Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Matthew Offord Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve for the first time under your chairmanship of a Westminster Hall debate, Mr Williams. I am very grateful to have the opportunity. The issue of Iran and, indeed, of the whole middle east, is often shrouded in some secrecy, so, in the interest of transparency, I draw hon. Members’ attention to what I have submitted to the Register of Members’ Financial Interests in the past.

On 24 November last year, the world woke up to the news that a deal had been reached between the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus one—the UK, the US, France, China, Russia and Germany—and Iran. A joint plan of action was the outcome of weeks of hard negotiation. The deal was revealed to be the fruit of years of US-Iran secret negotiations, alongside a decade of public Iranian diplomacy following the revelation of a wide-scale uranium enrichment programme. The P5 plus 1 countries and Iran concluded an interim six-month agreement, known as a joint plan of action, to restrain Iran’s nuclear programme, in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The deal is the interim first step towards a full agreement within six months to address comprehensively the international community’s long-held concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme is intended for military purposes. The agreement will be in effect for six months—it started on 20 January this year—during which time the P5 plus 1 powers will attempt to forge a conclusive, final-status agreement that will end the nuclear impasse.

We—or certainly I—have concerns about the agreement. I should start by saying that the interim nuclear agreement does not resolve international suspicions. It merely suspends some of the most immediately concerning aspects of Iran’s programme, pending a more comprehensive agreement. However, there are further serious concerns about the agreement. Some believe that it grants Iran exactly what it wanted—both a significant easing of sanctions and preservation of the most significant parts of its nuclear programme, including those with a military aspect. The agreement allows Iran to continue enriching uranium and retain all the centrifuges, and it is not required to dismantle the uncompleted heavy water research reactor at Arak, which has the potential to produce plutonium when completed. In effect, the agreement allows a plan B route for nuclear weapons in that country.

[Mr Lee Scott (Ilford North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on obtaining the debate. Does he agree with me and share my concerns that Iran could use this as a way of increasing its military capability and increasing its alleged sponsorship of terrorism throughout the region?

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is certainly one of my significant concerns, and I will ask my right hon. Friend the Minister to comment on it when he sums up the debate.

It is also of great concern to me that the P5 plus 1 have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrich uranium, something that has been rejected by the international community for many years. In essence, the deal eases the pressure on Iran’s economy in return for minimal concessions that fail to curb the nuclear ambitions of the country. The interim deal has unravelled an internationally imposed sanctions regime that took years to enforce and was having the desired effect.

The ultimate objective is to prevent, on behalf of many countries, a nuclear-armed Iran. The repercussions of that could be disastrous, not least because Iran has threatened to destroy the state of Israel, but also because it remains the world’s leading financier of terrorism, and has the potential to provoke a major regional power struggle and arms race.

For the rulers of Iran, this is just another chapter in a dangerous game. Iran has a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme, and the fear remains that this agreement is yet another example.

On Monday, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs updated the House on the progress of the E3 plus 3 and Iran talks. He reminded the House that the challenges to the success of the talks remain considerable and that a

“comprehensive solution must address all proliferation concerns related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”—[Official Report, 24 February 2014; Vol. 576, c. 29.]

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does he agree that the fact that Iran continues to support terrorist activity—Hezbollah and Hamas—and to support attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan puts into perspective its so-called peaceful aspirations in the area?

[Dr Offord]

My hon. Friend, like my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North (Mr Scott), has mentioned something that I hope to come on to in my speech. It remains a great concern that, while Iran is engaging in the process of reconciliation through the talks and the agreement, it is also engaging in activities not only in places such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, but in places such as Lebanon, combining forces with Hezbollah and others.

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does he share my concern at the reports coming out of the area that only in recent days Iran has been stepping up its military and material support, and the provision of personnel, for the Bashar al-Assad regime? Would it not be strange for us to be granting new favours to the Iranian regime and helping it economically when it is supplying that terrible regime, which is slaughtering its own citizens?

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is another issue I intend to raise. The fact that we are seeking to allow a country greater economic freedoms that in turn allows it to support terror in others parts of the region is of great concern. That seems to act counter to the things that are being said by President Rouhani and others in that country.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate, which is very timely, but does he not accept that the purpose of a sanctions regime, most of which is still in place, is to incentivise a change in attitude? Have not we seen that change in attitude since the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran, and should not that be encouraged, not least to encourage further negotiations and positive engagement on the subject of Syria?

[Dr Offord]

I genuinely thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He demonstrates that the interventions so far today have not been planted questions, because he has challenged me on what I am saying. I have to disagree with him. I cite as evidence the fact that the number of executions in Tehran and Iran in January last year was actually lower than the number of executions since the election of President Rouhani, which seems to indicate a more hard-line stance towards opposition in the country. In fact, the talks are more likely to disguise what is really going on there.

[Martin Horwood]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentlemen for giving way a second time so quickly, but that does not relate to the nature of the joint plan of action, which is precisely related to the nuclear programme. The commitments that Iran gave and the announcements that it made in that were very important. Surely he recognises that that represents progress of a kind, which should be encouraged.

[Dr Offord]

If I have not convinced the hon. Gentleman so far, I hope to do so later in my speech. I am not entirely convinced by what he says.

Let me return to the Foreign Secretary’s statement on Monday. What concerned me most was what he did not say. I hope that the Minister, in summing up the debate, can answer at least three specific concerns, including, first, how Iran’s nuclear programme, which includes a military dimension, will be addressed, as the interim agreement fails to address it. Secondly, I would be interested to learn what reassurances he can give that the final agreement will address the technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the dismantling of all existing advanced centrifuges that accelerate breakout time; whether the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors will be granted unfettered access to all Iran’s nuclear facilities, including those that are being operated secretly; and what will happen to Iran’s existing stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium.

Thirdly, what assurances can the Government give that the interim agreement will not simply unravel the international sanctions that have been imposed and that took years to be introduced, giving rise to a perception in the country that Iran is being rewarded for coming to the negotiating table while continuing to inflame tensions in the whole middle east, specifically in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, and while procrastinating on the fundamental issue of advances in its nuclear programme?

Before we get to that point, I want to take a few moments to outline Iran’s nuclear programme and the problems I anticipate. It is widely believed that Iran’s nuclear programme has significantly advanced in the past five years. Continuing to defy international pressure and binding UN Security Council resolutions, Iran has actively enriched uranium to 20% fissile purity—a level that has no credible civilian purpose. Without any additional sanctions being imposed, Iran has been able to continue producing uranium enriched to 90% purity, which brings it closer to weapons grade. The most difficult and time-consuming part of the nuclear process is, therefore, already complete. The IAEA estimates that Iran now has 9,000 kg of low-enriched uranium, an amount that experts say could be enough for four bombs if it was refined to 90% fissile concentration.

Iran also possesses as many as 18,000 centrifuges, including more than 1,000 new models—the IR2m—which are far more efficient and can provide bomb-grade uranium two and a half times faster than the previous model. A heavy water reactor has been constructed outside the city of Arak, which offers the possibility of a new pathway to a bomb using plutonium once it goes online. That is in addition to the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, which was built in secret and discovered in 2002; the Fordow enrichment facility, which was also built illegally and confirmed to be in existence by Iran in 2009; the Parchin facility, to which the IAEA is seeking access after evidence emerged that Iran has tested nuclear triggers and high explosives that could be used in nuclear weapons; the Bushehr nuclear power station, which is operated with external assistance; and the Isfahan nuclear research facility, which has the capability to process uranium yellowcake into a gas for enrichment.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. I heard the comments of the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) regarding a change in behaviour. However, my hon. Friend has just mentioned the Arak heavy water facility, which is perfect for producing weapons-grade plutonium. On 6 February, I asked a question in the House, to which the Minister responded:

“we remain concerned that Iran intends to develop the facility to provide a plutonium route to a nuclear weapon. Iran has not clarified how it would use the plutonium produced”.—[Official Report, 6 February 2014; Vol. 575, c. 356W.]

Despite the interim deal, the fact remains that Ministers are concerned. We should adopt the position of the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, who has said that

“Iran has not earned the right to have the benefit of the doubt.”

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He has asked a question, as identified by the House of Commons Library, on the effect of the P5 plus 1, Iran and the joint plan of action, and the continuing manufacture of new centrifuge devices. We know that the technology, which has many applications, continues to be used, but we do not know for what purpose. That remains a great concern, and I do not believe the joint plan of action addresses it.

On Iran’s agreement to freeze the enrichment and halt the production of uranium, Iran has halted the installation of new enrichment centrifuges and has ceased the installation of new components at the Arak reactor. It has allowed the IAEA to make inspections at Natanz, Arak and Fordow. I acknowledge that the regime has granted the international community some concessions. We must be aware, however, that in return, the P5 plus 1 agreed to provide £6 billion to £7 billion in sanctions relief, of which roughly £4.2 billion would be oil revenue frozen in foreign banks. The P5 plus 1 allow temporary relief on some sanctions, including trade in gold, precious metals, petrochemicals, auto parts and aircraft parts. The P5 plus 1 have also agreed not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months during the agreement.

Although the interim accord interrupts Iran’s nuclear progress for the first time in nearly a decade, it requires Iran to make only a modest draw-down payment on the central problem. Iran has benefited from disproportionate sanctions relief in exchange for cosmetic concessions that it can do away with in a matter of weeks. It has been rewarded with sanctions relief despite remaining unbowed in its demand to continue uranium enrichment, which is the root of the international community’s concern. Most importantly, the deal fails to dismantle many of the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without the requirement to dismantle a single centrifuge, Iran will remain a threshold military nuclear power. It will retain the capability to break across that line at any time it chooses.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend dispute the national intelligence estimates from the United States of 2007 and 2012, which directly contradict his proposition that Iran is on the verge of being able to break out in such a way? The United States national intelligence estimates are major pieces of work, and they are not done lightly. Does he dispute them?

[Dr Offord]

Yes, I dispute them. I am not a chemical engineer or a nuclear engineer, but on the basis of my research and the evidence I have read, I dispute those estimates and I maintain that Iran is on the verge of making a breakthrough. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), said in the House on Monday, with as many as 10,000 centrifuges in operation already, Iran retains the capability to break out and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. The deal does not roll back the vast majority of the advances that Iran has made in the past five years, which have drastically shortened what nuclear experts call its “dash time” to a bomb—the minimum time that it would take to build a weapon if Iran’s Supreme Leader or military decided to pursue that path.

Most concerning of all, the world’s leading powers have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrichment, which has been the Islamic Republic’s key demand for many years. The interim agreement states that the permanent deal will involve

“a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters”,

but the deal abandons the demand made by the six United Nations resolutions that Iran must halt all enrichment. That may undermine confidence in global non-proliferation norms. Iranian state media carried boasts by, among others, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif that the US had caved in on its long-standing position and recognised Iran’s right to enrich. President Rouhani said:

“No matter what interpretations are given, Iran's right to enrichment has been recognised.”

He went on to say:

“"Do you know what the Geneva agreement is? It means the superpowers’ surrender to the great Iranian nation. The Geneva agreement means that the world accepts [Iran’s] civil nuclear technology, which we achieved through the efforts and the sacrifice of our young scientists”.

The agreement does not stop Iran enriching uranium to a low level of 3.5% or compel it to dismantle any of its existing centrifuges, which can be used for military purposes. Iran can continue to enrich uranium with its 10,190 operational IR1 centrifuges. They are in addition to 8,000 machines that have been installed but are inactive. Iran can also continue to build new centrifuges to replace those that wear out.

The situation has not been lost on the Iranian rulers. In January this year, President Rouhani said that there would be no destruction of existing centrifuges “under any circumstances.” Iran’s Foreign Affairs Minister said in December last year:

“The structure of our nuclear program has been maintained and the 20 percent enrichment can be resumed in less than 24 hours”.

A month later, he said:

“We did not agree to dismantle anything”.

In January, Iran’s Parliament introduced a Bill to step up enrichment to the threshold of 60% fissile purity. That would put Iran on the technical verge of 90% fissile purity, which is enough for the core of a nuclear bomb. At least 218 of the Iranian Parliament’s 290 members have expressed support for the measure. The Bill’s supporters say that uranium refined to 60% concentration would be used to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. Some analysts have speculated that the Iranian Government might be using Parliament as a bargaining tool in nuclear talks with the P5 plus 1, because they would have no choice but to obey such a Bill if the Parliament passed it.

The deal also leaves untouched Iran’s portfolio of 1,008 installed advanced IR2m centrifuges, which can speed up break-out times using 3.5% enriched uranium. This month, Iran revealed that it had developed a new generation of centrifuges that are 15 times more powerful than those currently in use, and Iranian officials have stated that the centrifuges do not violate the joint plan of action. Although enrichment using those machines has not started, the vast majority of them are fully installed and under vacuum, which means that Iran could quickly begin feeding natural uranium into those cascades and more than double its enrichment capacity.

Centrifuges are not the only concern. Iran is in the process of constructing a 40 MW heavy water research reactor, for which there is limited peaceful civilian purpose. When it is operational, that facility at Arak will be able to produce plutonium, which is one of two substances that can form the core of a nuclear weapon. Iran is not required to dismantle the incomplete heavy water research reactor or convert the plant into a light water reactor, which would be less useful for military purposes.

Under the joint plan of action, Iran agreed to freeze progress on the Arak heavy water research reactor and not to commission it or transfer fuel or heavy water to the site. It also agreed not to produce or test additional fuel or install remaining components. The interim deal does not explicitly prevent Iran from manufacturing components offsite for Arak’s nuclear reactor that could then be installed later. Iran claims that its purpose is only to make medical isotopes and conduct research, but western countries believe that it could also produce plutonium, which is the plan B route to producing a full nuclear weapon.

The one mechanism we held over Iran was the sanctions, but the interim deal has unravelled the internationally imposed sanction regime that has taken years to enforce. Sanctions were having the desired effect, so why did we take a step back from a method that was working and put trust in a state that has given us no reason to assume that that trust will be guarded? However limited, the relaxation of sanctions will relieve the pressure that has brought Iran to seek an agreement, by giving direct financial relief and indirectly restoring confidence in the Iranian economy.

Many nations and companies—as well as the Iranians themselves—have interpreted the recent agreement as the beginning of the end of the sanctions regime. It is likely that a number of countries will apply pressure to resume trade with Iran, including its former key trade partners, such as South Korea, Japan, India and China. Within weeks of the interim deal, Iran’s petrochemical sector alone had appreciated by $9 billion—that is a capital gain of almost 40%, generated entirely by a new market psychology that bets on the end of sanctions. On top of that, Iran is already making efforts to recapture its dominant role in OPEC.

All of that goes to ensure that the agreement is rewarding Iran despite the fact that its long history of clandestine nuclear activities, support for international terrorism and repeat calls for the destruction of Israel are cause for legitimate trepidation and scepticism over its intentions. Although President Rouhani’s negotiating team has reportedly been more constructive in talks, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on major issues, including national security and Iran’s nuclear programme. Most worryingly, Iran continues to support terrorism in the region. It is a leading sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial and material support to extremist Islamist terrorist groups across the middle east, including Hamas, Hezbollah and insurgencies against allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran agreed to the deal as part of a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme. The six-month timetable to reach a final agreement could be extended by a further six months by mutual consent. President Rouhani has previously spoken of Iran buying time to advance its nuclear programme. In 2004, he gave a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, in which he explained how he was playing for time during the nuclear talks he was conducting with the EU3. He said:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [nuclear conversion] facility in Isfahan. By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work there”.

Answers to the parliamentary questions I have asked provide little assurance that the IAEA will ensure that inspections take place. Iran has agreed to the IAEA conducting only limited inspections at the main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Its history of deception about its nuclear projects requires higher levels of accountability. Iran is not required to provide unfettered access to its full portfolio of nuclear facilities, including many underground and undeclared sites where the USA, Europe and Israel believe that hidden enrichment facilities might exist. It is not possible to rule out the existence of secret nuclear sites in Iran without it agreeing to allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections anywhere beyond declared atomic installations under the agency’s additional protocol regime.

Iran is still not required to grant IAEA inspectors access to the nuclear-related Parchin site, a suspected weapons-testing facility, but it is required to declare all facilities containing nuclear material under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under the joint statement on a framework for co-operation between Iran and the IAEA, Iran has agreed to give the IAEA information on the 16 sites designated for the construction of new nuclear power plants, clarification about its announcement about new enrichment facilities, and information about all new research reactors. Fully verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities will require a level of co-operation and information-sharing between the IAEA, the western powers and Iran that is probably unprecedented for one country’s nuclear programme.

The overt military actions of missile development are also of concern. The interim agreement does not include a promise by Iran to abstain from pursuing work on ballistic missiles or weaponisation. UN Security Council resolution 1929 requires Iran to cease activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend is touching on a key issue. Does he agree that if we are to treat Iran’s protestations seriously, we must see progress being made on the ballistic missile programme?

[Dr Offord]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I am concerned about the fact that the agreement does not touch upon ballistic missiles and remains an opportunity for Iran to continue its programme—as President Rouhani said—in a calm environment, and to focus on its work and experimentation on such weaponry.

I am sure that your knowledge of ballistic missiles is better than mine, Mr Williams, but I can tell the Chamber that a nuclear weapons programme has three main components: the fuel, the warhead and the delivery system. Iran is free, in the coming six-month period of the interim deal, to continue with the missile and warhead-development activities to which my hon. Friend just referred. It has successfully test-fired two new domestically made missiles, including a long-range ballistic missile with radar-evading capabilities and a fragmentation warhead. It also test fired a laser-guided air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile known as a Bina. The country already has long-range surface-to-surface Shahab missiles with a range of about 1,250 miles that are capable of reaching Israel and—indeed—US military bases in the middle east. The recent deal does not grant IAEA inspectors access to Iran’s Parchin military facility, which is a long-suspected location for nuclear-related weapons testing.

In conclusion, it is worth reiterating the questions that I would like the Minister to answer. Does he share my concern that limited processes and structures appear to be in place should Iran walk away from negotiations with the P5 plus 1 before a permanent nuclear deal is reached within the six-month period? Given its history of duplicity and procrastination over its nuclear programme, would the Minister agree that it is only right that there will be a degree of concern that Iran might abuse the interim deal merely to pocket the concessions and walk away?

A more receptive Iranian negotiating team is being welcomed internationally. However, Iran has not tempered its anti-Israel rhetoric, recently labelling Israel as the

“sinister, unclean, rabid dog of the region.”

Does the Minister understand why many of us think Israel should be concerned about the agreement? There are also concerns that the joint plan of action has green-lighted Iran’s right to enrich, or at least that it has done so according to Iranian interpretations. Iranian state media carried boasts by President Rouhani and his Foreign Minister that the international community had caved in. What assessment has the Minister made of such statements by Iran? Iran’s latest actions do not suggest that it is complying fully with the spirit of the joint plan of action.

Does the Minister share my concern that domestic production of advanced centrifuges, which further reduce break-out times, raises questions as to Iranian intentions? Under the joint plan of action, Iran retains its full portfolio of centrifuges. Would the Minister agree that any final agreement must seek to dismantle the bulk of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? The interim agreement is undoubtedly asymmetrical in structure, with Iran merely freezing its programme while the international community chips away at sanctions. Does the Minister agree that that might influence whether Iran decides to abandon negotiations for a comprehensive deal over the next six months? Finally, does the Minister share my concern that the joint plan of action will result in billions of pounds of financial relief for Iran, enabling its continued ability to arm, fund and train its global terror network?

As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) said, it is right that the P5 plus 1 strive for a deal that reduces the threat of a nuclear Iran, but we must not agree to measures that have the potential to expedite such a scenario. A bad deal is worse than no deal at all. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr Offord) on securing this debate. Iran is a topic that often needs a good airing. At this critical time, it is important that we give strong scrutiny to the Geneva accord agreed at the end of last year.

First, may I declare my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests? I am chairman of the all-party group on Iran and have been for the past eight years. I have twice visited Iran—including recently, three or four weeks ago. I have also visited on a number of occasions the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna at the United Nations.

We always have to go back to the beginning on Iran. We have to remember that the nuclear programme for Iran did not start last Tuesday or last year; in fact, it started in the mid-1960s, when the Shah was in charge—funded by the United States, ironically. General Electric came to its aid, to develop the first reactor in the heart of Tehran. Iran has had nuclear ambitions, whether civil or military, for decades. They have been part of its psyche. It lives in a rough neighbourhood; it has rivalries that we can, perhaps, only understand as having similar aspects to those in the cold war and with the Soviet Union; and it is surrounded by ethnically and religiously different economic and military rivals. That has often driven some of its insecurities.

The history of the nuclear programme is long and sporadic and it has jumped, depending on which country has helped Iran. The Russians helped it build a reactor in the past, the United States has done so and I suspect that the North Koreans have, too. Certainly, other members of the international community have stuck their oars in. That is why there is a rather illogical, sporadic and often bizarre civil nuclear programme.

Iran is not the only country in that region to have a civil nuclear programme. The United Arab Emirates is developing one right now, as we speak. Many middle east countries have sought to acquire nuclear technology. The most striking examples are India and Pakistan, which developed in total secrecy a nuclear weapons programme that ended up in actual nuclear weapons. We in the west either chose not to know or did not seem to know.

The process goes on. It is not new. It has, unfortunately, become entwined with the Iranian psyche and its view of itself in the world. However, let us remember that middle east politics is often as much about rhetoric as about action. Throughout the 1980s, for example, at the height of Ayatollah Khomeini’s rhetoric against the country of Israel, Israel sold Iran nearly half a billion dollars’ worth of arms. In fact, Israel broke the UN sanctions on arms embargo to Iran and Iraq in that period. It suited Israel at that stage to ignore the rhetoric and to side with Iran against Iraq, while the west was unfortunately supporting Iraq, by supplying it with some pretty dubious methods.

We have to go forward. In 2001, Iran helped the west bring down the Taliban. We might remember the Lion of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was the west’s favoured leader of the Northern Alliance—the man who was going to liberate Afghanistan on our behalf. The irony was that he was Iran’s man in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance helped America and Britain in their targeting and intelligence gathering against the Taliban.

Throughout these processes, Iran has stepped forward, sometimes against its nature, but sometimes for its own self-interest, and it has often been rewarded by immediate rejection. The “axis of evil” phrase was used discended on Iran, despite its assistance to the British and Americans in getting rid of the Taliban.

Trust is the problem in much of this, whether in respect of the nuclear programme, human rights or exporting terrorism. The Iranians’ knowledge of Britain’s poor behaviour towards it in the last centuries is better than mine. The Iranians understand that we supported the constitutional revolution in 1906 and then undermined it, when we removed the democratic constitutional revolution, to put in a Shah, and then we moved that Shah when he became too friendly with the Nazis. Then we moved their Prime Minister in the ’50s and put in another Shah. They understand that we—the United Kingdom—play power games and that we are not to be trusted, in the same way that we, quite rightly, have every reason not to trust Iran in the near future.

We have not trusted Iran on its nuclear programme. It has hidden things and has certainly done its best. There is proof that, in 2003 and 2002, it acquired from the AQ Khan network—not funded by Iran, but by one of its regional rivals—military plans for a weapons programme.

Trust is failing on both sides. That has been the real issue. I do not argue with my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon that, really, at the heart of the Geneva accord, the issue is about trying to fix this trust and to see what steps we can take to build together. We will have to stick our neck out to build that trust. That is the problem. I understand; if I was living in Israel right now, I would be worried about that. It is not me under direct threat from Iran. In fact, British national interests and British security are not threatened by Shi’a Islam, but by Salafist Sunnis emanating from al-Qaeda. They are the people who will blow up our trains and tube stations. That is nothing to do with Iran; that is to do with other major players in the region, who are either tacit or have yet to deal with that problem.

If I was in Israel, of course I would be worried and rightly so. But I also recognise that, within Israel, there is a split about the extent to which the Iranians are rational or irrational and how much Iran really wants to do nuclear damage or blow up Israel. Meir Dagan, the ex-head of Mossad—not a boy scout organisation—said on the record that Iran is rational and that he does not think it intends to go to that next step.

Nevertheless, the situation is real and we should look at the facts and the evidence as they are presented. The first things that I look at are the national intelligence estimates of the United States, the first of which, in 2007, was made under George Bush. The estimates are put together by the National Security Council, the CIA and the Pentagon. President Bush was not known as a dove on any areas in the middle east, but the national intelligence estimate produced at the time said, “We do not believe—we believe they did previously—that they are now on the verge of a break-out”. That is an important document. It was dismissed at the time by the hawks, but in 2012, under President Obama, another one appeared that effectively reaffirmed that national intelligence estimate.

[Dr Offord]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s counter-view on some of these issues. It is easy to talk about organisations presenting reports. I have found the 2012 Institute for Science and International Security report, containing information from former weapons inspectors, who disagreed with Binyamin Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly in 2012 and felt that Iran would have a nuclear capability within months. It is okay to say that certain organisations say that is not possible. Equally, it is valid to say that other organisations contradict that point of view.

[Mr Wallace]

I register the point, but these are not national institutes. This is the CIA and the Pentagon—okay, they do not have the best track record on intelligence, but they never gave the benefit of the doubt to the doves; they always gave it to the hawks. These are major national institutions—Government organisations—that share intelligence with Israel and all the other allies that we have, so they are certainly serious. It is important to look at that fact.

We should not pass over the grand bargain offered by Iran in 2003. The grand bargain was something that every hon. Member in this Chamber would have signed up to tomorrow. It was an offer by Iran to suspend enrichment; to join the additional protocol, with further and more intrusive inspection than even Britain has under the non-proliferation treaty; and to demilitarise Hezbollah. It was even to have gone as far as to recognise Israel, which many countries in the middle east, which may be against Iran but are not necessarily allies, still do not recognise. They may help Israel, but they still have not taken the next step. That grand bargain was rejected out of hand by the White House.

People sitting now in Iran would say, “Hang on, we offered all this and this was all thrown away”. That goes back to the heart of the matter. The trail of trust has been full of missed opportunities on both sides. We really need to try to rebuild it. I commend this Government, the Obama Administration and the P5 plus 1 for sticking their necks out.

I do not mind who visits Iran. I have been to Iran, but I do not approve of what the Iranians do to Christians, Baha’is or other minorities. I condemn that absolutely, but I believe that visiting Iran does not mean supporting Iran. If people criticise or propose policy against a country, it is a good idea for them to take time to visit that country. That is important. I do not sit around and get involved in debates on Israel because I have not been there. One day I might decide to do so, mainly because it affects other middle east policy that I might want to discuss. Going there is important.