Defence Reform Bill

Debate between Madeleine Moon and Dai Havard

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dai Havard (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) (Lab)]

Obviously, I have spent some time on the Defence Committee, along with the Chairman and others. We have spent a number of years studying some of these things, from Governments who have come and gone. Clearly the Bill is central to our discussion about how we make our MOD efficient, so I do not approach it from the point of view of opposing change and reform. This is a debate about how we get the correct reform. On the question of GoCo or no-GoCo—or “NoCo” or whatever it is or is likely to be—or “NDPB-plus”, I am not going to go into great detail, because the previous speech raised many of the concerns. As for the freedoms required in the individual terms and conditions given to a chief executive of an organisation, who can pick and choose people and so on, I am a little worried that we should build structures around individuals, as they also come and go. That cannot be the only reason for reform, however; there must be broader reasons for making such a change.

Let me deal with the organisation in the context of the rest of the Ministry of Defence, because the remainder of the Levene reforms must be considered. The heads of individual services and joint services will be procurers. They will not sit on the central board, but they will buy things from various parts of the organisation, as there will be single contracts in addition to DE&S requirements. We can make DE&S as efficient as we like, but we must consider the broader context of whether changing DE&S will make the whole process more efficient, so a lot more work needs to be done on that.

My personal prejudice—I was glad that the Secretary of State spoke about where risk will be retained—is that if we are not careful, a further risk is created by moving things too far away from the political organisation. It will never abdicate responsibility, so if anything goes wrong, it might lack the strategic capacity to direct in such a way as to change the process. Care needs to be taken about the extent to which things are pushed out into a private contracting organisation.

Let me turn to the organisation of the reserves. It is a shame that the Secretary of State has left the Chamber, because I have written to him about this and received something of a reply. I was concerned by the weekend’s events because my constituents were involved, in the sense that my local mountain rescue and search team—Central Beacons mountain rescue team—effectively became the initial primary support for the rescue activity. I do not want to get this wrong, because there will be police and coroner inquiries, but if the Secretary of State were in the Chamber, I would ask him at least to thank the team publicly and to acknowledge its activities on that day.

The team was subsequently supported by Rescue 169 from Chivenor and various other highly professional people to help with the co-ordination of the activity, and they did their best in the circumstances. I thank the rescue team publicly, and my local community expresses its sympathy to those affected during the exercise and the families and friends of those who died. There are lessons to be learned from the weekend, so when that happens, I hope that the exercise will include those people involved. I saw volunteers rescuing volunteers. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with that, but if the support process is going to work, those volunteers should participate properly in that lessons-learned exercise, because they have much to contribute.

I am not a shrinking violet who wishes to downgrade the rigorous nature of training, but an exercise such as the Fan dance must be managed well, and monitored and supported correctly, or it should not be done. The sun had not been out in Wales for about nine months, but local people were expected to run around in the heat at the weekend. Perhaps certain exercises should be graded and there is something to be said for considering how a number are conducted, but the weekend’s activity was a selection exercise, not a training exercise. While many lessons could be learned from what happened, we must be careful, because there is a constituency that will want to downgrade the exercise. There is no need to do so, however, because with proper management, monitoring and support, such a downgrade can be avoided, and the legitimacy of the process will be unaffected.

Wales provides something like 7% to 8% of armed forces personnel, yet our population represents 3% of the UK. Hon. Members may draw their own conclusions about why that is the case, but it is due to many things, such as commitment and history. However, people will look at the proposals and say, “What is this new reserve force we’re being offered? How will we relate to the regular forces? Do I want to play this game and get involved or not?” Others will ask, “Do I want my son, daughter or godson to go into this?” It is not just about money. There are important changes, giving people extra rights, but it will not be possible to make the numbers unless the legitimacy of joining is recognised within the community where recruitment is to take place.

[Mrs Moon]

I recognise my hon. Friend’s expertise in this area. The exercise has been carried out in the beacons over many years, yet two people died and a third person is seriously ill. That is sending shock waves of concern throughout the families and friends of those seeking to join the reserves. Is it not crucial that, if mistakes are found to have occurred, the Ministry of Defence is clear about what those mistakes were and how they will be rectified, so that people may volunteer without anxiety, and families can feel confident that the reserves is a safe and credible option for their family members?

[Mr Havard]

I agree entirely. There is also the question of what people are required to do. There is some description in the White Paper about what reserves will and will not be required to do and how those are linked, but there is a broader question about the type of organisation and the support provided.

I shall come on to the duty of care, which is related to that. The call-out of reservists will be the same as that of regulars. That suggests that they are the same, but they are not necessarily going to do the same things. There may be legal issues involved that we need to explore. I understand why the present narrative is the way it is. It is trying to make things clearer, but at some point we may not be achieving that, and we may need to look to the White Paper to help us do so. The title includes the words “valuable and valued”. The reserves are both; that is absolutely correct, but they will be called out on the same legal basis as regulars. The training is to be the same, but it is not really the same. A lot more work needs to be done.

The Defence Committee is undertaking some work on one aspect. As in the case of the accident at the weekend, about which I will not go into detail, there is a duty of care to people when they are put in certain circumstances. We all know that and we see the latest decisions by the Supreme Court and so on. There is the potential for lawfare, when people might seek to use domestic legislation as a weapons system, all the way through to the development of universal jurisdiction. That is the background to the way that people might operate, and in the Defence Committee we are going to look at these things. We have an inquiry offer out now and people should put evidence to us to try to clarify how the system will work.

Regulars may not be the same as reservists in certain circumstances. The law will not necessarily provide the architectural background to some of the decisions that people think they have made. We are concerned about that and we need to inquire into the position and make sure that the law does that. Money is supremely important, as we all know. For some years we have been trying to drive more efficiency into the Ministry of Defence, yes, but it is not just about the money. The MOD should not degrade the quality of the response that it will get, by talking only in those terms.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Madeleine Moon and Dai Havard

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

As we approach the defence and security review and discuss how we are going to ensure our future defence and security, one thing that we must be very conscious of is the fact that this is not just the responsibility of our military. My father was in the merchant navy in the last war and was on a merchant vessel going to Russia. His ship was sunk by German submarines and he then spent considerable time in Russia, suffering extreme privations as a result of that sinking. That might be one reason why I am interested in maritime security.

Another reason might be my coastal constituency, and the fact that my friends and neighbours are involved in search and rescue operations on a daily basis. Seeing how the mood of the sea changes is part of our daily life. I do not have any military bases in my constituency, but there are hopes that it will play a key part in the future development of RAF St Athan and the joint training college that was to be established there. My local authority spent a considerable amount of money preparing for that, and still hopes that something positive will come of it. As a member of the Defence Committee, I am aware of the central strategic role of the Royal Air Force in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capability. My colleague on the Committee, the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), has mentioned the importance of intelligence in any future war, and the RAF and ISTAR are certainly critical to that.

I want to focus on the unbelievable, short-sighted and downright dangerous decision to cut the Nimrod aircraft. I cannot believe that the decision came from the Ministry of Defence: it must have been a Treasury-led decision, because only a bean counter could have made it. I honestly cannot see why else it would have been made.

Last Sunday I was at Rest bay in my constituency, where people had come from across south Wales, as well as from north Somerset and north Devon, because of the proposed loss of the search and rescue capability at Chivenor, which rescues people across those areas. We do not know what is happening in that regard and I urge that we should consider seriously our search and rescue capability, particularly on our coasts and for our mountains. That Sunday gathering was attended by experts in the field. I spoke to Phil Missen from the Royal National Lifeboat Institution and Ian Coles from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, both of whom expressed concern about Nimrod being cut.

Back in my office, when I was preparing this speech, I had my own little personal cyber-attack. As I was typing away, I received an e-mail in my inbox from Michael Hiscocks in my constituency. It said:

“With the cancellation of the Nimrod, how does the RAF intend to conduct long range surveillance of the sea, not only against the submarine and surface threat, but also long range search and rescue that the Nimrods and her crews so ably carried out over the years?”

That one paragraph written by a member of the public in an e-mail to a member of the Defence Committee, who happens to be their constituency MP, asks the major question that must be dealt with in today’s debate.

In his leaked letter to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence made it clear that the primary objective of the strategic defence and security review is to set direction, and that decisions should be based on the risks and threats to the security of our country now and in future. He made it clear that the review should not merely be a cost-cutting exercise, and said that the primary duty of the Government and the SDSR was not to undermine the UK’s ability to defend itself. He also said—I am sorry that he is not here now—that the Government’s words would be “thrown back” at them. Well, I am going to throw some words back at him today for getting things wrong. I do so despite the huge respect I have for him, as he has done an excellent job so far. However, we in the House must support him in getting the decision about the Nimrod MRA4 changed.

The Nimrod MRA4 has several key functions. It forms part of military operations, is an advanced reconnaissance tool, helps to ensure the safety of civil national infrastructure, assists in maritime search and rescue operations, and assists in the defence of our dependent territories. The Secretary of State also said:

“Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.”

So, we all agree: the cancellation of the Nimrod has left the UK with a grave gap in its maritime patrol capability.

As a maritime nation—and we do remain a maritime nation—monitoring and defending our sea is a critical element in the maintenance of our security. The Nimrod’s maritime reconnaissance capability was to have protected our nuclear deterrent, our nation’s ultimate defence, and supported royal naval vessels and submarines in our waters and way beyond. The Nimrods were to have fulfilled a hugely important civil role, providing 24/7 search and rescue services for seafarers, as well as defending vital national infrastructure. Our nuclear power stations and our North sea oil rigs would have all been defended thanks to the Nimrod.

We have talked about working closely with our allies to ensure that we have access to the equipment, training and personnel that we need as a necessary part of our defence, but we cannot rely on our allies to pick up on the capabilities that we will lose by not bringing the Nimrod aircraft into service. The Nimrod MRA4 has far greater capabilities than the aircraft that our allies either use now or have planned for the near future. It has world-leading anti-submarine warfare technology—a particular strength in the UK. We have that strength because of our history, and because submarines carry a vital part of our national security. So there we are: submarines carry the most vital part of our national security, and we are going to scrap the means of protecting them.

[Mr Havard]

Is my hon. Friend aware of the press reports that Ministers are trying to sell on the Nimrod’s capability to someone else? Does she have any comments to make about that prospect?

[Mrs Moon]

It worries me that our defence capability is up for sale. We are selling off some of our defence industry’s crown jewels, and selling on to potential enemies—we do not know where they will be—those capabilities at a time when we are in desperate need. I totally object to that, because anti-submarine warfare is not a relic of the cold war. If we are to protect our aircraft carriers when they are deployed in high-risk areas, who will provide the air cover? We recently lost track of a Russian submarine in the Atlantic for three weeks. We cannot rely on allies who are comparatively poorly resourced, or hope that they will buy the Nimrods, save us the money and provide us with the security.

The Nimrod’s civil use must be emphasised, too. Let us look at the history of its search and rescue capability. When the Fastnet yacht race was hit by storms in 1979, and when the Alexander Kielland oil rig overturned in the North sea, Nimrods provided vital cover. They also did so during the Piper Alpha disaster and, just recently, for the Athena fishing vessel, which needed the Nimrod’s capability because Sea King helicopters could spend only 20 minutes hovering above the vessel. We must remember that we have an international obligation to provide long-range search and rescue missions. We will not be able to adhere to the international convention on maritime search and rescue, which we signed in 1979, if we cancel the new Nimrod.

Let us also remember the use of maritime surveillance capabilities against drug smuggling, human trafficking and piracy. The new maritime patrol aircraft, of which the Nimrod was the mainstay, had the capacity to counter drug-running operations in the Caribbean, fight pirate activity in the gulf of Arabia and form a crucial part of maritime counter-terrorism operations.

It has been a long time since the Conservative Government needed to reinforce the Falkland Islands. I pay particular tribute to the speech made by the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh), who recognised the vulnerability of the Falkland Islands, particularly given the growing demand for energy. The UK’s claim to energy resources in the south Atlantic, which are being explored as we speak, must be safeguarded. The Nimrod provides the only capability that could deploy to the Falklands within 48 hours. It can provide early indicators and warnings for forces that follow. The Royal Navy would take three weeks to deploy there. That is 48 hours for a Nimrod, but three weeks for the Royal Navy.

The Nimrod MRA4 has not been cleared for overland operations, but it does have a tremendously sophisticated suite of new sensors that would make a good surveillance and support asset for land operations. I fail to see why our security and defence capability has been reduced by the removal of this asset. It has the capacity to provide maritime eyes and ears at long range—up to 4,000 miles. Where else do we have a 4,000-mile capability for intelligence? It can move very rapidly—within two hours—and with persistence it can fly for 12 hours without refuelling. No other asset has that capability.