Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Mark Garnier and Steve Baker

Thursday 23rd March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier]

My hon. Friend is right. Non-tariff barriers are incredibly disruptive to free trade, and we take that very seriously. We will be looking at our own system of trade remedies, but at the moment everything has been done through the European Union. We need to start engaging in that. To a certain extent, we have had conversations with other countries through the joint economic and trade committees, where we can deal with that.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

The Government will know that WTO rules are not something that we fall back on, but the ultimate foundation of all international trade. Will the Minister bear in mind the advice of Economists for Free Trade, which has said that a UK free trade policy could add 4% to GDP in the long term and reduce consumer prices by 8%?

[Mark Garnier]

Free trade is absolutely the key to giving prosperity to the world, including the UK—it is a huge benefit to developing nations, as well as developed nations. For consumers, there is the opportunity to have market choice, and therefore price choice, which can be incredibly helpful to the economy.

Charter for Budget Responsibility

Debate between Mark Garnier and Steve Baker

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Steve Baker]

I am well aware of that, but it was necessary in the context of the hideous mess left by the hon. Gentleman’s party. It is always the same and this is the essence of the problem: there is no kindness whatsoever in making to those in need attractive promises that subsequently cannot be kept. That is not kind; it is cruel.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. Does he agree that the chaos that could be brought about by a lack of fiscal discipline would result in huge uncertainty for public sector workers, who will not be able to rely on their jobs if balanced books are not maintained, because they will lose them? More importantly, for the thousands—possibly millions—of households across the country who were encouraged to pick up an extra £1 trillion-worth of household debt in the Brown bubble in the lead-up to the financial crisis, the uncertainty of unbalanced books could result in much higher interest rates and imported inflation as a result of reduced currency. An enormous amount of pressure would be put on those households as a result of chaos through ill-discipline.

[Steve Baker]

My hon. Friend is, of course, right. He and I sit on the Treasury Committee and we have heard from the Debt Management Office about the factors propping up the current level of borrowing. Not only has borrowing been back-stopped by the Bank of England, but bond market traders are aware of the Chancellor’s and the Government’s intention to balance the books, have confidence in it and, therefore, will keep lending to us. The situation, however, is precarious and the Labour party would put it in danger.

VAT cannot really go up. If it went up further, it would hit the poorest hardest and that would be wrong. On income tax, perhaps Labour would reduce the personal allowance. The truth is that the top 1% already pay a quarter of income tax. How much further can we go? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said that the 50p rate was pointless, I think—I will have to check whether that is what he said, but it is pointless. It is an act of spite to pretend that the rich will pay through their income tax; all they will do is adjust their behaviour. We put up capital gains tax and the revenues from it went down. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) has explained that in detail on his blog.

The truth is that the evidence shows that in this country there is a hard limit to how much the public will pay in taxation. Depending on how we measure GDP, it is somewhere between 35% and 40% of GDP. If we are committed to balancing the books, we have to take overall Government spending down to the level that people will pay in tax, and there is a historical limit.

Labour Members have been rather hysterical about the Government consumption chart, which shows us going back to the 1930s. This is about balancing the books. I believe that Labour Members want to put up capital spending, and debt interest is already forecast to overtake education spending. There is a really tough problem here. The truth is that hysterics on either side of the argument will not do. For example, wealth taxes will not work. Opposition Members seem to think we will get the rich to pay, but Denis Healey said of a wealth tax:

“I found it impossible to draft one which would yield enough revenue to be worth the administrative cost and political hassle.”

The truth is that there is very little chance of getting out of the mess we are in without taking extremely difficult decisions. Unlike turning around a commercial company, we cannot cut to the bone once and then build back up; reducing the deficit has to be taken gently, and we have done it at an appropriate pace. The Chancellor has the right plan, and I shall certainly back him tonight.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Mark Garnier and Steve Baker

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I add my congratulations to the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mike Thornton) on his maiden speech. I remember when I made my maiden speech: it was the most terrifying event of my life. If he continues with that masterful performance, the good people of Eastleigh will be very well represented in the years to come.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), who is no longer in his place. He started by talking about the members of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. As one of those members, it falls on me to pay tribute to the extraordinary work he has done in the past nine months or so, pulling together what is quite a tour de force.

At the heart of this debate lies the balance of interests within banks. Any commercial organisation—or, indeed, any bank—must balance the interests of its shareholders, the interests of its staff, and, importantly, the interests of its customers and the wider society at large. When those interests become unbalanced, we end up with problems. When staff are over-incentivised with bonuses, they will take greater risks at the expense of shareholders. When shareholders see stellar returns, they will fail to provide the governance oversight needed to protect the organisation. When looking after customers is seen as a tricky task in an ever-increasingly competitive world, the customer takes second place to proprietary trading, and is relegated to providing mere liquidity to help the proprietary traders. When those balances of interests become too skewed in favour of staff and shareholders, society loses out altogether, with the banking collapses and the bail-outs we saw, and which we are trying to avoid in the future.

One of the concerns that I have been wrestling with is that of over-regulating our banks. Can we, unwittingly, drive our banks to relocate offshore by supposedly over-regulating them? We need to look closely at the problem. What do we mean by relocating? In part, we are looking at banks changing their domicile, and in part we are looking at the moving of specific operations to different parts of the world. Those are two very different things, and it is important to make sure that we do not confuse them. Setting up a trading desk in Spain, for example, is decided by where the traders want to work. Moving a global bank to Singapore is a very different thing indeed.

First, these banks are huge. One has to asked oneself the question: who would want to have one of them located in their economy? If HSBC went to Singapore, its balance sheet would be over 1,000% of Singapore’s GDP. Not many countries can take a bank of that size, and, of those that could, do they have the same offering that we have here? There would be no question whatever of any implicit guarantee. London offers some key elements that banks need: we speak English, we are in the centre of the global time zone, we have a transparent and well-tested legal system, and, importantly, we have what amounts to a relatively good regulatory system. All those points are absolutely key.

The banks benefit from an implicit guarantee—valued at between £10 billion and £40 billion, depending on where we are in the cycle—that comes as a result of the expectation that the British Government would stand behind a failing bank in exactly the same way that we saw in 2007 and 2008.

[Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I am glad that my hon. Friend raises that point. Does he agree that if we subsidise anything, we get more of it, and that this actually subsidises risk taking?

[Mark Garnier]

Yes, it does, absolutely. I am going to develop that point in a second, if my hon. Friend will bear with me. We need to get rid of this implicit guarantee for exactly that reason and in order to encourage competition, because competition requires a guarantee for all banks, not just the big banks.

If we combined a transparent legal system with a robust and secure regulatory regime, international capital would come to this country—because of that security—and because capital would trust the UK’s legal and regulatory system, it would be prepared to take a slightly lower return. London would provide an environment in which the cost of funding for banks would be lower. That cheaper funding, as a result of regulatory security, should replace the banks’ implicit guarantee and thus result in a lower cost of capital. As a result of that cheaper funding cost, which is reliant on good regulation, we should not fear banks relocating when we introduce regulatory reform. They might complain, but they will ultimately thank us for the strongest regulatory regime in the world.

That also depends, however, on how the Government take forward the Bill. The Banking Commission has made its early recommendations, and the Government have responded. As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, we are grateful to the Government for listening to some of our recommendations, but they could pay more attention to certain other areas. We want a leverage ratio set at 4% by the Financial Policy Committee, a full reserve power for full industry-wide separation and regular reviews of the effectiveness of the ring fence in order to ensure the most effective and secure regulatory regime in the world. By winning the race to the top, we will ensure cheaper capital funding for our banks and help to preserve our country’s lead position in the financial world.

I turn to the thorny issue of proprietary trading. The term “casino banks” was coined by someone at a time when I suspect they were keener to play to the gallery than necessarily to address the serious issue of what investment banks actually do. It is important to remember that investment banks raise huge amounts of debt and equity capital, generating thousands, if not millions, of jobs in the UK and around the world in commerce and industry—jobs that create wealth and tax receipts for this country—but there is an element within investment banks of proprietary trading. The important thing is to define proprietary trading. Every bank that makes a loan makes it on a proprietary basis, but no one would want to prevent banks from doing that—it is the key to what they do. Pure proprietary trading, however, for the sole purpose of enhancing shareholder returns—with no benefit to the customer or society—has no place in our banks. It fails the balance of interest test and is incredibly difficult to define.

We can recognise the evil type of proprietary trading when we see it, but let us take market marking, for example. It provides a service to customers and liquidity to the markets, and so passes the balance of interest test, but at what point does a residual position on a trading book stop being that which is left over from normal market making activities and start being deliberate directional betting? That inability easily to distinguish between one and the other leads me to believe that, although a Volcker rule would probably be desirable, it would be too difficult to impose in a meaningful way. That is why, reluctantly, I come down on the side of not banning pure proprietary trading. If the Vickers proposals that the Bill implements seek to put a ring fence around the deer park, does it matter what type of predator is kept outside? The consumer will be protected from both the wolves of market makers and the tigers of proprietary trading.

Much of the commission’s work has looked at competition. With a handful of super-huge banks dominating the market, competition is tricky. Long before the commission was set up, however, I spent much time meeting smaller banks, including challenger banks, and those seeking to win new banking licences. It was clear that there was a huge problem with banks being too small to start—the regulatory hurdles facing small banks, such as licence applications and ongoing supervision, distorted the market in favour of the big banks—but the FSA has responded to pressure and had a change of heart. The regulator is moving in the right direction, and I am grateful to the FSA for taking heed of our warnings about new banking application processes and the treatment of asset risk weightings on the balance sheet. The regulator is moving towards greater opportunity for small banks in terms of regulation, which is very important.

There is also the thorny issue of account switching. Later this year, the seven-day switching programme, which is a significant step forward, will be put in place. I strongly believe, however, that the ultimate goal has to be full account number portability. VocaLink, which provides the payment system services, is considering doing for banks what the telecoms regulator did for mobile phones, and it is making good progress. My hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) has done a lot of work on this subject, and for four reasons her proposals for full portability are right: first, it will ensure greater competition, as I am sure we will hear later; secondly, the financial system will be more transparent and so provide greater oversight for the FPC, which is charged with ensuring stability in the financial system; thirdly, in the event of a collapsing bank, full portability will make bank resolution far easier and cheaper; and finally, the legacy IT systems in many banks have their foundations in the ’50s and ’60s, with the punch-card system. At some point, the banks will have to massively update their systems, and combining everything makes huge economic sense.

What is the point of banks? Why are we so keen to reform them? Those questions are crucial to the whole debate. Clearly, people need a safe place to deposit their money, to manage their finances and to plan for the future, but banks also provide an incredibly important social and economic function. There has yet to be devised a better way of taking money from where it has accumulated and distributing it to where it is needed. Successful investors and business men need a way to get their money to where it will work for them, and those with an idea but no cash need to be introduced to investors with surplus funds. So far, banks have done that job better than anyone else. No matter what we say, they have a fantastic distribution network, which we must utilise to the fullest extent.