Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Martin Horwood Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is another issue I intend to raise. The fact that we are seeking to allow a country greater economic freedoms that in turn allows it to support terror in others parts of the region is of great concern. That seems to act counter to the things that are being said by President Rouhani and others in that country.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate, which is very timely, but does he not accept that the purpose of a sanctions regime, most of which is still in place, is to incentivise a change in attitude? Have not we seen that change in attitude since the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran, and should not that be encouraged, not least to encourage further negotiations and positive engagement on the subject of Syria?

[Dr Offord]

I genuinely thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He demonstrates that the interventions so far today have not been planted questions, because he has challenged me on what I am saying. I have to disagree with him. I cite as evidence the fact that the number of executions in Tehran and Iran in January last year was actually lower than the number of executions since the election of President Rouhani, which seems to indicate a more hard-line stance towards opposition in the country. In fact, the talks are more likely to disguise what is really going on there.

[Martin Horwood]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentlemen for giving way a second time so quickly, but that does not relate to the nature of the joint plan of action, which is precisely related to the nuclear programme. The commitments that Iran gave and the announcements that it made in that were very important. Surely he recognises that that represents progress of a kind, which should be encouraged.

[Dr Offord]

If I have not convinced the hon. Gentleman so far, I hope to do so later in my speech. I am not entirely convinced by what he says.

Let me return to the Foreign Secretary’s statement on Monday. What concerned me most was what he did not say. I hope that the Minister, in summing up the debate, can answer at least three specific concerns, including, first, how Iran’s nuclear programme, which includes a military dimension, will be addressed, as the interim agreement fails to address it. Secondly, I would be interested to learn what reassurances he can give that the final agreement will address the technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the dismantling of all existing advanced centrifuges that accelerate breakout time; whether the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors will be granted unfettered access to all Iran’s nuclear facilities, including those that are being operated secretly; and what will happen to Iran’s existing stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium.

Thirdly, what assurances can the Government give that the interim agreement will not simply unravel the international sanctions that have been imposed and that took years to be introduced, giving rise to a perception in the country that Iran is being rewarded for coming to the negotiating table while continuing to inflame tensions in the whole middle east, specifically in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, and while procrastinating on the fundamental issue of advances in its nuclear programme?

Before we get to that point, I want to take a few moments to outline Iran’s nuclear programme and the problems I anticipate. It is widely believed that Iran’s nuclear programme has significantly advanced in the past five years. Continuing to defy international pressure and binding UN Security Council resolutions, Iran has actively enriched uranium to 20% fissile purity—a level that has no credible civilian purpose. Without any additional sanctions being imposed, Iran has been able to continue producing uranium enriched to 90% purity, which brings it closer to weapons grade. The most difficult and time-consuming part of the nuclear process is, therefore, already complete. The IAEA estimates that Iran now has 9,000 kg of low-enriched uranium, an amount that experts say could be enough for four bombs if it was refined to 90% fissile concentration.

Iran also possesses as many as 18,000 centrifuges, including more than 1,000 new models—the IR2m—which are far more efficient and can provide bomb-grade uranium two and a half times faster than the previous model. A heavy water reactor has been constructed outside the city of Arak, which offers the possibility of a new pathway to a bomb using plutonium once it goes online. That is in addition to the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, which was built in secret and discovered in 2002; the Fordow enrichment facility, which was also built illegally and confirmed to be in existence by Iran in 2009; the Parchin facility, to which the IAEA is seeking access after evidence emerged that Iran has tested nuclear triggers and high explosives that could be used in nuclear weapons; the Bushehr nuclear power station, which is operated with external assistance; and the Isfahan nuclear research facility, which has the capability to process uranium yellowcake into a gas for enrichment.