Victims and Prisoners Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Maria Eagle and Ellie Reeves

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th July 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Ellie Reeves]

I want to say from the outset that part 3 of the Bill had no pre-legislative scrutiny and there was a lack of consultation with the Parole Board. What that really shows, as I understand it, is that this policy was driven by the previous Justice Secretary. The current Justice Secretary is very reasonable; I hope that, along with his colleagues, he will look at these measures again and be open to our proposals.

The decisions to release John Worboys, Colin Pitchfork and Tracey Connelly rightly caused public outrage and undermined confidence in the Parole Board, but the proposals in clauses 35 and 36 are not the right approach. I will set out why new clauses 22 and 23 are so important. They both seek to give victims more of a voice and provide a mechanism for a check on Parole Board decisions, but they do so in a way that would give victims confidence. They would not undermine the separation of powers or the independence of the Parole Board, nor would they lead to the politicisation of Parole Board decisions.

Clauses 35 and 36 effectively give the Secretary of State a veto over a release decision on top tier prisoners. Our new clauses would give the Secretary of State a power to appeal a Parole Board decision to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal; give victims the power to refer their case to the Secretary of State to make an application on their behalf to the Court of Appeal; and expand the top tier cases in scope so that more victims could benefit. Likewise, the amendments would also expand the top tier.

The new clauses are far preferable to the current measures in the Bill, for the following reasons. First, the Parole Board acts as a quasi-judicial, independent and impartial body. Giving the Secretary of State the veto on its decisions would undermine that, and fundamentally change the application of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the Executive.

Nobody wants dangerous criminals to be released, but allowing a politician power over a release decision will leave them vulnerable to public or party opinion, which can run counter to the actual risk of reoffending. That could lead to decisions being made because they are politically or publicly expedient, not because they are properly considered or based on a fair assessment of risk. As the former Conservative Prime Minister Sir John Major recently stated in his lecture to the Prison Reform Trust,

“I do not see how (or why) the Justice Secretary would be able to reach a more just decision than the Parole Board. Any single Government Minister—however able or well-meaning—would be far more vulnerable to public campaigns and, under pressure, to make a harsher decision to appease them. This is a very slippery slope. I do not think that any politician should have that power, and I hope the new Justice Secretary will reconsider or—if he does not—that Parliament will deny it.”

He is absolutely right. That is why new clauses 22 and 23 seek to give power not to the Justice Secretary, but to the Court of Appeal, which will not bow to political pressure. That would maintain the separation of powers.

Clauses 35 and 36 are also likely to be incredibly costly. The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment assumes that 20% of top tier Parole Board decisions to release will be vetoed, suggesting that about 150 people a year will not be released. The central estimate outlines that that will require an additional 640 prison places to be built, at a cost of £238.3 million and an annual running cost of £28.7 million. In total, the central estimate puts that policy at just shy of £0.5 billion. It is disappointing that in a Bill that is supposed to be about victims, the only money that can be found is for prisoners.

Furthermore, as the Justice Committee outlined in its letter to the Justice Secretary after its evidence session, the only way it could see the Justice Secretary being able to make release decisions to the same standard as the Parole Board would be, in effect, to create a shadow Parole Board in the Ministry of Justice. How much resource and focus would that take?

New clauses 22 and 23 are likely to be far more cost-effective. They would not need the creation of a shadow Parole Board to ensure that the Secretary of State could make decisions effectively; the Court of Appeal is already expert in such work. Allowing an appeal mechanism to the criminal division is likely to be much less expensive than creating a complex veto process, which is full of legal risk for the Government.

In addition, clauses 35 and 36 do not give a mechanism for a victim to challenge release decisions; they only give the right to the prisoner and the Secretary of State. New clauses 22 and 23 would give victims, who are supposed to be at the heart of the Bill, more rights by allowing them to ask the Secretary of State to put in an appeal against Parole Board decisions. In effect, that would mirror the unduly lenient sentence scheme and, if a referral were not possible, those victims would be given reasons why. Their rights would also be increased by the new clauses through the expansion of the top tier of cases. The other amendments in this group would do the same.

Under the Government proposals, only murder, rape, causing the death of a child, and serious terror offences are in the top tier for which a referral can be made. New clauses 22 and 23 and our amendments would expand the top tier to include sexual offences against children that fall short of rape. Most people would agree that all sexual offences against children should be treated with the utmost seriousness, and their exclusion from the list of top tier cases risks diminishing that. Under our new clauses and amendments, the top tier would also include manslaughter. That is particularly important, because many men who kill their partners or ex-partners are convicted of manslaughter and not of murder.

I turn to the impact of clauses 35 and 36 on victims. The independent Victims’ Commissioner for London, Claire Waxman, outlined in her written evidence to this Committee that she believed the clauses would compound victims’ trauma and suffering. In oral evidence, she said of victims:

“Putting these measures in gives them a false sense of hope. We are telling them that there is a chance that the Justice Secretary can veto the Parole Board decision and that the prisoners will not be released.

What will actually happen in reality is that, yes, the Justice Secretary might veto, but that prisoner will then have legal aid to appeal the decision. They will appeal every decision, pulling the bereaved families into even more distress and trauma.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 30, Q68.]

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, as well as giving false hope, the measures would extend the length of time it takes to get the decisions made, therefore extending the agony that people feel while not knowing what a decision will end up being?

[Ellie Reeves]

That is absolutely right. Not only do the measures give a false hope, but they will cause a huge amount of delay in the system before those primary decisions are ever arrived at. That is incredibly detrimental to victims.

The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment supports the view of the London Victims’ Commissioner. Its estimates suggest that 75 cases a year will, after a lengthy process, result in the Secretary of State’s decision being overturned and the prisoner released. That does not suggest that clauses 35 and 36 will give victims more confidence in the justice system. In fact, the opposite is likely. As the solicitor Andrew Sperling outlined in his evidence to the Justice Committee, that is because the reforms would create a three-tier system of Parole Board, Secretary of State and upper tribunal. He said:

“What you have here is a system being set up that says that there needs to be a three-tier system, and that the Parole Board should not be capable of making decisions in the most serious cases.”

As the Law Society outlined in its written evidence, delays could have the result that

“fewer prisoners serving fixed sentences will be released on licence, instead being released automatically when their sentences end”.

That would create a public safety concern, as prisoners would return to the community without probation supervision, which would be concerning for victims and at odds with what the Bill is supposed to be about, as well as putting the public at risk. New clauses 22 and 23 would prevent those issues from arising, as they would create a more truncated route to a final release decision. Under our proposals, the Court of Appeal would make the final decision, rather than the Secretary of State, with the prisoner then having the right to appeal.

It is worth noting that in 2019 a reconsideration mechanism was introduced that allows parties to a Parole Board case to challenge a release decision. As Martin Jones, the Parole Board chief executive, outlined in an evidence session of the Justice Committee on the Bill, since the mechanism was introduced the Secretary of State has made 50 applications of reconsideration. Mr Jones said that

“in the last four years, the Secretary of State has been concerned about 50 of our decisions, of which, following reconsideration by a judge of the Parole Board, 12 have subsequently been set aside and then reheard.”

He went on to tell the Select Committee that, under the new proposals,

“20% of top-tier decisions may subsequently be set aside by the Secretary of State. That is in stark contrast to the fact that over the last four years, they have sought reconsideration for only 50 decisions. I am not sure how you jump from doing 12 a year to seeking to set aside hundreds of our decisions each year.”

I am aware that the Justice Secretary recently used the mechanism to request a reconsideration of the decision to release Colin Pitchfork, which I welcome, but new clauses 35 and 36 will seemingly make the mechanism irrelevant. New clauses 22 and 23 would complement the mechanism and provide another important check on Parole Board decisions by the Court of Appeal.

Finally, the Prison Reform Trust and a number of other stakeholders outlined in their written evidence that clauses 35 and 36 could lead to poorer, less transparent decision-making. We do not know what criteria the Justice Secretary will follow in exercising the new power. We do not know whether it will be exercised directly by the Secretary of State or under authority delegated to an official. If a prisoner released without the Secretary of State exercising their veto goes on to commit a serious further offence, we do not know whether the Secretary of State or their officials will be subject to the serious further offence review process or held accountable for any errors.

That brings us back to the point made by nearly every stakeholder providing evidence on part 3: why is the Secretary of State better placed to make a release decision than the Parole Board, which has heard the evidence and whose job it is to do this professionally? The reforms will risk poorer decision-making. At the moment the buck stops with the Parole Board, but, if it knew that the final decision rested with the Secretary of State, that could drive down parole decisions, conversely leaving the public less safe. As Caroline Corby, the chair of the Parole Board, stated when she gave evidence to the Justice Committee, the clauses

“could have an unintended consequence of making it more difficult for us to recruit judicial members,”

as the role could be seen as downgraded. That could risk the board losing such valuable expertise. Our new clauses would ameliorate those issues.

For all those reasons, I strongly urge the Government to look at their proposals again. They have attracted widespread concern and will undermine the separation of powers, risk the politicisation of police decisions and cost vast sums to implement. They could cause victims more harm and leave the public less safe. New clauses 22 and 23 would give the Secretary of State the power to appeal against a Parole Board decision in cases where they think that the decision is wrong, ensuring that another check is in place. Victims would also be empowered to ask the Secretary of State to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The amendments and new clauses would expand the top tier of cases, increasing victims’ rights and ensuring that some of the worst crimes are treated with the seriousness that they deserve. I hope that the Government will consider that carefully, and look again at their proposals.