All 1 Debates between Mark Garnier and Mark Lazarowicz

Interest Rate Swap Derivatives

Debate between Mark Garnier and Mark Lazarowicz
Thursday 24th October 2013

(11 years, 1 month ago)

Commons Chamber
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Mark Garnier Portrait Mark Garnier
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My hon. Friend is absolutely right in what he says. The banks made an incredibly cynical effort to persuade people to enter into these contracts where, in many instances, they should not have done so. Sometimes it was the right thing to do, and I think that many businesses will agree that they just got it wrong, but we need to look after the smaller businesses that were simply mis-sold these products.

Mark Lazarowicz Portrait Mark Lazarowicz
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Do not the banks, or at least some of them, also have to be much more proactive in identifying the people who been the business victims of this practice? As we all know, whenever we have a debate such as this, more people come forward who were frightened to come forward before or who did not even realise that they were victims of these schemes. It is up to the banks to be much more proactive in identifying the cases and then trying to resolve them.

Mark Garnier Portrait Mark Garnier
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That is absolutely right. Part of the problem, however, is that the banks have an incentive not to get in touch with people, for obvious reasons. That relates to the second point I wish to develop. It is a technical point, but it is incredibly important in terms of why it is incentivising banks to delay technical redress for as long as they can, and it has implications for the financial stability of the banks.

We should not think of these things as stand-alone products, but should recognise them for what they are. They are not stand-alone products; there is another side of this trade. They are swaps for a reason, and it is important to understand what a swap is. Any one of our victims will have been persuaded to take out a contract with the bank that has the beneficial effect of capping interest rate payments at a certain level. That is a virtuous thing and we are all familiar with the financial planning behind the thought process, through things such as fixed-rate mortgages. But these are not fixed-rate mortgages; they are stand-alone products that relate to a loan, but are not part of that loan. Importantly, many people have paid off the loan but still have the outstanding liability on the swap. The quid pro quo of having a fixed cap on interest payments is the collar that has caused so many problems for our victims, whereby they have to pay a relatively high rate of interest in today’s terms. What is not fully understood is that this is not a simple contract with the bank, as it first appears. The bank is not taking a naked bet with its customers that, in the environment of falling interest rates, it has won. It is not receiving as profit the penalty in the increased premiums being paid in interest rates by the victim, because for a swap to actually be a swap, there is a matching trade with a third party on the other side. What the banks receive in higher interest rate payments they are paying to an opposing and third-party counterpart on the other side.

I shall now go into a bit more detail. Businesses may want to make sure that they do not pay too high an interest rate; that is why they are persuaded, rightly or wrongly, to take the swaps. However, an organisation such as a pension fund needs to guarantee its income should a severe drop in interest rates, such as we have seen, occur. It would want to take a position opposite that of the businesses, which are the victims.

The pension fund will forgo a rise in rates while winning the guaranteed floor rate that it will receive. For a business to have a rate cap at, say, 7%, it will guarantee to pay no less than 5%. For a pension fund to be guaranteed to receive a minimum payment of 5%, it would agree to receive no more than 7%. In that way, the business’s and pension fund’s interests are perfectly aligned in opposition.

As both the pension fund and business are clients of the bank, the bank does two simultaneous trades—one with the business, to cap and collar the rate payments, and the other with the pension fund, to collar and cap the interest rate receipts. The bank makes a small margin, but essentially its liability, if everything stands up, is perfectly and oppositely aligned. That is the symmetry of liability and the basis of the swap market.