Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Lee Scott Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve for the first time under your chairmanship of a Westminster Hall debate, Mr Williams. I am very grateful to have the opportunity. The issue of Iran and, indeed, of the whole middle east, is often shrouded in some secrecy, so, in the interest of transparency, I draw hon. Members’ attention to what I have submitted to the Register of Members’ Financial Interests in the past.

On 24 November last year, the world woke up to the news that a deal had been reached between the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus one—the UK, the US, France, China, Russia and Germany—and Iran. A joint plan of action was the outcome of weeks of hard negotiation. The deal was revealed to be the fruit of years of US-Iran secret negotiations, alongside a decade of public Iranian diplomacy following the revelation of a wide-scale uranium enrichment programme. The P5 plus 1 countries and Iran concluded an interim six-month agreement, known as a joint plan of action, to restrain Iran’s nuclear programme, in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The deal is the interim first step towards a full agreement within six months to address comprehensively the international community’s long-held concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme is intended for military purposes. The agreement will be in effect for six months—it started on 20 January this year—during which time the P5 plus 1 powers will attempt to forge a conclusive, final-status agreement that will end the nuclear impasse.

We—or certainly I—have concerns about the agreement. I should start by saying that the interim nuclear agreement does not resolve international suspicions. It merely suspends some of the most immediately concerning aspects of Iran’s programme, pending a more comprehensive agreement. However, there are further serious concerns about the agreement. Some believe that it grants Iran exactly what it wanted—both a significant easing of sanctions and preservation of the most significant parts of its nuclear programme, including those with a military aspect. The agreement allows Iran to continue enriching uranium and retain all the centrifuges, and it is not required to dismantle the uncompleted heavy water research reactor at Arak, which has the potential to produce plutonium when completed. In effect, the agreement allows a plan B route for nuclear weapons in that country.

[Mr Lee Scott (Ilford North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on obtaining the debate. Does he agree with me and share my concerns that Iran could use this as a way of increasing its military capability and increasing its alleged sponsorship of terrorism throughout the region?

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is certainly one of my significant concerns, and I will ask my right hon. Friend the Minister to comment on it when he sums up the debate.

It is also of great concern to me that the P5 plus 1 have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrich uranium, something that has been rejected by the international community for many years. In essence, the deal eases the pressure on Iran’s economy in return for minimal concessions that fail to curb the nuclear ambitions of the country. The interim deal has unravelled an internationally imposed sanctions regime that took years to enforce and was having the desired effect.

The ultimate objective is to prevent, on behalf of many countries, a nuclear-armed Iran. The repercussions of that could be disastrous, not least because Iran has threatened to destroy the state of Israel, but also because it remains the world’s leading financier of terrorism, and has the potential to provoke a major regional power struggle and arms race.

For the rulers of Iran, this is just another chapter in a dangerous game. Iran has a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme, and the fear remains that this agreement is yet another example.

On Monday, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs updated the House on the progress of the E3 plus 3 and Iran talks. He reminded the House that the challenges to the success of the talks remain considerable and that a

“comprehensive solution must address all proliferation concerns related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”—[Official Report, 24 February 2014; Vol. 576, c. 29.]