Committee on Standards
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)
The motion before the House should be viewed, as I have said in several debates over the last few days, from a fundamental perspective that affects all Members from all parts of the House. It is essential to review the workings of the fair trial system—the investigatory panel—created under the Labour Government in 2003 on the recommendation of the Committee on Standards itself, which consisted of six Labour members, two Liberal Democrats and only three Conservatives. This was to ensure fairness for MPs accused of misconduct in serious cases, as insisted upon by a series of high-level reports, which the House then accepted.
All those high-level reports—including the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999, the Wicks report, and the 2003 Committee on Standards report, especially paragraphs 39 to 42, which set up the fair trial investigatory panel—made it clear that the fair trial requirements would only be applied in seriously contested cases, where the facts were in dispute in relation to alleged misconduct by a Member.
Appendix 2 of the third report shows that the particular case of the former Member for North Shropshire fell squarely within Standing Order No. 150(5). The Standing Order clearly states:
“The Commissioner may at any time in the course of investigating a complaint, and if so requested by the Committee on Standards shall”—
I repeat “shall”—
“appoint an Investigatory Panel to assist”
the Commissioner “in establishing the facts”.
This was not done. I am astonished by how few people seem either to have read or understood this point, but it lies at the heart of the issue. No one in this House or elsewhere could say that a person was guilty or innocent, unless that panel had been set up, completed its work and reported, and that was not done in this case. Not to request, and thereby to require, the setting up of such a panel in seriously contested cases seriously impairs the principles of natural justice specifically referred to in Standing Order No. 150, affecting MPs accused of serious misconduct.
Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)
I have listened carefully to my hon. Friend. Will he set out for the House perhaps just one example of a fact that is contested? Mr Paterson contested the interpretation of his behaviour, but I read the report in full and I did not find a single contested fact. Will he set one out for the House, please?
Sir William Cash
I will give my right hon. Friend one example: the question raised by Professor Elliott on the matter of public safety in relation to carcinogenic elements in ham or bacon. As I said in the previous debate on this matter, Professor Elliott recognised that in 35 years, he had never come across such a case. That is one example, but there are others.
Not to request the setting up of a panel also impairs the fundamental rules laid down by article 6—known as the fair trial provisions—of the European convention on human rights, drafted in accordance with British principles of justice in all civil and criminal cases. The failure to implement the requirement of the panel under Standing Order No. 150(5) impairs the report. The door to fairness is opened by the setting up of the panel, and for the sake of all Members of the House it was a mistake not to have done so in this case.
The failure to adhere to the clearly defined six principles of fairness for accused MPs as set out by the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999 and article 6 of the European convention—including the examination of witnesses and the cross-examination of other witnesses—has adverse consequences as a precedent for Parliament itself. Not a single citizen in the land, even terrorists and criminals, is denied a fair trial under these principles of natural justice, and has the right of appeal in every court and every disciplinary tribunal. The Member in question should have been afforded the procedures under the fair trial arrangements laid down by Standing Orders because we, as Members, are exceptionally excluded from judicial review by article 9 of the Bill of Rights.
My hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Alberto Costa), who is a member of the Committee, argued convincingly that the Standing Orders must be reviewed to avoid conflicts of interest. The procedural reforms that will inevitably now have to be made need proper and full examination by the whole House, not only by the Committee on Standards, but it will be tragically too late for the former Member for North Shropshire when new reforms are properly introduced in the near future.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William CashTuesday 21st November 2017
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 View all European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 21 November 2017 - (21 Nov 2017)
Oral Answers to Questions
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Harper
I do not know whether that is what the commission will recommend. It gave us some welcome interim advice on reform of the European Court of Human Rights, which was helpful in the negotiations that secured the agreement of all 47 members of the Council of Europe to some improvements, which were welcomed on both sides of the House. I will wait to see what the commission recommends at the end of the year.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Will the Minister confirm that, far from nibbling away at this problem, which many of us fear is what the commission is doing, any Bill of Rights will be based on Westminster legislation, not on European Union legislation or the European convention on human rights?
Mr Harper
Again, I do not know what the commission will recommend. It contains distinguished and eminent lawyers on both sides of the argument. I think that it will come up with a very good report, and the Government will consider what it says. I remind my hon. Friend that this country signed up to the European convention on human rights only because this House decided that it should do so. We will listen to the commission’s conclusions and act on those that the Government support.
Public Procurement
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(12 years, 9 months ago)
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Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
A big issue that has cropped up in the past year is that of Bombardier. The question that the hon. Member for St Helens North (Mr Watts) just asked is apposite because this is not simply a question of whether there are fair rules on procurement in terms of competition. Because a legal framework has been created, there is a special and fundamental requirement to comply with those rules because they are part of the legal process. The problem is not merely whether proper competition is being avoided but whether the law is being breached as well.
Mr Harper
I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. On the specific issue of procuring rolling stock, he will know that when this came up in the House last year the then Transport Secretary made it clear that the bids were being evaluated by criteria laid down by the previous Government. The problem was that we had to follow the criteria that were already laid down. The then Secretary of State also said that we would look at procurement in the growth review that was under way, and that we would look at what happens in other EU countries that are constrained by the same rules and at best procurement practices to make sure that, where appropriate, we include appropriate socio-economic criteria in the procurement decisions. That has to be done right at the beginning; we cannot set out the criteria and then change the rules part way through the process to favour domestic bidders. I have looked in detail at the particular case my hon. Friend mentions and it was made clear that the decisions that people are not happy with were taken under the previous Government and that we had to implement them. The alternative would have been to suspend the procurement process completely and go right back to the drawing board.
Mr Cash
After 28 years in this place one gets a sense for when a Minister wants to get to the end of his speech as quickly as possible, particularly when he is being assailed on all sides. May I just ask whether a full analysis has been made by the Government through the appropriate Department—not his Department, but the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills—of whether there has been a real investigation into the way public procurement operates in this country as compared with the rest of Europe?
Mr Harper
The short and honest answer is that I do not know. I will find out and make sure that I or my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office writes to my hon. Friend to let him know.
I was not close to sitting down because I was about to set out the three areas in which the Government have subsidiarity concerns about the proposed oversight body—concerns that are shared by the European Scrutiny Committee. First, the oversight body was not proposed in the Commission’s consultation green paper or otherwise consulted on, so neither member states nor anyone else had an opportunity to comment on the proposal. The Commission’s impact assessment does not provide a clear or detailed justification. The European Scrutiny Committee expressed similar concerns about the inadequacy of the Commission’s impact assessment when we debated the common European sales law.
Secondly, the proposal for a single, national oversight body in each member state does not recognise or respect the different legal systems within the UK. As Members are well aware, Scotland has a separate and distinct legal system. Under the devolution arrangements, the development and application of public procurement policy and the implementation of public procurement legislation are devolved matters in both Scotland and Northern Ireland. As I have mentioned, Scotland has chosen to implement the procurement directives separately. The requirement for a single national oversight body for a member state is inconsistent with those settlements, and the Commission has not demonstrated any objective necessity for a single body in each member state.
The third substantial concern is the proposal that the oversight body should be empowered to seize the jurisdiction currently resting with the courts to determine some disputes about compliance with the procurement rules. That would be a judicial function, whereas the other functions of the body would be administrative or regulatory. If they were all combined in one body, that would intrude unjustifiably in national legal and judicial structures. That would be inconsistent with the UK’s legal traditions in which a clear distinction is made between judicial and administrative functions. The remedies rules that I mentioned earlier leave it to member states to determine the legal structures that enforce the rules. There seems to be no clear justification for departing from those now. This might affect other member states as well.
As I have said, a number of other member state Governments will have issues with the national oversight body, whether on grounds of bureaucracy, cost, incompatibility with existing arrangements or subsidiarity. The Parliament of one country has already set out similar concerns to ours in a reasoned opinion. The debate has been very helpful and the European Scrutiny Committee’s motion is very welcome. I look forward to listening to other Members and having the opportunity to support the motion and have this House take a sensible decision today.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Harper
I will give way in a moment.
If the Lords amendments were accepted, the electorate would have no certainty as to how long the Parliament that they will elect on 7 May 2015 would last. Such certainty, and the principle behind the Bill, have been welcomed by many electoral administrators and by members of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee.
Mr Harper
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. The polling that has been carried out suggests that the public support fixed-term Parliaments. Indeed, if we think back to the previous Parliament, there was a general sense, both in the House and among the public and commentators, that the “will he, won’t he” debate about whether the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) would call an election on becoming Prime Minister was not helpful to good Government or to good democratic accountability. It will be helpful to have greater certainty, as that will benefit us all. Let us ask ourselves this question: if the Bill became law, and fixed-term Parliaments became the norm, would any Minister realistically be able to come to the Dispatch Box and suggest with a straight face that we should change the position and give the power back to the Prime Minister to hold an election at a time of his choosing to suit his political party? Would anyone take that proposition seriously? I suggest that they would not.
Mr Cash
Has it occurred to the Minister that part of the problem with this wretched Bill is that it is trying to organise things to suit the requirements of this coalition? Decisions on the future should actually be down to the public at large, and if they want to get rid of a Parliament, they will do so in their own way. That is where the question of a confidence motion starts to kick in.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. We are not dealing with the whole Bill; we are dealing with the amendments. I am sure that the Minister will take that into account in his answer.
Mr Harper
To be fair to my hon. Friend, Mr Deputy Speaker, he was speaking to the amendments that we are discussing. He made the assertion that our proposals would suit this particular Government during this particular Parliament, but that is simply not the case. If the Prime Minister wanted to ensure that this Parliament ran for the full five years and that the general election took place on 7 May 2015, he would need to do only one thing—namely, not approach Her Majesty the Queen to seek a Dissolution before that date. We could thereby achieve a five-year Parliament for this Parliament, but we want to make a change to our constitutional processes—I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) does not agree with it—to remove from Prime Ministers the ability to choose the date of a general election.
The second part of my hon. Friend’s question effectively suggested that a sunset provision would be a good thing. Under our democratic system, the public elect Members of Parliament for a term. At the moment, they do not have a choice about when the general election will be; the sole decision about that sits with the Prime Minister. The Bill seeks to give that power to Members of this democratically elected House. I would have thought that my hon. Friend, as a champion of parliamentary control of the Executive, would welcome that proposition.
Mr Cash
I can assure my hon. Friend that the real question is not whether the Prime Minister wants to call a general election, but what the state of the country is and whether there is a sense of urgency among the public at large. That can force a general election, irrespective of whether a Prime Minister wants to pull the plug.
Mr Harper
I am afraid that my hon. Friend is simply not right. That is not the current constitutional position. The current position is that for a period of time during which a Government have the confidence of this House, the only person who decides whether there should be a general election—assuming that we have not reached the end of the Parliament—is the Prime Minister, who seeks a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. Members of Parliament, unless they vote down the Government on a vote of confidence, do not have that power. The general public certainly do not have that power.
Mr Harper
I am not sure that I want to conjure up visions of Cabinet Ministers throwing themselves in front of prime ministerial cars, which is not a happy thought—[Interruption.] Some of the comments from Opposition Members are unworthy of them. Let me explain what I do not understand about my hon. Friend’s point. He is arguing, I think, for decisions about the timing of general elections to be a more collegiate effort, rather than just the choice of the Prime Minister—but that is exactly what the Bill does. It takes away from the Prime Minister the power to call a general election by asking the Queen for a Dissolution and gives that power to Members. Two thirds of them can choose to have an early election for any reason, including general concerns about the state of the country, which deals with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. Having this Bill in place would allow that to happen, which cannot be done today. The other way of bringing about an election is the Government losing a vote of confidence. That is why the Government believe that the Bill should be in place; it should not be up to each individual Parliament to decide whether the Bill should remain in force. That is why we oppose these sunset clauses.
We think that the real threat presented by the amendments is that they could create a scenario in which political parties, and specifically the Government party, could choose in each Parliament, even at its beginning, whether that Parliament should be a fixed-term one. As the Bill is currently drafted, both Houses would have to vote in favour of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill kicking into place at any time during the Parliament. I simply do not think that that is a very sensible proposition. It would mean that Governments would have a way of manipulating the timetable. We should think it through. If both Houses have to vote in favour of a motion for a fixed-term Parliament to be in place, a Government with a majority could simply refuse to pass that motion—and we would effectively have given back to the Prime Minister the ability to call an election. That would not be a positive step forward.
It is important to note that when this House and the other place were legislating for the fixed terms of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, it was not thought appropriate to have sunset clauses. We did not give those legislatures the opportunity to pick and choose each time how long their terms of office should be. I do not believe that doing so makes sense now.
Mr Harper
That is not an analogy I would make with the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. When this House made decisions about setting up those bodies, we did not think it appropriate to give them the power to pick and choose their term of office. We set it out in the legislation that set the bodies up.
I am curious to know what the supporters of the Lords amendment think would happen if the next Parliament decided that it did not want a fixed term. It is not very clear from the amendments, how exactly the mechanisms would work. I shall take Members through the Lords amendments shortly and explain how I think they would work.
It has been suggested that a sunset clause would ensure that the issue of fixed-term Parliaments and the merits of this particular Bill would be subject to post-legislative scrutiny. That is not necessary, however. This legislation has already been scrutinised by four Select Committees: the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, the Lords Constitution Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am sure that any one of those Select Committees or another Select Committee will subject the Bill to some form of post-legislative scrutiny, which is something that the Government would welcome. I do not think that these sunset clauses, however, would lead to that type of sensible scrutiny.
I said that I would look at the effect of the Lords amendments on the working of the Bill. Lords amendment 9 talks about a resolution having to be
“approved by each House of Parliament”.
That is fairly straightforward. The most unclear provisions relate to clause 7(4), stating that a number of parts of the Bill will have effect
“only until the first meeting of the… Parliament”,
which would then decide whether to bring those provisions in. The provisions on early elections and confidence votes would not be clear and it would not be clear how Parliament would be dissolved. The schedule, which has a number of consequential amendments, would also not be in force. The schedule, which repeals the Septennial Act and a whole load of other provisions, would effectively cease to be in force and, presumably, all the repeals and amendments would be unrepealed and unamended. We would then end up with a very complicated constitutional proposition.
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman confuses the will of the House and the will of the Prime Minister. The scenario that I set out stands. If the other place had chosen not to vote for fixed-term Parliaments, we would not have a fixed-term Parliament, despite this House having voted in favour, and that would give back to the Prime Minister the ability solely to decide whether there should be an election. We would have taken powers away from Members of this House who had voted, perhaps overwhelmingly, to ensure that the Bill was in force. We would have been thwarted by their lordships. Given the importance to Members of the primacy of this House, that effectively moves power in the opposite direction, which Members will find unwelcome.
Mr Harper
That is not what I said at all. My specific point is about the relative powers of the two Houses, but the point stands that if we do not have a fixed-term Parliament, we give back to the Prime Minister the power to call an early election. To repeat my example, the amendments would mean that both Houses must vote positively in favour of resurrecting the provisions of the Bill. I want the other place also to be elected—I know that my hon. Friend does not—but under the amendments the elected House, despite having voted by an overwhelming margin, could be thwarted by the unelected House, and the provisions of the Bill would not be in force. The will of the House of Commons, having said that it did not want the Prime Minister to have the power to call an early election, and that it wanted that power to be held by Members of this House, would have been thwarted by the other place. I am sure that my hon. Friend would not agree with that.
Mr Cash
I am grateful to the Minister for engaging in dialogue on this question, but the assumption, at any rate in the mind of the Deputy Prime Minister, is that proposals for reform of the House of Lords will go through by the end of this Parliament. The arguments to which the Minister refers, therefore, will effectively expire when the arrangements for this fixed-year Parliament come to an end.
Mr Harper
I disagree with my hon. Friend. Even if we successfully push our proposals through in their current form, and we have the first set of such elections in 2015, most Members of the other place will still be unelected. Secondly, regardless of how many Members of the other place are elected, we are talking about primacy. Effectively, the amendments would move power away from this House to the other place. Whatever one’s views about House of Lords reform, I picked up clearly from our earlier debate that most Members of this place want it to be clear that this place has primacy over their lordships’ House. The amendments, perhaps inadvertently, would lead to a different situation.
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman has put his finger on it. The provisions are completely silent about that. They do not say who would table the motion, or whether the same question could be continually repeated.
The amendments are not very well drafted. I think that they are wrong in principle, because under the normal procedure legislation that is passed stays in force unless it is changed by a future Parliament, but even if we liked the concept of a sunset provision, such a provision ought to be much better drafted and much more effective. This House can choose only between accepting the amendments and disagreeing with them, and I think I have almost made my case that we should disagree with them.
It has been argued that we are trying to bind future Parliaments. That is not what we are trying to do at all. We are merely trying to re-establish the normal constitutional position. We are passing legislation which we hope will become the established position, but if a future Parliament, perhaps the next one, decides that the fixed-term Parliament experiment—an experiment that is common to many countries around the world—has not been successful and has not led to better government, it will be perfectly free to pass another piece of legislation that repeals these measures either in full or in part. We do not have an arrangement whereby we “sunset” every piece of legislation, and an incoming Government then find that the rules are unwritten and they can choose what those rules should be. That would not be a very sensible constitutional position.
Mr Cash
Without going into all the questions relating to judicial supremacy and the claims of ultimate authority by certain members of the judiciary, I am afraid to say that through this measure and a number of others the Government have opened the door to the possibility—indeed the likelihood, as Lord Bingham made clear—of certain members of the Supreme Court interpreting legislation in a way that suits their ultimate authority, as they claim it.
Mr Harper
I would not characterise the relationship like that at all. A good case was made, and on this particular issue the Prime Minister has demonstrated tremendous leadership. He is the first Prime Minister to give up the power—a power that was his personally—to seek a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. That improves our arrangements, because we now know the date of the election and so for the last year of this Parliament we will not have the “will he, won’t he” proposition, where everyone is trying to second-guess when the election will be and people are arguing about when the best time is for the party or parties in government. That is an incredibly powerful step forward and it is very welcome.
Mr Harper
I am grateful, Madam Deputy Speaker.
The new version of clause 2 set out in the amendment spells out the exact wording of motions of no confidence, motions of confidence, and motions for an early Dissolution. Whether the conditions have been met would therefore be plain for everyone to see, and it would be clear from the Votes and Proceedings and the Journal, and the Speaker would not need to be drawn into certifying whether the motions had been passed. That was the reason why the amendment was supported by the former Speakers, the Opposition and the other place. The amendment delivers what we had originally intended—that the power to trigger an early Dissolution should lie with this House—but adds clarity and does not risk drawing the Speaker into controversy.
Amendments 7 and 8 are very important, especially for those Members who represent parts of the United Kingdom with devolved legislatures. When the Bill left this House, I told Members that we were in discussions with the parties in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly about how to deal with the coincidence of elections in 2015. I wrote to the Presiding Officers of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly on 17 February, and proposed that if they passed a resolution with the support of at least two thirds of their Members, ensuring that there was consensus across the parties, we would agree to legislate to move the dates of the 2015 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly general elections up to one year later. The Scottish Parliament passed a unanimous motion on 3 March confirming that it wished the UK Government to bring forward a provision to defer the 2015 election to 5 May 2016, and a similar motion was passed by the Welsh Assembly on 16 March.
We have said that if the House accepts the amendments, in the longer term we will conduct a detailed assessment—this issue arose during the debate on the earlier group of amendments—of the implications of the two sets of elections coinciding at a later date. Once we have conducted that assessment, if we think that there is a case for changing the cycle of elections, we will carry out a public consultation in Scotland and Wales on whether the devolved legislatures should be subject to permanent five-year terms.
Mr Cash
Does the Minister not agree that, whether we adopted the original proposals in the Bill or the proposals of the former Speakers and others, the matter would be justiciable? The Speaker would indeed be drawn into controversy, but there would also be a risk of the whole question being adjudicated by the courts.
Mr Harper
We debated the issues of privilege, justiciability and whether the courts would seek to intervene in these matters at length in Committee and on Report, and they were also debated in the other place. I think that the general view was that the risk of intervention by the courts was very slight. It did not seem to concern Members of either House, although I accept that my hon. Friend still has concerns about it.
Mr Cash
The Clerk of the House, in his careful consideration of the issue, took the view, very strongly, that it would lead to justiciability. That is not just the view of one humble Back Bencher; it is also the view of the Clerk of the House, to whom fulsome tributes were paid yesterday for his wise advice.
United Kingdom Parliamentary Sovereignty Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Cash
I am referring directly to the Minister to ask whether he will respond to a specific point made by the Prime Minister when he was Leader of the Opposition, in a speech to the Centre for Policy Studies in 2005 on the repatriation of powers. He stated that it was imperative to ensure British competitiveness by repatriating social and employment legislation. That has now apparently been directly contradicted by his boss, the Deputy Prime Minister, who has said that we will not take any so-called backward steps by repatriating powers. The measures involved include the working time directive and other matters that are absolutely essential to the growth that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be addressing next week in the Budget.
I know that the Minister has a job to do, and I have no doubt that there are moments when that is somewhat unpalatable, but the bottom line is that we are far more interested in the jobs of the British people than in whether a few lines in the coalition agreement override the commitment that was made not only in our manifesto but in statements by the then Leader of the Opposition that we would repatriate social and employment legislation. There is no getting round this, and I want an answer to my question. I am sure that the House does, too.
Mr Harper
I can give my hon. Friend that answer now. We did indeed put a number of proposals before the British people, and we did seek a mandate for them. It will not have escaped his notice, however, that we did not win the general election outright, and that we therefore formed a coalition—[Interruption.] He raises his eyebrows, but that is a fact. Earlier, he specifically said that we had sought a mandate for certain things. We did indeed seek such a mandate, but I must draw his attention to the fact that we did not get that mandate. The coalition then set out its policies very clearly in its programme for government.
Mr Cash
I hear what the Minister says, but I am afraid I remain unconvinced, not least because the first priority must be to ensure that we achieve growth. Reducing the deficit is supposed to be the fulcrum of the coalition Government’s proposals, but we cannot do that without increasing growth, and we cannot increase growth without reducing the burden of over-regulation, much of which comes from the European Union and has the effect of strangulating British business.
This is not exactly rocket science; it is completely obvious. I understand the Government’s dilemma, but I am certain that, in the national interest, we need to tackle the problem. That is why the formula to which I have referred remains embedded in the Bill. I stress the necessity for Government policy to shift the burden on British business to give it the oxygen it needs. We cannot trade with the European Union when most of its member states, apart from Germany, are in a parlous state of low growth. Many of the countries are virtually bankrupt. It would be completely self-defeating to continue to make all these treaties and pacts on European economic governance and competitiveness in defiance of the fact that Europe is suffering from very low growth.
We need to relieve the burden on small and medium-sized businesses in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe to ensure that we can achieve the growth that we need. That is a perfectly reasonable proposition, and it should not get in the way of the overall objectives of the coalition. Unfortunately, however, it appears that it does, because the Government keep on saying that they will not repatriate these powers. I find it astonishing that we are working against the national interest in this way, rather than working for it. Statements by the Deputy Prime Minister in this context have been extremely unhelpful, but I gather that the Minister is going to associate himself with those remarks and not attempt to give any sustenance to those of us who want the repatriation of powers through this Bill.
My arguments apply not only on the business front—[Interruption.] I see some hon. Members shaking their heads, but this country is in a parlous condition at the moment, and common sense ought to prevail. It is not asking a huge amount to ensure that we have a thriving business community. The situation would be emphatically improved if we were to adopt the policy that I am proposing, and have been proposing for many years. As I said before the interruption for the Prime Minister’s statement, that policy was formally agreed by us in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill in 2006 when we were in opposition.
Mr Harper
I would like to ask my hon. Friend a question. He drew attention to the repatriation of powers and spoke of using the mechanisms of the Bill to achieve that. Although I do not agree with it, I could understand the argument that the Bill would stop us giving away more powers to the European Union, but what mechanism in it would enable us to get back powers that have already been given away?
Mr Cash
The use of the sovereignty of Parliament to pass an Act notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972, which is inherent in the Bill. The Minister might recall that in opening my remarks, I specifically stated that I had a clause in mind that would put it beyond any doubt that the courts would be obliged to give effect to, for example, what the then Opposition properly did when they voted for my amendment to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill.
We should not be arguing about this. I find it astonishing that I should have to raise the matter in a debate. For a Minister to question whether my remarks are valid in one respect or another is again astonishing. I cannot believe it: I know the Minister’s business background; I know he understands the issues; I know perfectly well that he is caught on the horns of a dilemma. I believe that he would personally love to see the repatriation of powers—and I am sure his constituents would, as well. I am afraid, however, that it will do no good if he offers resistance to my simple, straightforward and common-sense proposals. This involves making adjustments to European Community law and requiring the judiciary to give effect to the latest inconsistent Act. I should not have to repeat myself; it is terribly obvious. It is all so simple that I cannot believe that the Minister would want to offer any kind of resistance to the proposition.
Let me provide a few examples—some from the business environment, some from elsewhere—from the massive tsunami of European law. I have already mentioned the working time directive, which is coming up for consideration by the European Scrutiny Committee. We recommended that proposals relating to it should be debated in the House, so we do not need to debate it immediately. I will say unequivocally, however, that the working time directive is causing a great deal of damage to small businesses. There are also questions in the pipeline relating to waste electrical and electronic equipment, which is a matter of concern to a number of manufacturers and to people in the waste disposal business.
Mr Harper
I will not dwell on that now, if my hon. Friend will forgive me. I will come to it later in my remarks, and he will be free to intervene on me then.
My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) and several others touched on issues such as the European Union Bill, particularly the debate that we had on clause 18; the issue of prisoner voting, which my hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel) mentioned; and our relationship with the European convention on human rights, including the role of the Court. Those are all important.
There is no doubt that the sovereignty of Parliament lies at the heart of our constitution as one of our fundamental underpinnings. Since the time of the Bill of Rights in 1689, no one has seriously challenged the notion that Parliament is the ultimate arbiter of the powers of the Executive. Indeed, Parliament determined who the Executive should be: it intervened in the line of succession to the Crown and altered it. I will not go into the various changes to the line of succession, as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) dwelled on that. I was disappointed that he did not feel the urge to set out his views on those historical events in more detail, and probably on a much better informed basis, than I would be able to.
It may be surprising to some that the adoption of parliamentary sovereignty is nowhere set out in authoritative form. The Bill sets out sovereignty without attempting to define it in any way in a piece of primary legislation. That would mean, in effect, that the courts would then be invited to define what we meant by sovereignty, to define what “reaffirming” meant, and to do a number of other things. The Bill would therefore take us down a dangerous road that would undermine the proposition of parliamentary sovereignty instead of defending it.
Mr Cash
I merely add that the most distinguished authority on the question of parliamentary sovereignty, Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy, has indicated that clause 1 is the best way to deal with the situation with which we are faced. I have no idea where the legal advice that the Minister is getting comes from. If his advice comes from the same source as that of those who wrote the explanatory notes for the European Union Bill, the fact they have had to go into a steep reverse on this issue as a result of our Committee’s report indicates that the quality of the advice is appalling, and, I am glad to say, that the Minister’s comments are unnecessary and wrong.
Mr Harper
My remarks are clearly not unnecessary, because it is necessary to set out the Government’s view. I suspect that my hon. Friend and I will not see eye to eye on everything; indeed, on quite a lot, particularly regarding these issues. Of course, he is entitled to his view, but I happen to disagree with him.
It is worth saying that in the debate in Committee of the whole House on clause 18 of the European Union Bill—my hon. Friend has referred to the evidence given in the European Scrutiny Committee, which he chairs—it was specifically made clear that it was not intended to be a general clause setting out the origin of parliamentary sovereignty; rather, it sets out how EU law gets its place in the UK legal order, which is by Acts of this Parliament. That was the purpose of the clause, and it did it very well. The EU Bill makes it very clear that directly applicable or directly effective EU law had status in the UK only because it was granted that status by an Act of the UK Parliament. I think that that was a helpful thing to do. As the hon. Member for Rhondda pointed out, that was agreed to by this House. Those arguments will be had at the other end of the building, and I hope that in due course that Bill will be passed by this sovereign Parliament.
Mr Harper
I believe that my hon. Friend is correct in saying that the explanatory notes have changed, so I am of course happy to agree on that fact. There are still matters of debate, but you will be pleased to know that I will not repeat those, Mr Deputy Speaker, because this is not a debate on the European Union Bill. I want to touch on issues other than the European Union because the Bill before us goes much wider, and there are other reasons why it should be opposed by Members.
Mr Harper
As my hon. Friend knows, I am here to set out clearly what the Government’s view is. I would never say, just because there may not be many Members present in the Chamber, that words spoken in this House are not heard far and wide. We should be very careful about what we say and should weigh our words carefully, particularly when speaking in a Chamber of a sovereign Parliament.
I hesitate to say this because I am sure that it will provoke my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, but I think it is worth saying that the Minister for Europe dealt with the issue of sovereignty in detail in relation to clause 18 of the European Union Bill in this House and in the European Scrutiny Committee. He said that the Government’s view was that an amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone tabled, which was similar to what is in this Bill, would have invited exactly the sort of speculative consideration by judges that my hon. Friend feared. It is the Government’s view that the approach in this Bill would make things worse rather than better.
Mr Cash
The problem for this Minister and the Minister for Europe is that the Bill is not in law and we are already being affected by the assertions of certain members of the Supreme Court that the sovereignty of Parliament is not absolute. If it were not for that, there would not be a problem. This is a recent development. It is precisely because of the Court’s assertions of judicial supremacy that we are required to retaliate and to make our position clear through a simple declaration such as that in clause 1, just to make it absolutely certain.
Mr Harper
The flaw in that argument is that to put into an Act of Parliament the language in clause 1 would invite exactly the problem that my hon. Friend is concerned about. Because it would be in a statute that judges would have to interpret, it would invite them to start defining “sovereignty” and interpreting what Parliament meant by the words in the Bill. I do not think that is very helpful.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Having studied the amendment, I trust that the Minister will not spend another 25 to 30 minutes going through all the stuff about the Electoral Commission. We want to get down to the real stuff.
Mr Harper
If my hon. Friend will allow me, I will make some progress.
The House of Lords has now asked us to consider the matter again, after voting to reinstate the original provisions. It is only right, therefore, that I briefly report the reasons that it gave for doing so, and explain why I do not believe that those reasons are sufficient to change the clearly expressed view of the House of Commons. First, though, let me deal briefly with the suggestion made by the Lords that it was necessary for this House to consider the issue again because we had not given it proper scrutiny.
The House of Commons has debated the issue of thresholds on a number of occasions, and has voted conclusively against the principle twice. We specifically considered the merit of Lord Rooker’s proposal. During the Lords debate, Lord Falconer suggested that I had misrepresented it, but I thought that I had made myself clear when I said that his amendment sought to make the referendum result indicative should turnout fall below 40%, rather than ruling out implementing the result altogether. My point was that this proposal is a threshold nevertheless, and I make no apology for making the case against it yesterday.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(13 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Harper
My hon. Friend makes what would be a good point if it were not for the coalition Government’s clear commitment to bring forward a draft Bill in the near future—early this year—to reform the other place. If we were not doing that, he would have a solid case, but given that we are proposing to do that, his case falls away and there is just a timing difference.
Mr Cash
Would my hon. Friend be interested to know that some of us are beginning to think, in the light of the forthright position that the House of Lords has taken on the threshold, which we will come to later in the debate, that that House may be more trusted by the electorate than those on the Government Benches?
Mr Harper
Mr Deputy Speaker, you would not expect me to be tempted to debate the threshold now, because we will come to it later. I do not agree with my hon. Friend. There is a good case for electing Members to the other place. He knows that the coalition Government have committed to a wholly or mainly elected House. We are in the process of drafting that legislation. From what he says, it is clear that he does not agree with that, but I know, Mr Deputy Speaker, that you do not want me to go into the case for or against House of Lords reform in this debate.
Mr Harper
I shall treat the first part of the hon. Gentleman’s remarks as political posturing and nonsense that have nothing to do with the Lords amendments. On his second point, I shall explain why I will be urging the House, in a consistent way, to take the same view on these matters that it took in Committee and on Report, whereas the hon. Gentleman, if those on his Front Bench follow suit, would seem to be demonstrating a bit of shameless opportunism.
Mr Harper
I am sorry; I did not quite understand my hon. Friend’s point. We debated and voted on his proposal on thresholds in this House, and it was defeated by 549 votes to 31—[Interruption.] Well, my hon. Friend should have another go, because I did not really follow the point he was making.
Mr Cash
This is an electoral reform proposal in which we are asking the electorate to decide in a referendum what they want to do. Does he not think it a little shameless that the question of whether that decision should be subjected to the 40% test should be decided by the House of Lords rather than by the House of Commons? Perhaps my hon. Friend can answer if I put it that way.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(14 years ago)
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Mr Cash
Absolutely. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. Furthermore, there was the motion of no confidence in the Callaghan Government in 1979, in which the numbers of votes were 310 against 311. The result of that vote may have been a matter of satisfaction for the Conservative party, but I am sure that it would not have been to others. However, if the two-thirds rule had been in operation, there would not have been a change in Government and that would have been a disaster for the country.
Mr Harper
I am listening very carefully to my hon. Friend. I think that he is confusing the two different processes in the Bill. There is provision for having an early election if the Government lose a vote of no confidence. That is by a simple majority, as now, and it is not changed. The other provision is an extra power for the House of Commons, which it does not have today, for two thirds of MPs to vote for an early election. We are not in any way, changing the ability of a Government to be held to account by having to have a simple majority.
Mr Cash
It is only because I have not completed my remarks that my hon. Friend’s intervention seems understandable. I do not dispute the fact that a vote of confidence by a majority of one would apply in the circumstances described in the clause, but—this is the other side of that equation—we then get into the question of the 14 days and the shenanigans that would follow with all the Whips and other people manoeuvring around to guarantee that the vote of confidence would be secured. We go back to my main point: it is the power of patronage of the Whips and the determined and ruthless exercise of that power that lies behind this proposal. That is my main objection to the whole thing irrespective of the fact that there is no mandate for these provisions from any political party.
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend has mentioned the 1979 example twice now. As I said, the Bill would not change the situation when there is a motion of no confidence in any way. If that position happened now—[Interruption.] If the Government lost a Division on such a motion by one vote, the situation would be the same, but the 14 days for the formation of a Government makes things different. Amendment 4, by removing the two thirds majority rule, would effectively mean that anyone who controls a majority in the House can have an election at will—it would effectively give back to the Prime Minister the power to dissolve the House whenever he chooses to do so in a perfectly open way. If my hon. Friend is happy with that, that is fine, but that is not our proposal.
Mr Cash
I understand to a degree where my hon. Friend is coming from, but I am afraid that I am not attacking that constitutional position. I do not believe it necessary to take the power to dissolve from the Prime Minister—that power is based, as it were, on his democratic mandate—and give it to the Whips to engage in their shenanigans in the 14 days following a no confidence motion, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn said.
Mr Harper
Will my hon. Friend make that clear? Is he saying that the intention of amendment 4 is to ensure that the Prime Minister retains the power to seek a Dissolution? I ask that because Opposition Members say that they are in favour of fixed-term Parliaments, albeit there is a debate over whether the term should be four or five years. My contention is that the Opposition’s support for amendment 4 effectively drives a coach and horses through their support for fixed-term Parliaments, because it would give the power to dissolve directly back to the Prime Minister.
Mr Cash
The Opposition’s thinking is not a matter for me. I happen to believe that our present constitutional arrangement should be sustained. It gives me no pleasure to know that the Opposition will vote with me on amendment 4. Their reasoning does not matter; what matters is the constitutional principle that I am advancing.
Mr Harper
I am simply participating in the debate. I cannot agree with the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) on his characterisation of the 1979 situation. The motion in March 1979 was not about giving vent to anything; it was very clearly about whether the House had confidence in Her Majesty’s Government. I assume that everyone who voted for it had a clear idea what would happen if it were carried. It was, and there were consequences. It states:
“That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”,
so I cannot believe that anyone was confused about what they were doing.
Mr Cash
I will now move on to the very question that is being discussed, which is motions of no confidence and what they really mean. There are various permutations, which are well described in the Library note, but the issue for me is basically this. In my belief—and according to the House’s tradition and its conventions, which are now to be overtaken by statute—a majority of one should remain. However, in that 14-day period, with shenanigans worthy of Lord Voldemort and the servants of the Dark Lord, an attempt would be made to keep in power a Government who had lost the confidence of the House of Commons—that is, the representatives of the electorate. That attempt would keep the Government on their feet, while the public would be left watching the spectacle of streams of members of the Cabinet and prospective members of the Cabinet from the Opposition parties striding up and down Whitehall, in and out of offices, all under the baleful influence of the Cabinet Secretary, as they tried to hatch yet another coalition agreement, no doubt based on very different principles from those for which the electorate had voted, in accordance with the parties’ respective manifestos or—dare I use the words?—their promises.
As to the question of what confidence motions actually are, they are various. In 1945 it was Churchill versus Attlee, and the Government won. Then there was Attlee against Churchill in 1952, and Gaitskell against Eden in 1956, when the Government won again. There was also Wilson against Heath in 1972, on the European Communities Act, when there was thought to be quite a lot of manoeuvring on the question of whether there had been a free vote or not. I will not go down that route now, but examples of where the Government have lost confidence motions include the Liberal Government of 1895, the Baldwin minority Conservative Government —note: minority Conservative Government—in 1924, the MacDonald Government in 1924, when there was again a Dissolution, and, of course, the famous Callaghan defeat by Thatcher, by 311 votes to 310.
Mr Harper
In a moment; let me first address the question I have just been asked.
Earlier in the debate, we had a conversation about motions that were not specifically in these terms, and several Members on the Government Benches referred to certain votes. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) referred to some votes on Europe and my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) talked about a vote on VAT on fuel. How the Government behaved after the debates on those motions was determined by Ministers, not the House.
Mr Harper
Excellent; that is an excellent step forward. [Interruption.] I shall take it as one.
Amendment 4 stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and was also signed by Opposition Members. Effectively, it drives a coach and horses through these entire provisions; the hon. Member for Foyle picked that point up very well. It is because we want to provide for fixed-term Parliaments that the Bill specifies that an early general election can be triggered only if there is a majority of at least two thirds. If it were possible to have an early general election by way of a motion that gains a simple majority, we all know that in most circumstances that would mean that we have given the power back to the Prime Minister. If he felt an early general election was in the interests of the governing party and that view was shared by the governing party, the motion would be passed and we would have a general election, and we would therefore not have fixed-term Parliaments.
I am not surprised that my hon. Friend has tabled this amendment as it is clear from his speech that he does not like the concept of fixed-term Parliaments at all, and that instead he is happy with our current arrangements, which he is entitled to be. However, given that the Opposition have said they are broadly in favour of fixed-term Parliaments—albeit for four years, not five—I cannot understand why they have supported the amendment because, as I have said, it drives a coach and horses through the entire proposition.
Mr Harper
Mr Hoyle, you are pointing out that we can discuss this at length when we get on to a later group of amendments. My view on the hon. Gentleman’s example is very clear: if the Prime Minister so wishes, he can cease being Prime Minister whenever he feels like it. The House could then see whether an alternative Government under a different leader could be formed—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda says not under this provision, but this provision is for an early election. The Prime Minister can cease being Prime Minister whenever the Prime Minister chooses and Her Majesty will then be able to send for an alternative person to form a new Government. That is not what the Bill is about. The Bill is about fixed-term Parliaments, not fixed-term Governments.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(14 years, 1 month ago)
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Mr Harper
The amendments moved by my hon. Friends seek to specify certain thresholds. They are very different, as has emerged from the debate. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) would impose a simple turnout threshold. At least 40% of those entitled to vote would have to cast a vote, or the result would not be valid.
I should take this opportunity to put my hon. Friend right on the form of the alternative vote system that we propose in the Bill. I do not know if he was present for the debates that we had on it. His concern, I think he said, was that people would be forced to vote for all the candidates on the ballot paper, and if they did not, their vote would not be valid. He referred to some parties for which people would not want to vote. I can reassure him—
Mr Harper
Okay, but under our system of optional preferential, we are not forcing anybody to vote for anyone. Voters can vote for one candidate, all the candidates or any number in between, so the form of the alternative vote that we are putting to the electorate next year does not raise any of the concerns that my hon. Friend touched on. I am sorry if I overstated his argument.
The reason we have not specified a threshold in the Bill is, as a number of hon. Members said, that we want to respect the will of the people who vote in the referendum, without any qualifications. The argument against my hon. Friend’s amendment is that specifying a threshold for voter turnout—on this I agree with the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg)—is that it makes every abstention effectively a no vote.
People may choose to abstain, but the amendment would create an incentive for people who favour a no vote to abstain. So people would not campaign, as they rightly should, for only yes or no votes in the referendum. We would have people campaigning actively for voters not to participate. We debated this a little on Second Reading, and as I said in my speech then, I do not think that is right. We need to encourage participation in the referendum. We want people to take part, and putting in a rule that encourages at least one side to campaign actively for voters not to take part would do our democracy a disservice.
I am not concerned as some colleagues are about what the turnout will be. As we have said in previous debates, both in Committee and in the House, there are elections for the devolved Administrations—for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly—but there are also elections scheduled next year for 81% of England. The percentage turnout in English local elections varies, but it is usually in the mid to high 30s at least. I am confident that with the additional publicity and the awareness of the referendum, and the fact that it is an important decision, we will indeed get a good turnout.
Previous referendums in this country have either had good turnouts or, where the turnouts have not been that high, they have produced decisive clear results from the electorate, so I do not share that concern. We should not go against our tradition and practice in this country by setting turnout thresholds.
Let me now focus on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing). She is right to say that it proposes a completely different, outcome-specific threshold. It is worth saying to colleagues on the Government Benches who support the Government’s proposals and respect the coalition agreement that my hon. Friend’s amendment is not compatible with what we set out in the coalition agreement, which was a simple majority referendum, without an outcome-specific threshold. Colleagues who are reconciled to a referendum being held should bear that in mind if they are tempted to vote for my hon. Friend’s amendment.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(14 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Harper
If I may say so, I think that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make debating points where there simply is none. He knows the proposals that we have set out, and appointing the counting officers has nothing to do, in essence, with the combination amendments, which we can debate next week. They will be tabled today, as I said in my letter. Members will therefore have a week to scrutinise them, and we can deal with that point next week.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Will my hon. Friend be good enough to give me an assurance on an important question relating to thresholds? He mentioned the issue in response to my concerns during earlier proceedings of the Bill, and he knows very well that the threshold is commonly regarded by anyone who knows anything about referendums, including about the Scotland Act 1998, as absolutely crucial—as fundamental to the question of how such legislation should operate. Will he assure me that the splurge of amendments before us has nothing to do with depositing the threshold proposals, which I and my hon. Friends the Members for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) and for Christchurch (Mr Chope) have put forward, at the bottom of the pile for discussion today? It looks highly likely that we will never reach them. Can my hon. Friend the Minister assure me that he is concerned to ensure that the threshold amendment is properly considered today?
Mr Harper
That is a very helpful intervention, because my hon. Friend will know that in the programme motion that I laid before the House last week we made provision for the House to sit until 11 o’clock this evening, which, notwithstanding Mr Speaker’s decision to allow an urgent question, means that the House will have more time today to debate those matters than it would have had if we had not tabled the motion. I am very keen to ensure that the House makes progress. That is not entirely in my hands—it depends on every Member ensuring that we can debate all these important matters—but I certainly want to reach that debate and will do my best from the Dispatch Box to ensure that we do.
Government amendment 262 mirrors the position for UK parliamentary and European elections and is necessary to ensure that counting officers and regional counting officers are suitably equipped to conduct the referendum poll.
Government amendment 270 provides that across the United Kingdom the polling stations allocated for the referendum will be the same as those allotted to electors for UK parliamentary elections. The amendment also provides that where special circumstances arise, the counting officer can allot different polling stations.
The Government have tabled amendments 168 and 169 at the request of the Electoral Commission. Paragraph 5 of the schedule gives the chief counting officer a power to direct regional counting officers and counting officers in the discharge of their functions at the referendum. The amendments clarify the extent of the power of direction and specify that it includes any planning and preparatory steps essential to the smooth running of the poll. That will enable the chief counting officer to require regional counting officers and counting officers to provide copies of plans, risk registers or other things that demonstrate that they are, or will be, discharging their functions in accordance with the chief counting officer’s directions. We believe that the amendments are necessary to enable the chief counting officer to prepare, plan and manage the poll effectively and to ensure compliance with any directions issued within the scope of her power.
Amendments 265 and 266 allow for the fees that are paid to counting officers and regional counting officers for delivering the referendum on the voting system to be reduced in circumstances where they fail to meet an adequate standard of performance.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Debate between Mark Harper and William Cash(14 years, 3 months ago)
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Mr Harper
As my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) said, in the last Parliament, when Conservative Members had the opportunity to discuss this matter, we did not vote against it. It is a very clear principle in the coalition agreement to have a fixed-term Parliament. All Members on the Opposition Benches—or at least in the main Opposition party—were elected on that principle. I am sure that they will support the Bill if there is a Division this evening.
The proposals this morning from my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House on the way we want to change the Sessions of this place to fit in with this Bill can, I am confident, be debated in Committee. We debated them a little earlier today and I think that the fact that the Chair allowed that debate to take place shows that they are in order and that we will be able to debate them in Committee.
Mr Harper
If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I want to make some progress.
On the subject of the date and combination of the elections, my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister made it clear that the Government draw a distinction between the coincidence of the referendum next year and parliamentary or Assembly elections—a combination that we think is perfectly justifiable when there is a simple yes-no decision—and the coincidence of elections to different Parliaments or Assemblies. He accepted that such elections were more complex and made it very clear that the Government will engage and continue to engage with devolved Administrations.
Mr Harper
I do not think that the hon. Gentleman can have it both ways. If I were to come out with specific proposals before we have discussed them in detail with representatives from the devolved Administrations and from those Assemblies and Parliaments, he would rightly criticise me for being high-handed. The Deputy Prime Minister has made it very clear that we want to solve this problem.
On the issue of not having consulted people in advance, however, I think it is right that, unlike what happened under the previous Government, proposals brought forward by the Government should be announced to this House first before they are discussed with others. That explains why we did not hold those discussions with others first.
On the issue of confidence and the mechanism for motions of confidence, a number of colleagues on both sides of the House seem to be a little confused about the present position. This Bill does not change the position in any way. The right hon. Member for Knowsley and my hon. Friends the Members for Epping Forest and for Christchurch (Mr Chope) all appeared to confuse to some extent our proposals on confidence and on Dissolution. It is very clear that, on confidence, we are not changing the position at all. The Government must have a simple majority in this House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Tewkesbury (Mr Robertson) worried about a change of Government without an election. That can happen now, so that is not a change. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) said that there was an automatic right for an election following the loss of a confidence vote. There is no such automatic right—that is a matter of judgment for Her Majesty the Queen.
Mr Cash
In the memorandum that my hon. Friend issued this afternoon, he effectively attacks the Clerk of the House when he says:
“Turning to the specific points raised by the memorandum: it contains a fundamental misunderstanding about the effect of the Bill on the rules and principles”,
and so on. Will he clarify something for me? On the jurisdiction of the courts, will he be good enough to spell out, as do the Parliament Acts, that none of the documents or procedures under the Bill should or could be questioned in any court of law? Will he bring forward an amendment to make sure that we get absolute symmetry between this Bill and article 9 of the Bill of Rights?
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend makes some very good points, but I do not think I will be able to do them justice in the four and a bit minutes remaining to me. I have placed in the Library a memorandum responding to the Clerk’s points, which Members can look at. We will deal with these issues—I am confident that my hon. Friend will raise them—in Committee.