Defence

Matt Western Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge]

The hon. Gentleman, who I believe is a gallant gentleman who served in the Royal Air Force, knows exactly what he is talking about. I agree with him wholeheartedly. It is having a real impact, and it is not just me saying that.

The serious consequence of this paralysis is our brilliant defence industry hanging on by its fingertips. This morning, I addressed a roundtable attended by many defence primes and small and medium-sized enterprises in Westminster. They are the experts at the coalface, and they spoke of British defence companies going abroad or even having to close because of delays to the defence investment plan, and a defence industry under strain when it should be firing on all cylinders.

When it comes to consequences, on a personal basis, what I find most disheartening of all is the impact of this paralysis on our ability to learn lessons from the war in Ukraine. I am incredibly proud of how, in government, the Conservatives stood by Ukraine even before Putin invaded.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

I came into this place only in 2017. I was deeply disappointed by what happened in 2014 and our failure to stand by Ukraine on the invasion of Crimea. I think Michael Fallon was one of the few who said, “We should actually take action.” What was the hon. Gentleman’s view and what would he have done?

[James Cartlidge]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that we have been training Ukrainian soldiers since 2014—over 60,000, I think, under Operation Interflex. I think there is a very strong consensus in the House on support for Ukraine. Obviously, there were limitations on what we could do. We have done everything possible. We were the first country in Europe to stand by Ukraine. We sent weapons before the invasion started. We did not wait for Putin to invade so that we could comply perfectly with international law. Boris Johnson and Ben Wallace had the guts to ignore the Foreign Office and send those weapons, despite that—premeditated. If Kyiv had fallen and the column of tanks heading to Kyiv had not been intercepted, we would have been in an extremely serious situation.

I am making a point about procurement. This is important. By April 2024, we were providing Ukraine with drone and counter-drone capabilities that were proving decisive on a real battlefield, against the peer military threat in Europe. They were not being produced through the old system, full of delays and overspend, but by British SMEs, producing them cheaply, swiftly and with constant feedback from the frontline. We were therefore incredibly well placed to deliver the vision of the MOD defence drone strategy—which I published in February 2024 and is meant to be current Government policy—whereby we would be a leading nation in uncrewed warfare. Most importantly, we would have achieved that by providing in parallel for our armed forces the drone technology that we were giving to Ukraine.

By now, our Army should have been training across the board in drone warfare, the Navy should have been fielding the beginnings of an autonomous drone fleet, learning the lessons from Ukraine’s extraordinary victory in the Black sea, and the RAF should have been maximising investment in loyal wingmen—drones that would fly alongside and enhance the lethality of our current Typhoons. But there was one big problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

There are clear NATO defence spending targets. That is written down, and will be produced in due course.

[Matt Western]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. The 1.5% is, of course, about security-related initiatives, and it is important that we get to those soon. As for the wider defence investment plan, I would just say a word of caution: we must get it absolutely right. I have been trying to work with colleagues on both sides of the House since the start of the Ajax project in 2016 to find a resolution to some of these problems. We must take great care and be very clear-eyed about the procurement strategy that we follow.

[Al Carns]

I completely agree. We have to get the defence investment plan right, and we have to ensure that it balances all the different problems that we face, whether they relate to air defence in the middle east and the lessons identified there or, indeed, the lessons identified in Ukraine.