Legislation (Territorial Extent) Bill

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Friday 11th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin) on what she has said today. This is an historic moment. West Worcestershire has taken up the cudgels on the West Lothian question, and I very much welcome her comments. I have taken an interest in these issues for a long time. I first entered the House in 1974, and when Margaret Thatcher became leader of our party, she was kind enough to appoint me as a junior spokesman on devolution. I have therefore had to take some views on these matters. I am now the Member for Kensington, but my primary home remains in Scotland, outside Edinburgh in East Lothian. Later, I will offer what might immodestly be referred to as an East Lothian answer to the West Lothian question.

I have no doubt that the consequences of devolution represent unfinished business. Over the past 12 years, we have witnessed the single biggest constitutional change in the United Kingdom since the Act of Union in 1707—

[Chris Bryant]

What about 1801?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

It was far more important than what happened in 1801, which turned out to be a blip in the constitutional history of the UK. What we are seeing now is a permanent change. It has not destroyed the United Kingdom, but it has undoubtedly created a new kind of United Kingdom. That has constitutional implications, as well as implications for fairness. I suspect that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) would suggest that, since Stormont, we have lived with the fact of Members from Northern Ireland being able to vote on all the measures in this House despite the fact that their own constituencies might not be affected by them. There is a de minimis issue that we can sometimes live with, but we now have something quite different, particularly if the Welsh approve an extension of the legislative powers of their Assembly in their referendum.

We will have a situation in which not 11 but approximately 100 Members of this House from three of the four constituent parts of the United Kingdom will be able to vote on issues that do not affect their own constituents. There will be only one part of the UK that does not have that right. Rather curiously, having dominated the United Kingdom, by numbers, since the Act of Union in 1707, England will become the one part of the UK whose elected representatives do not, by themselves, have the final say on matters that affect purely their constituents. That will no longer be the case for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, but paradoxically it will have become so for England. Talking about 100 Members, rather than 11, is not a minimal side issue; it goes to the very heart not only of constitutional propriety but of fairness. My remarks today will be about fairness rather than constitutions, because that is the fundamental principle of our political system, and the implications of these arrangements are significant.

We must not get this out of proportion, however. I do not believe that it is right to imply that, as a consequence of devolution, this place has effectively become an English Chamber because the Scots, the Welsh and the Northern Irish have very little continuing involvement here as a result of the big areas that have been devolved to their own Parliaments in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. That is a gross exaggeration. If we look at the whole scope of government, we see that the UK Government and Parliament still have either sole or predominant responsibility for massive swaths of policy. The most important issues facing any Government are those of taxation. At this moment, virtually all tax powers reside with the United Kingdom Parliament, and all Members of Parliament from every part of the kingdom have an equal interest in and responsibility for those matters. The largest budget of the British Government is the social security budget, and that is a United Kingdom budget. It does not differentiate in any material way between north and south of the border.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and learned, and very old, Friend for giving way—[Laughter.] I mean “old” in the sense of time. We are both of a certain age.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Speak for yourself!

[Bob Stewart]

He is no longer my friend. I always used to respect him. Does he think that there will be increased pressure to give more tax-raising powers not only to Scotland in the Scotland Bill but to the Welsh Assembly and to Stormont?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Such proposals are under deliberation and likely to go forward. That could mean a reduction in the block grant to Scotland, if it were to raise a proportionate sum through its own decisions. This is an evolving situation, a dynamic constitutional process. I cannot predict, any more than anyone else, where that process might lead, but for the foreseeable future the UK Government will retain responsibility for virtually all tax responsibilities, as well as for the social security budget, all foreign affairs, all defence policy, all European Union issues, all trade policy, all electoral matters such as those we discussed yesterday, and a whole host of other issues. So we must not imply that Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Members have a diminished interest in the affairs of this Parliament.

It is sometimes suggested that it is quite improper, in this post-devolution situation, for a Member from Scotland, Wales or wherever to be appointed as a Minister in a Department whose responsibilities cover only England. Criticisms were made of John Reid when he became Health Secretary in the previous Government because he represented a Scottish constituency. We should not think of that as a constitutional issue, but it might be politically stupid to make such an appointment because of the controversy that it will give rise to, enabling criticism to be made. There is no lack of precedent for such decisions being made in other contexts, however. During the Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, every Secretary of State for Wales represented an English constituency. There has never been a Northern Ireland Secretary who comes from Northern Ireland, for obvious reasons with which we are all familiar. Let us not suggest that that is a constitutional problem. It is a political problem, and Prime Ministers have to decide whether it is sensible to appoint Ministers from constituencies that are not affected by the decisions of the Department of which they will be in charge. It is against that background that we are considering the question of voting in this Parliament.

[Mr Stewart Jackson (Peterborough) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that we have institutionalised a sense of resentment and unfairness by not giving greater fiscal autonomy and tax-raising powers to the devolved Governments? That sense of unfairness does not exist in other devolved systems, such as the federal system in the United States, in which each state can raise its own taxes, and there is no feeling of resentment towards the central Government.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I return to my point that this should be seen as an evolving situation. We speak of devolution to the three other parts of the United Kingdom, but the devolution is different in each case. We have a power-sharing institutionalised system in Northern Ireland, which does not exist anywhere else. We have a Scottish Parliament that is an Executive with full legislative powers over devolved matters. Wales does not have a Parliament; it has an Assembly that does not yet have legislative powers. In each case, the arrangements will change, but they will change in response to experience and to what are perceived to be the political wishes of the people in the territories concerned. That is the history of the United Kingdom. We are blessed with an unwritten constitution that we can evolve and adapt over the generations in a way that goes no further than necessary but that responds to the aspirations of the peoples in the various parts of the kingdom in a sensible and coherent way.

I shall turn now to the consequences of those arrangements for voting in this Parliament. As my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire so eloquently said, a range of options has been proposed to deal with what has become known as the West Lothian question. Some of them are completely understandable, including the proposal that, if there is a Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish Parliament, there should be an English one. That sounds completely logical, but I was once warned that logic was the art of going wrong with confidence. It is, in fact, absurd to contemplate the co-existence of an English Parliament with this Palace of Westminster, for several reasons.

First of all, to state an emotional and political fact—I say this with some caution—the vast majority of people in England think that there is already an English Parliament and that it is called the House of Commons, largely because of the history of this place and its origins many centuries ago. When such an option is occasionally raised, we are not talking only about two Parliaments. In practice, there would have to be two Governments; there would have to be an English Government just as there is a Scottish Government. The idea that that is a sensible way of dealing with these matters is foolish. It would be a sledgehammer to crack an important but nevertheless modest nut—foolish, as I say.

The second option—one of the bad options—was attractive to many of my hon. Friends during the previous Parliament. It is the idea that Scottish Members—and, one assumes, Welsh and Northern Ireland Members either now or in due course—would be vetoed or prevented from voting on issues that applied only to England. I have always thought that that is a very dangerous and unwise approach. It would manifestly create two classes of Member of Parliament for the very first time since the Act of Union in 1707, and therefore I can only describe it as a nationalist solution to a Unionist problem. I have no doubt that it would be welcomed by the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, because it would provide a constant opportunity for them to emphasise the increasing irrelevance of the Union, as they would see it, and to go much further than the vast majority of people throughout the United Kingdom would currently want. It is not sensible to contemplate having two classes of Member, although not because it could not work. Here I disagree with the hon. Member for Rhondda: it is not a matter of the technical problems, although I can come on to those in moment if he wants me to; rather, I believe that it would be hugely dangerous and, in any event, it is unnecessary.

If those options are unattractive, is there an alternative route to resolve these matters and to deal with the issue of fairness? We do not need a solution that is absolutely perfect in every constitutional respect that fits seamlessly into some web of other issues; we need something that resolves the problem and removes a sense of unfairness.

At one stage, I argued for having an English Grand Committee, to which English-only Bills would be sent. It could be a Committee of all English Members sitting in this Chamber, but only those on such a Committee would be able to vote, just as members of Select Committees are the only people able to vote on them. That would not, in itself, be constitutionally improper. I acknowledge, however, that that would be quite a complicated innovation, which would take a complex series of thoughts to resolve and could take years in practice to implement.

In any event, there is a much simpler alternative—one that has not thus far been mentioned—and I shall put it forward. I would strongly argue that the most simple and straightforward solution relates to when a Bill is certified by the Speaker, as my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire indicates, as applying only to England. Doing that, incidentally, is not difficult. Many Bills currently affect England and Scotland or England, Scotland and Wales, because there is no reason at the moment for the draftsmen not to draft them in that way, if it suits their drafting objectives. If the rules change and the draftsmen are required to restrict any Bill to that part of the kingdom to which it overwhelmingly applies, they can draft accordingly if instructed to do so.

Where a Bill applies only to England, the right way to resolve matters would be to say that before it can be approved on Second and Third Reading, it must achieve not only the majority of votes of the whole House but, subsumed within that, a majority of Members representing English constituencies. In other words, a double majority is required: a majority of the House as a whole and a majority of those representing English constituencies. If it does not meet that target, it cannot be deemed to have been approved on Second Reading. The attraction is that no hon. Member is prevented from speaking in the debate or from voting in the Division Lobby for or against the measure, but the question of whether an England-only Bill goes forward and is given a Second Reading will have been determined by the House to be dependent on a majority of Members from English constituencies voting for it.

[Harriett Baldwin]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way and also for sharing his enormous wisdom on this topic with the House. Does he agree that the Scotland legislation of the 1970s included a provision made by the Lords for a 14-day waiting period, in which something like what he is describing would apply? What does he think of that particular approach?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Yes, that is indeed one approach. We are always reminding ourselves that this country has a sovereign Parliament. The idea that a sovereign Parliament cannot determine that certain classes of legislation will not go through unless there is a double majority of the kind that I have described is absurd. Of course it can do that if it wishes; it is entirely within its power. It is simply a political judgment as to whether that is the right way forward.

I shall not speak for much longer, but I want to address one fundamental challenge that will be made—it has already been made—to any of the solutions that have been described. I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Rhondda will raise this suggestion. It is constantly said that the problem with all these approaches is that if a Government were denied the use of all the votes of their supporters that would usually give them a majority, the whole business of government would become unworkable and the Government would be unable to get their programme through, which would create some sort of constitutional crisis. To be fair, that argument is not made only by Labour Members. Mr Vernon Bogdanor, for example, who we are often told is a great constitutional expert, has constantly opined that that is a fundamental flaw in any such approach. Although I can understand why the Labour party adopts that view, because there is a political interest in putting forward such an argument, I find it very difficult to understand why such a learned gentleman has come to this conclusion—and I hope that he reads this speech.

[Chris Bryant]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman might like to know that Mr Bogdanor was the tutor of the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper).

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I have no doubt that he was. Eric Anderson was the headmaster who taught Tony Blair, but I do not think that either could be held responsible for the other; each must come to their own judgments on these matters.

I come to the central point about the accusation that government would become unworkable. It is not just my view, my opinion or my theory that that is nonsense. We know from our own history that it is a ludicrous argument; it is exactly what happens every time we have a hung Parliament. When there is such a Parliament, as there was between 1974 and 1979, there will be many occasions when Governments cannot get their legislation through. It does not necessarily mean the collapse of the Government unless it is on some fundamental issue of confidence. What happens is that Governments either have to withdraw the proposal or discuss it with their opponents and table amendments to make it more acceptable. That is also exactly what happens between the House of Commons and the House of Lords from time to time. It is what happens in the United States all the time. The current President of the US does not have a majority in Congress, so he can never be certain of getting any legislation through. The argument that a British Government would somehow find themselves in an unworkable and unacceptable situation because not all but some of their English-only legislation was so controversial that a majority of English Members could not be persuaded to vote for it and that that would create chaos in the workings of government is manifestly ludicrous. That argument cannot be put forward in any credible way.

[Mr Chope]

I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend on his wisdom. Has he yet been approached by the Deputy Prime Minister to serve on this committee, which is yet to be set up? Surely, his service on that commission would be really useful.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I suspect that my hon. Friend’s intervention has guaranteed that that will not happen. In any event, I would rather give evidence to the committee than serve on it. We will have to wait and see.

Finally, it is the essence of a parliamentary system of government that Governments must not assume that they can always get their business through. They will occasionally be defeated and, if they believe that the issue is fundamental, they can ask for a motion of confidence to enable them to survive. It is not a barrier to the kind of change that I and others have recommended to say that a Government might from time to time have to amend or withdraw their proposals because they lacked parliamentary consent. The parliamentary consent is what matters, not the Government’s wishes.

[Andrew Bridgen]

May I drag my right hon. and learned Friend back to a point he made earlier in his eloquent speech? He said that he did not wish to create two classes of MP. Indeed, there is only one class of MP in this place. However, do we not already have two classes of MPs in our constituencies, because the work load of English MPs is far higher than that of Members in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) makes a sedentary comment, but if the work load of MPs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is not less than that of English MPs, what are the devolved Governments doing and what is their purpose?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I know the point my hon. Friend is making, and it has some validity, but he takes the argument too far. Certainly, the constituency correspondence with which a Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland Member deals must be substantially less, as many issues that the rest of us have drawn to our attention would be a matter for the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly or Northern Ireland Assembly. Nature abhors a vacuum, however, and none of us has enough time to do all the things that we would like to do in this Parliament. Although many of our Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish colleagues might not have as much work of that kind, I assume that that gives them more time, if they so wish, to take part in debates on wider, national issues and on matters that affect their constituents. It is not as if they sit around wondering, “How should I spend my day?” The naturally indolent may be in that position and enjoying every moment, and that is for our constituents to come to a judgment on, but a good Member of Parliament never has a shortage of legitimate matters, affecting constituents in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, to occupy their time.

I conclude more or less where I began: let us not get too involved in constitutional proprieties. The essence of the British constitution is its flexibility and ability to evolve to meet changing circumstances. When, for the first time since the Act of Union, three of the four component parts of the kingdom have their own Parliament or Assembly, the principle of fairness is paramount. The approach that I have suggested would meet that requirement in a fairly simple and straightforward way. There may be other solutions, but it is important to recognise that a solution is needed, and the quicker we achieve it the better.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

I think “Sceptical” might be the hon. Gentleman’s middle name. I see he is smiling—I have managed to get a smile out of him; that must be a first. He is now trying not to smile. Now he is laughing.

The only point I would make to the hon. Gentleman is that there is no academic evidence, and probably never will be. All that we have is anecdotal evidence. I merely offer my own evidence—I have not seen my work load diminish compared with that of my predecessor, who did not have a Welsh Assembly to contend with. The hon. Gentleman is right that a constituency with a smaller number of people might mean that the Member concerned has fewer people contacting them, but it might also mean that access to the Member for constituents is more difficult and that it involves considerable travelling around the constituency. Anyway, that is a matter for a different debate.

The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington referred to the issue of whether there should be an English Parliament. He is right to argue that there is a danger that we would end up with two Governments. Who would take possession of Downing street? Presumably, we would have a set of English Ministers, in addition to British Ministers, and so on. I am not sure that is the direction in which British voters want to go. The hon. Member for West Worcestershire referred to the fact that on the one occasion when we had a referendum on whether there should be devolved responsibilities within the English regions, people decided, largely because they did not want more politicians, not to go down that route.

In parenthesis, let me say briefly that I hear regularly, not from the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington but from others, that this is the mother of Parliaments. I again say that John Bright meant that England was the mother of Parliaments and that it was a very difficult and complicated birth. The effortless English superiority that sometimes arises in these debates is unfortunate.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman referred to Wales, and I was reminded of a story, which may not be apocryphal, of Charlotte Church singing before George W. Bush when he was President—a meeting of two great minds, obviously.

When Charlotte Church was introduced to the President, he asked, “Where are you from?” She said, “Wales.” He asked, “What state is that in?” , and she said “Terrible.” Discussions about issues such as this are not always informed by great intelligence.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned the possibility of an English Grand Committee. It has been suggested in the past that such a Committee should sit in the Chamber, because it would obviously have a significant number of members. During the last Parliament we discussed the possibility of regional Grand Committees and arguments were presented both for and against the idea, but it has fallen by the wayside.

I am not convinced by the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s argument in favour of a requirement for a double majority. Neither House has ever operated a system of secondary mandates.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

So what?

[Chris Bryant]

It is true that innovation is sometimes a good thing, but I think that it would lead to confusion in this instance.

I am afraid that I am going to disappoint the right hon. and learned Gentleman now. He expected me to argue that a Government who lost a piece of legislation would fall, but I am not going to argue that at all. In fact, the danger is that as we move towards an elected second Chamber—and over the past few weeks we have seen both sides of the second Chamber behaving almost exactly like an elected Chamber—we will reach a point at which there will be absolutely no check on the power of the Executive. There will be no check by virtue of the time that the second Chamber can take to delay legislation, and no check in this House because, by definition, the Government have a majority. We may have to address that problem through the way in which we interpret the Standing Orders of the House.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The hon. Gentleman has been kind enough to say that he does not think that a double-majority requirement would create an unworkable situation for the Government. The only argument—in fact, it is not even an argument, but just a word—that he has used to indicate his reason for opposing such a requirement is that it would cause “confusion”. What does he mean by that?

[Chris Bryant]

I shall deal later with an issue that relates directly to the point of the Bill, and I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will then understand why I believe there is a problem. [Interruption.] He is now confused, but I hope that I shall be able to rescue him from his confusion in a moment or two.

As I said to the hon. Member for West Worcestershire, this is an age-old issue. There is a meretricious argument, which the hon. Lady steered away from today—although she dangled it in front of us a little bit—that it is patently absurd for Members whose constituents will not be affected by an individual piece of legislation to be able to vote on it. That is, at any rate, a paraphrase of something that she said. My response is “All that glisters is not gold.”

If we decide that Members can vote only on matters that affect their constituents directly—or even indirectly, I suppose—we end up with the question of who runs the country. At any one moment, on any one piece of legislation, there is uncertainty, and in the case of Finance Bills in particular there is a real problem. The issue is not just what the Government propose, but what Members can or cannot amend. Some money Bills have effect only in England, but the danger is that a money Bill could be amended in a way that caused it to have an implication elsewhere.