International Immunities and Privileges

Debate between Mark Francois and James Cartlidge

Wednesday 24th July 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his question, but I do not regard it as a strange partnership. All my experience of dealing with GCAP and meeting my Italian and Japanese counterparts, particularly industry representatives from all three countries, and working so closely together—there is already so much work going on—tells me that this is about developing a brilliant platform that is needed by all three nations. There will always be a multiplicity of platforms from different countries, which I think is perfectly healthy. What is good about the hon. Gentleman’s question is that he has opened up the debate about sovereign capability, which I will come to shortly. I just wanted to finish my point about the uncrewed domain, and what it means to be sixth-generation.

[Mr Francois]

Before my hon. Friend does so, would he give way very briefly?

[James Cartlidge]

Of course—it is a pleasure.

[Mr Francois]

My hon. Friend was a very good Defence Procurement Minister, and we on the Committee liked him because, crikey, he actually answered the questions. He will know from that experience that even the Americans, who have a new thing called the next generation air dominance fighter, are struggling to afford it; there have been media reports in the US that they may even cancel that programme, because even the Americans cannot afford to do everything unilaterally anymore. In the light of that, does my hon. Friend believe that a three-way programme represents good value for money?

[James Cartlidge]

My right hon. Friend, who not only served on the Committee but was an Armed Forces Minister, makes an excellent point. There are those who argue that we should go beyond 2.5%; I would argue that 2.5% is still a significant jump for this country. We had a funded plan, and that 2.5%—crucially and critically, with the pathway we set out, which became an accumulation of significant additional billions of pounds for the MOD—enabled us to afford GCAP and stabilise that programme.

I want to make one crucial point about the uncrewed domain. To be frank, for the uncrewed side of the Navy, Army and Air Force, those programmes are not funded: hitherto, the funding has come primarily from support for Ukraine. That is entirely logical because, under the defence drone strategy, we were very clear that there is no point in the Army, for example, ordering large-scale drones now; it might order them to train with, but the technology is changing so fast. What we as a country need to build, as I set out in the drone strategy, is the ecosystem to develop those drones, and we are doing that.

I have always said—I said it during my statement on the integrated procurement model—that my most inspiring moment as Defence Procurement Minister was visiting a UK SME that was building a drone for use in Ukraine. It was a highly capable platform, but brilliantly, it was getting feedback and spiralling it—as we call it—the very next day. On GCAP, it should be a technology for the whole of defence—it should be a pan-defence technology of how we team with uncrewed systems, how the Navy fights with an uncrewed fleet above and below the surface, for the Army and of course for the Air Force.

I have two final points on military capability, as a couple of points have been floating around in the press. The first is that the Army is putting out its opposition to GCAP. I find that idea impossible to believe. Of course, if the Army wants to succeed, it needs the support of the Air Force and so on. That is why an integrated approach to procurement is so important, not single service competition. There has also been the point that we should choose between GCAP and AUKUS, as if, when the next war comes, the Russians will step into our dressing room and ask if we would like to bowl or bat: would we like to fight on land or sea—what is our preference? The fact is that we do not know where the threat will come from, but we know that it is growing, so we should support both GCAP and AUKUS, not least for the enormous economic benefit they bring.

You will be pleased to know, Mr Speaker, that that brings me to the last part of my speech, on the economic benefits of GCAP. There are those who say we should buy off the shelf. We would stress how, in a state of ever greater war readiness, it pays to have operational independence and sovereignty. In particular, investing in the great tradition of UK combat air offers huge economic gains for every part of the country.

In 2020, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that the Tempest programme alone would support an average of 20,000 jobs every year from 2026 until 2050. Those are well-paid jobs in every constituency up and down the country—including many in Lancashire, as you will know, Mr Speaker. Scrapping GCAP would hit our economy hard. Even delaying or deferring GCAP expenditure would undermine our brilliant aerospace industry, which was on display this past week at the Royal International Air Tattoo in Farnborough, and cast doubt over the vast sums of private investment that are waiting, from which hundreds of UK SMEs stand to benefit.

An interesting point was raised by the Leader of the Opposition when asking the Prime Minister about exports and discussions with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is an incredibly important point. I was clear that, in reforming procurement, we have to have exportability at the heart of it because otherwise industrial supply chains wither. It is as simple as that. The demand from this country is not big enough. This has been the French lesson for many years, which is why they have put so much effort into export, and we need to do the same—whether it is GCAP, or any other platforms or capability manufactured by the United Kingdom.

To undermine GCAP is to undermine our economy, our future war-fighting capability and relations with our closest international partners. The Government should instead embrace GCAP wholeheartedly and confirm that they stand by their previous position of steadfast support. Then they should commit to a clear timetable on 2.5%, so that we can turbocharge the programme by investing not only in the core platform, but in the associated technology of autonomous collaboration and a digital system of systems approach, enabling the mass and rapid absorption of battlespace data.

To conclude, the best way to win the next war is to deter it from happening in the first place. Part of our overall deterrence posture is to signal to our adversaries our preparedness to always be ready to out-compete their technology. How can we send that deterrent signal if we have such mixed messages on our largest conventional military programme? We support this statutory instrument, we support GCAP and we support the powerful gains it will give to the United Kingdom’s economic and military strength.