Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Thursday 16th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

My hon. Friend makes a fair point. He is right to say that this Bill will repeal the 1972 Act, and that is a significant step in this country’s history, but it will also, as he says, make sure that we do not have huge amounts of disruptive change for business, industry and individuals, and we will try to make sure that there is as much continuity on the day after departure as there was on the day before departure, where that is feasible.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Does the Attorney General envisage that there will be consent motions under EVEL provisions in respect of any of the potential clauses in the great repeal Bill?

[The Attorney General]

Again, we shall have to wait and see the content of the Bill, but it is unlikely—given what is likely to be in the Bill, and given the purpose of the Bill—that we will be looking at very many areas, if any at all, that do not affect the entire United Kingdom.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Thursday 14th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Vara]

A lot is happening in the pensions world at present, and I think it important that we prioritise making sure that all that goes through, rather than thinking of new innovations.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Does the Minister share the Prime Minister’s view that the good settlement for pensioners extends to 1950s women, and will he explain the bits of that settlement that are best for them?

[Mr Vara]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that in a debate of 2011 a concession was made and the time period was reduced from two years to 18 months, at a cost of £1.1 billion to the Exchequer.

John Downey

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I choose my words to my hon. Friend with care because, over time, the letters may have been approved in slightly different ways. Let us be quite clear: these letters were ultimately the responsibility of the Governments in office at the time at which they were sent. I will not accept the suggestion that it was otherwise. That is a completely distinct issue from that of where mistakes may have been made in the factual analysis before the letter was sent.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

This is not just about some unsatisfactory circumstances. This is traumatising victims, and it is scandalising the public. The court seems to have been misled into thinking that all parties agreed at Weston Park—that is implicit in the judgment. All parties did not agree at Weston Park, nor did they agree in the submissions that we made to Government papers after Weston Park, and certainly, all parties but Sinn Fein opposed the disgraceful Hain-Adams Bill that purported to give an amnesty through legislation.

Will the Attorney-General address the implication of a judgment that basically says that even the wrong word of a Government official as part of a secret scheme should trump due process and the transparency of the rule of law? Is there not a danger in allowing that as the going rate for the future, if there is no appeal in this case? As for the status of the letters, could Parliament legislate to rescind or qualify the import of them?

[The Attorney-General]

Can I try to deal with both matters in turn? I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s characterisation that the court’s decision is in some way an infringement of the rule of law. I recommend, if he wishes, that he read the judgment. Far from its being an undermining of the rule of law, I have to say, while it may be a result with which I am uncomfortable and would hope that it might have been otherwise, it is actually an upholding of the principles of the rule of law, even when it has an outcome that we may find extremely uncomfortable, because it emphasises the fairness at the heart of our criminal justice system. As for the other matters that the hon. Gentleman raised, it seems to me that they are matters, as I said earlier, for wider debate.

Abortion Act

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2013 Westminster Hall

[The Attorney-General]

I hope I may be able to reassure my hon. Friend. On the second matter that he raises—it is not germane to one of the cases, although it was to another—as he knows, the evidence revealed that the pre-signing of forms was quite widespread. I understand that that practice has now been stopped, and that clear guidance has been issued as to its undesirability. That is a policy issue, and I have no doubt at all that as a result, the requirements set down by professional standards have already been clarified.

I turn to the more general point. There are two ways in which we can move forward. We might take the view that the current situation is, overall, a satisfactory one, in which professional medical discretion, which must inevitably be relied on, is left at large, with the law enforcement agencies acting as a back-stop for the most egregious cases that flout any conceivable proper standards. The other view, which I understand that the Department of Health has accepted, is that such a situation allows law enforcement far too residual a role and that the balance needs to be redressed. The law enforcement agencies will need clearer and more specific guidance on how to distinguish between desirable and undesirable professional practice in making and recording decisions on the termination of pregnancy. I greatly welcome that, and I have no doubt that it will make the task of prosecutors much easier.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

The Attorney-General has rightly said that we should not second-guess a prosecutor, the professional judgment of a doctor or the position of a jury when taking evidence. We can, however, second-guess ourselves as legislators. During the passage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, we were assured that gender selection would not be permitted as a ground for abortion, and that a proposed amendment to that effect was redundant. I am sure that that was said in good faith, and the amendment was withdrawn on that basis, but do we not have cause for consideration in that area?

[The Attorney-General]

It is quite clear from a reading of the 1967 Act that gender selection alone is not grounds for the termination of a pregnancy. The debate has highlighted policy issues, which Parliament can debate further if it wishes, about how the question of gender selection may carry some weight in respect of, in particular, the impact on a woman’s mental health of continuing with a pregnancy. That is inherent in the drafting of the legislation, which places a great burden of responsibility on the medical profession to carry out a specific assessment, under the subsection that, as we know, is the most relied on as the justification for a termination.

It would be wrong of me, in the course of this debate, to start re-examining something that is a policy issue for Parliament. I have done my best to answer the question, which is whether the law as it stands is workable and can be made better. I have already indicated that if, as I understand to be the position, the General Medical Council produces such guidelines, they will be of immeasurable assistance in providing a benchmark for how doctors are expected to make the assessments required under the 1967 Act.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has informed me that he would be more than happy for his officials to comment on the practicalities, from a prosecutorial viewpoint, of any amended arrangements, should that be thought necessary. I can see that that might be of great practical value. I hope that I have been able to provide hon. Members with some reassurance.