Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Mark Field and William Cash

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

Provided evidence to those who will be making decisions about terrorism-related activities. It is not just about providing evidence to the court, which I think is implicit in what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting; it is about providing evidence about the facts described in the amendment. It is not necessary for the case to go to court, and the amendment leaves out the word “reasonable” in this context for that reason. If the Home Secretary provides evidence that is based on the person in question having repudiated their allegiance to the United Kingdom, and if that person has provided evidence of their allegiance to the new state by virtue of their actions and statements, that is enough in itself. That individual has done those things, and that is the evidence in question.

The legislative framework of this measure has already been mentioned, and I say to the Minister and my colleagues—some of whom I thoroughly disagree with on these matters—that it will be extremely difficult to exclude the operation of the charter of fundamental rights in applications of the kind likely to arise under the Bill. That is a serious problem because it will mean that under sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, the charter of fundamental rights will apply. That has already been made applicable—the European Scrutiny Committee has established that without a shadow of doubt, over and against the continuing belief, which has now been abandoned, that that charter does not apply to the United Kingdom. The charter of fundamental rights will apply, as will the Human Rights Act 1998. In those circumstances, the question of whether decisions will be taken by the British courts is a matter of extremely grave doubt; in fact, I would go further and say it is an impossibility. On the basis that the charter of fundamental rights does apply, if a decision were to go to the courts as in the Opposition amendments, it would be decided by the European Court of Justice under matters covered by the charter. That is a fatal objection. If the measure were to be carried out notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972 it would be another story, but that is not what the amendments would do.

In conclusion, these are grave issues with great sensitivities, beliefs, convictions and principles at stake. There is an honest disagreement, to say the least, between myself and other Conservative colleagues, and I think we should put the British subject first, by which I mean those liable to be affected by jihadist atrocities, and not put forward the generalised view that the human rights lobby would prefer. This matter is too serious and too dangerous. It is not just about allegiance in its own right, but about a physical danger to the British public.

[Mark Field]

Unlike many of my colleagues I am more sympathetic to the Government’s position than others, although I respect the deep concerns felt across the House about broad issues of civil liberties. I have less concern about the temporary exclusion order being down to Executive authority, and in many ways the accountability of any Minister to come to the House and justify their actions counts for quite a lot.

The right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) referred to the protection only of judicial review. If it were still down to old-fashioned Wednesbury principles I could accept that, but judicial review is now a rather broader body of law than was perhaps the case in the 1940s. It is now pretty substantial, which provides enough comfort—at least to my mind—for us to go down that route, rather than requiring the oversight that would come through David Anderson QC.

EU Reform

Debate between Mark Field and William Cash

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure, Mr Robertson, to serve under your chairmanship. In 1997, shortly after the Maastricht rebellion, Thomas Kielinger of Die Welt wrote a pamphlet entitled “Crossroads and Roundabouts” about Germany and the United Kingdom in Europe—the contrast between the German vision of Europe and the UK’s commitment to its Parliament and its own national interest. We have done the roundabout; now we are truly at the crossroads of the EU and perhaps even of our relationship with Germany. Is it really the case that in this country we are disproportionately preoccupied with our own national concerns?

I am introducing this debate about the UK and Germany in the EU—the first devoted specifically to the subject, I think—about which, in the interests of our mutual relationship, we must be both realistic and straight with each other, as we were yesterday in discussions with the Bundestag European affairs committee.

I warned John Major before Maastricht that the treaty, which I urged him to veto, would lead to a European Government and a German Europe. I campaigned for a referendum on that and the petition to Parliament received many hundreds of thousands of signatures. In my book of that time, “Against a Federal Europe”, I wrote:

“The answer to the German question lies primarily in Germany itself and that to hand her the key to the legal structure of Europe with a majority voting system gravitating around alliances dependent on Germany simply hands her legitimate power on a plate.”

That is now becoming clearer by the day. I also wrote then:

“Britain wants to work together with Germany in a fair and balanced relationship, based on free trade, cooperation and democratic principles. She does not want to be forced into a legal structure dominated by her. Plans for a united Europe stray into the darkest political territory, and must be firmly rejected.”

I wrote that in 1991. In 1990, I had written that

“if Germany needs to be contained, the Germans must do it themselves…now is the time for the Germans to prove themselves”.

In the words of the German philosopher, Thomas Mann, in 1953:

“We do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany.”

I argued that we were embarking on

“a European Germany and a German Europe”

because the two ran together after Maastricht. As Bismarck himself said:

“I have always found the word ‘Europe’ on the lips of those politicians who wanted something from other Powers which they dared not demand in their own names.”

He meant their own national interests. It is also to be recalled that, as Friedrich Karl von Moser stated:

“Each nation has its main characteristic. In Germany it is obedience. In England it is liberty.”

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

My hon. Friend and I have talked many times about these matters, for obvious reasons. Does he accept that a British exit from the European Union would be the single most likely thing to provide the German dominance of Europe to which he refers? Is it not very much within the modern German mentality to see the European Union as a way of containing elements of some chapters of their history—of which, understandably, they are not proud? They see a strong European Union as being the way in which the dominance of Germany can be kept at bay.

[Sir William Cash]

I understand that point and my hon. Friend has made it to me before. All I can say is that it depends on the structure being created and the irreversibility established by the treaties themselves as put into legislation. As I shall explain in a moment, the consequence of the existing structure is to create an imbalance in favour of Germany and a disadvantage for the United Kingdom in several areas. That is what we must evaluate because we want a peaceful and stable Europe; unfortunately, however, what is happening now is creating instability, and I believe the European Union as it was conceived will ultimately be undermined. Our parliamentary system is the bulwark of the liberty and democracy that saved us and Europe. That is no anachronism today.

The problem we now face in an increasingly assertive German Europe is one increasingly at odds with British national interests. For me, that was one of the mainsprings of the Maastricht rebellion and it has been exacerbated by successive treaties, including Lisbon—against which, notably, the Conservative party was united.

The situation is getting worse. For example, we are told that the single market is the prime reason, or certainly one of the prime reasons, for our engagement in the European project. Although more than 40% of our trade is with Europe, our trade deficit with the other 27 member states is £56 billion, whereas the German surplus with the same member states is £51.8 billion. At the same time, we have a substantial surplus with the rest of the world with the same goods and services. I fundamentally disagree with the CBI’s analysis.

A host of individual problems give rise to concern—for example, the regulatory system in the City of London. I wrote about that in the Financial Times, warning the City against the consequences, and we have lost case after case in the European Court of Justice. There is the ports regulation, opposed by port employers and the trade unions. There is the change in the patent courts system. There is the lack of a reciprocal policy of liberalisation in relation to energy, professional services and other matters. There is over-regulation, particularly of small businesses, on which no substantial progress is ever made, and which is calculated to cost about 4% of EU GDP.

The effect on our economy is deep. Our growth is being dragged down by the sclerotic eurozone, whose problems in many countries, such as Italy and Greece, are blamed on German currency and export manipulation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

The short answer is that in the German constitution, in the preamble to the Basic Law of 1949, an assumption is built in for a united states of Europe. Unfortunately, therefore, a change in the German constitution would be required to enable the Karlsruhe court to override the provisions of the Basic Law. Therefore, Germany faces a real constitutional question that we do not, because we do not have a written constitution and we have the inherent right, within our own Parliament, to make the kind of adjustments that we want in this area.

To refuse to accept our Committee’s proposals—I say this with great respect to the Minister—is not merely walking away; it is not even engaging with the real problem, which is the dysfunctional structure created by successive treaties and the disadvantages that that creates for the United Kingdom.

All that demands a direct return to democratic accountability at Westminster—not the Maastricht-based co-decision with the European Parliament, which I opposed at the time, and not the manner in which the majority voting system and the so-called consensus have led to us being put at significant disadvantage from time to time in matters of our national interest. Those are increasingly becoming a matter of concern following the change in the voting system as of 1 November.

[Mark Field]

Does my hon. Friend not accept that many in continental Europe would say that Britain has a permanent exclusion from the single currency, is not signed up to the Schengen agreement, and in fact, under Maastricht, was also exempt from the social chapter, although that exemption has now gone? He talked about the fiscal compact, which technically speaking was not a veto, but essentially was done at eurozone level.

If we are going to continue to opt out, does my hon. Friend not recognise the concern that, as we become ever more marginalised from the centre of Europe, the case for staying in the European Union will become ever weaker? Is that the path down which he now wishes to take us, and if so—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

We are all indebted to my hon. Friend for his time in the Ministry of Defence. What he said is well known to me, but ought to be better known outside the House. This is crucial. The question, whether we have an EU military headquarters moves us into very dangerous territory. I will show my hon. Friend the full transcript of the exchanges between me and the German delegation on this matter. I do not have time to go into it now, but I can assure him that I set out some very powerful arguments, including by making reference to article III of the 1990 treaty, which dealt with the question of the restrictions on Germany in relation to the manufacture and distribution of nuclear weapons, which went back to the original NATO treaty of 1949. Also, of course, I mentioned in particular the role of NATO in relation, for example, to the Baltic states and the rest of it. NATO is there; it is the cornerstone, as my hon. Friend rightly says.

[Mark Field]

I very much agree with what my hon. Friend has said and with the intervention by our hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), but does he not think that we would be greatly assisted in making the case for ensuring that there is no change in the European defence mechanism if we honoured our own commitments to ensure that at least 2% of our GDP is spent on defence and, given the insecurities of this world, rather more in the years to come?

[Sir William Cash]

I very much agree with that. Of course, there is this wave of counter-cyclical agreement and disagreement between my hon. Friend and me. Actually, that is encapsulated in a personal matter. We were, through our respective families, involved in the battles in Normandy, which I will not go into now, but which he knows about and I know about and which were extremely poignant and extremely relevant to what went on at that time.

[Mark Field]

My hon. Friend is far too modest to go into great detail or perhaps did not want to embarrass me, but I should point out that although his father served in the British Army, my great-uncle was serving in the Panzer regiment for the opposite side during that particular battle.

[Sir William Cash]

That was on 10 July 1944. My father got the military cross, and my hon. Friend’s great-uncle was on the other side, but there we are.

We must also—this is very delicate territory—remain clear that the United States, which has for more than 50 years impressed on the United Kingdom the importance of a more integrated Europe, must not be allowed to persuade us against our national interest in relation to the question of defence. However, this is not by any means only about defence. As I have explained, it is also about our economy and our trading relationships, which are punctuated by constant tensions embedded in our European relationship that, to a greater or lesser degree, are based on our alleged obligations under European law.

Most recently there was the budget surcharge issue, but there are also disputed areas of policy such as the European arrest warrant and, of course, the current wave of concern over immigration and freedom of movement, on which we are warned against infringing European law and on which we had very interesting exchanges with the Bundestag’s European affairs committee yesterday. It takes the view that one has to distinguish between workers and people, and that it is our fault that we have ended up where we are now, but as the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), heard me say last night, of course we believe that that was the consequence of decisions taken by the former Labour Government. But there we are.

It must be said, however, that the European rule of law is itself a moveable feast at the whim of certain states. For example, in 2003, Germany and France themselves broke the stability and growth pact with impunity when it suited them. We are currently reminded by a proliferation of articles and books about the collapse of the Berlin wall that the German question, and its embodiment in European and our own and their political history, remains a constant national interest. In fact, very rarely do we talk about Germany in this country, but in Germany and in France they talk about it almost incessantly. Indeed, I recall taking part in a debate on the future of Europe in the then dilapidated Reichstag when the Berlin wall was still up, and putting my hand against the wall itself, and I recall a member of the German delegation vigorously waving his arms as I heard him through the Bakelite headphones vociferously remonstrating that, as he put it,

“my heart and soul rages with fervour and passion at the thought of a single government and a single parliament in this Reichstag.”

I warned the meeting that such language would merely rekindle old tensions—and that was before the wall came down.

As Peter Watson, who rightly reminds us in his book “The German Genius” about the great contribution of Germany to industry and art, said in a book review last week,

“no one has yet succeeded in explaining the collapse into barbarism that followed the First World War.”

I would add that nor has sufficient attention been given to the question of how to deal with a European Union—created to avoid everything that had happened in the aftermath of the first and second world wars—dominated, as it now is, by a peaceful but assertive Germany, based on a framework delivering supposedly irreversible policies that have delivered instability throughout Europe and vitally affected our own economy, our national interest and Westminster democratic accountability. Insufficient attention has been given to how we deal with that problem, and it is not just for us but for all the European member states, and Germany in particular.

Furthermore, far from containing German domination of the EU, the treaties have stimulated it. For all the protestations, the European Union has morphed into an increasingly undemocratic Europe, with Britain unacceptably relegated to the second tier and with Germany largely predominant over the whole, as well as the low-growth eurozone.

The Prime Minister was entirely right to state in his Bloomberg speech:

“Our national Parliament is the root of our democracy.”

We must address the question of a fundamental change in our relationship with the EU and the reassertion of sovereignty at Westminster and in our democracy. Those are the reasons why we were able to prevail in the dark days from 1940 to 1945, and we must not underestimate their importance today. Now we must do so again on those principles, but in very different circumstances. It is not enough merely to reform at the margins. We must resolve the European, and therefore the German, question in our own time. If negotiations for that purpose, above all else, cannot be resolved, we must leave the treaties and lead Europe on the right road to stability and peace, both for ourselves and for Europe—including Germany—as a whole. We must be, as Churchill said, “associated, but not absorbed.” For that purpose, we must pursue a policy of an association of nation states.

The Prime Minister’s purported renegotiations do not, at present, tackle the fundamental structural question of the treaties. The Foreign Secretary is right to indicate that we must never go into a negotiation unless we are prepared to get up from the table and walk away, but it is essential that we are told what our red lines are, and that they address the fundamental changes that we need within the EU. Immigration is, of course, a major issue, but the question of our borders is not simply a question of immigration. It is a question of parliamentary democracy and jurisdiction, and therefore it is about more than the symptoms of our problems with European integration and its impact on our entire political and economic national interest. Trade alone is not the arbiter of freedom and democracy; it flows from them, as do the laws that affect our economy and that have been so disadvantageous to us, as I have indicated already, in many areas.

The renegotiations cannot be successful in our national interest without a fundamental change in the architecture of the European Union. If we do not renegotiate and achieve such fundamental change, Germany’s predominance in the project will increase and the United Kingdom will be required to leave the EU. We must not be continually subjected and subordinated to being in the second tier of a two-tier Europe.

We are now at an historic moment at the crossroads of the European Union, which can be evaluated only on a broad historical landscape. I voted yes in 1975, and I attempted to reserve our Westminster sovereignty in the Single European Act in 1986. Maastricht and European Government changed all that. Britain and Germany have historically had, and still have, very different visions of Europe. We look to our borders, and Germany looks towards a broad, roaming European vision—a political union without borders.

Not so long ago, I referred in the book I mentioned, “Against a Federal Europe”, to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was Foreign Minister of Germany for 15 years and was one of the most powerful architects of reunification and the current European Union. Although he repudiated his former loyalties, Genscher stated:

“We Germans can be the architects of a united and indivisible Europe”

and that a strong Germany was good for Europe. In my analysis in 1999, from which I do not demur, I said that the assertion of a strong Germany being good for Europe

“begs many questions. Germany’s economic strength derives from the fact that she saturates the EC”—

as it was then—

“and Eastern Europe with her exports; if as seems likely, she consolidates this position via the single market, while gaining de facto control of the single currency, one could well envisage a scenario in which a strong Germany was bad for Europe. If industries in other countries were weakened or depleted by German domination and if the single currency removed the competitiveness of weaker economies, while the social charter…insulated German workers from competitively low wages abroad, then one could well imagine economic decline and rising unemployment on the periphery of the EC financing the German stranglehold.”

Who would argue today that that has not happened? I noted that at the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin wall, when Dr Michael Stürmer was asked on “Newsnight” how Germany had achieved such predominance, he indicated that it was “by default”. I reserve judgement on that.

Furthermore, we are not simply talking about Germany’s economic impact on other member states, whatever subsidies or defensive alliance through NATO they may receive in return. As I have said, the preamble to the German Basic Law of 1949 includes a policy leading to a United States of Europe as one of the constitutional foreign policy goals of Germany. As all those factors have aggregated, it has become ever more important for the United Kingdom to look to its own future. To that we must turn our determined attention, while seeking peaceful co-operation and trading relationships within Europe and with Germany. There will be no peace in an unstable Europe, which will implode with disastrous consequences. Such instability is inherent in the imbalanced structure of the whole, not only of the eurozone. We all want peace in Europe, but to ensure such peace we must restructure the treaties, not simply tinker with them.

We must clearly put this to Germany and the EU as a whole. The United Kingdom cannot and must not allow our democracy, in this Parliament, from which all political and economic action flows and which has saved Europe and herself for generations, to be in any way compromised. As William Pitt stated in his Guildhall speech in 1805:

“England has saved herself by her exertions and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example.”