Iran (Proposed Nuclear Agreement)

Debate between Nadhim Zahawi and Guto Bebb

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Guto Bebb]

I fully endorse those comments. I will address the issue of the centrifuges in due course. It is reasonable to say that the figure of 6,000 now assumed to be part of a proposed treaty is significantly in excess of the 1,000 originally discussed by the P5+1 when the negotiations started. The question whether that is actually in the treaty must be addressed.

I do not want to be described as a cynic, but it is fair to question whether the agreement is actually an effort to resolve the issue, or whether it is effectively an effort to ensure a foreign policy legacy for the current American Administration. I am making this contribution in the spirit of the Back-Bench business debate held in November 2014. I think that there is a genuine realisation that we need an agreement, but must that agreement be rushed to achieve a foreign policy goal for a US Administration who might not be in place for very long? We need some certainty on that.

[Nadhim Zahawi (Stratford-on-Avon) (Con)]

Many of the Gulf states—my hon. Friend mentioned Bahrain, but obviously this includes the United Arab Emirates and others—are nervous about Iran’s intentions. Iran knows that we want a deal, but it clearly understands the timetabling, and that it will be much easier to leverage something advantageous to Iran if we are working to a timeline that is affected by legacies in the United States of America or anything else.

[Guto Bebb]

My hon. Friend makes a fair point. The key thing is that the proposed treaty stands or falls on its own merits. It should not be subject to a timetable pushed on the basis of others’ priorities. That certainly came across in my meeting with GCC representatives prior to this debate.

We must ensure that the agreement satisfies the concerns of our allies in the middle east. In addition, it is important to clarify whether major concessions have been made by the P5+1, as current rumours about the agreement’s content would indicate. It is important for the Government to say what concessions have been offered in return for the ones that have been made, for example, in relation to the number of centrifuges. We need an outline of the concessions made.

To return to the Back-Bench business debate held in November 2014, I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon), who was one of the Members who secured it. It was a positive debate, in which a range of opinions were expressed about the intentions, or otherwise, of Iran, and about the historical context of any proposed deal. There were fine speeches that highlighted the missed opportunities in the past for an agreement with Iran. It would certainly benefit any Member who is interested in this subject to reread the debate, as I did prior to coming to Westminster Hall today.

I was struck by the very fair summary of that debate provided by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who is also here today; I welcome him back to his position in government. He concluded that debate in an excellent manner by saying clearly:

“It is right that we should leave no stone unturned in the quest to”

reach an agreement,

“but we must not, and will not, do a bad deal. The stakes are too high.”—[Official Report, 6 November 2014; Vol. 587, c. 1034WH.]

Those comments can probably be endorsed by everybody here today. However, we need certainty that a proposed deal or compromise, which is rumoured to include significant concessions, is the right deal; we need reassurance on that.

What are the main concerns? My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) mentioned centrifuges, and I have to mention one of the biggest challenges in this debate: how do I pronounce “centrifuges”? Initially, the aim of the P5+1 was to reach an agreement that would allow Iran to maintain 1,000, or possibly 1,500, centrifuges. In the Back-Bench business debate in November 2014, the then Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee stated that the evidence that the Committee had heard as part of its inquiry was that the maximum number of centrifuges that Iran should be allowed was between 2,000 and 4,000. It is said that 4,500 centrifuges will allow the production of 25 kg of highly enriched uranium within a six-month period, yet we hear a rumour that an agreement will allow Iran to have 6,000 centrifuges. We can do the maths. We would be looking at 25 kg of enriched uranium within not six months, but four. There is a real question as to why the demands of the P5+1 have changed so dramatically and what concessions have been offered in return. We need a response to that question.

Secondly on centrifuges, perhaps 13,000 or 14,000 centrifuges would be made redundant as a result of an agreement that would leave Iran with 6,000. How many of those 13,000 or 14,000 extra centrifuges would be dismantled? If they are not dismantled, what is to stop them being recommissioned, and how long would it take to recommission them? Again, there are significant questions about the possible allowance of 6,000 centrifuges and what happens to the 13,000 or 14,000 other centrifuges that would remain in Iranian hands.

It is important to state that 30 countries have a civilian nuclear programme. In the November debate, Jack Straw, the former Member for Blackburn, forcefully made the point that any sovereign country has the right to pursue an energy policy. I agree. However, of those 30 countries, only 11 have the capacity to enrich their own fuel. On what basis do the P5+1 conclude that Iran should become the 12th, given its Government’s track record on allowing monitoring and allowing third parties to examine its military capacity in relation to the enrichment of uranium?

[Guto Bebb]

I certainly accept that the good will and good intentions of Iran should be considered in the context of its continued support for terrorism in many parts of the middle east, which, as I have said, is a key concern of many of our partner nations in the region.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

rose—

[Guto Bebb]

I will take a quick intervention.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I will be very quick. We sometimes get stuck on the number of centrifuges. However, since the negotiations began, the technology around centrifuges —I declare an interest: my background is in chemical engineering—has advanced so far that a single centrifuge now is much more productive than when the negotiations started.

[Guto Bebb]

Indeed. My hon. Friend makes an important point that I was going to come on to. The research and development allowed as part of any agreement is very important. What guarantees can we be offered about the development of more advanced centrifuges? If there are no such guarantees in the agreement, real questions must be asked. If we are trying to reach an agreement to curtail the breakout time for Iran to develop nuclear capacity, the sophistication and possible development of centrifuges is crucial, yet there is no detail, as far as I can see, about what kind of monitoring of research and development will be undertaken.