Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Seventeenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMatthew Pennycook
Main Page: Matthew Pennycook (Labour - Greenwich and Woolwich)Department Debates - View all Matthew Pennycook's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesClause 96 is a placeholder clause. The Government’s intention is to replace it with substantive provisions later in the Bill’s passage.
New development is commonly met with hesitance from local residents—it is often perceived as a threat to the beauty of the area or as an unwanted disruption—usually because residents see it as imposed upon them and bearing little relationship to the character of the area. Fundamentally, people are more likely to support development that they feel they can control.
Street votes will provide a new way of consenting to development that will enable residents to come together and bring forward the development they want to see on their streets. A group of residents will be able to develop proposals to extend or replace properties on their street. They will have the option either to provide a detailed development specification, or to prepare a design code that any development they permit must comply with. Development proposals put forward by residents will be independently examined against a set of development and design rules set out in legislation to ensure that they meet high design standards and do not lead to adverse impacts on the local environment and the wider community. Planning permission will be granted only when an examining body is satisfied that the proposal has met these and other statutory requirements, and when the proposal is endorsed by a large majority of residents at referendum.
The use of street votes will be restricted in sensitive locations, such as the green belt. Street votes will encourage residents to consider the potential for new development on their streets. Where residents choose to take up the opportunity, street votes will help to deliver new or more spacious homes in places where they are most needed and in a way that is supported by the people who are most affected by that development. I commend the clause to the Committee.
As the Minister has made clear, clause 96 is a placeholder clause. All it specifies is that the Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for a system that permits residents of a street to propose development on it and to determine, by means of a vote, whether that form of development is given planning permission. At the outset, I have to put on the record that we are instinctively uncomfortable with placeholder clauses of this kind. They are an implicit admission that a piece of legislation is incomplete and that policy in a given area has not been finalised. The absence of any detail about what substantive provisions might replace such placeholder clauses in future is an impediment to effective legislative scrutiny.
Furthermore, the increased use of placeholder clauses in recent legislation, as well as the general upward trend in the number of amendments that add new policies to a Bill part way through its passage or following completion, should be a cause of concern to any hon. Member who values good lawmaking. Nor are we satisfied with the reassurances set out in the explanatory notes to the Bill that any new system introduced by means of the clause will receive appropriate scrutiny—we are all familiar with the limitations of an affirmative procedure in that respect. We therefore seek from the Minister some sense—further to what he has just said—of what the new system will look like, how it will operate in practice and what its wider implications might be.
The basic concept of street votes is easy to grasp. We certainly appreciate that, at least in theory, democratically approved codes that permit development, or the extension or redevelopment of all the properties on any given street, may be a way to facilitate the gentle densification of inner suburbs—an outcome that would undoubtedly have a range of benefits, not least boosting productivity. The issue is whether and how such a system would work in practice. My strong suspicion is that any new street votes system introduced will likely be something of a damp squib and, ultimately, we will not see any significant uptake, which is largely why I struggle to get too worked up about the prospect of its introduction.
However, given the powers that the Government are seeking for themselves by means of the clause, we do need some answers from the Minister, and I ask that he provides them on six distinct areas. First, we deserve to know why the Government believe that an entirely new system for the hyper-local devolution of planning powers is required or, to put it another way, what problem are the clause and the substantive provisions to follow attempting to address.
I ask because the Minister will know that the Localism Act 2011 gives neighbourhood forums the power to create and vote on neighbourhood development orders. Such orders grant planning permission for specific types of development in a particular area following a referendum, thus enabling greater control over development, densification and design. That is essentially the same principle that lies behind the street votes concept. As such, is it not simply the case that for all the hype around the clause, it does little more than adjust the electorate for neighbourhood development orders from the neighbourhood level to the street? If that is the case, should we view the intention to introduce a new street votes system as an admission that NDOs have failed to achieve the objectives that the Government set for them, and what makes the Government think that street votes will be any more successful as an initiative?
Secondly, we should be told why the Government believe that a street is the appropriate spatial area for the powers. The Minister mentioned that it might give residents a greater sense of control but, further to the question I just put to him on neighbourhood development orders, is the choice of a street as the appropriate spatial area related to evidence that the size of the electorate involved in approving NDOs is the reason that initiative has not been taken up more extensively? Do the Government have any reason to think that street-level democratically approved codes will be utilised more extensively than NDOs?
Thirdly, we need to know what the Government believe the impact of street votes will be on housing supply and affordability. It stands to reason that successful street votes are likely to lead to substantial value uplifts for those properties that use the planning permission secured as a result. If a street votes to permit mansard roof storeys to be added to existing terraces, the homeowners who take advantage of that will increase the space within, and value of, their properties. However, I struggle to see how the benefit that those homeowners will gain from the new system will be shared in any way by those who do not already own their own home.
Street votes are unlikely to contribute much, if anything, to new housing supply. In practice, how many residents are likely to organise themselves to secure new powers to provide for infill development on their street? I suggest not very much. If, as seems more likely, street votes are largely used to add space and value to existing properties, the system could end up making it harder for first-time buyers to get on the housing ladder. Can the Minister therefore tell us whether the Department has modelled the likely impact of a street votes system on housing supply and affordability, and whether it is likely to exacerbate existing housing inequality? If not, why not, and will they do so before we get to Report and Third Reading?
Fourthly, local planning authorities deserve an indication of how the Department will assist them financially to carry out the new demands that will be placed on them as a result of the introduction of a new street votes system. We have already debated in previous clauses the parlous state of local planning authorities when it comes to capacity and resources. We have considered the new burdens placed on them as a result of numerous measures included in the Bill. If a street votes system is introduced, the Government must ensure that councils are given sufficient resources to oversee it.
We cannot have a situation, as we do at present with neighbourhood plans, where the cost of sending a plan to referendum nearly always outstrips the amount that local authorities can claim from central Government to hold them. The Government must also ensure that we do not replicate the problems experienced in the uptake of neighbourhood plans, with only affluent communities able to take advantage of them. What resourcing can local authorities expect to run a new street votes system? What steps will the Government take to ensure that less affluent communities are able to take advantage of it?
Fifthly, given the concerns expressed that street votes could prove to be an extremely divisive measure to relations between neighbours on a street, we deserve some sense of how the process might work. Will there be a minimum number of residents in any given street required to bring forward proposals to extend or redevelop properties on it, or can a single resident do so? If it is the case that a single resident can submit a proposal, what safeguards are in place to ensure that local authorities do not constantly have to put different proposals to a referendum of residents on a street?
Surely a vote should not pass if a significant minority of residents on a street are opposed to it. I think the Minister mentioned a large majority, but what does that mean? What threshold will apply to a street referendum? Are the Government minded to adopt the recommendation, made by Create Streets, that it be at least two thirds of residents on the electoral register, or Policy Exchange’s suggestion of at least 60% of votes cast? We all know that nothing gets as bitter as a dispute between neighbours, so I would like the Minister to respond to my questions and tell the Committee that the Government’s thinking when it comes to the process by which planning permission via this new system will be secured.
Finally, we need to know how a new street votes system will interact with local development plans and the Government’s wider housing and planning policy objectives. It is an obvious question, but could the Minister confirm that any street votes proposal will have to be in conformity with a local development plan in order to proceed to a vote? I think he mentioned that the new proposals must be examined: does that mean they need to be compliant with a local development plan in order to move to a vote?
How will a street votes system work in an area with a neighbourhood development order already in place, or a design code adopted as part of it? Again, will any proposals need to be found to be in accordance with an existing NDO or design code before it can go forward? Will the new provisions that the Bill puts in place for neighbourhood plans to ensure that they consider climate change mitigation and adaptation apply to street vote proposals, and will similar safeguards be put in place as those that clause 89 provides for in relation to neighbourhood plans, ensuring that street votes cannot be used to block development from taking place?
As the Minister outlined, clause 97 of the Bill inserts new sections into the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to provide for two new routes to apply for planning permission in respect of the development of Crown land in England—that is, land in which there is a Crown or Duchy interest. In the case of either route, the provisions in the clause will allow the appropriate authorities to apply for planning permission direct to the Secretary of State, rather than being subject to the same requirements and the same application processes as any other person undertaking development.
In such circumstances, the Secretary of State must notify the local planning authority whether or not they intend to decide the application. If they opt to determine it themselves, they can approve it conditionally or unconditionally or refuse it. They have to consult the local planning authority to which the application would otherwise have been made, but the authority would have no right to veto it.
The policy paper accompanying the Bill portrays the clause as a means simply to
“provide a faster and more effective route for urgent and nationally important Crown development”,
but we are concerned that, in practice, its effect is likely to be far less benign. Specifically, we are concerned about the implications of introducing such an open-ended measure, in terms of both removing appropriate and necessary limits on the exercise of Executive power and denying communities a chance to express views about development in their area and to signal their consent or opposition.
We appreciate fully that there are emergency situations where it is necessary to expedite the planning application process to facilitate essential development, and the construction of the seven Nightingale hospitals during the pandemic to provide critical and step-down care for patients is probably the best recent example—the process exists by which they could come forward, and they did. However, the broad scope of the provisions in the clause, which do not provide for any limit on the type of development that can be approved directly by the Secretary of State or in what circumstances, means that it could be used for a much wider range of proposals.
Let us take the system of large-scale accommodation centres that the Government have announced they intend to establish to house people seeking asylum while they await a decision on their claim. The system includes the “new, bespoke, reception centre” the Government plan to open on an ex-RAF base in Linton-on-Ouse in North Yorkshire for up to 1,500 people—a development that the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) has raised serious concerns about on a number of occasions.
The Committee will know that the Government have variously opened, or signalled their intention to open, centres accommodating—I use the term “accommodating” very loosely—asylum seekers in Penally in Pembrokeshire, Napier in Folkestone, Barton Stacey in Hampshire and in the shadow of Yarl’s Wood in Bedfordshire. All the sites were either on, or proposed for construction on, Crown land. All have been subject to controversy and, in the case of Penally and Napier, legal challenge—not least because of the lack of consultation with local communities in the areas where they have been, or were proposed to be, situated.
I have very much been involved with the community around Linton-on-Ouse. The fact that there has not been any proper consultation on transportation issues or on the impact on the local community has caused real concern that the Government will just press ahead with these developments without considering those issues. Does my hon. Friend agree that a more thorough, thoughtful process needs to be put in place? Also, should we really be offering refugees this type of accommodation? They are clearly in a desperate situation and need community to be wrapped around them, not to be isolated away from people and services.
My hon. Friend gets to the heart of the matter. Our concern is that the powers provided for by the clause will facilitate precisely what she suggests: the driving through of centres such as the one in Linton-on-Ouse, regardless of their impact on the people placed in them or the local communities in which they are situated.
My understanding—the Minister is welcome to correct me—is that in establishing Penally and Napier, the Government sought to rely on schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, which relates to permitted development rights. In the case of Napier, the Home Secretary granted herself permission to extend the life of the facility for a further five years, without any public consultation, by using a special development order provided for by delegated legislation. In a judgment handed down on 24 June 2022, the High Court ruled that decision unlawful.
Why have I explained that history at length? Because it is difficult to be aware of that history and not assume that the powers in clause 97 are being introduced to provide a more definitive way of securing planning consent for development on Crown land, such as for asylum centres, irrespective of the harm that such centres might cause for those placed in them, or their impact on local communities, who under the clause will be denied any right to influence a decision taken by the Secretary of State without public consultation.
I listened carefully to the Minister, who was quite clear that the powers will be used only in “moments of crisis” and in “exceptional circumstances” when there is a clear and urgent need to do so in the wider public interest. The Minister can correct me, but I see nothing in the Bill defining “exceptional circumstances”, “issues of national importance” or a “clear and urgent need”. Labour feels strongly that it is essential to insert appropriate safeguards into the clause to ensure that there are limits to the use of these powers and that minimum requirements are in place to secure some measure of consent from affected local communities. Without a firm commitment that such safeguards will be introduced at a later stage, we believe that the clause needs to be removed from the Bill. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I agree that the clause is too much of a blank cheque for the Government. The Minister said in support of the clause that the powers are for emergency use only, but if that is the case, he needs to set out far more specifically the terms for their deployment.
Members have spoken about asylum centres and the powers being a potential route to securing such sites. My concern is for those who are seeking asylum and going through that process. Having visited Napier barracks, I can tell the Committee that those who work there are good people who do their best to provide for the people staying there, many of whom have suffered huge trauma as a result of unimaginable experiences that we have never been through ourselves. There is no doubt, however, that that kind of camp-style site is no place for people who have escaped dreadful things and sought asylum. They are dealing with trauma and mental health issues, and have experienced appalling things. We are seeking to help them—I hope, given that the majority of people who make claims are genuine refugees and will, in time, be given the right to settle here—but how do these places help them to immerse and integrate themselves into society? That is just an aside on one of the potential uses of the clause and why it is particularly dangerous for those people, who are the most vulnerable in our society.
If we care about democracy—we are talking about levelling up and giving communities power—the Bill should not contain such an open-ended clause that seeks to undermine that power. I can understand why a Government would need emergency powers in some circumstances, but they should specify them, because otherwise the clause looks like overreach.
I beg to move amendment 114, in clause 98, page 114, line 21, leave out lines 21 to 28.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 115, in clause 98, page 115, line 20, at end insert—
“(12A) In relation to an application for planning permission that is made to, or is to be determined by, the Mayor of London, a reference in this section to the local planning authority is to be read as a reference to the Mayor of London.”
Clause 98 is relatively straightforward, in that it simply makes provision concerning minor variations to planning permission, allowing for greater flexibility to make non-substantial changes that would not be possible at present without the submission of multiple applications by various different routes. We broadly welcome it: the change it will give effect to is long overdue, and it will simplify arrangements currently in place that were only ever intended as a short-term holding position. However, we believe that amendments 114 and 115 are necessary to ensure that the clause works as intended by resolving two issues of concern.
First, current arrangements ensure that if a variation to planning permission is sought, whether prior to completion or post completion, the circumstances of the day are taken into account when determining the section 73 application. That includes the policies in place at the time and any other material considerations. As drafted, clause 98(7) suggests to us that the circumstances at the time of the original grant of permission would be the framework for determining applications in future. We are concerned that this would mean, for example, that if a new local plan had been adopted since the original permission, that plan—which might, for example, include more stretching environmental standards—could not be applied in deciding whether or not to grant the section 73 application.
Similarly, many section 73 applications relate to the number of residential units or to floor space. As drafted, we are concerned that the decision maker would not be able to revisit the viability information or amount of affordable housing provided by the scheme, potentially creating a significant loophole that enables the avoidance of key policy requirements. We believe local planning authorities should be able to consider up-to-date planning policy and/or guidance when determining such applications to guard against adverse consequences, such as the prevention of increases in affordable housing or the application of more ambitious sustainability policies. Amendment 114 therefore proposes the removal of subsection (7) from the clause.
The second issue of concern relates to those powers devolved to the Mayor of London concerning strategic planning applications. As the Minister knows, the Mayor has powers to become the decision maker for strategic planning applications subject to certain provisions. However, we are concerned that the Bill as drafted only provides for the Secretary of State’s call-in powers, leaving a vacuum in relation to the mayoral powers. Amendment 115 therefore inserts new language after clause 98(12) to ensure that the powers of the Mayor of London to call in applications in accordance with the terms of the Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2008 are taken into account. I hope the Minister will consider accepting both amendments.
First, I want to thank the hon. Gentleman for his proposal in amendment 114, which seeks to remove subsection (7) of proposed new section 73B under clause 98. The effect of the amendment would be to broaden the scope of planning assessment and allow local planning authorities to reconsider the principle of development established under the existing permission to which the variation is sought under proposed new section 73B.
The purpose of the reform is to provide a clearer process for enabling sensible and practical changes to be made to planning permissions that are not possible under the existing framework without the submission of multiple applications under different routes. I am sure we can agree about the importance of ensuring that the planning system is flexible, responsive and proportionate to changes of circumstances to facilitate the delivery of appropriate development.
We are resisting the amendment because it goes against the overarching objective of allowing permitted schemes to evolve where changes are required without having to start the planning application process again. If we were to agree to the amendment, local planning authorities would be empowered to look again at the principle of development for the proposal and refuse it, even though the application may only be for a minor variation. That would undermine the new process and make it more difficult for developers to manage minor change through the planning system.
The ability to amend an existing grant of planning permission is an important flexibility afforded by the planning system. Clause 98 seeks to improve the current framework for varying a planning permission by providing a clearer, more certain and proportionate process for planning authorities, communities and applicants.
Post-permission changes to respond to, among other things, specific design matters and external factors is a common and critical part of the development process. Enabling flexibility for minor changes to development can support delivery in changing circumstances. In the majority of cases it is not proportionate or reasonable to require a new planning application or revisit the principle of development.
Under clause 98, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich can be assured that the new power has been drafted to ensure that planning permission under the new power will be permitted only where the local planning authority is satisfied that its effect will not be substantially different from that of the existing permission. Local planning authorities have the power to determine whether changes would constitute a substantial difference from the existing permission on a case-by-case basis. That allows for consideration of local and development-specific context.
The “substantially different” test would be assessed against the existing planning permission to ensure that the cumulative impacts of changes to a permission are acceptable in planning terms. In addition to consideration of the existing permission, the planning merits of the proposed change may include consideration of any previous changes made to the existing permission.
I can also assure the hon. Gentleman that the process for applications made under proposed new section 73B will be set out in secondary legislation. We will consult on the details of publicity and consultation for the applications following the passage of the Bill, but I want to emphasise that we will seek to engage widely with the sector to ensure that the new route works. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will withdraw amendment 114.
Amendment 115 would clarify that section 73B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 applies to the Mayor of London, in his capacity as local planning authority, when determining applications of potential strategic importance. It is similar to the provision under subsection (12) of that Act for the Secretary of State when he is determining applications under that section.
Although I agree with the principle behind the amendment, it is more appropriately addressed by a consequential amendment to section 2A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. That Act provides that if the Mayor is determining applications of potential strategic importance, he is the local planning authority, and the references to local planning authorities in new section 73B should apply to him.
It is likely that a number of consequential technical amendments will need to be made to provisions in the Town and Country Planning Act as a result of the introduction of section 73 provisions to vary permissions. We propose to use the powers set out in clause 191 to do that. This specific example is one such amendment that we could consider. In view of my explanation, I respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Amendment 114 raises an extremely technical matter. I listened carefully to the Minister and I will revisit what he said. I hope he understood that I mean that planning applications must evolve when changes are required. The amendment does not seek to ensure that the principle of development is ever revisited, just that when minor variations are applied for, that updated planning policy and guidance are taken into account. We think that is important. I will go away and study carefully what he said.
On amendment 115, I am grateful for the clarification about where these matters might best be dealt with. I am grateful that the Minister will go away and give that further consideration. We think that the Mayor’s powers need to be formally taken into account when making the changes that the clause makes. On that basis, I am happy not to press either amendment, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.