind the forthcoming agreement. American Presidents in their second term are—dare I say it?—dangerous, because they are looking to leave legacies, and those who might struggle to leave a legacy look even harder. We must be careful that that is not what the agreement is about. I have much respect for my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon), who is a great friend of mine, but I entirely disagree with him. Will there be a pecking order for terrorism as to which groups are the worst? I think not. In our desire, which is quite right, to have Iranian help to deal with ISIS, I worry that we are blind to what is actually happening in Iran. We must be careful if we take that line.

[Rehman Chishti]

The point has been made that Iran is supporting the international community to defeat Daesh or Faesh. I think that that is completely wrong. The G7 statement says that we must first defeat the Assad regime to defeat Daesh, but as long as Iran is supporting the Assad regime, we cannot defeat Daesh or Faesh. That point must be clear.

[Neil Parish]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. The middle east is complex and contains states such as Iran that will sponsor terrorism. It is something that none of us wants to foresee, but the idea of Iran, with its attitudes towards its neighbours, especially towards Israel, having a nuclear weapon and being capable of using it is abominable.

Why does Iran need so much enriched uranium? We could go through the figures all day, but I do not intend to go into them again. I do not believe that Iran needs uranium just to create nuclear power stations; it wants to enrich it. Why does Iran not allow proper access for us to see what is going on? If we were allowed better access, we could stand up in this Chamber and say what a delight it is that we are able to go all over Iran and see exactly what it is enriching and what it is not, but we have no real idea, because we are not allowed access. We have a fairly good estimate of what might be going on, which in itself is far too much.

I am from the west of England and have the same trouble as my hon. Friend from the north of England, the hon. Member for Brigg and Goole (Andrew Percy) in pronouncing such words, but consider the Bushehr nuclear power station. It uses Russian technology— I first upset the Americans and now the Russians, so I will perhaps upset everyone this morning—and I am not always delighted with Russian technology or with Russian nuclear power stations. The idea of such a combination does not bode well. It is no good our sitting here, putting our rose-tinted glasses on and saying, “Let’s do a deal with Iran”—dare I say it?—“at all costs.” I have great faith in the Minister here today and Britain must stand up and be sensible about this matter. If we are actually to reduce terrorism in the middle east and to make the region more secure, we cannot possibly have an Iran with the capability to make a nuclear bomb.

The agreement mentions 10 to 15 years of control, but that is just not enough. Ten to 15 years passes almost in the blink of an eye. I would love to think that we could talk of a wonderfully peaceful middle east in 10 to 15 years. Call me cynical, but I do not believe that that will be the case—although I hope that it is. We must stand up to such states. It is no good sitting here saying, “It’s okay. Let’s have an agreement and brush all the problems under the carpet because they don’t really exist.” Oh yes they do. They exist and Iran will have that capability.

We have debated the matter thoroughly this morning. We need to have our eyes open. I want to hear from the Minister about the British position and not about some nice, cosy and lovely agreement that makes everyone feel warm. What is actually happening in Iran? What are we doing about getting inspectors in? I cannot see how we can sign any agreement until we know exactly what is going on.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Tobias Ellwood)]

Thank you, Mr Hollobone, for the opportunity to reply to this interesting, informative and important debate, which is taking place before the negotiations.

Let me begin by responding to the kind words from the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar). I am sorry that we have heard his valedictory foreign affairs speech. We will certainly miss him. I have worked with him for more than a year, and it has been a real pleasure. There has been huge cross-party support on this and other issues, and that is very welcome. I am sorry that the energy and enthusiasm he has shown in the debate has not been reflected by Labour Back Benchers, who have not taken part in the debate. It was perhaps also too early for Scottish National party Members to make the debate. I would have thought that they would want to engage in a debate on nuclear issues. None the less, I am grateful for the debate.

Like others, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb) on securing the debate and on his continued interest in this matter. We had a good debate last November, and I hope there will be further opportunities to discuss the issue. Through you, Mr Hollobone, I would certainly ask the Backbench Business Committee to make time for it to be debated on the Floor of the House as well as in Westminster Hall.

For more than a decade, the Iranian nuclear issue has posed one of the most intractable and persistent threats to international security and stability. The prospect of a nuclear weapons-capable Iran carries severe consequences for the security of the UK, the region and, indeed, the world. The Government have always been clear that the best solution lies in finding a peaceful, diplomatic and negotiated settlement. The process has been long and challenging, and we are grateful to both sides of the House for their support.

Our discussion today comes at a crucial moment. The joint plan of action agreed by the E3 plus 3 and Iran in November 2013, and extended in July and November 2014, froze the most concerning elements of Iran’s nuclear programme in return for limited sanctions relief. When the interim deal was extended in November, we, our E3 plus 3 partners—China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States—and Iran set ourselves a deadline of 30 June to reach a final comprehensive deal.

The UK played a leading role in diplomatic efforts that secured agreement on the key parameters of a deal in Lausanne on 2 April. That marked an important milestone in the ongoing negotiations, but as has been made clear today, those negotiations are not complete. Since April, UK diplomats and experts, and E3 plus 3 colleagues, have been working intensely to secure a comprehensive agreement by the 30 June deadline. That agreement, which has been questioned in the debate, must satisfy the Government’s objectives, which have remained consistent throughout this process: preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability, while recognising its right to access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We have always been clear that we will not agree to a deal that fails to address our proliferation concerns.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will be present for the talks in Vienna in the coming weeks, where he will maintain a laser-sharp focus on our key UK objectives. As the deadline draws ever nearer, it is crucial that Iran should appreciate what is at stake. Significant economic advantages and political benefits await if Iran agrees to a robust nuclear deal. Right hon. and hon. Members must forgive me for not going into the detail of the deal, but I will try to outline answers to some of the questions.

[Neil Parish]

Is the Minister certain that if a deal is reached Iran will stick to it?

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend is right to raise that question: what assurances do we have that Iran would maintain the deal? I shall certainly try to answer the questions that have been asked. I am, to the horror of my team, going to abandon the speech that they have carefully prepared for me, and do my best to answer the questions from the debate. I offer my apologies if I do not manage to answer all the detailed questions. I shall read Hansard—not because I like reading what I have said, but because it is important that I read what Members have said and reply in writing, if I may, to keep dialogue going.

My hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy asked whether the agreement was intended to be a non-proliferation or arms control treaty. It is a mixture, as I have made clear. It important for us to be able to maintain that, because there are breakout weapons systems that we are concerned about in addition to what Iran is doing on the nuclear side. He mentioned Iran’s foreign policy objectives, for itself and the wider region, which I want to touch on in relation to other concerns. Iran’s role, and where it sees itself in the region, is a major issue. It has a responsibility not just to itself but in the wider region and we look to it to act responsibly.

My hon. Friend mentioned the United States foreign policy aspects of the matter, and my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) raised the question whether there was a legacy issue. I have never heard the line before that a President is most dangerous in his second term. It could be argued both ways; a President in that case is not tied by anything and therefore can be more robust in some of the measures that he or she is willing to pursue.

I want to go through the eight major headings of the deal, which may help the House to understand where the conversation and agreement are going, leading up to 30 June. First there is the question of a durable and verifiable deal. The first heading is enrichment, which covers Iran’s capacity and its enriched stockpile. The number of centrifuges is obviously part of that. Many figures have been given in the debate, but the number is less significant than the breakout time—how quickly a weapon could be procured if it was decided to close the doors and prevent IAEA from carrying out inspections. We have set that as a year. Whatever the experts are saying, that leads to the number of centrifuges that we would consider acceptable. We are less focused on the actual numbers at the moment, and more on the breakout time.

The second area heading is research and development, covering types of centrifuges, and leading to a mutually agreed scope and schedule. Thirdly, the Arak plutonium reactor has been mentioned. There will be a redesign to cut off the plutonium route to a nuclear device. Fourthly, Fordow, which has also been mentioned, will no longer be a site for the enrichment of uranium. The fifth area is duration. There are programme restrictions in a number of areas. A period of 10 years for the agreement has been mentioned. It could well be that parts of it will last longer, and parts might even be shorter. That is some of the detail being worked out.

The sixth heading is the possible military dimensions, which I have touched on. That covers the measures that Iran must address: the IAEA’s concerns about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. If there is one area that is of concern in the discussions at the moment, that is probably the most difficult. The seventh area is sanctions: relief from the comprehensive EU and US economic and financial sanctions in return for IAEA-verified actions on Iran’s programme; an agreement on the termination of UN sanctions, with limiting transfers of sensitive technologies and activities; and other issues relating to conventional arms and ballistic missiles. The eighth and final area is transparency and verification, which many hon. Members have mentioned. That covers the ability to make sure that nothing is being done behind our backs, and a robust and credible monitoring programme including the implementation of various protocols to give the IAEA greater oversight of Iran’s activities.