Excess Death Trends

Debate between Maria Caulfield and Neale Hanvey

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Westminster Hall

[Maria Caulfield]

The public inquiry is independent, and the Government are under heavy scrutiny from it. It is not for me to say how the inquiry should be conducted. As a Government, we are looking at the causes of excess deaths and introducing, where we can, urgent measures to reverse that increase as quickly as possible.

No vaccine or medicine—even simple paracetamol—is completely risk free, but we have systems in place to continually monitor the safety of our medicines. For example, in April 2021, following concerns raised through the yellow card system or by GPs or clinicians, the MHRA reacted to rare cases of concurrent thrombosis and thrombocytopenia following the AZ vaccine. That resulted in actions, with adults under 30 not offered the vaccine any further. In May of that year, that was extended to adults under 40. Where there is concern, we will take action and take recommendations from bodies like the MHRA to make sure that those vaccines are as safe as they can be.

[Neale Hanvey]

The Minister knows as well as I do that the yellow card scheme sits at the heart of safe clinical care, but allegations are circulating that the MHRA is sitting on 50 times more yellow cards related to the covid-19 vaccine than those related to any other vaccine that have been reported to it. Will she commit to asking the MHRA to account for that and to taking urgent action if, indeed, it is sitting on the yellow card system reports?

[Sir Gary Streeter (in the Chair)]

Minister, please leave some time for the Member in charge to wind up.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Maria Caulfield and Neale Hanvey

Tuesday 11th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Neale Hanvey (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (Alba)]

12. What steps his Department is taking to create a vaccine development and evaluation centre.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Maria Caulfield)]

The vaccine development and evaluation centre, backed by £65 million for state-of-the-art facilities, at the Porton Down site has been operational since early last year. It supported the autumn vaccine roll-out and the spring vaccine roll-out earlier this year.

[Neale Hanvey]

In November 2021, Dame Kate Bingham rightly called the decision to withdraw support for the Valneva whole virus vaccine “inexplicable” because a broad portfolio of vaccines is important as we move forward against future variants. The British Society for Immunology states that there is an urgent need for second and third-generation covid vaccines, including universal mucosal vaccines with longer-lasting protective immunity. With growing public concern and mounting clinical and scientific evidence of vaccine injury from mRNA, why is the UK not seeking to harness the power of all technologies instead of establishing an inexplicable exclusive relationship with Moderna?

[Maria Caulfield]

I confirm to the hon. Gentleman that, in the recent spring campaign, we deployed four approved vaccines—Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, Novavax and Sanofi-GSK—as part of our roll-out. We are using a range of vaccines to protect us from the pandemic.

New Covid Variants: Government Preparedness

Debate between Maria Caulfield and Neale Hanvey

Wednesday 28th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Maria Caulfield]

We know that the virus has the potential to evolve with new covid-19 variants that may evade immunity and the vaccinations that we have in place. We also know that we could face new pathogens with pandemic potential, so we remain vigilant at all times not just in the United Kingdom but with our global partners.

It is imperative that we retain the ability to detect and identify any new covid-19 variants as well as wider threats. The House will be aware that the community infection survey ended in March. It was commissioned by UKHSA as part of a suite of covid-19 surveillance programmes and delivered by the Office for National Statistics. The survey was world-leading, playing a critical role in enabling decision making during the pandemic. However, it is right to ensure that that surveillance programme remains proportionate, cost-effective and commensurate with how we monitor a range of other infectious diseases that pose a similar risk to public health. That is why we have scaled it back, but again, should we need to, we can step it up.

That does not mean that we are not taking any action going forward. We are maintaining surveillance for covid-19 and respiratory pathogens through a number of programmes. Those programmes will enable the evaluation and effectiveness of vaccination against a range of clinical outcomes, informing vaccine deployment and appropriate disease management. Our surveillance programmes are underpinned by the continuation of genomic sequencing to determine and assess variant severity and vaccine effectiveness.

A range of vaccines are still available, which clearly we monitor on an ongoing basis. mRNA vaccines are one part of our toolkit, but others are still available. That is why continued surveillance is important, but it is proportionate that it has been reduced since the peak of the pandemic. UKHSA continues to sequence covid samples each week, so should a variant of concern emerge, we would identify it relatively quickly. It publishes the results of that sequencing and surveillance in the national influenza and covid surveillance report.

Obviously, covid-19 is a global risk, so as well as looking at what is happening in the UK, we continue to support international surveillance, and we work closely in partnership with other organisations and international partners to monitor covid-19 globally. The Government continue to fund new variant assessment platforms, increasing the capacity to provide genomic sequencing in nine countries and establishing the International Pathogen Surveillance Network. That will enable us to be alive to the risks of covid-19 elsewhere in the world. I am sure that hon. Members will recognise the importance of that work and agree that it is vital to continue it to understand and respond to dangerous new variants should they emerge.

If a variant of concern with potential immune evasion is detected, the Government have proportionate contingency response capabilities in place, a range of which are set out. Those capabilities will support an initial response to any new and dangerous variant of concern. The Department for Health and Social Care and UKHSA continue to work together to ensure that appropriate commercial mechanisms are in place to support a longer response to covid-19, whether through testing or vaccination.

I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman that vaccination is the only tool in our armoury. Our surveillance is our key weapon in identifying a new variant of concern. We still have testing capability should we need it, and of course, our vaccination programmes are nimble and can respond to any new variant should it emerge.

[Neale Hanvey]

The Minister is giving an interesting response to the question about surveillance. What is the surveillance mechanism exactly? Can she take us through how the virus is being monitored in the wild? What practical steps are being taken? Is waste water being assessed? How is it being identified? What border controls are expected if there is a novel threat somewhere else in the world? How are we managing our borders and ensuring that the 1.5 million passengers in the air at any one time do not immediately bring a new threat right to our door?

[Maria Caulfield]

There are several ways, and I did try to set some of them out. As I said, UKHSA tests samples from covid-positive patients around the country every week and does genomic sequencing to identify new variants or variants of concern.

We are not currently doing international border checks, but we are working with international partners, so should a new variant emerge in another country, we can step up that capability. We introduced border controls on new arrivals a couple of months ago due to the risk of a new variant from China, but that was stepped down because testing showed that there was no risk to the general population. Waste water testing is also still available should it be required, so there is a range of testing capabilities to identify variants of concern and respond quite quickly.

Moving on to vaccines, we are developing mRNA capability, but not just in covid-19 vaccinations. That is one way of delivering covid vaccinations, but that capability is also being used for respiratory illnesses and cancer vaccination trials. There is the potential for that technology to be used in a range of vaccines, not just for covid-19. A range of different vaccines are available, and should a variant of concern or change of variant emerge, we will take advice from the JCVI as to which vaccine is best to use and which group of the population is best to vaccinate. That is an ongoing piece of work.

On some of the hon. Gentleman’s other points, the covid inquiry is obviously ongoing. As the Minister responsible for pandemic preparedness, I am keen to learn the lessons about testing capability, PPE, and vulnerable groups that may need greater protection in future pandemics. But we also need to be live to the fact that a pathogen could emerge that is completely different from covid, flu, or avian flu, which we are also monitoring actively. We need to be nimble in our response to any future pandemic. My concern is that we may just look at covid as the only future threat, but that is absolutely not our policy; we are looking at a wide range of threats, both in the UK and abroad.

[Maria Caulfield]

We are certainly not putting all our eggs in the mRNA basket for covid, or for any other use of mRNA technology. Such vaccines must still pass the MHRA assessment in order to be licensed for use. As mRNA technology develops for other clinical conditions, whether cancer or respiratory illnesses, those vaccines will also have to be awarded a licence by the MHRA. It is not the case that mRNA vaccines are given carte blanche because they have been used in covid; they will have to pass the necessary research hurdles to gain licences for future use. We are certainly not just relying on mRNA for covid—although it has been effective and the technology means that it can react to variants and be altered depending on the variant. We are using other vaccines for covid, and working with other partners. I reassure my hon. Friend on that.

I am very happy to continue updating Members on the progress that we are making and any future booster vaccination programmes for covid-19 that will be running, and to update the House on the work of UKHSA regarding monitoring, surveillance, and future testing capabilities.

[Neale Hanvey]

I thank the Minister for being a good sport and allowing me to intervene again. I did make a couple of requests in my contribution: I asked for some written feedback from the Minister, and whether she would be able to find time in her diary for a meeting to discuss some of the finer points. I would be very grateful if she would agree to that.

[Maria Caulfield]

I am very happy to meet up with the hon. Gentleman, and also to write to him regarding the specific points on which he asked for clarification. It is important that we give the public confidence that our vaccine portfolio is very diverse, guarding against both current variants and future variants. The contracts that we have in place with vaccine developers are flexible, so should the need arise, we have the ability to stand up vaccinations in a speedy manner. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman and to meet with him, because in order to bust some of those myths that he has pointed out exist, it is important that we are open and transparent about the arrangements that are in place, the risks that we face, and the tools that we have in our arsenal to fight any future pandemic.

With that, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will draw my remarks to a close.

Question put and agreed to.