(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe point I am trying to make is that an employment tribunal will determine whether a dismissal was fair or unfair, depending on the specific circumstances of the case. Therefore, it may take into account breaches of academic freedom of speech. The Bill does not amend employment law in this regard and we do not think it would be appropriate to make dismissal because of a breach of the new duties an automatic unfair dismissal.
The Bill does, however, give new protections to academic staff, including those who may not have employee status or who have been employed for less than two years. It therefore broadens the scope of the current provision section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, to ensure that visiting fellows, for example, have the freedom to research and teach on issues that may be controversial or challenging, without the risk of losing their post.
The Bill provides new specific routes of redress for those without employee status, including a complaints scheme operated by the Office for Students and a statutory tort. I hope that Members are reassured that the Bill strengthens protections for academic staff and employees. It expands the range of available routes of complainants and ensures that a wide range of individuals are able to secure redress.
I hear what the Minister says, as well as the comments from other Members, but there is still a lack of clarity. The Minister said that an employment tribunal will decide if a dismissal has been fair or not fair, and may take into account academic freedom.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank my right hon. Friend for that comment.
Finally, the Wilberforce Academy has been held at Oxbridge colleges for the last 11 years. I have actually spoken at one of its conferences; the students who attend the conference are serious young people seeking to inform themselves about issues of the day. We need to encourage that, not shut it down.
Amendment 79 would make the director for freedom of speech and academic freedom responsible for providing an annual update to higher education providers and student unions on the number and nature of freedom of speech complaints that the Office for Students has dealt with, as well as examples of unacceptable infringements of freedom of speech.
It is important that the OfS is accountable for the operation of the complaints scheme. That is why clause 4 provides that the Secretary of State may require it to include a special report in its annual report on matters relating to freedom of speech and academic freedom. Such a report must be laid before Parliament so that Parliament and the sector may scrutinise it. Equally, paragraph 12 of proposed new schedule 6A to the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 provides that the Secretary of State may request that the OfS conduct a review of the complaints scheme or its operation and report on the results.
As for what the OfS believes constitutes unacceptable infringements of freedom of speech, it will issue guidance to providers and student unions to help them to comply with their duties under the Bill. In particular, it will consult on and issue changes to the regulatory framework, under section 75 of the 2017 Act, which states that the OFS
“must include guidance for the purpose of helping to determine whether or not behaviour complies with the general ongoing registration conditions.”
That guidance may specify
“descriptions of behaviour which the OfS considers compliant with, or not compliant with, a general ongoing registration condition”
as well as
“factors which the OfS will take into account in determining whether or not behaviour is compliant”.
Similar guidance will be included for student unions.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe OfS did publish data around no-platforming, but as we heard from several of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee, no-platforming is just the tip of the iceberg. It is the chilling effect that we are dealing with in the Bill. To minimise that, and focus just on no-platforming, is to fail to understand the gravity of the issue that we are trying to tackle.
The governing body of the registered provider is required to provide the OfS with such information as it may specify to assist the OfS in performing its functions. The registration condition also requires providers to take such steps as the OfS may reasonably request to co-operate with any monitoring or investigation by the OfS, which may include providing explanations or making staff or documents available. In addition, following Royal Assent to the Bill, we will fully expect the OfS to consult on the detail of the new registration conditions relating to freedom of speech, in accordance with the statutory provisions on consultation in section 5 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017.
This process will enable the OfS to best understand what is required from the providers in order to comply with the new conditions, including by way of reporting and information. Adding a further separate information requirement to the 2017 Act would cause duplication with section 8 and the existing registration conditions and could also increase bureaucracy. As I have said throughout the Committee stage, I will commit to take away the issue of reporting and seeing how we could go further.
I had hoped to speak for a moment against the amendment but, before the Minister concludes, I draw the Committee’s attention to the written evidence that was submitted by Professor Kaufmann, I believe after he gave his verbal evidence. He confirmed that the number of cancelled events is tiny—just a handful among some 10,000—and he gave us some very interesting survey data about the much deeper and widespread crisis in our universities of the chilling effect of self-censorship.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe amendments would narrow the application of the freedom of speech duty in proposed new section A4 on students’ unions so that it only applies, as regards premises, to the “sole” use of those premises and does not apply to the terms of the use of those premises.
Proposed new section A4(1) in clause 2 requires students’ unions to take “reasonably practicable” steps to secure lawful freedom of speech. Proposed new sections A4(3) and A4(4) set out how this duty will work in relation to the use of the premises. The students’ union must take “reasonably practicable” steps so as not to deny the use of their premises because of
“the ideas, beliefs or views”
of an individual body when inviting speakers. That was an excellent point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings.
A key part of the Bill is the emphasis on “reasonably practicable” steps. On the point that the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown made, if a range of rooms was available and some rooms were not suitable, for example because of religious beliefs, it would be “reasonably practicable” not to choose certain rooms. However, I have heard the concerns raised in the debate and the evidence that has been provided, so I will commit to take this important point away.
I thank my hon. Friend for her encouraging words. Could she reflect on whether the code of practice is a vehicle that could be used to respect freedom of religion or belief in this context?
An important aspect of the Bill is that it does not place freedom of speech above other duties, such as freedom of religion. It is down to the university or students’ union to balance those competing duties and make a reasonable assessment. We think that freedom of speech duties should apply to the terms of use of premises. It would not be right if a students’ union decided, for example, to charge one group more for room hire than another group. In any event, proposed new section A4(3) is clear that the freedom of speech duties include the stated provision on premises, so the exact wording of the amendment would not be likely to have any effect in practice. However, I am happy to reconsider how we could make it clearer in the Bill.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI have listened to the debate, and I am troubled by amendments 75 and 76. I believe I heard the the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington say that the best form of consultation is ballot. I would normally construe that to mean a secret ballot. I am happy to be corrected if I misinterpreted his words. The whole aim of the Bill is to promote and secure freedom of speech—to open up dialogue at universities. We could end up with the almost bizarre situation in which people could vote in a secret ballot for what witnesses described as the monoculture, or even vote a certain way because of prejudice against a particular speaker, without having to give any reason why. I strongly believe that if the decision is made not to allow a speaker, or not allow the use of premises, those making that decision should publicly justify it; that goes to the heart of the Bill.
I will try to be brief and not take interventions, given the time. Amendment 74 seeks to ensure that university authorities set out procedures to facilitate peaceful protest on campus and to engage with campus stakeholders on amendments to the code of practice. Amendments 75 and 76 would require the governing body to have a democratic procedure for decisions taken on use of their premises, and a provider would have to have particular regard to that procedure.
Proposed new section A2 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 will require registered higher education providers to maintain a code of practice, as they are already required to under section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986. Providers will, of course, need to revisit their existing codes after Royal Assent to ensure that they are fit for purpose and comply with the new duties of the Bill.
To help providers to update their codes, the Office for Students will in due course issue comprehensive guidance about what should be included in a code of practice. As well as setting out the provider’s values relating to freedom of speech and how those values uphold freedom of speech, the code of practice must set out the procedures to be followed when organising meetings and activities, as well as the conduct required in connection with them, and the criteria for decision making on the use of premises. This will ensure that individuals on campus are aware of the ways in which freedom of speech and academic freedom are effectively secured by the provider, and will provide guidance on how individuals can go about exercising their freedom of speech.
Although we encourage providers to work with their university community to ensure these values are upheld in a transparent way, we do not think there is a need to consult on subsequent changes to the code, as would be required under amendment 74. As for the right to peaceful protest, which is also covered by amendment 74, this is a fundamental tool of civic expression. It is in itself an aspect of freedom of speech, and so it is protected by the Bill. For example, if there is a protest against an academic because they have said something controversial but lawful, providers will need to decide what they can do that is reasonably practical to ensure that that academic can speak freely, but without limiting the peaceful protest surrounding them. Proposed new section A2(3) allows providers to include in their code such other matters as they think appropriate. That could include provision on the right to protest as a key part of freedom of speech.
Turning to amendments 75 and 76, it is intended that the code of practice should facilitate the discharge of the freedom of speech duty. A provider could choose to include a procedure for a ballot to assist with selecting speakers in the first place, but to insist on one would be overly bureaucratic. More significantly, one of the aims of the Bill is to secure the freedom of speech of everybody on campus, including those with minority viewpoints. It would not, therefore, be right to mandate a process that would give the majority a right that might act as an effective veto over decision making on events and, in effect, the free speech of minorities.
I hope that Members are reassured that nothing in this Bill restricts the right to protest, and that the requirements for the content of a provider’s code of practice are appropriate as drafted.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI tabled amendment 29, as other Members have tabled other amendments, on a constructive basis, seeking to improve a Bill that I strongly support.
Amendment 29 would clarify that
“references to “members of the provider”—
that is, the higher academic provider—
“include any affiliated academics and any other person holding an academic position at the provider”.
Why is this important? It is to ensure that those who are undoubtedly intended to be covered by the Bill, such as visiting fellows, research associates, life fellows, guest scholars and emeritus fellows do not fall outside the scope of the Bill’s protection. Many within the higher education sector would not view these categories of affiliated academics as “members”, on the basis of what I understand is a commonly accepted understanding of that word. The simple remedy provided by amendment 29 would be to clarify and broaden the meaning of “members” to include affiliated academics and anyone held to be occupying an academic position within the university.
I will just refer to two remarks from witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee. Associate Professor Tom Simpson told the Committee:
“In academic life, there is a really important category of what you might call affiliated academics—people with visiting fellowships or emeritus professorships, guest scholars or life fellows. The wording does not make it plain that such people would be included.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 67, Q136.]
And Professor Matthew Goodwin told us of academics being “disinvited from workshops”, who I rather think might not necessarily be a member of the higher academic provider, when he said that
“speaking out about issues that go against the monoculture in many of our universities comes with very real consequences, and I know that from the many emails that I have received from junior academics and members of staff at universities who simply feel unable to voice their true views on those issues because they are fearful of what will happen to their careers. Indeed, in some cases—including friends of mine—they have been sacked or disinvited from workshops.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 91, Q185.]
I do not propose to press this amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will confirm in her closing remarks that she will consider taking this matter away for consideration as the Bill progresses through the House.
Amendment 29 seeks to expand the notion of who is a member of a higher education provider to include affiliated academics and other individuals holding academic positions. Amendments 55 and 56 seek to extend academic freedom to members and visiting academic speakers.
Clause 1 will insert part A1 into the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. Part A1 (1) and (2) require registered higher education providers to take “reasonably practicable” steps to secure lawful freedom of speech for their
“staff…members…students…and…visiting speakers.”
Turning to amendment 29, we have used the term “staff” to broaden the existing reference to “employees” in the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, because not all of those who work at a provider have an employment contract or employee status. To be clear, expanding the protections to these individuals is a key aspect of the Bill and ensures that all academic staff have access to redress. It is important to note that the term “staff” is already used in the current definition of academic freedom in the Higher Education and Research Act, so it is an understood term in this context. Similarly, “members” is a commonly used term in the sector, as well as in legislation. It is included in the existing provision in the Education (No. 2) Act, which is carried over into the Bill to ensure that individuals who are currently covered do not lose that protection. Members of a university include members of the governing council, for example.
I now turn to the proposed extension of academic freedom to members and visiting academic speakers in amendments 55 and 56. As already defined in the Higher Education and Research Act and strengthened in clause 1, academic freedom is necessary for academic staff who may be at risk of losing privileges and jobs or with reduced likelihood of securing a new academic role because of their views. Visiting academic speakers will therefore have academic freedom in relation to their own universities. A visiting speaker who speaks controversially at another university will have the benefit of the provision at their own university, but they do not need it at the university they are visiting, as they do not have a job or promotion prospects at that university that they are at risk of losing.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to work with you today, Mrs Cummins. These amendments seek to extend academic freedom protections to students as well as academic staff. Where clause 1 provides that higher education providers must take reasonably practical steps to secure freedom of speech for staff and members, as well as students and visiting speakers, this includes securing the academic freedom of academic staff. Academic staff have studied and researched for many years to reach the positions they hold. It is wrong for them to fear for their jobs or career because they have taken a minority view or put forward a controversial opinion.
I am pleased to reassure Committee members that the Bill goes further than previous legislation, broadening the definition of academic freedom so that it will include promotion and new applicants for academic positions. Indeed, it goes even further, in that all academic staff, not just employees, will have the benefit of academic freedom. That means that the Bill covers those who hold honorary positions, whether they are paid or not, as well as PhD students who teach undergraduates.
I must be clear that the additional protections afforded by academic freedom are relevant only to the academic staff of a provider. That is because the provision is about the risk of losing one’s job or the possibility of promotion, which are not issues that apply to students.
I am listening very carefully to my hon. Friend, as I did to the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington. It was refreshing to hear him make common cause with me, and I appreciate it. If academic freedom is not to be extended to students, would freedom of speech under this Bill have covered the situation of the midwifery student who lost a year of her academic life? It is a very important point and I would appreciate it if the Minister reflected on it.
While it would not be appropriate for me to outline how the Bill would apply to a retrospective individual case, I can give guarantees that in broad terms it will be comprehensive, and freedom of speech will cover students in a range of scenarios, so it is not necessary to include academic freedom for students. However, I have listened to the arguments that have been made today, and I will keep them under consideration.
I thank the Minister for her promise to keep under consideration the points that have been made today by Members on both sides of the Committee, and I look forward to her returning to this issue as the Bill progresses. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ Do you think that breaches of the current duties are going under the radar? What impact do you think they are having on individuals? That is what Bill is intending to impact—it is intending to change the lives of academics and students.
Dr Harris: To give an example, one of our members is Dr Abhijit Sarkar, a scholar of Indian political history at the University of Oxford. He specialises in research into far-right Indian politics, or so-called Hindutva. He posted on Instagram about the president-elect of the students’ union. He alleged that she herself was a Hindutva, a far-right Hindu nationalist. He backed it up with the fruits of his research and pointed out the various signs and tell-tales of codes that British people like me would not pick up on. It is sort of like what Searchlight do in pointing out the signs of the far right.
There was an extreme campaign against Dr Sarkar, and I have some details of the threats made against him, which have gone to the university. They include: “You die with your spine broken”, “You and your subhuman kin need to be culled and wiped from the subcontinent” and, “I request to start a campaign to bring that bastard to India” In response, the university disciplined Dr Sarkar and called him in for investigation. I cannot, and Dr Sarkar cannot say, what the outcome of that was. What is telling for me is that this was a situation where an academic was really fulfilling a public watchdog role. He was telling people that these were the tell-tale signs of far-right nationalism. When his life was threatened, the university still could not bring itself to take his side. They could not stand behind him and say, “We are with you and we support your academic freedom.”
That, I suspect, is a major part of the trauma that is caused by this. It is this feeling of isolation—that there is no one who has got my back. We see that with the gender critical feminists. There is a member whose mental health has been destroyed—I cannot mention her name. There was a campaign of harassment against her and it was brought to the attention of the university. Nothing happened and she was managed out in a sham redundancy. This is the effect. What has come before us—the cases we have dealt with—are not exhaustive; I suspect they are representative of a wider phenomenon, and I think it is too much already.
Q Good afternoon, Dr Harris. Do you think the duty to take reasonably practicable steps to secure free speech is adequate—the duty in clause 1 and elsewhere in the Bill?
Dr Harris: It is difficult to say, and that is the problem. The Government and their lawyers have perhaps missed some opportunities to bring greater clarity and perhaps have not been as ambitious as they could have. “Reasonably practicable” steps largely replicates the wording of the 1986 duty. The problem is that in that interim there have been very few cases where the courts have considered the meaning of that. One ambiguity is if a court were asked to consider what “reasonably practicable” steps means. There is a possibility that they would say it is pretty much for the university’s discretion to decide what is reasonably practicable, and the court will simply insist that it not be irrational—that it not be Wednesbury irrational. That is a very low standard of irrationality. It is: “Don’t be completely unreasonable.” In the light of that, it is disappointing that there has not been more to state what that means.
Another ambiguity is that obviously since 1986 the Human Rights Act has become law, which means that this duty now sits alongside the section 6 duty of the Human Rights Act that a university must not act incompatibly with the article 10 right to freedom of speech, so I think that there is a bit of a missed opportunity to say how the two duties sit alongside each other. Do they essentially mean the same thing or does the Bill superimpose a positive duty—the Human Rights Act says that you must refrain from incompatible acts, and then the Bill says further that you must positively take steps to secure freedom of speech?
That is one potential interpretation, so I think my answer is that there is too much pot luck in this. There is too much hoping that when the courts get around to asking what this means they will tell us. I think Parliament should decide what it wants to do and say it, rather than leave a gap to be filled by the courts. Saying “all necessary steps such as are reasonable to secure freedom of speech” would be a very clear way of at least achieving clarity. Some may disagree, but it has the benefit of being a clearly defined duty.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Dr Harris: To give an example, one of our members is Dr Abhijit Sarkar, a scholar of Indian political history at the University of Oxford. He specialises in research into far-right Indian politics, or so-called Hindutva. He posted on Instagram about the president-elect of the students’ union. He alleged that she herself was a Hindutva, a far-right Hindu nationalist. He backed it up with the fruits of his research and pointed out the various signs and tell-tales of codes that British people like me would not pick up on. It is sort of like what Searchlight do in pointing out the signs of the far right.
There was an extreme campaign against Dr Sarkar, and I have some details of the threats made against him, which have gone to the university. They include: “You die with your spine broken”, “You and your subhuman kin need to be culled and wiped from the subcontinent” and, “I request to start a campaign to bring that bastard to India” In response, the university disciplined Dr Sarkar and called him in for investigation. I cannot, and Dr Sarkar cannot say, what the outcome of that was. What is telling for me is that this was a situation where an academic was really fulfilling a public watchdog role. He was telling people that these were the tell-tale signs of far-right nationalism. When his life was threatened, the university still could not bring itself to take his side. They could not stand behind him and say, “We are with you and we support your academic freedom.”
That, I suspect, is a major part of the trauma that is caused by this. It is this feeling of isolation—that there is no one who has got my back. We see that with the gender critical feminists. There is a member whose mental health has been destroyed—I cannot mention her name. There was a campaign of harassment against her and it was brought to the attention of the university. Nothing happened and she was managed out in a sham redundancy. This is the effect. What has come before us—the cases we have dealt with—are not exhaustive; I suspect they are representative of a wider phenomenon, and I think it is too much already.
Q
Dr Harris: It is difficult to say, and that is the problem. The Government and their lawyers have perhaps missed some opportunities to bring greater clarity and perhaps have not been as ambitious as they could have. “Reasonably practicable” steps largely replicates the wording of the 1986 duty. The problem is that in that interim there have been very few cases where the courts have considered the meaning of that. One ambiguity is if a court were asked to consider what “reasonably practicable” steps means. There is a possibility that they would say it is pretty much for the university’s discretion to decide what is reasonably practicable, and the court will simply insist that it not be irrational—that it not be Wednesbury irrational. That is a very low standard of irrationality. It is: “Don’t be completely unreasonable.” In the light of that, it is disappointing that there has not been more to state what that means.
Another ambiguity is that obviously since 1986 the Human Rights Act has become law, which means that this duty now sits alongside the section 6 duty of the Human Rights Act that a university must not act incompatibly with the article 10 right to freedom of speech, so I think that there is a bit of a missed opportunity to say how the two duties sit alongside each other. Do they essentially mean the same thing or does the Bill superimpose a positive duty—the Human Rights Act says that you must refrain from incompatible acts, and then the Bill says further that you must positively take steps to secure freedom of speech?
That is one potential interpretation, so I think my answer is that there is too much pot luck in this. There is too much hoping that when the courts get around to asking what this means they will tell us. I think Parliament should decide what it wants to do and say it, rather than leave a gap to be filled by the courts. Saying “all necessary steps such as are reasonable to secure freedom of speech” would be a very clear way of at least achieving clarity. Some may disagree, but it has the benefit of being a clearly defined duty.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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Yes, Jonathan Sacks, who is so respected and speaks from a heart of compassion, indeed said that. I very much support those words, because we know that about 1 million children have little or no contact with their fathers, and they are vastly over-represented in our poorest communities.
What I said about the poorest 20% on the income spectrum holds true for those who have a bit, but not a lot more. The Institute for Social and Economic Research found that, on average, women’s incomes dropped by more than 10% after a marital split, and that family breakdown is a route into poverty for many. The single fact of family breakdown can tip people out of a degree of financial security and into a much more precarious and uncertain set of circumstances, in which they are also far more dependent on the state.
As I always state in such debates, I make no criticism or condemnation of single parents. So many of them strive so valiantly to support their children and to do their very best for their family, often in challenging circumstances. However, the fact is that lone-parent households are twice as likely to be in poverty as couple families. In 2015, 44% of children from lone-parent families were in households living on less than 60% of median income, as compared with 24% of children from two-parent families. Inevitably, single parents struggling to juggle their time will face greater challenges to spending time with their children.
Some might suggest that parents raising children on their own should simply receive more support from the state, but single parenthood is a risk factor for poverty internationally. Swedish statistics show that parental separation is the biggest driver into child poverty, by a large margin, and that is in the country with the most generous welfare regime in the world. The state does not and cannot protect a child against the absence of a relationship missed with one parent or another. As this Government’s emphasis on life chances has made clear, however, we cannot look only to the effects on income. Poverty is not only about income, but about many other things in life, not least, particularly in a child’s life, poverty of relationships. How are the nation’s children and young people faring in terms of their mental health and wellbeing?
Research commissioned by the previous Labour Government shows that children who experience family breakdown are more likely to experience behavioural problems, to perform less well in school, to need more medical treatment, to leave school and home earlier, to become sexually active, pregnant or a parent at an early age, and to report more depressive symptoms and higher levels of smoking, drinking and other drug use during adolescence. The most up-to-date research also demonstrates those associations. The recently published “Longitudinal Study of Young People in England” found that young people in single-parent families had greater mental health challenges than those with two parents, and there was a greater likelihood of them being above the “caseness” threshold, which means that someone is suffering from such psychological distress that they need clinical help.
I welcome my hon. Friend’s comment that social injustice is based not just on financial poverty but, in effect, on social poverty—things such as bereavement, family breakdown and children’s time being consumed by them acting as carers. Does she agree that we should look at how things such as the pupil premium are calculated to ensure that they take into account the whole range of social injustices that children in this country face?
We certainly need to look at a range of solutions for supporting such children more, and that could be one. My hon. Friend raises the concerning issue of young carers, who are certainly under-supported and under-resourced and whose number is underestimated, as I know from my own area.
I am patron of a young persons’ mental health charity, Visyon, which cannot cope with all the requests for help that it receives, including from children as young as four years old. I recently asked how many of those children have mental health issues because of relationship difficulties, and the answer was virtually all of them. Similarly, young people in step-families were reported by the longitudinal study that I referred to as being significantly more likely to be above the caseness threshold than those living with two parents. We are often reminded of the need for more and better mental health services, but the role of family breakdown in fuelling that need is almost never mentioned. Would it not be wonderful if we could start to look earlier in the chain of difficulties and challenges that such children experience at how we can prevent family breakdown from occurring, as it does in so many cases?
When the study that I referred to was publicised, digital media received the lion’s share of the blame for driving poor outcomes. I have no doubt that over-exposure to screens and the online world does children and adolescents no favours—I and many other Members spoke about that only yesterday during the debate on the Digital Economy Bill—but digital media are here to stay, and we must be ruthlessly honest that family background can make children more likely to get less help than they need to navigate the challenges of the digital world. That is why I said in that debate that
“whatever protections the Government devise, they cannot be comprehensive. Parents need to be given as much information and support as possible to enable them to engage with and protect their children from harmful behaviour online in what is a very challenging environment for many parents.”—[Official Report, 13 September 2016; Vol. 614, c. 841.]
That might not be the responsibility of the Ministers promoting that Bill, but I believe that it should be grasped by someone in government.
Families with two super-invested parents who have time and motivation to supervise their children’s internet use and coach them to be savvy digital natives are at a distinct advantage over others in helping to protect their children from self or other, abusive sexual experimentation. My main point is simply that when it comes to social harms, there is still a tendency to emphasise factors external to families and to look for solutions at a safe distance. However, the report of the Government-commissioned “Longitudinal Study of Young People in England” stated:
“Schools would seem ideally placed to cut through to all young people in year 10 and provide them with the support that they need around wellbeing”.
I accept that schools have an important role to play—many do so and support children with difficulties and disadvantages well—but the challenges are huge. We should surely also equip and educate parents so they can help their children. I commend Keith Simpson, headmaster of Middlewich High School in my constituency. When he seeks to support children with challenges in his school, he seeks to work with their parents, too.
The Institute for Public Policy Research, in its report “A long division”, found that no less than 80% of the factors influencing pupil achievement come from outside school, and family influence is particularly strong. Equipping and educating parents must include helping them when their own relationships are under strain and being honest about the effects that a culture of family breakdown has on the next generation.
The Government has a self-interested responsibility in this area, given that young people with poor mental health and wellbeing often grow up into adults who struggle, with implications for employers, national productivity and health services. University College London’s research department of epidemiology and public health has shown that 60-year-olds still suffer the long-term effects of childhood stress linked to the trauma of family breakdown. As someone who has been involved in a law firm that has undertaken family work for three decades, I can confirm that the bereavement and grief that young people feel from missing relationships can be profound and last a long time.
Members will be pleased to hear that that brings me back to the title of the debate, “A cross-departmental approach on social justice”, which has clear implications for the Prime Minister’s broader social reform goal. I have touched on just some of the social problems that restrict a child’s life chances and make life in Britain much less fulfilling and prosperous for so many than we in this place want it to be. If we are to cut through and make a lasting difference to those problems, a much more concerted and co-ordinated effort has to be made from the very top of the Government to address family breakdown than has been made to date.