Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Twenty Fourth sitting)

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Lee Rowley]

The clause enables the Secretary of State to commission, from time to time, reviews of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. RICS, as many hon. Members will know, is the leading professional body for surveyors. Its members work across the UK, and RICS plays a vital role in these sectors. The guidance RICS publishes is valued by surveyors, industry and members of the public. The clause will enable reviews into RICS’s governance and its effectiveness in meeting its objectives. The clause does not prescribe the frequency of reviews, but gives the Secretary of State the necessary power and flexibility to further specify the scope and timing of any review that is required.

The Government do not envisage enacting a review of RICS on a regular or specified basis, so long as RICS demonstrates its effectiveness and is reviewing its own performance to the satisfaction of Government and Parliament, but should a review be required the clause sets out that the person the Secretary of State appoints to carry out the review must be independent of both the Secretary of State and RICS. The reviewer must submit a written report setting out the results and any recommendations of the review to the Secretary of State, who will publish a copy of the report. The clause does not include powers for the Secretary of State to act on any such findings or recommendations; they would need the explicit approval of Parliament. That will ensure that the Government have the ability in law to review whether RICS is performing in the public interest, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Hollobone. I thank the Minister for that explanation of the purpose of the clause, but he will be aware that the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors has expressed deep concerns about its precise wording, not least in terms of the precedent that it would set in relation to Government interference in other royal chartered bodies.

The issue is not the need for RICS to undergo periodic reviews of its governance and performance. Following the September 2021 publication of the Levitt report into the events that took place within the institution in 2018 and 2019, and the subsequent independent review undertaken by Lord Bichard, which examined its purpose, governance and strategy, RICS’s governing council accepted that regular independent reviews should take place, with their findings laid before Parliament and the devolved nations. The case for periodic independent reviews is therefore uncontested.

From what the Minister said, I think what remains the point of contention is whether the Secretary of State should be given the power to commission reviews of RICS, the scope and frequency of which are not clearly defined in the Bill, or whether the clause should be revised to reflect the commitments made by the institution in the light of Lord Bichard’s independent review. Given the serious concerns expressed by RICS, I will probe the Minister further on the Government’s rationale for the clause’s wording. Can he set out more clearly why, given that RICS’s governing council has made it clear that it accepts recommendation 14 of Lord Bichard’s review in full and will implement it subject to Privy Council approval, the Government believe that they still need to legislate to ensure that the Secretary of State can initiate reviews of RICS whenever they choose, as well as determine their scope?

Can the Minister also outline how such periodic reviews initiated by the Secretary of State using the powers in the clause would differ, if at all, from the parameters of independent reviews as outlined in paragraph 3.22 of Lord Bichard’s review, and accepted in principle by RICS? Can he reassure the Committee that the Government have given serious consideration to the potential impact of approving this clause unamended on not only RICS’s independence and ability to act in the public interest but the status of royal chartered bodies more widely?

As I say, we have no issue with the clause in principle, and we do not suggest that it should be removed from the Bill entirely; there is clearly a need to act to ensure that RICS is subject to regular independent review. However, we want the Government to properly justify the inclusion of the clause as worded in the Bill, rather than amending it to reflect developments following the publication of Lord Bichard’s review. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lee Rowley]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his questions, which are entirely reasonable and on which I hope to provide some assurance. First, he asked why the Government are asking for this power, given that the Bichard review has outlined a process to resolve the current situation. The view of the Government and of previous Ministers who instigated this was that a process was likely to be under way, but equally there is value in the Secretary of State having this power, should it ever be necessary in the future, which obviously we hope it would not, and we have indicated that it would be used extremely sparingly. The principle of having the ability to instigate a review is one that the Government believe is reasonable and proportionate.

Secondly, the hon. Gentleman asked how the terms of reference would differ from an independent review. That question would have to be asked in individual circumstances, so I hope he will accept that it is a difficult one to answer. However, I understand the sentiments behind the point he makes.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman asked whether the Government have given serious consideration to the impact of this approach on the ability of RICS and other bodies to operate. I am happy to confirm that the Government and I will engage in discussion with RICS about this in the coming weeks before further stages of the Bill, and I will be keen to discuss with RICS all elements of the Bill, to understand its concerns and to see what reassurances I can provide.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 186 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 187

Vagrancy and begging

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Pennycook]

We are extremely concerned about the implications of this clause, and the explanation just given by the Minister does not reassure me one bit. Clause 187 is a placeholder clause that allows for a substantive clause to be introduced via Government amendment at a later stage in the Bill’s passage. Its effect is to disregard the full repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 that the House approved via amendments to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.

There are two fundamental problems with the clause. First, in approving section 81 of the 2022 Act, the House made it clear that it wished the Vagrancy Act to be repealed in full, so that homelessness would no longer be criminalised. It did not seek to qualify the effect of that measure by stipulating that the repeal of the 1824 Act should be delayed until replacement legislation was brought forward, which appears to be the Government’s intention in inserting this placeholder clause in the Bill. The House voted purely and simply for repeal in full.

Secondly, precisely because clause 187 is a placeholder clause, we have absolutely no idea as we debate it today what the “suitable replacement legislation” will look like. It could include positive measures that featured in the consultation that the Minister mentioned, which was launched in April, such as multi-agency outreach, but there is a clear risk that any replacement regime introduced via the powers provided for by this clause could once again criminalise people who are begging or sleeping rough. We take the view that replacement legislation is not required at all. Existing legislation—including the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Fraud Act 2006—already provides the police with sufficient powers to tackle harmful types of begging, harassment, antisocial behaviour and exploitative activity. By expressly allowing for the reintroduction of criminal offences or civil penalties for conduct that is the same or similar to that under sections 3 and 4 of the Vagrancy Act, clause 187 enables the effective re-criminalisation of homelessness and rough sleeping, with all the damaging and counterproductive implications that that entails.

As the Minister has recognised, the Vagrancy Act is an embarrassing remnant of Georgian England’s approach to the poor and destitute. It deserves to be consigned to the dustbin of history in its entirety, rather than being surreptitiously restored in a modern form to enable the criminalisation of rough sleeping or passive begging. As I said, the House made its views on this matter clear during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, but if the Minister is in any doubt about the strength of feeling on this issue, she need only look at the long list of names of Members from her own Benches who have signed amendment 1, in the name of the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Nickie Aiken).

We do not intend to oppose clause 187 today, but if the Government do not voluntarily withdraw it from the Bill, we will work with Members from across the House to ensure that it is removed on Report. I hope that the Minister can give some indication today that that will not be necessary, and that the Government will reconsider their position.

[Tim Farron]

Likewise, I am appalled and deeply troubled by this provision. Clause 187 feels gratuitous—unnecessary. As we have heard, plenty of provisions already exist to allow the police to deal with antisocial behaviour that could be associated with rough sleeping and people who are begging. This clause feels unnecessary and counterproductive. Above all, it feels like an act of bad faith, given what the Government have committed to doing—both from the Treasury Bench in the Commons and from the Dispatch Box in the other place.

Tomorrow, we will either celebrate or mourn the 100th anniversary of the last Liberal leaving No. 10 —notwithstanding the current sleeper agent, obviously. The legislation that is brought back to life by this clause was nearly 100 years old, and out of date, back then, but even saying that is not going far enough, because if something is morally wrong, it is morally wrong no matter how old it is—whether it is 200, 100 or new, and whether it is from Georgian England, Lloyd George, or the current era. It is morally wrong to criminalise people for being homeless. It is pointless as well.

I have spent a number of nights over the years raising money for our local homelessness charity, Manna House in Kendal. We do a night sleeping rough in January up at Kendal castle. Some of the people who work with Manna House have slept rough in reality—in many cases for years. As we went through the difficulties of one night out in the open, the casual way they would speak about their experience on the street I found more chilling than the night air. It was not just the poverty, the hardship, the hunger and the cold; it was the sense of shame, the sense of not being fully human. A Crisis poll of people who are street homeless found that 56% felt that laws that criminalise them added to that sense of shame.

People who are in desperate housing need, and are on the street, need more than just a roof over their head—though they need that. They need sustained help in rebuildibng their life. Often there are addiction and other mental health issues that partner their homelessness, and may even have fuelled it. The last thing that they need is to be criminalised. There is no value to society in doing so. All that happens is that they are displaced to somewhere else. Instead, our society should be compelled to do something to meet their needs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dehenna Davison]

That is why I made the point about the consultation we are running. We want to make sure that we get this right, which is why we sought views on this issue in a public consultation that closed in May. Analysis of those responses is ongoing and will form the backbone of our response to any new legislation. The measure is a placeholder until we can bring something forward. I recognise that it is not an ideal situation, but that is where we are.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I want to challenge the Minister on that point. If I heard her correctly, I think she said that the intention behind the clause is not to recriminalise homelessness.

[Dehenna Davison]

Absolutely.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Can she explain why subsection (2) allows regulations to include provision to create criminal offences, in similar ways to sections 3 and 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, which the House voted to repeal? It effectively will allow for the recriminalisation of homelessness. I think she is wrong on that point, but if she could provide further clarification, I would appreciate it.

[Dehenna Davison]

As I outlined, this is a placeholder, and we are analysing the consultation responses. The commitment I have given is that no criminalisation will result from the fact that someone is homeless. I want to put that point on the record incredibly strongly.

I cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, but I have spoken to the Minister with responsibility for rough sleeping, who has committed to writing to Committee members to outline the next steps. As I say, this issue does not usually sit within my brief, but we are limited by the number of Ministers we can have in Committee today. Hopefully, that Minister will be able to provide additional reassurance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lee Rowley]

The Government and the country need to ensure that world-class sustainable infrastructure can be consented to, vitally, in a manner that can support our ambitions for economic growth. To achieve that, we must have a robust planning system that is able to accelerate infrastructure delivery and to meet the forecast demands and complexity of projects coming forward in order to attract strong investment in infrastructure. Through these changes, the planning system can continue to lead in its approach to supporting the delivery of nationally significant infrastructure, which incentivises investment and makes it quicker to deliver that infrastructure.

The Government have an ambition in the national infrastructure strategy for some development consent applications entering the system from September next year to go through the process up to 50% faster from the start of pre-application to decision, but to achieve that a national infrastructure planning reform programme was established to refresh how the nationally significant infrastructure project works and to make it more effective and deliver better and faster outcomes. New clause 60, as a consequence, will amend the part of the existing NSIP process that concerns the examination of a development consent order application. Under existing legislation, the relevant Secretary of State can set an extended deadline for the examination of an application for development consent, but there is no corresponding legislative power to enable the same Secretary of State to set a shorter deadline for such an examination.

Our measure will rectify that, providing the means for the Secretary of State to set a shorter examination period for projects that meet quality standards as part of wider NSIP reform and the fast-track consenting route that we plan to put in place, as set out in the energy security strategy. The mechanisms and criteria that could trigger the exercise of that power by the Secretary of State will be set out in supporting guidance and we will commit to consulting on that in due course. I commend these measures to the Committee.

[Matthew Pennycook]

We have serious concerns about the potential implications of Government new clause 60, which, as the Minister has made clear, will provide the Secretary of State with the power to impose a shorter statutory timeframe for the examination stage of some NSIP applications.

In the policy note entitled “Improving performance of the NSIP planning process and supporting local authorities”, which was published in August to accompany the tabling of the Government new clause, the rationale cited for its introduction is specifically the need significantly to reduce the time it takes to gain consent for offshore wind projects in order to realise the commitment set out in the British energy security strategy. That objective is entirely laudable, but while we support efforts to improve the overall performance of the DCO system—a reform, after all, introduced by the last Labour Government to expedite decisions on large-scale infrastructure projects—the Government have not provided any convincing evidence that the length of the DCO examination stage is the reason why project consents can take too long to secure.

As the Minister will know, the DCO system already specifies a fixed timeframe of nine months for the planning inspectorate to make a final decision, with only six of those months being allocated to the examination stage. The Minister might have some convincing evidence that he can share with the Committee to explain why the six-month examination process is the reason why the Government believe that offshore wind projects are taking up to four years to gain consent, but we are not aware of any such evidence that has been published.

Allowing an appropriate time for a DCO examination is important not only because that enables inspectors to gather and analyse all the available evidence and the social and environmental impacts of projects properly to be interrogated, but because it is the part of the statutory process in which communities have a say over developments that are often likely to have a significant impact on their lives. If the Government want to hand themselves the power to curtail the timeframe in which that important part of the DCO process takes place, we feel strongly that they need to bring forward the evidence to justify such a measure, and they have not done so yet.

However, beyond that in-principle concern over reducing the time available for the public to engage with a detailed process, there is a further reason why we are concerned about the possible implications of the Government new clause, which is that its scope is not limited simply to offshore wind projects. Instead, the powers provided to the Secretary of State by the measure will seemingly apply to all DCO applications and any large-scale infrastructure project that meets as-yet-to-be-specified qualifying criteria.

To take a topical example, the powers could be applied to schemes for hydraulically fractured shale gas production, which I know is of deep concern to the new housing Minister and other Government Members. With the Government having abandoned their manifesto commitment by signalling the end of the fracking moratorium and with UK onshore oil and gas already gearing up to convince Ministers to designate fracking projects as nationally significant, the obvious concern about Government new clause 60 is that the Government will use it to facilitate fracking applications with only the most limited opportunity for local communities to have their say on them. That concern is made more acute by the fact that Ministers have so far failed to provide any detail on precisely how it will be determined that local consent for fracking schemes exists.

Given the serious nature of those concerns, I would be grateful if the Minister answered the following questions. First, what evidence do the Government have that the examination phase of the DCO process is unduly holding up consent for offshore wind and other large-scale renewable energy projects? Secondly, given that the new clause allows the Secretary of State to set an unspecified date for a deadline below the current six-month timeframe for DCO examinations, can the Minister give us a sense of how much shorter the Government believe the examination stage should be under the proposed fast-tracked DCO application process? Thirdly, when will the Government tell us what the qualifying criteria will be for large-scale infrastructure projects subject to shorter examination stage timeframes via this route? Lastly, do the Government intend to designate schemes for hydraulically fractured shale gas production as “nationally significant” and bring them within the purview of this new fast-tracked DCO process—yes or no? I look forward to hearing from the Minister and to returning no doubt to this matter as we consider the Bill further.

[Lee Rowley]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his questions. Again, they are entirely reasonable and I will answer as many of them as I can. We recognise that this is a change to the approach, but it is a change that comes directly from a recognition, which I hope we all share, that where there is a desire to move quicker on important infrastructure for this country that we are able to do that. We have an in-principle ability to extend this process, which has been in place for a number of years, and—although I do not know the history—presumably ever since the Labour party started this process a number of years ago, as the hon. Gentleman indicated. Given that, it is not necessarily conceptually problematic that we have the ability to vary that in the other direction, while accepting the understandable challenge of ensuring that there are appropriate reassurances within the process that mean that it will be used in a reasonable and proportionate manner.

While I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point about the evidence base and working through all the detail and ensuring that it is reasonable and proportionate, we are trying to establish the principle that while there is already an ability to vary this timeline in one direction, we can also vary it in another direction. In that narrow sense of what we are trying to achieve, that is a reasonable thing to do. I will try to answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions as directly as I can. On evidence, I am happy to have a further discussion with him—either verbally or in writing, whatever his preference—going through why the Government think this is reasonable and proportionate. This is all part of a broader attempt to improve this in aggregate, and I hope that the Opposition will accept that pulling multiple levers to try to secure incremental improvements in all parts of the process is a laudable aim to pursue.

On the hon. Gentleman’s specific questions on the length of time the stage should take and the qualifying criteria, that can be dealt with in guidance. I will ensure that the officials have heard his concerns and I hope we can deal with them at the guidance stage. In addition, because we have given a commitment to consult, there will be an opportunity for that. We have an interest in providing that information in the detail that is sought, so that the Government can consider it in appropriate detail as well.

Finally, on fracking, I have strong views on hydraulic shale gas and hydraulic fracturing, which I have put on the record many times in this place, and I will continue to share those views. At the same time, and I hope the hon. Gentleman accepts that there are times and places to debate policies like this one, I am no longer a Minister in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. I am sure that there will be regular opportunities to develop this matter, but my own position is known and understood. On his specific question, hydraulic fracturing is not within the NSIP process. There was a consultation in 2018-19 in which the Government decided not to put it in the NSIP process at the time. Should that change, I would be happy to debate with him at the appropriate moment.

Amendment 197 agreed to.