Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

Matt Hancock Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)]

The Opposition support the Bill. It has been debated at length in the other place and in this House on Second Reading, in Committee and—perhaps at greater length than some of us anticipated—on Report today.

Not much has been said during the passage of the Bill about part 2, which relates to the National Audit Office. That is not least because it implements the measures that were introduced in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. It is fair to say that there is widespread agreement on part 2.

As was clear in previous proceedings, there is similarly common agreement on the creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility and on placing it on a statutory footing. We did, however, table a number of amendments in Committee to challenge some of the details of how the OBR will function, as one would expect from the Opposition. In particular, we addressed the concern that has been expressed inside and outside this House that the OBR may not turn out to be sufficiently independent from the Government. For the public to have confidence in the OBR, it has to be seen to be independent. That is why we proposed measures that would have made it more accountable to the House and measures that would have increased the role of the Treasury Committee. We also wanted to ensure that the division between the Treasury and the OBR in terms of staffing and premises was enshrined in law. We are grateful for the assurances that the Economic Secretary gave in Committee on those points. We also welcome her promise that substantive details of the contact between OBR staff and the Minister’s special advisers and private office staff will be published.

We were also concerned about the potential overlap between the OBR’s responsibilities and the Bank of England’s economic forecasts. We therefore proposed that the Bill provide for a memorandum of understanding to ensure that there was clarity from the outset for all parties. I urge the Economic Secretary to ensure that the memorandum is subject to proper scrutiny in this House. I hope that the OBR and the Bank of England will in time formally agree their working relationship.

We consider that a crucial way to secure the independence of the OBR is to ensure transparency in its funding so that the budget responsibility committee is not at the mercy of the Treasury and vulnerable to the whim of the Chancellor. Comparisons with other countries were made earlier. In Canada, the Parliamentary Budget Officer published two critical reports of the Government in its first year. It is difficult to divorce that from the fact that its budget was frozen, despite promises that it would be increased by a third. Some people would say that that was not a coincidence.

Likewise, Sweden has a similar organisation to the OBR in its Fiscal Policy Council, which reported that its resources were not sufficient to enable it to carry out its remit properly. In response, the Minister for Finance suggested that the council’s budget be cut. We obviously want to avoid a situation like that, and we have received assurances from the Economic Secretary that the OBR’s funding is secure for the next five years. We very much welcome that.

Much of the OBR’s decisions and remit will be based on the charter, so it is disappointing that we have not had the opportunity to scrutinise the revised charter today alongside the Bill given that it is so central to the OBR. The Economic Secretary has assured us that it will be published promptly after Royal Assent, which we expect in no time at all, so we look forward to a full debate on the charter in the Chamber before too long.

Although we support the principle of the OBR and the Bill, we have reservations about how the OBR will work in practice. A major concern is the Treasury’s insular conception of economic policy and sustainability, which seemingly allows it to focus narrowly on the deficit and to ignore the consequences of its own policies. Rising unemployment, rising inflation, as seen in today’s figures, and falling growth are not sustainable and cannot be ignored, so we hoped that the Government would allow the OBR the latitude to take into account those crucial determinants for the long-term recovery, even if the Treasury will not. Unfortunately our amendments were rejected, so we could not enshrine that in the Bill, but we hope that a truly independent OBR will include those matters in its remit. The House may well return to the definition of “sustainability” and the issue of intergenerational fairness when we come to debate the revised charter.

During Labour’s last Budget, the present Prime Minister was fond of claiming that our growth forecasts did not match those of the independent experts. In fact, they were consistently much more reliable than he made out. He concluded:

“What we need is a proper independent office of Budget responsibility, which we would set up to set independent forecasts and to keep the Chancellor honest.”—[Official Report, 24 March 2010; Vol. 508, c. 268.]

I agree with the present Prime Minister, for once, about the need for that, but as is so often the case, the reality does not match his rhetoric. Now we have the OBR, but its independence has been undermined by the release of favourable figures in time for a recent Prime Minister’s Question Time.

Moreover, the British Chambers of Commerce has described the OBR’s growth forecasts as “too optimistic”, and despite the Prime Minister’s concern that official forecasts should match those of independent experts, it seems that other independent experts disagree with the Government’s independent experts. In February, the consensus forecast for 2011 was 1.9% growth, which was downgraded to 1.8% in March, whereas the OBR forecast was a more optimistic 2.1%. The discrepancy increases for next year’s forecast. The consensus forecast is 2.1%, compared with the OBR figure of 2.6%, which it has already had to downgrade once thanks to the Government’s policies.

The differences between the OBR and consensus forecasts could be critical. The Institute for Fiscal Studies, which the Government seem to respect on the occasions when it says anything favourable about their policies, has reported that they will fail to achieve their fiscal mandate to

“achieve cyclically-adjusted current budget balance by the end of the rolling, five-year forecast horizon”

if growth does not meet the OBR’s central economic forecast. Whether the Chancellor will achieve his fiscal mandate is clearly in the balance, and although he may use the OBR figures, it would be a great mistake if we held the OBR responsible for whether he fulfils that mandate. Only the Treasury can determine that.

Fundamentally, and finally, we have to remember that the Bill places no enforceable obligations on the Chancellor for responsible fiscal policy. The OBR can report on the state of the economy, and its analysis will no doubt be very valuable, provided it is genuinely independent. However, the Government already have a track record of ignoring expert advice and indisputable evidence that their policies are failing.

The British Medical Association and almost every health organisation that we care to think of warned against the Health Secretary’s reckless experiment with the national health service, but with the Prime Minister’s full backing, he ignored the evidence and carried on regardless. The IFS published independent research proving that the Government’s June Budget and comprehensive spending review would disproportionately hurt women and children and the most vulnerable people in our big society, but the Chancellor ignored the evidence and carried on regardless.

The Office for National Statistics reported that unemployment had reached a 17-year high and that youth unemployment was at its highest level ever, and the OBR itself reported that the Tory-Liberal Democrat plans would mean 110,000 more people on the dole by the end of this Parliament, but did the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions review their policies in the light of that evidence? No, they ignored the evidence and carried on regardless.

The OBR downgraded growth forecasts after the coalition’s emergency Budget, and again as a result of its comprehensive spending review, and the economy contracted by 0.6% in the last quarter of 2010, proving that the Government’s policies had undermined the economic recovery, but the Chancellor ignored the evidence and blamed it on the snow. The question for the House is whether we can do enough to secure the status of the OBR so that ideologically driven Ministers cannot just disregard its reports.

[Matthew Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kerry McCarthy]

No, I am just drawing to a close.

I urge the Minister to ensure that the principles of objectivity, transparency and impartiality are respected, particularly when she lays the revised charter before the House. Most importantly, we seek assurances that Ministers will actually listen to the evidence provided by the OBR and respond accordingly.

When the Chancellor came to office, unemployment was falling, growth was predicted at 2.3% for this year, inflation was lower and falling, and borrowing had come in £20 billion lower than was forecast in 2009. I do not need to tell the House again how the Chancellor has reversed that recovery, but that is the context in which we must consider the role of the OBR. The office is intended to report on responsibility, but it cannot guarantee responsibility. That is the Chancellor’s role, and it is about time he realised it.