Abortion Act

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2013 Westminster Hall

[The Attorney-General]

I hope I may be able to reassure my hon. Friend. On the second matter that he raises—it is not germane to one of the cases, although it was to another—as he knows, the evidence revealed that the pre-signing of forms was quite widespread. I understand that that practice has now been stopped, and that clear guidance has been issued as to its undesirability. That is a policy issue, and I have no doubt at all that as a result, the requirements set down by professional standards have already been clarified.

I turn to the more general point. There are two ways in which we can move forward. We might take the view that the current situation is, overall, a satisfactory one, in which professional medical discretion, which must inevitably be relied on, is left at large, with the law enforcement agencies acting as a back-stop for the most egregious cases that flout any conceivable proper standards. The other view, which I understand that the Department of Health has accepted, is that such a situation allows law enforcement far too residual a role and that the balance needs to be redressed. The law enforcement agencies will need clearer and more specific guidance on how to distinguish between desirable and undesirable professional practice in making and recording decisions on the termination of pregnancy. I greatly welcome that, and I have no doubt that it will make the task of prosecutors much easier.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

The Attorney-General has rightly said that we should not second-guess a prosecutor, the professional judgment of a doctor or the position of a jury when taking evidence. We can, however, second-guess ourselves as legislators. During the passage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, we were assured that gender selection would not be permitted as a ground for abortion, and that a proposed amendment to that effect was redundant. I am sure that that was said in good faith, and the amendment was withdrawn on that basis, but do we not have cause for consideration in that area?

[The Attorney-General]

It is quite clear from a reading of the 1967 Act that gender selection alone is not grounds for the termination of a pregnancy. The debate has highlighted policy issues, which Parliament can debate further if it wishes, about how the question of gender selection may carry some weight in respect of, in particular, the impact on a woman’s mental health of continuing with a pregnancy. That is inherent in the drafting of the legislation, which places a great burden of responsibility on the medical profession to carry out a specific assessment, under the subsection that, as we know, is the most relied on as the justification for a termination.

It would be wrong of me, in the course of this debate, to start re-examining something that is a policy issue for Parliament. I have done my best to answer the question, which is whether the law as it stands is workable and can be made better. I have already indicated that if, as I understand to be the position, the General Medical Council produces such guidelines, they will be of immeasurable assistance in providing a benchmark for how doctors are expected to make the assessments required under the 1967 Act.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has informed me that he would be more than happy for his officials to comment on the practicalities, from a prosecutorial viewpoint, of any amended arrangements, should that be thought necessary. I can see that that might be of great practical value. I hope that I have been able to provide hon. Members with some reassurance.