Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Debate between Matt Warman and Bob Seely

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

As I said earlier, we would want to apply those standards not just to telecoms companies but to the garment industry and in a host of other areas where we know that there is the potential for similar abuses. I absolutely hear what my right hon. Friend says, but Britain can do better than focus simply on the relatively narrow aspect of telecoms.

[Bob Seely]

I hear what the Minister is saying, but I wish to follow up the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). If the debate on this Bill is not the place to discuss human rights, I get that, but we are also told that the debates on the National Security and Investment Bill are not the place to discuss human rights. I may get that as well, but the Government need to say where significant national interest concerns that are outside national security can be addressed. We talk the talk on human rights an awful lot in this country and this Parliament, but we have to put some trousers on that, I think.

[Matt Warman]

I am not going to engage too heavily with my hon. Friend’s trousers, but I will say to him that, as I said a minute ago, we are committed to taking forward an ambitious package of changes to strengthen and future-proof the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and that is one of several significant avenues that are open to him.

On the important matter of diversification, the telecoms supply chain review asked how we can create sustainable diversity in our telecoms supply chain. That question is addressed by the new diversification strategy that we published today, which is crucial to ensuring that we are never again in a situation in which we are dependent on just a handful of vendors who supply the networks on which so many of us have come to depend. I wish to spend a little time on this issue. The Government have been working at pace to develop the 5G supply chain diversification strategy, which sets out a clear vision for a healthy, competitive and diverse supply market for telecoms and the set of principles that we want operators and suppliers to follow.

The strategy is built around three key strands: first, securing incumbents; secondly, attracting new suppliers; and thirdly, accelerating the development and adoption of open and interoperable technologies across the market. That is why, in the diversification strategy that we published today, we commit to exploring commercial incentives for new market entrants as we level the playing field; to setting out a road map to end the provision of older legacy technologies that create obstacles for new suppliers; and to investing in R&D to grow a vibrant and thriving telecoms ecosystem here in the UK.

I say gently to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) that we have directly addressed a number of the issues that she raised in Westminster Hall last week. I look forward to engaging with her more on the strategy because it is important that we should work together to try to make sure that we all derive the benefits of a serious £250 million Government commitment that will drive early progress and ensure that our 5G diversification strategy not only bolsters the resilience and security of our digital infrastructure but creates opportunities for competition, innovation and prosperity.

Huawei and 5G

Debate between Matt Warman and Bob Seely

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[Matt Warman]

Our aim is not to be reliant on high-risk vendors at all. I appreciate that my right hon. Friend would like me to set out a timetable for that, but I cannot do that today.

There are major market problems we need to address and they are common to all western nations. We have to remain hard-headed and evidence-based. We want to ensure that, as new technologies develop, we have a vibrant and diverse ecosystem of suppliers that we can rely on. The decisions we have made in this area are the right ones because they are based on hard evidence.

[Bob Seely]

We are not getting at the Minister, who we hold in high regard, but at the decision that he is, unfortunately, having to defend. He is now talking about the economics. The problem is that because Huawei is so bankrolled by the Chinese state, it can simply undercut other providers. Even if Fujitsu and Samsung—not to mention UK companies—want to come into the market, so that there is a diverse, multiplayer, western market in 5G, it is very difficult to get to that because Huawei will always undercut, and telcos are heavily indebted and therefore will do Huawei’s bidding. That is a structural problem.

[Matt Warman]

I will come on to what we will do to try to promote market diversification in a moment. Suffice it to say, we do not and will never put anything other than national security at the very top of our agenda on this issue.

[Matt Warman]

Yes. Huawei and ZTE are both high-risk vendors, as we have said previously.

[Bob Seely]

Will the Minister give way?

[Matt Warman]

I fear making no progress at all if I keep giving way.

Put simply, in the view of the most expert telecommunications specialists in the world, as others have said in the debate, a limited amount of carefully controlled hardware from China does not compromise our national security. This Government will continue to do all it can to put the experts who hold that view, both private and public sector, at the disposal of this House. I am grateful to all those hon. Members who have taken up the opportunities for such briefings and I wish they were greater in number. The Government are confident that we are putting the nation’s interests first.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Warman]

I hope my right hon. Friend takes significant comfort from what I have said: we want to get to a position where we are not reliant at all on high-risk vendors.

We have confidence in the independent technical assessment from our security experts and, importantly, the telecommunications industry has confidence in those assessments, too. That is why we have been in a position to publish as much of our security assessment as we have done. As a result, we have the most detailed study of what is needed to protect 5G networks anywhere in the world. We are not naive about Huawei or its relationship with the Chinese state. Since Huawei has entered the UK network, it has been carefully managed. Through the cyber-security evaluation centre and the oversight board, we have the greatest access to, and insight on, Huawei equipment anywhere in the world.

[Bob Seely]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way yet again.

Does he understand that many of us take issue with what he has just said? First, figures from the security world who have publicly spoken up, such as Richard Dearlove, are hostile to what the Minister says. There is a sense that the Government have given our security agencies a fait accompli, because almost all our allies’ cyber-security agencies take a diametrically opposed view to the one that he presents. Secondly, will he acknowledge that the Banbury Cell now has very serious concerns about Huawei?

[Matt Warman]

As I said, we are introducing the new regime because of some of the concerns that my hon. Friend addresses. I reiterate the Government’s offer to put at the disposal of any Member of the House as many experts from the public and private sectors that we can, so that colleagues can be in touch with the latest thinking on this issue.

We understand the threat from China and are robust with it when our interests are challenged. We will continue to publicly call out malicious cyber-activity, and the decision to categorise Huawei as a high-risk vendor took into consideration the potential links between Chinese companies and the Chinese state, including the fact that Chinese companies are subject to China’s national intelligence law. The UK has also been vocal in drawing attention to the systematic human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China. The Government have set out our expectations of businesses in the UK national action plan on business and human rights.

The telecoms supply chain review, which was laid before the House in July 2019, underlined the range and nature of the risks, highlighting the risks of dependence on one vendor, faults or vulnerabilities in network equivalence equipment, the back-door threat, and vendors’ administrative access. We need to be alive to the totality of the risks that the telecoms network faces today and will face in the future. High-risk vendors are part of that security risk assessment, but they are not the sole factor.

I want to address some of the myths about how the network will develop. It is true that technical characteristics of 5G create a greater surface area for potential attacks, but it will still be possible to distinguish different parts of the network. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Ruth Edwards) said, what matters are the critical functions within the network. We need to ensure that critical functions, wherever they are, have appropriate security.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Matt Warman and Bob Seely

Thursday 13th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

T5. Given the almost weekly stories showing the unsuitability of Huawei as a high-risk, high-tech vendor of our 5G, is the Minister aware that while we in this country are saying that we can build a 5G network that separates core and periphery, nearly all our closest allies and their cyber agencies say that that cannot be done?

[Matt Warman]

As my hon. Friend knows, the Government will legislate at the earliest opportunity to ensure that we do everything in line with the advice of our agencies, which is that with the “ban and cap” approach, we can ensure that national security is our top priority while also building the 5G network that we deserve safely.

5G Network and Huawei

Debate between Matt Warman and Bob Seely

Monday 27th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that this Government will always make decisions in the national interest.

[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Why is it argued that we can limit Huawei to the periphery of the network, when Australia and the United States do not agree and when the head of Australia’s cyber-agency says that

“the distinction between core and edge collapses in 5G,”

and that

“a…threat anywhere in the network”

is a threat everywhere? Why is it said that the risks are manageable, when our allies say not? Why have previous Ministers claimed that Huawei is a private firm, when in no way is that true? Why are we told that there are no alternatives, when there are? Why are we told that the quality of Huawei’s work is high, when its Cell in Banbury says that its work is sloppy? Why do we need high-risk vendors in our network at all? Whoever controls 5G will significantly affect our rule of law, our data privacy, our security and our freedom to support our allies. We have had so little parliamentary debate on this issue.

[Matt Warman]

There are a number of questions there. My hon. Friend is right to allude to the fact that there are alternatives to Huawei, and we would of course seek to use them as much as possible. He is right to say that we have to consider the unique nature of a 5G network, and that is precisely what our agencies will do when they offer advice to Government. He is also right to say that we have to look at this decision in the round, and that is what we will do.