Intelligence and Security Committee

Mark Field Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

Although we accept that some radical change is clearly overdue, which will, we hope, be put in place, and accept that the change will be fluid because of the fluid international world in which we live, will my right hon. and learned Friend reiterate the importance of remembering that there will always be a need for certain information to remain secret? We do not want to throw everything out with the bathwater. There will always be a need for certain things to remain secret, even within this transparent 24/7 media world.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Yes, there are crucial requirements and anyone will understand why that is the case. The identity of intelligence officers can never be revealed. If it were, not only would they not be able to carry out their proper responsibilities but their very physical safety would be in danger. Intelligence operations and the ways in which intelligence is obtained, processed and dealt with should not become public knowledge. If they were, they would be available to our enemies and would cease to be available in that way in future. There would be no benefit in having intelligence agencies unless that fundamental secrecy applied—that covers all the areas that are relevant to the operational work they do and the benefits they provide for our society.

In the years since the end of the cold war, we have had the 7/7 bombings in London, which were very traumatic. Those terrible actions led to some deep soul-searching within the security and intelligence agencies. The perpetrators were British citizens who had been born in this country, but the agencies had not anticipated that event. In addition, there are problems with nuclear proliferation and cyber attacks, which might be aimed at Governments but cover a wide range of economic intelligence that is sought by foreign Governments and industrial interests. That is a matter of great significance.

Those new demands led the intelligence agencies to operate rather differently, which is a welcome development. The most significant point is that the intelligence agencies now work together far more than ever before. If one went to GCHQ on any day of the week one would probably find officials from the Secret Intelligence Service who had been seconded there for a significant period. The same would apply to the SIS and to each of the agencies in reverse. That is happening not because of some doctrinal view but because of the practical requirements of getting the best use of intelligence in this modern world and ensuring maximum public benefit. It is not too dissimilar to the way in which the Navy, Army and Air Force have increasingly realised that operations will involve all those services, or two of the three services, with joint activity becoming the norm rather than the exception.

The other big change, which I very much welcome, as does the Committee, has been the creation of the National Security Council. Not only does it provide an opportunity in general terms for strategic thinking, strategic planning and proper consideration under the Prime Minister, but for the first time the heads of the intelligence agencies attend meetings as of right and are able to ensure not only that they hear what is being said but that the intelligence they are providing is much more easily fitted into the requirements of Government so that the practical benefits of the intelligence is of much greater value.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I certainly agree that serious issues came to prominence during those years, some of which were the responsibility of the agencies and some of which were more the responsibility of government. However, I think we should get this into perspective. So far as I am aware, not a single British intelligence officer has ever been accused of personally being involved in water-boarding, torture or maltreatment of an individual. The issue—and it is a very serious issue—is whether they were aware of those matters and whether they might indirectly have colluded in such activity. I do not wish to diminish the seriousness of these matters but it is very important to make that point and get things into perspective because the same is not true of many other countries around the world. That is an important point that has to be made.

I want to speak briefly about four points in the report and then say something about the issues in the Green Paper, particularly about what is called the control principle, with regard to the handling of intelligence. Finally, I shall address the reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I shall try not to detain the House too long. The first of the four points in the report I want to address concerns the single intelligence account—the £2 billion that goes to the intelligence agencies. They have had a very large increase over the past few years but a cut is now being imposed—and understandably so—of 11% if one takes account of inflation over the next four years. The Committee has said:

“It is essential—given the fundamental importance to our national security of the Agencies’ work—that the settlement is kept under review and that there is scope to adjust it if there is a significant change in the threat.”

I know that every single recipient of Government funding would like to be able to say that, but I hope there is no dispute that when we are dealing with the fundamental issues of national security, if the threat were to change in a material way, it would not be acceptable to say that those resources could not be reviewed by a Government because that might in some way contradict public expenditure decisions. I have no reason to believe that the Government would take that view, but it is important to make that point, and that is what the Committee would like to stress.

The second point is the security that will be needed for the Olympics. The director general of the Security Service—again, I quote from our report—

“told us that he considers the Service to be well placed to manage the risks that the Olympics will bring.”

However, he added that

“the effort required to cover the Olympics will inevitably divert resources from the Service’s other work.”

The Committee would like to emphasise that the National Security Council must take such steps as are necessary to minimise that risk. Although we understand that the Security Service is not at present making representations and feels that the task can be handled effectively, it is too early to be certain that that will remain the case and it must be kept under consideration.

The third point relates to cyber security. In its reports of 2008 and 2009, the Committee drew attention to the increasing risks this country faces from cyber attacks. The Committee welcomes the fact that the Government have said that cyber is now a tier 1 interest in our national security strategy and have provided more than £600 million in new resources for that purpose.

The Committee’s concern is not those sums but the potential over-interest within Government in cyber matters. We note in our report that there are 18 units with responsibilities in this field across the three agencies— two law enforcement bodies and five Government Departments—and express our concern, which the Government share, about the risk of duplication. It is extremely important that these matters are looked at to ensure that, with such large sums and so many elements of Government involved, we do not do mischief to our own objectives.

[Mark Field]

I entirely endorse what my right hon. and learned Friend says. We feel strongly that there is a risk of duplication, with 18 bodies having some say in cyber security. We are grateful for the Government’s commitment and provision of certainty of financing over a four-year period—the £600 million to which he referred. However, if in 2007 we had asked about the importance of cyber, it would have been largely off the radar. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that we must be aware that if this becomes a much bigger problem not just in governmental and military terms, but in commercial terms, by the end of that four-year period considerably larger sums might be required, along the lines of the provision for the Olympics?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I thank my hon. Friend for his contribution to the work of the Committee. He and I visited GCHQ and saw at first hand the increasing threat from cyber that this country faces from a number of sources. I therefore very much endorse his comments.