(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIs it not true that the Office for National Statistics has confirmed that the Government have included in their employment figures those who are not being paid for their work?
If the hon. Gentleman looks at the detail of the Office for National Statistics labour force survey, he will see that there are people who are on schemes who say that they are in employment, but that was the case under the previous Government. I have raised that issue with the ONS, because I agree that they should not be included in the numbers who are employed, but it rejected the argument on the grounds of international consistency. We cannot ignore the fact that, excluding those schemes and any reclassification, we have seen more than 1 million net new jobs created in the private sector since May 2010. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman should congratulate us on achieving that.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThe roles are different, as I will mention later, but the Chancellor did give the Treasury Committee responsibility, in the way it is asking for here, for the appointment of senior members of the Office for Budget Responsibility. Obviously, then, he had sufficient confidence in the Committee to involve it in appointments.
Of course, there is a distinction between the chairman of the OBR and the Governor of the Bank of England. The former does not have an Executive role; their role is more akin to that of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
I shall come to that almost Jesuitical distinction between Executive roles.
It is critical that the right person be appointed to the crucial role of Governor of the Bank of England in this coming period. The new Governor will need to demonstrate not only that he or she is professionally competent, but that they can exercise sound ethical judgment. They must be able to convince the public and the markets that they can turn the liner that is financial services around. To have any credibility they will need to demonstrate that they have the confidence of not only the Chancellor of the Exchequer but of Parliament as a whole, and that they are independent—no crony, no place person, no political appointee—and able and willing to give robust independent advice. Given the scale of the task facing the new Governor and the heightened political atmosphere and context in which the banking reforms are to be developed, now, more than ever, this critical appointment cannot be left in the hands of a single Minister.
I suggest that people listen to my speech. I will get to that point, but if I miss it out, perhaps the Minister can intervene again.
The wider engagement of Parliament in the appointment process is more likely to result in the appointment of a talented and competent professional whose independence is demonstrable and protected, and who will therefore have the authority to drive through the reforms and change of culture in our banking system for which we are all calling.
This is not a revolutionary proposal. To allow Parliament, via the Treasury Committee, to have a decisive say in the appointment of key posts is nothing new. If Members read the Institute for Government’s excellent report “Balancing Act”, by Akash Paun and David Atkinson, which the Committee recommended, they will see that the Bill stands in an evolutionary line on the growing role of Parliament in public appointments. In the past 30 years, there has been an evolution from all public posts historically being appointed by prerogative of the Executive through to pre-appointment hearings, confirmation hearings for the Monetary Policy Committee, to the current Chancellor granting the Treasury Committee a veto over the senior posts in the OBR. That was enshrined in the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011, the wording which I have simply transferred into my Bill.
The OBR is not the only area where appointments are made subject to the approval of a Select Committee. For example, last year the Ministry of Justice announced that the appointment of the Information Commissioner would not be made if the Justice Select Committee opposed it. The proposal in today’s Bill, then, is nothing new or revolutionary but simply part of the evolving relationship between Parliament and the Executive.
In line with the evolutionary progress in that relationship, when the Treasury Committee undertook its investigation into the accountability of the Bank of England, the report of which was published in October 2011, it examined parliamentary involvement in the appointment and dismissal of the Governor and concluded:
“The power of veto with respect to the OBR was given to ensure the independence and accountability of that body. The Governor of the Bank’s independence from Government is crucial for his or her credibility. Given the vast responsibilities of the Governor, the case for this Committee to have a power of veto over the appointment or dismissal of the Governor is even stronger than it is with respect to the OBR.”
The Committee recommended, therefore, that it be given a
“statutory power of veto over the appointment and dismissal of the Governor”.
That was a fair, appropriate and responsible submission from the Committee.
It is a matter of striking a balance and, at the moment, the Governor’s independence is undermined by association with appointment by one Minister and the Executive. My Bill would spread the burden of accountability and responsibility for the appointment.
On the issue of politicisation, the argument was that the Committee veto would politicise the post of the Governor. However, spreading the decision, to include all parties in determining the appointment, would avoid the charge that the person had been appointed by one party or one coalition grouping and was therefore a party political appointee. The charge of politicisation also neglects to acknowledge that our Select Committees have, over decades, developed a good culture of cross-party working. Where there have been disputes over a ministerial appointment in the past, they have not been on political lines. There have been only two rejections of a Minister’s recommendation, and they were cross-party rejections. Having to secure the approval of the Treasury Committee would override any charge of a single-party or party political fix.
That charge was laid before, but when the Institute for Government examined it in detail, it found no example of that happening, because the Select Committee system—
The decision in the case that my hon. Friend the Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) raised was not accepted. The Select Committee system has worked remarkably well, and when people have served on them, they have done so on a cross-party basis. However, the point the Minister makes still does not undermine the argument that it is better to have a group examining, interviewing and then coming to a decision about an appointment on a cross-party basis than to leave it in the hands of a single, party politician.
I hate to say it, but I thought my hon. Friend was uncharacteristically uncharitable about our hon. Friends the Liberal Democrats. Perhaps they did not get the three e-mails that I got from the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington imploring me to be here today. I answered that call, and I am sorry that more Members on his side of the argument did not do so.
No, I think I ought to have the opportunity to summarise the Government’s position on the Bill.
We are committed to maintaining the appointments process for the Governor, which is proportionate, attracts candidates of the highest quality and represents value for money for the taxpayer. It is important to ensure the credibility of the candidate, and to safeguard his or her independence and prevent them from becoming a political pawn.
The Financial Services Bill, which is currently in the other place, already contains provisions to strengthen the Bank’s governance arrangements, including moving the Governor to a single eight-year term. Much has been made of the enhanced powers that the Financial Services Bill bestows on the Governor, but it is important to remember that the Bill does not create new responsibilities for the Bank. Rather, it is returning the Bank to a role more akin to the one it played prior to the creation of the Financial Services Authority, when it was responsible for financial stability and prudential supervision of banks. In a way, we are going back to the situation prior to the Labour Government.
The Governor is already accountable to the court and to Parliament, and the Treasury Committee holds pre-commencement hearings for the Governor and deputy governors. That is the right balance. Of course, the Governor—rightly—is regularly called before the Treasury Committee. The market-sensitive nature of the Governor’s role makes it unsuitable to be subject to the approval of the Treasury Committee. Such a step risks uncertainty, delay and disruption to financial markets. That is also true in respect of the proposal to make the dismissal of the Governor subject to the approval of the Treasury Committee. I therefore cannot offer the Government’s support for the Bill.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from but we have tried that and it has not worked. We sought under the recent Companies Act to increase the responsibilities on directors, but unfortunately we were unsuccessful. The evidence that came to the London Mining Network report, which I shall send to the hon. Gentleman, clearly shows that the existing system is not working, and this Bill provides an opportunity to enhance the powers of the regulatory authorities in this country.
My hon. Friend the Member for Wigan will not push the amendment to a vote. I understand why, although I am a bit more proactive on these matters. May I suggest to the Minister that the Government usefully look at the report and bring together the relevant representatives, including the existing authorities and the new individuals who will sit on the various authorities when the Bill has gone through, to discuss where we go from here? How do we ensure that we have an effective mechanism that includes the monitoring of corporate ethical behaviour within companies that are listed in this country and that gain all the advantages from that, such as reputational advantage, but that are doing our country a disservice through their operations in the developing world?
I am grateful for the opportunity to reply to this debate. The hon. Members for Wigan (Lisa Nandy) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) have raised some very important issues and there is a lot of truth in what they say. The reputation of the UK listing regime depends partly on the behaviour of companies, and we need to think about that quite carefully. However, there are other forums in which these issues should be explored—I do not believe that the Financial Services Bill is the place for it. In the regulatory reforms we have brought forward, we have tried to be very clear about the responsibilities and focus of the new regulators, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority, and the macro-prudential body the Financial Policy Committee.
Matters of stewardship and corporate behaviour are predominantly the responsibility of the Financial Reporting Council, which is responsible for the stewardship code and corporate governance issues. I encourage both hon. Members to engage with the FRC on this issue. Of course, it is not only the FRC that is relevant. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington talked about the mining sector, and the Government are engaged in that debate. We are a strong supporter of transparency in the extractive sector and we are pressing for requirements to be placed on EU extractive companies to disclose the payments they make to Governments. That is flowing from the accounting and transparency directives. We are also very supportive of the extractive industries transparency initiative, under which companies publish the payments they make to companies in resource-rich countries, so we are aware of the need to increase transparency.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker) highlighted, there is a responsibility on directors and there are criminal sanctions for criminal behaviour. We need to be very careful that we do not duplicate powers that already exist elsewhere and that we do not confuse the role of the regulators. It was the Treasury Committee that highlighted some of the problems in the existing regulatory system with the confusion of roles and remits. We want to be very clear in these reforms about what we seek to achieve.
The FSA—and in future the FCA—has a role to play. The FSA supports the FRC’s stewardship code through mandatory requirements on asset managers to disclose the nature of their commitment to the stewardship code or to explain their alternative investment strategy. Those powers will transfer to the FCA.
I hope that what the Minister just said was helpful. Is he saying that the stewardship role that he envisages for the FCA will include an element whereby judgments can be made about behaviour in terms of corporate ethics?
I am saying that what we need to ensure in terms of the stewardship code, and what the FCA does, is to require asset managers to disclose the nature of their commitment to the stewardship code or to explain their alternative investment strategy, so the obligation is on asset managers rather than necessarily on companies themselves to disclose their adherence to stewardship matters.
All right, I will not be a pain any further. To be frank, that does not move the matter on. The Minister need not give an answer on this tonight, but it would be incredibly helpful if he or one of his colleagues met my hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy), me and representatives from the London Mining Network to talk this issue through because there is clearly a gap between the different institutions, which corporate ethics seem to fall down when it comes to their being pragmatically adhered to.
I am always loth to offer meetings on behalf of colleagues, because it has happened to me, but the hon. Gentleman may wish to approach the Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs, who is also responsible for corporate governance and the role of the FRC. That might be the most productive furrow to plough.
On amendment 38, the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) is absolutely right that we have heard it before. It is identical to amendment 150, which we discussed at some length in Committee before rejecting it. I do not think his arguments today were any more persuasive than they were a few months ago. I know that he will find that personally disappointing but I am sure he will get over it. In short, the objectives of each authority are broad enough to enable them to make the rules suggested in the amendment.
More generally, these issues are better considered in other forums, including those concerned with governance across the corporate sector. I also point out gently to the hon. Member for Nottingham East that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills recently consulted quite widely on executive remuneration and that it included in that consultation both the suggestions that have been made, neither of which received significant support. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Nottingham East says that it depends whom we consulted but it was an open consultation. Views were encouraged from across a wide range of bodies, including investor organisations, and I am sure that institutions such as the TUC and others would have taken part. I know that the Treasury Committee is also looking into this matter, so perhaps the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love) can illuminate us about the conversations he has had this afternoon with Baroness Hogg.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Lady makes an important point. It is my understanding that some of these prepayment schemes get their income from being able to negotiate a discount with the supplier of the goods, as well as, perhaps, from the interest they earn on the prepayments. The question then arises whether the revenue the prepayment scheme gets is sufficient to outweigh the cost of enhancing customer protection. Some of these schemes are administratively expensive, and the cost of protection may exceed the income generated, which would lead to that service being withdrawn from the consumer.
As this exchange demonstrates, some complex issues are involved. The hon. Lady is right to raise them, and it is right that the Government should continue to address them. Many people rely on these schemes and it is important that they are well protected. We should make sure that there are alternative sources of information for them, in order to enable them to judge where they might get best protection and, perhaps, earn some interest themselves on the prepayment they are making, rather than the supplier making that money.
Both of the issues under discussion have cross-party support. There is a consumer affairs element in them, and this kind of legislation comes around very rarely. Indeed, I doubt whether we will see such an all-encompassing Bill for another decade. There does not appear to be any consumer legislation in the planned Queen’s Speech, other than the proposed groceries adjudicator Bill. Will the Minister therefore reconsider these two matters, and meet the relevant Members to see whether there is any way they could be better addressed in this Bill before it goes to the other place or before the final vote on it?
I think that there is adequate provision in the Bill on consumer credit; the FCA has the powers to tackle that issue and I am confident that it will be able to make appropriate use of the remedies available to it. A different issue about pre-payment schemes has been raised, but that does not fall within the scope of the Bill. Of course there is a mechanism in the Bill to move the regulatory perimeter if appropriate, but I think that it is the Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs who needs to respond on that point.
I know that we want to move on to deal with the next group of amendments, but before concluding I just wish to say that there is support across the House for new clause 4, which enables us to complete the transfer of regulation from the OFT to the FCA. That does yield important benefits for our constituents. We need to get that regime right if we are to ensure that there is a reasonable supply of affordable credit to our constituents and that they are well protected—that is the goal we are all aiming at. The Bill contains the powers to do that, and I commend new clause 4 to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 4 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 1
Retrospective reviews of Bank performance by court of directors and publication of court minutes
‘(1) Section 2 of the Bank of England Act 1998 (Functions of court of directors) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (5) add—
“(6) The court shall conduct retrospective reviews of the performance of the Bank with respect to its functions and objectives.
(7) The court shall determine the particular matters to be reviewed under subsection (6).
(8) The court must publish a report on each review carried out under subsections (6) and (7) unless the court decides that all or part of such a report should not be published for reasons of confidentiality or because it would endanger financial stability.
(9) When all or part of a report of a review is not published under the provisions of subsection (8), the court must—
(a) publish as much as possible of the report,
(b) send a copy of the full report to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons or, in exceptional circumstances, inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the reasons for not sending it, and
(c) publish the report or part of the report as soon as possible after the court decides that the considerations in subsection (8) no longer apply.
(10) After each meeting of the court, the Bank shall publish minutes of the meeting before the end of the period of two weeks beginning with the day of the meeting.
(11) Subsection (10) shall not apply to minutes of any proceedings where the court has decided that publication should be delayed for reasons of confidentiality or because publication would endanger financial stability.
(12) Where any part of the court’s minutes is not published under the provisions of subsection (11), the Chairman of the court shall inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons of the reasons.
(13) Any part of the minutes of a meeting of the court must be published as soon as the court has decided that the considerations in subsection (11) no longer apply.”.’.—(Mr Tyrie.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberSignificant studies have been done by both the EU and the IMF on such a tax, how it would work and the pitfalls in the proposals. We will see an impact assessment on that emerging shortly. We have not ruled out a financial activities tax. We are engaged in discussion with our international partners and we have pressed for the Commission to consider such a tax. It is working on that. We are making progress. Another review is not needed; there is sufficient work going on to explore the issue in significant detail. The amendment would impose more burdens on the Treasury and it would be better to allow that work to take its course.
I would like to give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I want to try to wind up the debate because there are other important matters to be discussed this evening.
On Government amendments 32 to 50, since our proceedings in Committee, it has been brought to our attention that in one area the Bill as drafted may not fully achieve the intended policy ambition. These are the rules relating to netting and in particular the rules concerning multi-lateral netting agreements in groups. These are essentially agreements that allow different members of the same banking group to enter into a net settlement agreement with the same counterparties.
We have sought as a public policy objective to ensure that banks should be able to net off certain liabilities against assets, and that the levy is charged only on the remaining balance of liabilities. The amendments clarify the purpose of the Bill and ensure that the netting rules apply so that some banks are not adversely affected. We want to make sure that we keep the provisions under review. That is why we have put into the amendments a power to allow the Treasury to amend the rules applying to netting arrangements.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East asked whether there would be an impact on yield as a consequence of the amendments. There is no impact on yield, as the amendments reflect the policy objective that we have pursued.
In conclusion, we think it is right that banks should make a contribution reflecting the risks they pose to the UK financial system and the wider economy. That is why we introduced the bank levy. We expect the levy to raise more each and every year than the bank payroll tax did under the previous Government. All the Opposition have to offer in the debate is a tax that did not work the first time round. We have put in place a clear strategy to reform the banking sector. I believe that the actions we are taking are right, and I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to oppose the Opposition amendments.