Strategic Defence and Security Review

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I fear that the strategic defence and security review was a cost-cutting exercise rather than an exercise that focused particularly on the defence needs of this country. As those who know me are aware, I have a particular worry about maritime patrol capability.

Following the decision to scrap the Nimrod MRA4, we have been left with no maritime patrol capability. The £6 billion Nimrod fleet is now ancient history and resting in a scrap yard somewhere. I do not want to spend any time discussing that again, but I want to consider where we stand without the capability that it would have provided. The former Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), summed up the problem in his infamous letter to the Prime Minister:

“Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.”

I want to examine each aspect of that assertion—first, the rapid deployment of the maritime forces into high-threat areas. The maritime patrol aircraft is there to protect our nuclear deterrent. In mid-December, The Scotsman reported that a Type 42 destroyer had to be dispatched when a Royal Navy battlegroup appeared off the coast of Scotland. [Hon. Members: “Russian navy battlegroup”] I am sorry—I meant a Russian navy battlegroup. Did I say “Royal Navy”? That is a real Freudian slip—I do apologise. Clearly, my meetings with Alex Salmond have left things in my brain that I should not have brought forward. A Russian navy battlegroup appeared off the coast of Scotland, as have a number of Russian submarines. In addition, Russia is building a new fleet of submarines. In the past a Nimrod would have been dispatched to keep a watchful, discreet eye. Instead, we sent a Type 42 destroyer. Without the MPA, we do not know who is out there or what risks we face.

Scotland is a part of what we should consider our back door—the high north. We spend very little time focusing on that region, but we ignore it at our peril. We tend to forget that we are a northern European country, and that the high north is growing in significance. Without a comprehensive maritime patrol capability, we cannot address the strategic and economic importance of the high north. As the ice melts in the Arctic ocean, the 160 billion barrels of oil that are assessed as being in that region are becoming more accessible. No one dreamed of those sea routes being opened up, or of the 40-day saving on travel made possible by the Suez canal being available for our shipping lanes. Without the MPA, we cannot keep an eye on those shipping lanes to watch for military deployments or respond to any disasters, whether they are environmental, security-related or human.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way and particularly for the extraordinarily good work that she does on the Defence Committee, including in drawing our attention to issues such as the high north. In the comments that she just made, was she also making a comment about some of the possible implications of Scottish independence?

[Mrs Moon]

It is vital that the House addresses the issue of defence in relation to Scottish independence. I hope that, with the Chairman’s agreement, the Defence Committee will include it in our future programme. It is a matter of grave importance to the security and defence of the United Kingdom, and we should take it extremely seriously.

I turn to maritime counter-terrorism. On a visit to Northwood, information was given to me that having one Nimrod, a maritime patrol aircraft, was the equivalent to having 12 ships. We have only 19 ships, and we no longer have MPA capability. We have the increasing problem of countering piracy, which is a form of criminal maritime terrorism. Naval command said last year that 83 warships were needed to ensure a one-hour response time to merchant ships attacked in the high-risk area, yet in October only 18 vessels were deployed. The area of risk is huge—2.5 million square miles—and over the next 20 years, the volume of trade going by sea will increase by 50% and Navy cover will drop by 30%. Tracking rogue ships over such a wide area needs maritime patrol capability, which we do not have.

Counter-piracy operations conducted through NATO and through EU NAVFOR—Naval Force Somalia—rely on the resources provided by members. The availability of MPA fluctuates according to demands elsewhere, and operations in Libya meant that those limited resources were diverted. We face increasing numbers of attacks in the Indian ocean, the strait of Hormuz and now off the west coast of Africa.

Our reliance on the sea is enormous. In 2010, 35% of our total natural gas imports arrived by sea. By 2020, 70% will be imported in that way. Some $952 billion of trade a year passes through the Suez canal, and piracy costs the international economy between $4 billion and $7 billion a year. Those figures are being passed on to taxpayers through the rising cost of the goods transported through the region.

There are huge problems with the proposal to post armed guards on merchant ships. I have particular concerns about the rules that would be needed to govern the licensing of firearms on UK-flagged vessels, and about what would happen to the pirates who were captured. Kenya is no longer willing to help. How will pirates be transported to third countries for trial, and what will the legal position be of both the pirates and the maritime security company that transports them there? Are we in danger of giving rise to the issue of rendition?

I turn to our long-term search and rescue obligations. In 2010 our Nimrods were called out between 30 and 40 times to assist with search and rescue. We have an international responsibility for search and rescue covering 1.2 million nautical miles, but in a collection of letters in The Daily Telegraph in 2010, one writer said:

“I advise mariners to avoid requiring rescue more than 250 miles from shore.”

Without a maritime patrol capability, our capacity to rescue our seafarers is removed.

I wish briefly to consider the Falklands. I remind the House that when the invasion started on 31 March 1982, a Nimrod arrived at Ascension island on 6 April. A battle group of Harriers did not arrive until 1 May. That maritime patrol capability gives us the flexibility that we need, and it is a matter of great urgency that the House is advised on when it will be restored.

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[Hugh Bayley]

The hon. Gentleman makes some fair comments, but the Government have not established that the level of risk facing the country is declining, so they have not made the case in defence and security terms for the reduction in expenditure that they are making.

The United States, the UK, France, Greece and Albania are the only NATO members that spend at or above 2% of their GDP on defence; the other 23 of the 28 NATO allies spend less. The Libya campaign showed that current European spending on defence is not sufficient to conduct an effective military operation against a poorly armed regime distracted by a civilian uprising in a sparsely populated country with only 6 million inhabitants. Within weeks of the start of military operations, European countries were running out of precision-guided missiles and needed to turn to the United States to provide them. We also needed to turn to the United States to provide surveillance aircraft to identify targets and to provide air-to-air refuelling.

All 28 NATO member states voted for the Libya campaign, but less than half participated in it and fewer than one third contributed to strike operations. In June 2011, in a speech in Brussels, the outgoing United States Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, said that

“many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they cannot. The military capabilities simply aren't there.”

That led Mr Gates, just before he left office, to question the future of NATO, and in the same speech he said:

“If current trends in the decline of European defence capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders…may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”

Robert Gates is not a maverick. He served as Defence Secretary under the Bush presidency and under Obama, and in that speech he articulated views that are frequently expressed by members of the United States Congress and other US speakers at meetings of the NATO Parliament Assembly, which I attend along with the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who leads our delegation. Indeed, a report adopted by the economics and security committee at our most recent meeting in October 2011 stated:

“If anything, Secretary Gates was being diplomatic. Europe’s defence posture has grown woefully weak…It is time for Europe to get serious about this issue.”

In November, in a speech to the Australian Parliament, President Obama declared that the United States was a Pacific power, and said that maintaining a military presence in the Asia-Pacific region was a top priority and would not be affected by United States defence cuts—a point that he re-emphasised earlier this month in a speech at the Pentagon about the US comprehensive defence review.

Those statements from our American allies make it clear to me that we in Europe need to do more than we are currently doing. Although we stay above the NATO target of 2% of GDP spending on defence, our defence cuts in the UK make it harder for us to persuade our European allies of the need for them to do their bit and get their spending up to that target.

In President Obama’s speech at the Pentagon he said:

“the size and the structure of our military and defense budgets have to be driven by a strategy, not the other way around.”

The UK Government need to operate on the same basis. I therefore believe that the defence cuts that the Government have announced should be contingent on the successful implementation, on a Europe-wide basis, of a strategy to increase defence expenditure and make better use of the resources that we already have by eliminating waste and duplication.

The UK-France defence and security co-operation treaty is a step in the right direction. It will allow the shared deployment of aircraft and aircraft carriers and air-to-air refuelling capabilities, and I am sure that as a result capabilities will be provided more cost-effectively than if we did such things alone. The nascent Nordic defence co-operation is another example. But we clearly need more shared assets in Europe. Why are we not buying strategic airlift on a joint basis with allies, as NATO did with the airborne warning and control system, or AWACS—although the UK, of course, did not join that initiative? Why do we not do the same with air-to-air refuelling?

Most of all, we need better co-operation in our defence industries. The armed forces in Europe have more service personnel than the United States, but we are way behind in terms of defence budgets, investment and capabilities.

[Mrs Moon]

One way to resolve the problem of sharing capacity would be to have an agreement with Luxembourg, a land-locked country that has no coastline but two maritime patrol aircraft. Perhaps we could agree to share its maritime patrol capability, as we have none.

[Hugh Bayley]

My hon. Friend has made her point well. I would like us not only to make bilateral agreements with other countries but, far more, to look strategically across Europe at how we should restructure our defence industries to eliminate duplication and produce what we need—common equipment on a common basis. We should acquire major capital items of equipment that will be shared in NATO operations on a common basis.

In the few seconds that I have left, I would like to say a word or two about the local implications of the defence cuts for my constituency and the rest of Yorkshire. The latest figure that I have for the number of regular military personnel based in Yorkshire and the Humber is 14,730; for North Yorkshire the figure is 13,310, and in my constituency of York it is 880. The figures date from 2009, before the general election. If between now and 2015 those figures reduced in proportion with the overall reduction in the numbers of our armed forces—that is, by 8.5% or 9%—one might expect force reductions of about 1,300 across our region, of whom 1,200 would be in North Yorkshire and 70, perhaps, in York itself.

On the day last week when the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), made his written ministerial statement about the second tranche of redundancies, I tabled a number of parliamentary questions asking for these regional numbers at the time of the general election, in December 2011, and in 2015. At business questions last week I asked whether the Leader of the House could make sure that I got answers before this debate. I received a letter from the Minister with responsibility for defence personnel, but it did not contain the figures. I hope that those figures will be provided to me as soon as possible.

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[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

It is an absolute pleasure to take part in the debate, and I commend our Select Committee Chairman, the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), for his work on securing it. It is also an absolute pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray). I found myself agreeing with pretty much everything that he said, although I would suggest that many people did see the second world war coming. That was his only example that perhaps fell down slightly.

What I find amazing about the Defence Committee’s work is not only the bipartisanship under which it operates under the chairmanship of the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire but the breadth of knowledge of its members. We have seen that illustrated again today in the contributions from the right hon. Gentleman, from my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) and from others. We produced a report following our forensic investigation into the strategic defence and security review, and our conclusions were clear and damning. We concluded that the SDSR was a Treasury-driven budget settlement that would have dreadful consequences for the defence of the realm; it would be dreadful for the morale of service personnel, and for UK manufacturing.

The decision on carrier strike capability was rushed and bizarre. On the question of the air frame, it is perfectly reasonable for the Government to consider whether the F35-B was the correct choice in the context of Future Force 2020. After all, the United States had placed the B variant on probation, and there were technical concerns about the lift. My understanding is that, at that time, only the United Kingdom and the United States had signed up to take an order. It is also valid to argue that we should consider the question of interoperability with our allies, as well as the value for money of the air frame to be chosen. Those are all reasonable elements that a sensible Government should examine.

Unfortunately, the Government did not bother to take the time to understand the consequences of the decision to switch variants. For example, the F-35C cannot land on the French carrier, thus defeating the argument of interoperability, particularly given the Anglo-French alliance. The cost of the F-35—B and C—is still not known, and that is a concern shared by the Defence Committee and our counterparts in the United States Congress, the Pentagon, the Canadians, the Australians and every other country that is purchasing either the F-35B or C.

Lastly, many of us do not have confidence that, most crucially, the F-35C will be able to land on the Queen Elizabeth class carrier. It would be a good idea if it were able to come down safely to our own carrier, although perhaps I am a bit of a traditionalist.

[Mrs Moon]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Admiral Sir Trevor Soar, Commander-in-Chief, Fleet, said in a speech to industrialists in the US that, due to the US defence cuts, the chance of us being able to buy the joint strike fighter are reducing, as it will not be delivered on time? As alternatives, we will have to look at the F-18 from the Americans and the Rafale from the French.

[Thomas Docherty]

My hon. Friend is right. The Times paints a disturbing picture today. We on the Defence Committee and the wider defence community have for some time had serious concerns about the capability of Lockheed Martin to fulfil the aspirations set out. When the Minister appeared before the Defence Committee, it was disturbing that he adopted a relatively blasé approach to the problem, in direct contradiction to the postures of Secretary Gates, who has already been name-checked, and Secretary Panetta, who have been turning the screws on Lockheed Martin. As the decision has been rushed, we might have to go back and reverse it, and go to the F-35B, which would be not only embarrassing but a vast waste of money. We have only two other options: as my hon. Friend says, the F-18 Super Hornet, a proven air frame, of which the Australians have just ordered additional quantities, and for which Secretary Panetta has announced an additional order, or the French variant, which, to be fair, would at least solve the Charles de Gaulle issue.

On the carriers themselves, it is no secret that I have absolute scorn for the decision that was taken to take the Invincible class out of service. In fact, despite the claim of a minority on the Government Benches that the Libyan operation justifies the decision, the reverse is true, as it demonstrates absolutely the need for carrier capability throughout the decade.