Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Tenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hodge of Barking
Main Page: Baroness Hodge of Barking (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hodge of Barking's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the Minister for his remarks, and wish to speak to this group on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon as well. I must say that these provisions are not easy to follow, so forgive me for feeling like I will need to reread Hansard in a darkened room in order to completely follow what the Minister has said.
I do not think any of us understood a word of that. It would be really nice if the Minister could explain it in black and white, because I just could not get what that was getting at at all.
Perhaps the Minister could also explain how that is different from what we agreed last week.
I thank my right hon. Friend for her question, which the Minister may wish to answer before I continue my remarks.
We are debating Government amendment 106 to clause 84, with which it is convenient to consider Government new clause 34. It is this light; I am afraid I am reading eights for threes. I am terribly sorry.
I am not sure that what we are trying to do here is relevant to the matter that the hon. Lady raised. Amendment 114 would prevent regulations being made to allow the registrar to make information unavailable for public inspection under new section 1088 unless there are compelling reasons for the information to be withheld, which this amendment outlines.
Of course, there are instances where disclosure of information on the public register is inappropriate—I think we have all agreed that through the course of this debate—for instance, where it could lead to an increased risk of fraud and identity theft, or put individuals at risk for some reason, such as in cases of domestic abuse. There are limitations in the extent to which existing provisions in the Companies Act 2006 allow personal information to be withheld from the public register. We want to expand that to ensure that personal information is properly protected.
Clause 87 amends the Companies Act to allow individuals to apply to the registrar to suppress information relating to an individual or address and prevent it from being disclosed or made available for public inspection. That will include their residential address, signature, business occupation, and date of birth in old documents.
This is another opportunity to raise the issue, to which I have not had an answer, of Fedotov. That is how he kept his name off the—[Interruption.] It is. We just need an answer.
The answer is that any person applying under the exemption will have to prove to the registrar that there is sufficient evidence of a serious risk of violence or intimidation to protect their names or information. If necessary, the registrar will refer cases to an appropriate law enforcement agency and will have the power to revoke protection if information comes to light to suggest that false evidence has been provided.
Does the right hon. Lady honestly think that a registrar, who has a duty and responsibility to protect the integrity of the register, would assist an oligarch, for example, in trying to hide information? I think we are into conspiracy theory territory here, which I do not think will get us very far.
In general, I would agree with the Minister. However, the truth is that Fedotov did manage that. If the Minister could provide an explanation of why and how that happened, then we might get greater comfort in this Committee that those circumstances will not arise again.
I committed earlier to look into that case, and I will, but the Usmanov case, as I said, was a completely different case. The whole reason why we are bringing forward this legislation is to improve transparency and fight economic crime. The right hon. Lady’s indication that perhaps the registrar might be complicit with Russian oligarchs, who may be guilty of economic crime, is not really plausible.
These are reasonable provisions for people whom we suggest might be at risk of harm if we publish that information, and they have to demonstrate that that harm is a salient risk. They are reasonable provisions that would be used fairly sparingly in the main, but nevertheless there have to be those kinds of provisions where somebody is at risk of harm. That does not exempt the applicant from providing the information to the registrar, where it is still required by legislation, but it will no longer be displayed publicly. Critically—and this should answer the right hon. Lady’s point—information would still be available to law enforcement agencies and other public bodies. It would not be appropriate to limit the registrar’s ability to protect personal information in the way proposed by the amendment.
I just want to reiterate that all protected information, whether suppressed or not, is available to law enforcement agencies. That is the critical point. Individuals who seek to use these exemptions have to provide sufficient evidence of a serious risk of violence or intimidation, and that protection can be revoked if new information comes to the registrar’s attention that she feels casts doubt on the original assertions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 88
Analysis of information for the purposes of crime prevention or detection
I beg to move amendment 119, in clause 88, page 68, line 15, leave out from “must” to the end of line 17 and insert
“analyse information within its possession with a view to preventing or detecting crime.”
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 120, in clause 88, page 68, line 17, at end insert—
“(1A) In carrying out the analysis the registrar must make use of its power to require additional information under section 1092A where the registrar considers that such additional information may contribute to the prevention or detection of crime.”
Amendment 116, in clause 88, page 68, line 17, at end insert—
“(1A) As part of the analysis under subsection (1), the registrar must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.
(1B) Where the assessment identifies a matter of concern, the registrar must—
(a) carry out whatever further analysis it considers necessary; and
(b) share any evidence of unlawful activity it identifies with the relevant law enforcement agency.
(1C) For the purposes of this section, a “matter of concern” includes—
(a) inaccurate information;
(b) information that might create a false or misleading impression; or
(c) evidence of economic crime.”
New clause 37—Duty to check person of significant control status—
“(1) The Companies Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 790LP (Offence of failing to comply with sections 790LI to 790LN) insert—
“790LQ Duty to check person of significant control status
(1) This section applies when a registrable person’s identity is verified under section 1110A(1) and a risk assessment carried out under section 1062A(1A) has identified a matter of concern in relation to the registrable person.
(2) The registrar must take steps to ensure that the registrable person whose identity is being verified is a person with significant control over the company.””
New clause 38—Risk-based examination of accounts of dissolved companies—
“(1) The Companies Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 1062A (analysis of information for the purposes of crime prevention and detection) insert—
“1062B Risk-based examination of accounts of dissolved companies
(1A) In a case where the registrar’s risk assessment under section 1062A(1A) has identified a matter of concern in relation to a dissolved company, the registrar must examine the accounts of the dissolved company with a view to establishing whether any economic crime has been committed.
(1B) The registrar must share details of any evidence gathered under subsection (1A) with the relevant law enforcement agencies.””
New clause 41—Disclosure of control of 5% or more of shares in a public company—
“(1) This section applies to shareholdings in public companies as defined by section 4 of the Companies Act 2006.
(2) A person who controls 5% or more of the shares in a public company must declare this fact to the registrar.
(3) The duty in subsection (2) applies whether the person controls the shares directly or indirectly.
(4) The registrar may impose a penalty on any person who fails to comply with the duty in subsection (2).”
This new clause would require all persons controlling 5% or more of the shares in a public company to declare the total amount of their shareholding to the registrar. This would, for example, require a person controlling shares through multiple nominees to declare the total number of shares they control.
New clause 42—Verification of persons controlling 5% or more of shares in a public company—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person has disclosed to the registrar control of 5% or more of the shares in a public company under section [Disclosure of control of 5% or more of shares in a public company], and
(b) the registrar has identified a matter of concern under subsection 1062A(1A) of the Companies Act 2006.
(2) the registrar must—
(a) verify the identity of that person, and
(b) verify the number of shares that person claims to control.”
This new clause should be read together with Amendment 116 which inserts subsection 1062A(1A) into the Companies Act 2006. It would require the registrar to verify both the identity and the shareholding of a person who controls 5% or more of shares in a company where the registrar’s risk-based analysis set out in Amendment 116 has identified a matter of concern.
New clause 43—Disclosure of shares held by nominee—
“(1) This section applies to public companies as defined by section 4 of the Companies Act 2006.
(2) Any person holding shares in a public company as nominee for another person must disclose this fact to the registrar.
(3) The registrar may impose a penalty on any person who fails to comply with the duty in subsection (2).”
This new clause would require shareholders of a company to disclose the fact that they are acting as nominees. Failure to comply could result in a penalty.
The Minister is delighted. All the provisions are grouped together, so he will have to listen to me forever. The lighting is not much better, but we will see how we go—I know we are saving energy.
The provisions that we are discussing all sit together. I will start with amendments 119 and 120, with which we are trying to strengthen the duties, rather than the powers, of Companies House. During the course of the Committee’s discussion of the Bill, we have considered how UK corporate structures and vehicles are used to move, hide and launder money. When the Bill is enacted, although I hope that it will be amended to strengthen the nature of the information we get by strengthening the supervision of company service providers, Companies House will hold a wealth of data.
Amendment 119 seeks to make it compulsory for Companies House to analyse that data to prevent and detect crime. By removing some words, it would be tougher than the current wording of the clause, according to which Companies House could analyse that data, but does not necessarily have to. The clause says
“as the registrar considers appropriate”,
and, without the amendment, Companies House could and will argue that it does not consider analysis “appropriate”. We would remove that provision and say that the registrar must use the data that has been made available to her to see whether or not it can support us in our efforts to avoid crime.
I have one other thing to say about this issue. We have talked a lot in the debate about corruption and the way in which it has impacted the UK economy. As we discuss the Bill further, we have to remember the impact it will also have much more widely. According to the ONE Campaign’s latest estimate, around $1 trillion is lost every year to corruption in developing countries. A lot of that comes through the abuse of corporate structures that we have in the UK. That is just one example that demonstrates how UK corporate structures facilitate theft and corrupt activity.
I know that that is under the current regime and that much of this should go when we get to our new regime. However, I will give another example of how the abuse of UK corporate structures led to money, again, coming out of Russia, which is the bottle laundromat—another of these laundromats—that was uncovered by Transparency International. British companies were, again, at the centre. It was a money laundering operation from 2014 to 2016 where $820 million came out of Russia. Again, it involved—classically—a network of shell companies, many of them UK firms, that apparently sold bottle-moulding machines to Russia.
The right hon. Lady raises some important cases, and she is right to do so. Is that not exactly why we are trying to do this in this way? There are 4.5 million companies registered in England. Around 700,000 companies are registered every year, or 2,000 a day, and 400,000 are dissolved every year. If she is asking Companies House to analyse every single company—that is exactly what her amendment says—to determine risk, she is asking too much of Companies House and she will miss the important needles in the haystack that she refers to.
Were I asking that, that would be unreasonable but if the Minister takes all my amendments together, he will see that they and others talk about a risk-based assessment of the available data.
The amendment does not say that. It says that
“the registrar must carry out a risk assessment”,
not a risk-based approach. There is a big difference in terms of what the right hon. Lady is asking for.
But when we come to the new clauses, which we will discuss later, they say “risk-based”. It is a risk-based assessment. Perhaps the Minister could explain what the difference is.
The amendment says
“a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.”
That certainly says to me that a risk assessment would be required for every company. To me, a risk-based approach would identify various pieces of information, and Companies House would act on that information and determine whether the risk is from companies, directors or persons of significant control and act on that. That is our approach; the right hon. Lady’s approach is moving away from that.
The Minister is misinterpreting our approach. I am sorry if he reads it that way, but I agree that we are not asking for 100%. He calls it a risk-based assessment; I call it a risk assessment. Apologies for the difference in language.
If we were having this debate in my constituency, my constituents would say to me and, indeed, to the Minister, “We want to hire a police officer to stop crime.” If we look at a definition of what a police officer does, they maintain law and order in local areas, prevent crime, reduce fear of crime and improve the quality of life for all citizens. We want Companies House to stop economic crime and that is what my right hon. Friend’s amendments seek to achieve.
At the moment, the Bill says—I can’t read it because there is no bloody light! It is a thing that as you get old, your eyes aren’t brilliant:
“The registrar must carry out such analysis of information within the registrar’s possession as the registrar considers appropriate”.
We are attempting to take that wording out of the Bill to make it a duty, because otherwise we know from the other enforcement agencies and the work of other Government agencies that unless clearly directed, the real work would not be done. There would be an excuse. They would be busy doing something else. This is their key proactive role. We can go on and on about it during the course of the Bill, but I assure the Minister that the registrar should do it in a risk-based way. She should not do it, as the Bill says, as is appropriate; she should just do it. That is really the first thing.
I will quickly describe the bottle laundromat. The Minister and I are very familiar with all the stories, but other members of the Committee are not, and the stories are pretty shocking. Every time we hear another one, it is shocking. The stories reinforce the justification for the sort of interventions that Labour Members want to include in the Bill.
I think this is about a different interpretation of words.
The amendment would require Companies House to conduct risk assessments of the information and data it holds on the register for the purposes of the prevention and detection of economic crime. The amendment also creates a basis for new clauses 37 and 38, to introduce an obligation on Companies House to use all the data it collects to identify where economic crime risks lie.
I genuinely think we are quarrelling about words, not about what we want to do. On the basis of that risk assessment, or whatever word the Minister wants to use, Companies House would then decide when to use its powers proactively.
Interestingly enough, my wonderful staff have looked it up, and everybody else uses these terms. We are not alone in this. The Financial Action Task Force standards talk about risk assessments. It talks about a “risk-based approach”. Is that language better for the Minister?
It means the same to us—I think the Minister is really being a little bit pedantic here. If we bring the amendments back on Report with the words “risk-based”, perhaps we will have a better chance of getting them through.
The risk-based approach is central to the implementation of FATF’s recommendations. The UK’s AML regime and the Council of Europe use a risk-based approach, as does the private sector. I want to use a risk-based approach, and so does the Minister, so why do we not just get on with it?
We do, and it is exactly what the clause states:
“The registrar must carry out such analysis of information within the registrar’s possession as the registrar considers appropriate for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime.”
In other words, the registrar identifies a red flag and then does an investigation. The right hon. Lady’s amendment 116 says:
“the registrar must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.”
That is a non-risk-based assessment.
Order. Minister, may I intervene for a second? You will have time to respond to all this in the debate, but that is a very long intervention.
I have to say we disagree, but I will come back to this issue. I think our proposals strengthen the Bill.
I tabled my amendments to clause 88 because I do not support the wording of
“as the registrar considers appropriate”.
I have to say to the Minister that we discovered in this morning’s sitting that the company registrar has so far registered 3,000 properties for a register that has now been in place since August. In three months, she has done 3,000, but there are 138,000 to deal with. At that rate—if she does 12,000 a year—she will be there till doomsday, so putting a little bomb underneath her to ensure that she takes action is important.
My right hon. Friend is making a brilliant speech. If anything, the Minister has caused more alarm than he might have intended this afternoon by referring to the language in the Bill that says the registrar must take account of the information that she holds. There is no way that we would ask a police officer to police Hodge Hill simply with reference to the information that that police officer happens to hold. We would ask the police officer to look at the crime environment in the constituency as a whole, taking account of all kinds of perspectives, not simply the information that he or she happened to have in their little black book.
I will move on to new clause 37, which has the aim of checking that the stated person of significant control really is the person who controls the company. Powers to get information, to reject documents, to require information and to remove documents all sit in the Bill. The new clause would ensure that, through a risk-based assessment—I just reiterate that for the Minister—Companies House would proactively check that the person named as the PSC was the PSC in reality. Current legislation requires the ID verification of a company owner, but not the verification of their status as a company owner, so the risk remains that nominees will continue to be put forward as owners of companies despite the real control being elsewhere. The risk is heightened if the Minister does not move to ensure that company service providers are properly regulated, supervised and vetted before the whole system comes into force.
In the current system, there are endless examples that demonstrate the extent of the problem that the Minister and the Government are trying to tackle—we are trying to contribute to that process. One is the famous dentist in Belgium. From an interrogation of the Companies House register, we know that five beneficial owners control more than 6,000 companies, which is a huge red flag. Some 4,000 of them are under the age of two, and 400,000 companies—almost 10% of the total—still do not declare a person of significant control. We have the Azerbaijan laundromat example, where a lorry driver in Baku was named as the person of significant control and had no idea that kleptocrats from Azerbaijan were taking all the money out of the banks and money laundering it elsewhere.
There is one filing in Companies House for which I thought I would name the person of significant control. The company is called Global Risks Reduction Funding Ltd, and the name is listed as—I will take a deep breath—
“Neutral-Claimant-Federal-Witness-Director-Captain-Postmaster-Bank-Banker-Plenipotentiary-Notary-Judge-Vassalee For The Vessel-Phouthone-Thone: Siharath.”
I do not think anybody has questioned that as the person of significant control. The whole thing is absurd.
An important point for the Minister is that, in 2019, Transparency International did a quick Google search and found 23 active company service providers that were offering the service of nominee persons of significant control—that was one quick search of one directory. When Global Witness undertook research on Scottish limited partnerships, it found that 40% of the beneficial owners of Scottish limited partnerships were either a national of a former Soviet country, or a company incorporated in the former Soviet Union.
I have been tracking for some time the number of times when a person of significant control for Scottish limited partnerships has not even been registered. Does the right hon. Lady agree that it is ridiculous that there are still 201 companies for which a person of significant control does not exist at all?
Yes. The law is being broken but nobody is pursuing those who are guilty.
These are all reasons for closely monitoring data on persons of significant control. The measure would simply put a duty on Companies House to be proactive and to check the status of the person named on a risk-based basis, not just via their personal details.
New clause 38 deals with dissolution, which has been raised with me by a number of stakeholders. We know of numerous instances of bad people dissolving companies for nefarious purposes. The new clause would ensure that the registrar looks at the accounts of a company seeking to dissolve to ensure that no fraud or other crime has occurred. If the registrar found such cause for concern, she would have to pass the information on to relevant enforcement agencies.
We are all very familiar with the phoenixing of companies and the role that that practice has played in facilitating fraud. I have chosen as an example the case of Rodney and Pauline Williams, which is typical. They ran a company called Curio Bridal Boutique Ltd. They made false representations to take money out of the company and put it into another company in anticipation of winding up Curio Bridal Boutique. They took £111,000, of which they put £42,000 into the pockets of their own family. They were detected and convicted, but sadly the successful detection of such cases is all too rare and the practice happens all too often.
The Troika Laundromat—another of the laundromats that has hit us over the last 10 years or so—is another example of where a leak of documents showed how one of Russia’s largest investment banks, Troika Dialog, was central to the channelling of billions of dollars out of Russia. That leak covered 1.3 million transactions. It involved more than 1,000 UK limited liability partnerships, and it was found that the UK had been handling nearly £10 billion of dodgy Russian money. One UK-based company was found to have made payments totalling £360 million, although it filed accounts each year and dared to declare itself dormant. It then dissolved itself in 2014. That company was called Stranger Agency LLP.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his kind words. I remember very clearly my speech in Westminster Abbey that night. He might remember that I talked about corporate criminal liability and whistleblower reform, which are absolutely essential. Indeed, at least one of those falls under my portfolio, so I am certainly committed to bringing forward those reforms when I can.
The only difference between hon. Members of the Opposition and ourselves is the means by which we would achieve the same end. On amendments 119 and 120, I am always happy to look at sensible amendments that take us forward. When Opposition Members talk about those cases, they are talking primarily about cases in the past where we did not have the powers that this Bill provides, and where we did not have the level of enforcement; we both agree that that needs improvement.
Where we differ is on how we go about this. I have serious concerns about the provisions in amendment 116, tabled by the right hon. Member for Barking, which seem to require the registrar to look at every single company on the record. That is exactly what it says. It says that the registrar
“must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.”
The registrar can do that only by looking at every single record.
I will just develop my arguments. I listened to hers at length, and I heard them very clearly. Our approach is a more workable one. I do not think her approach is workable. I think that if we listen to each other’s arguments, we are probably saying the same thing. We are trying to overlay the information that sits with the registrar herself in Companies House with information from others, such as banks, lawyers, accountants—we discussed that in earlier debates—and law enforcement agencies in order to identify where the information she holds identifies risks, so that she can then carry out an investigation.
I will develop my point a little further, and then I will let the right hon. Lady intervene.
As the right hon. Member knows, objective 4 establishes exactly that: an obligation
“to minimise the extent to which companies and others carry out unlawful activities, or…facilitate the carrying out by others of unlawful activities.”
That is quite clearly in the Bill.
New clauses 37 and 38 would require the status of a person with significant control and the accounts of dissolved companies to be checked by the registrar. The registrar would be required to carry out a risk assessment of all those companies—roughly 1,000 companies per day. Members might be thinking that every person with significant control has some connection to Russian dirty money or Russian oligarchs, but the vast majority of state-owned enterprises have a person with significant control, because they own more than 25% of those companies. For the registrar to look at 1,000 companies every single day to determine whether there is a risk, and then investigate further—that is exactly what the right hon. Lady’s new clauses would require—would not be practical.
This is becoming a rather absurd psephological debate. I have just asked my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill whether I have got the wording wrong—whether there is a great difference between risk assessment and risk-based assessment. Perhaps Government Members will tell me differently, but those two things are the same, and we should not try to locate a difference between them.
The last thing any of us wants to do is micromanage any of our organisations through legislation, but we have to look at the experience and the record of all the enforcement agencies and bodies in the financial services sector over the years. If we have colleagues of ours in the House doing that, they will meet with massive criticism. One way to tighten and toughen this up without having to get involved in the minutiae is to move from powers to duties, which is the purpose of a lot of the amendments we are debating today. If the Minister does not take seriously some of these practical suggestions, he is in danger of setting up a new system that is as open to abuse as the current system, and we will be back here in a couple of years putting it right.
All legislation needs improvement, but we must not put the registrar under a duty that makes her job impossible. That is what the right hon. Lady’s amendment would do. That is what I am pointing out to her; not that I do not think—
I cannot let the right hon. Lady intervene again. We are pressed for time. We just do not agree on this point. I think that we agree on the broad sentiment that there should be a risk-based analysis, but that is not what her amendment says.
With 1,000 companies resolved every day, it would be impractical to have a risk assessment of every single one of those companies and to then do the risk-based analysis. I think that the amendments are too directive, and I ask Members not to press them. I am happy to consider whether there is a less prescriptive formulation that we could add to the clause to have that effect. I completely understand and concur with Members’ broad objective. Of course we want a proactive regulator who determines where the risks are and acts on information, be it from journalists, private sector companies or enforcement agencies, to inform her work and to make sure that she pursues those who are most likely to be guilty of wrongdoing.
A couple of Members referred to the Russian sanctions regime. In the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 13) Regulations 2022, we broadened the designation criteria to include specified immediate family members and those with links to Russian state-owned businesses. There are, of course, things like the combating kleptocracy cell at the National Crime Agency.
New clauses 41, 42 and 43 seek to address concerns about nominee shareholders. New clauses 41 and 42 would require people who control, directly or indirectly, 5% or more of the shares in a public company to declare themselves. New clause 43 would require any person holding shares in a public company as a nominee for another person to disclose that fact to the registrar. The new clauses would put additional obligations to disclose information to the registrar on to the person who holds the shares, rather than the company to which the shares relate.
New clauses 41 and 42 would create a burden in relation to public companies that would not exist for private companies. It would not be proportionate to impose such a burden on public companies that are low risk and that have additional requirements placed on them. It is already the case in the law on nominee shareholders or proxies that a share held by a person as a nominee for another is to be treated as though the share is held by the true owner and not by the nominee. Failure to declare a shareholder is a criminal offence and if the court were to find that a person should have been registered, the person and their company would be at risk of prosecution. I hope that provides the assurance that right hon. and hon. Members need.
I know that we share the objectives, but I feel very frustrated by the inability to decide whether a risk assessment and a risk-based assessment are the same. For the life of me, I cannot see the difference. We will put it to the vote and see whether those in favour of risk-based assessments are happy to go with “risk assessments”.
That is not what the right hon. Lady has put in her amendment. It says not “risk-based assessment” but “risk assessment”.
I would say that there is no difference. In amendment 116, we have “risk assessments”. For those of us who think this is the way forward, I have to say that the Minister’s argument seems constructed rather than real.
Let me be clear. We are discussing amendment 119 to clause 88. Does the right hon. Member for Barking want to press the amendment to a vote?
No. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 116, in clause 88, page 68, line 17, at end insert—
‘(1A) As part of the analysis under subsection (1), the registrar must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.
(1B) Where the assessment identifies a matter of concern, the registrar must—
(a) carry out whatever further analysis it considers necessary; and
(b) share any evidence of unlawful activity it identifies with the relevant law enforcement agency.
(1C) For the purposes of this section, a “matter of concern” includes—
(a) inaccurate information;
(b) information that might create a false or misleading impression; or
(c) evidence of economic crime.’—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.