(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to be able to follow the hon. Member. Colleagues will be pleased to know that I will be trying to hold their attention for only about three or four minutes.
I am certain that the hon. Member will have regard for the assertion by the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), that the Bill is a power grab by Government. Would he not agree that that is an odd thing to say, given that the Bill provides the courts with additional powers around remedies in a way that ensures practicality and efficiency, and enables courts to give consideration to the effect of remedies in a way that is not readily applied in the current framework? That surely serves to evidence the shadow Secretary of State’s lack of understanding of what our courts actually need and of the flexibilities built into the Bill. As the Minister said on Second Reading, far from weakening quashing orders, as the shadow Secretary of State said, these new remedies
“strengthen quashing orders and thereby strengthen judicial review.”—[Official Report, 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 233.]
On prospective remedies, I would like to give two examples that show that this concept is not new but has precedence in our legal system. Judges have limited the retrospective effect of quashing orders in some instances in the past, such as in R (British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors, Musicians’ Union & Ors) v. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills & Anor in 2015. Therefore, these remedies do not change the position of judges but act to encourage a wider use of the new quashing order modifications.
It is important to state that these remedial modifications are not being pursued to bypass Parliament but are in fact focused on resolving practical issues that arise during judicial review cases. The concept of prospective-only orders is not novel or unique. Under the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, courts in the devolved Administrations have a power to make such orders where decisions are outside devolved competence. The Government wish a similar concept to be available in all cases of judicial review in England and Wales.
May I point out that there is no presumption in any of the devolved legislation, and that is primarily what we are arguing about here? It is not about having the ability to do this; it is about the presumption that it has to be a default position.
Courts will none the less still have discretion, as I understand it, so they can decide, case by case, what framework they intend to follow.
These are discretionary quashing order modifications, and courts will have regard to the constitutional separation of powers. It is not foreseen that the Government will stop having to work with Parliament to pass retrospective legislation in future.