Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Michael Ellis Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 14th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General (Michael Ellis)]

I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.

The Bill passed through the other place, where it was carefully scrutinised and amended in only one respect: to seek to retain a role for this honourable House in respect of Dissolution. The Lords amendment provided that the Prime Minister could request the sovereign exercise—the revived prerogative powers to dissolve and call Parliament—only when this House agreed the motion

“that this present Parliament will be dissolved.”

That would create an untested, hybrid system by imposing statutory arrangements on top of the prerogative system that existed prior to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. Such statutory constraints would undermine the flexibility that for generations characterised the pre-2011 arrangements that the Government want to reinstate. With respect, the Government therefore firmly disagree with the Lords amendment.

In fact, the Government and the Opposition both committed—in their manifestos, no less—to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. The Lords amendment would repeal that Act only to retain one of its fundamental flaws. That is not our wish or our intention and it does not meet the commitment that we made to the electorate.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am hugely relieved to hear the Minister say that. I have stood in every election since 1997. Only when we saw the chaos caused by a Government who did not want to continue and an Opposition who did not want the chance to face an election could we see how dreadful that old system was. We need to get rid of it, bag and baggage.

[Michael Ellis]

I agree with my right hon. Friend; there is of course a good reason why the 2017 to 2019 Parliament is referred to as the zombie Parliament.

I remind the House of the commitments that both parties made in 2019. The Conservatives committed to repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Will the Minister confirm that, if we dismiss Lords amendment 1 today, the courts will not have a role in fixing the dates for elections, because, surely, that is matter for us, answerable to the electors?

[Michael Ellis]

My right hon. Friend is quite right that it is not productive, and, in fact, it would not be in the interests of the judiciary themselves, for the courts to have such a role.

We committed to repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, as it had led to paralysis at a time when the country needed decisive action. In a similar vein, the Labour manifesto said that the 2011 Act

“stifled democracy and propped up weak governments.”

A vote in the Commons could create paralysis in a number of contexts, including minority Governments, coalition Governments, or where our parties, Parliament or even the nation, at some point in the future, were divided.

As a majority on the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act noted, a Commons vote would have a practical effect only where Parliament were gridlocked. The problem is that if the Government of the day had a comfortable majority, a vote would be unlikely to make any difference; it would have no meaningful effect, beyond causing unnecessary delay and expense. However, when Parliament is gridlocked, a vote could mean denying an election to a Government who were unable to function effectively. We witnessed the consequences of such a vote painfully in 2019, so let us not repeat that mistake by devising a system where those events could happen again. Lords amendment 1 is, therefore, with the greatest possible respect, without merit.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has mentioned what happens in the event of a minority Government. What would happen where the Prime Minister of a minority Government wished to call a general election, but there was the possibility of an alternative Government being formed? Would that Prime Minister be able to dissolve Parliament by prerogative in those circumstances, or would another person be given an opportunity to form a Government and a majority in the House of Commons?

[Michael Ellis]

I do not want to get into hypotheticals, but what I will say is that the pre-2011 position worked extremely well. There is a reason why it worked well and it was proven to have functioned correctly. We seek to go back to a proven, tried and tested system, which works in a whole variety of different circumstances, not every one of which can be easily expostulated.

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend share my disbelief at some of the opposition to the current position, especially as we recall the chaos that led to the last general election and the frustration among the public when Parliament, in many people’s eyes, seemed to lose the respect of the population?

[Michael Ellis]

Good constitutional practice involves protecting the integrity of the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary and, in our view, the proposals do that and this amendment would not, so I agree with what my right hon. Friend says.

[Jackie Doyle-Price (Thurrock) (Con)]

I sat on the Joint Committee that reviewed the 2011 Act and we spent long, productive and interesting hours looking at it. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is really unproductive to look at our future arrangements in the context of what happened in 2019, just as it is to look at them in the context of what happened in 2010? The beauty of our system must be that the constitution can flex. Those were particularly unique circumstances in 2019, and we should not let them affect what happens going forward.

[Michael Ellis]

My hon. Friend is completely right. In fact, it is difficult to expostulate all the different scenarios that may occur in future, so it is best to avoid that, but we know what worked well—the status quo ante the 2011 Act.

As I say, we have experienced the consequences of a statutory scheme and we know what happened in 2019, but the amendment is also dangerously silent on critical questions of implementation and is likely to have undesirable consequences for our constitutional system. For example, it is likely to have negative consequences for the fundamental conventions on confidence. The privilege to request that the sovereign exercise the Dissolution prerogative is an Executive function enjoyed by virtue of the ability of the Government to command the confidence of the Commons. That is the alpha and omega of everything, and should not unduly constrained by any sort of prescriptive parliamentary process that would be disruptive and unhelpful when expediency is essential.

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

The Minister responded to the hon. Member for Thurrock (Jackie Doyle-Price) by saying that he fully agreed with her excellent statement, but he is in essence doing the exact opposite. Why this paradoxical situation?

[Michael Ellis]

I am obviously not doing that. We are able to see where mistakes have been made and where things have gone well in the past, and we see that in the pre-2011 position—the position we are seeking to achieve and that Labour sought to achieve in its manifesto, as did my party. That tried and tested system worked well, and worked well for generations.

[Mr William Wragg (Hazel Grove) (Con)]

May I refer my right hon. and learned Friend to “The Crown”, of which I am sure he was an avid viewer? In answer to the intervention by the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan), is my right hon. and learned Friend familiar with the Lascelles principles, as written to The Times under the pseudonym “Senex”, and can he update the House on whether they now form part of the Cabinet manual?

[Michael Ellis]

The Lascelles principles are something we still respect. One of the fundamental tenets of Sir Alan Lascelles’ letter was the fact that we wished to avoid any suggestion that the sovereign be involved in politics.

The amendment, as I was saying, is silent on the issue of the negative consequences. The privilege to request that the sovereign exercise the Dissolution prerogative is an executive function that is enjoyed by virtue of the ability to command the confidence of the Commons.

We must also question how the amendment would work in practice. For example, how would the parliamentary process be sequenced and when would it apply? Would the Prime Minister be required to confirm the support of the House only when they intend to request that Parliament be dissolved before the maximum five-year term, or would it apply following a loss of confidence? There are myriad questions that the amendment would leave unanswered; as we can see, it adds undesired complexity to what is a simple proposition—a return to the status quo ante.

The Bill intends to return us to that status quo, reviving the prerogative powers for the Dissolution and the calling of Parliament and preserving the long-standing position on the non-justiciability of those powers. The amendment would undermine the entire rationale for the Bill. If it is amended as proposed, we would be entering into precisely the kind of ill-thought-through constitutional innovation that we are seeking to repeal.

The simplest and most effective route is to make express provision to revive the prerogative powers for the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, returning our country to tried and tested constitutional arrangements offering certainty around the calling of elections. The prerogative power to dissolve Parliament is the ultimate expression of humility on the part of the Executive, placing the future and power into the hands of the people.

Finally, with all due respect for the undoubted expertise and value of the House of Lords, I suggest it is not appropriate for the revising Chamber to ask the elected House to revisit questions, not least when they relate to the process and role of this House, on which this House has already definitively decided. I thank their lordships, but I hope that they will now take note of this House’s clear view. Therefore, I would welcome this House’s sending a clear signal and I urge it to vote against the amendment.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak for the Opposition in this debate.

I listened very carefully to the case that the Minister made for his motion to remove Lords amendment 1 to clause 2. I was sad to hear it, and I think we could do better. He is right that Labour, both in our manifesto and in the two years since, has supported the principle of the repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which was an ill-thought-out and poorly executed piece of legislation. I gently say, though, given how strongly the Minister stressed that, that it was this Government’s piece of legislation, not ours. He cautions us against novations in this space, but that was actually a lesson for themselves, and it is not quite fair to point it in our direction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Patrick Grady]

It is not really for the Scottish National party to defend the Westminster interpretation of democracy, but the Bill, and rejecting the Lords amendment, is such a retrograde step that we must put that on the record and see it as part of a bigger picture. This is not control being taken back by Parliament but control being taken from Parliament by the Executive and, as a number of other hon. Members have said, consolidating power as part of a package of measures—not least the Elections Bill.

The effect of all that is that the next election campaign starts today. Everyone in the Chamber must therefore be aware of what they are doing when they cast their vote on the amendment. The campaigning starts today. The power will end up with the Prime Minister and he alone, without the check of his Cabinet or of this House. That is a significant power grab that will further undermine confidence among the public in the institutions of this place. Again, I say to Government Members that, from an SNP point of view, that is fine in a way. The Bill and the rest of their package of reform is not strengthening the Union. As I said in my interventions, we can look at the systems in place to protect the devolved institutions’ democracies and see how they can dissolve only with the permission of the legislature or must operate to a fixed term that everyone knows in advance, but the Bill is taking this place backwards. It is increasing the divergence on these islands. Once again, from where I am standing, that is fine, but perhaps Government Members ought to think twice about it.

[Michael Ellis]

First, may I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Jackie Doyle-Price) that I, too, am a romantic—that may come as a surprise to the House—especially when it comes to the constitution? I agree that flex is required and that it is highly desirable to have an unwritten constitution that gives us that flex and ability to change things as needed while accepting the conventions of our constitution.

The Lords amendment before the House is not a small amendment; in fact, it is a wrecking amendment as it would convert the whole purpose of the Bill. I can hardly think of anything more democratic than saying: a Government of any particular day might have lost of the confidence of the elected House and will therefore go to the country and ask the people for their view.

I know that the Opposition would not want to go back to 2019 and, as happened then, block a general election three times. That is no doubt why they agreed in their manifesto that the 2011 Act had to go. Let us not allow that to happen again. Let us hand power to the people, let us protect the sovereign from involvement in politics and let us disagree with the Lords amendment.

Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.