Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [LORDS] (Second sitting)

Luke Taylor Excerpts

Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

My hon. Friend is right to point to the fact that PSOs serve as a lifeline for many regional airports, and provide important economic and business connectivity to the nation’s capital from many regions of the United Kingdom, including his own, which is serving as a catalyst for regional economic growth. We of course need to think about the intersection of these questions, and how we can work with local mayors to create robust public transport systems that can get people to the places they want to go, to facilitate economic growth across the entire United Kingdom. My hon. Friend makes the point well.

I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for tabling new clause 6, which seeks to require the Government to publish proposals for a cap on airport drop-off charges within six months of Royal Assent, and to specify that the cap must be £5. The Government have committed to reviewing the impact on airport users within 12 months of Royal Assent. The new clause would cut across that proposal by requiring the Government to bring forward proposals for a specific £5 cap before the review had completed, effectively predetermining the outcome before evidence had been adequately considered. For those reasons, I cannot support the new clause and ask the hon. Gentleman not to press it to a vote.

[Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. On new clause 6, I note the Minister’s comments about the study to understand the level of public transport provision and charges at UK airports, which we obviously welcome. It is worth reflecting on the comments from a number of Government Members that a charge to encourage passengers to use public transport to access an airport, to reduce emissions, congestion and the impact on airport communities, is unfair when a public transport option does not exist for that airport. It is contradictory and confusing, and it undermines the case and the consensus that we must build that aviation is good but the impacts of aviation travel—be they emissions, disruption for nearby communities, or noise—must be mitigated and addressed.

As part of the review, I encourage the Minister and his officials, and those who are undertaking the study, to come up with a much more nuanced approach to the allowable limits for charges related to public transport provision to the airports in question. I believe we will push new clause 6 to a vote, primarily to make the point that a particular charge level cap is appropriate, but I implore the Minister to look into that nuance. It is absolutely right that we encourage modal share and push passengers to use sustainable methods of transport to get to the airport; however, where airports use a charge to increase their revenue that conflicts with the goals at alternative airports, where it is levied entirely to manage ground transportation demand and the impact on local residents.

Airport charges, it is worth noting, are not the norm across Europe. They are definitely not the norm across the world. It is our model of airport ownership that means that this has become an additional fee that, as in the two examples given by Government Members, is unavoidable. It becomes effectively an essential fee. There is an argument that suggests using public hire vehicles to travel to an airport reduces the impact on roadways because instead of dropping off and travelling home empty, or parking, that vehicle is then available for picking up passengers and returning them to another location. It should be considered that there is a possibility to have different charges for different vehicle types—public hire taxis, for example. It is not that we are against the principle; there just needs to be a much more considered approach to how it is structured.

Finally, as stated in the new clause, we believe that £5 is the right level for the charge to be set at, considering all the various cost of living challenges and the lack of alternatives in many places. We have to see that accompanied by investment in active travel and public transport infrastructure at airports, particularly those outside London, where there is lacking provision at present. Hopefully the Government are able to pull those two aspects together to balance that investment in alternatives with the nudge of that charge pushing passengers into alternative modes.

[Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. My constituency is the home of East Midlands airport, where just a few weeks ago there was an increase for rapid drop off from £5 for 15 minutes to £8 for 10 minutes. One of the briefings that we received on the Bill identified an interesting rationale for the charges, and I am sure that will come out in the review.

I have some reflections on choice and fairness. When parking or getting a loved one to drop someone off there are a number of variables. In my constituency, just 9% of the public travel to East Midlands airport using public transport because the options are just not available. At East Midlands Parkway, the closest train station, passengers cannot get a public bus; instead there is a demand-responsive transport option. There is a free one-hour car park and the airport claims that people can get a free shuttle bus—which they can until early November, after which they will have to walk in the dark. I did that without any luggage and it took me about 14 minutes and I was quite speedy. I can imagine how inconvenient that would be for individuals who do not have the ability to pay.

The ability to pay at the point of use and simply forgetting to pay is also very much a part of my casework. When someone has dropped off a loved one at the rapid drop off, they are often doing so at unusual hours—early in the morning or late at night. By the time they get home, they have simply forgotten to pay. I have been asking the airport that a pay terminal be installed inside the airport for a person being dropped off and with the ability to pay, but it simply continues to refuse to do that. For me, it is about choice and fairness, and there does not seem to be much choice or much fairness there. The fear is that it is using the £100 penalty as a way of making up the cost.

There is also the question of whether the cost is proportionate. It is clearly too expensive. What is really frustrating is that Manchester Airports Group also operates Stansted and, as a direct comparison, 50% of people travelling to Stansted use public transport. We are talking about choice and fairness. People there can choose to use other methods, but at East Midlands airport that is simply not the case.

The other additional benefit of Stansted is that people who live within a 10-mile radius get an 85% discount on the rapid drop-off fee. There is no such discount at East Midlands airport—an airport with such poor transport links that only 9% can choose public transport as an option. Not to pre-empt the consultation, but I would welcome the Minister’s views on how we can start making sure that rapid drop off and the fairness to use it is equated with the use of public transport in the locality.

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Amendment 20, also tabled by the hon. Member, seeks to remove one of the circumstances in which the CAA is not required to consult when making rules. The Bill currently allows the CAA to skip consultation where it considers that a proposed provision is sufficiently minor that consultation would be unnecessary.

[Luke Taylor]

Amendments 21 and 20 are alternative approaches to a safeguard, as the shadow Minister observed. Our preferred amendment is 21 because it gives the oversight back to the Secretary of State to confirm that that minor classification is appropriate. We prefer amendment 21 and will hopefully persuade the Government to accept it, in which case amendment 20 will be superseded.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. On that basis, I will turn to a substantive challenge that we have with amendment 21. The decision about whether a proposed rule change is sufficiently minor to justify the use of the fast-track procedure is, we believe, primarily a technical regulatory judgment. The CAA is the independent aviation safety regulator and is therefore best placed to assess the significance of proposed changes within the wider aviation safety framework. We feel that requiring ministerial agreement for every minor technical amendment risks introducing additional administrative steps that could delay routine updates without materially improving scrutiny or outcomes.

[Luke Taylor]

It is worth clearly defining the CAA’s role in delivering safety and process improvements. Obviously, it is down to the Minister and the Government to drive the direction they want to take. Is there a risk that the regulator, which is operating within the status quo, may consider something minor without being able to consider the direction the Government might want to take—for example, in prioritising the impact on drone operators, new technologies and innovation? Should it not therefore be for the Minister to agree whether a particular innovation or approach can be fast-tracked, or whether it requires full consultation? I think it just gives the Government and the Minister himself more opportunity to direct, which is why this would seem to be a logical process.

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is well made. He also notes that, as our aviation sector evolves—especially in relation to drone and beyond visual line of sight technology—we may want a more hands-on approach to determining what constitutes significant change. When a lot of these technologies first appear, it might seem as though they will not reach fruition and maturity for some time, and then they quickly become very consequential to how our airspace develops. Ministers are ultimately responsible for setting the CAA’s strategic priorities. The Secretary of State of course has the power to direct the CAA and can reserve particular functions. On that basis, the amendments are not necessary at present, given the suite of ministerial powers available when those more nuanced circumstances might arise. However, I will happily pick that conversation up with the hon. Gentleman outside the Committee to consider it further.

Amendment 22 seeks to make it explicit that guidance on the publication of CAA rules may provide for signposting to related requirements in air navigation orders and other legislation. I understand the intention behind the amendment. It is important that those who are subject to aviation safety requirements can understand how CAA rules interact with requirements elsewhere in the legislative framework. However, I feel that the amendment is unnecessary. Proposed new section 61G already gives the Secretary of State the ability to issue guidance about the publication of CAA rules.

In my view, it is unnecessary to be more specific, but perhaps we ought to have a conversation about what more routine processes we can build in to make sure that guidance is provided in a more timely way, so that the smaller operators the shadow Minister spoke of have access to the guidance they need. As the provision stands, the guidance that can be issued can address, should Ministers choose, how rules are presented and published, including appropriate signposting to related legislative requirements, without prescribing that particular approach in the Bill. We therefore consider that those matters are better addressed in that flexible way, through the guidance under proposed new section 61G.

Amendment 16, which was tabled by the shadow Minister, returns to the question of whether the CAA should have to agree the Secretary of State’s priorities and objectives. The Government’s position on that matter remains clear. The CAA is the UK’s independent aviation safety regulator, and its technical experts will be responsible for turning the priorities issued by the Secretary of State into a deliverable rule-making programme. Requiring its agreement ensures that the programme is feasible, appropriately targeted and compatible with its statutory responsibilities.

In our view, removing that safeguard would not improve accountability. Instead, it could require the CAA to pursue priorities it considers undeliverable or inconsistent with its responsibilities, undermining both its independence and the effective operation of the new framework. The requirement for its agreement does not, however, give the CAA a veto over Government policy. The Secretary of State has the power to direct the CAA in its rule making, and retains powers to reserve matters from the CAA’s rule-making functions and to legislate directly where appropriate. For those reasons, we believe that the amendment would remove the necessary safeguards without necessarily strengthening ministerial authority. On that basis, I ask the shadow Minister not to press it.

Amendment 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, would require the CAA to maintain on its website an up-to-date and consolidated version of the whole text of the CAA rules. I agree that aviation rules must be clear and accessible—all CAA rules will be published and remain available and accessible—but the question is whether the CAA should be under a legal duty to keep the entire rulebook continuously consolidated. We do not consider such a duty to be necessary.

The CAA rulebook will contain many thousands of provisions, and it is important for the authority to have flexibility in how it develops, prepares and maintains a consolidated version of the rules, which it then publishes. If the CAA is required to consolidate fully the rulebook after every change, no matter how minor, it would be required to ensure that the whole consolidated rulebook is updated even when a change affects only a small number of provisions. That would also prevent, for example, the CAA from undertaking consolidation exercises at more appropriate and proportionate intervals than in every instance that would be required under the proposed provisions. That could impose disproportionate cost and delay, frustrating the Bill’s purpose of enabling the CAA to maintain a more agile rule-making framework.

I promise, Ms McVey, that I am making good progress through my response to this group of amendments. Amendment 17 returns to the provision that enables consequential amendments to be made in connection with CAA rules. In our view, the need for that power is practical and unavoidable. As responsibility for safety rule making moves to the CAA, the Government must be able to make facilitating regulations and update related legislation so that the statute book remains coherent and the new framework can operate as intended. Without that, the provisions may become unworkable and result in significant legal uncertainty.

The power is not broad or unconstrained; it may be used only to make the secondary legislation needed to facilitate or give effect to the CAA’s rule-making function. Such powers are a well-established feature of primary legislation where necessary to manage an orderly transition to a new statutory regime. Removing the provision would therefore not provide an additional safeguard; it would risk leaving gaps in the legislative framework and prevent the transition to CAA rule making from operating effectively.

The clause itself delegates powers to the CAA to make legally binding aviation safety rules using a process that is quicker and simpler than the existing process of making secondary legislation. That will allow detailed and technical aviation safety requirements to be updated more quickly and efficiently, helping the UK to keep pace with technological developments and evolving international standards. The Secretary of State’s existing powers to legislate remain unaffected. The Bill allows the Government to reserve matters that should not be delegated to the CAA, including where issues of national security or the wider public interest arise.

Importantly, the framework includes robust safeguards. That includes a power for the Secretary of State to direct the CAA with regard to rule making. The CAA will in most situations be required to consult before making rules, to publish them transparently and to report annually on the use of its powers. The Secretary of State will also set strategic priorities for the CAA’s rule making and may direct how those functions are exercised, while not being able to dictate the content of individual rules. That gives Parliament a clearer and more joined-up view of safety rule making, replacing today’s fragmented approach. Together, the provisions create a more agile system for updating aviation safety requirements, while maintaining clear accountability and oversight. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

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[Keir Mather]

In relation to when I would expect the power to be used, I will not be drawn into commenting on hypothetical situations in which that might be appropriate. However, I can reassure the shadow Minister that it is designed to allow the Bill to operate effectively. It is limited and consequential and affects only legislation that does not have a primary application. In that sense, it is both proportionate and technical in ensuring the application of the Bill.

Clause 13 pertains only to restoring powers that have been lost following our exit from the EU to both create and amend the relevant criminal offences. It closes the gap in the current framework that relates to offences that breach those requirements in assimilated law. It does not create any new offences, and any future use of the power would be subject to robust parliamentary scrutiny. There are appropriate safeguards, and that addresses a powers gap issue that has only been caused by our exit from the European Union. I would be happy to provide the shadow Minister with any other information she might require. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Independent Aviation Ombudsman

“(1) The Civil Aviation Act 1982 is amended as follows.

(2) After Section 1 insert—

‘1A Independent Aviation Ombudsman

(1) There is to be a body corporate known as the Aviation Ombudsman (“the Ombudsman”).

(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the establishment, funding, and operation of the Ombudsman, and such regulations must include provision for—

(a) the appointment of the Ombudsman by the Secretary of State, following consultation with such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;

(b) the term of office, terms of appointment, and removal of the Ombudsman;

(c) funding of the Ombudsman’s functions by a levy on operators or owners of aircraft registered with the Civil Aviation Authority and on airport operators.

(3) The Ombudsman may investigate a complaint made by—

(a) a passenger, or a person acting on a passenger’s behalf;

(b) a resident, or a representative body of residents, in an area materially affected by a decision on airspace change, flight path, or air navigation services; against a regulated person, in relation to a matter within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction under subsection (4).

(4) The matters within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction include—

(a) complaints about the service provided by an airline, airport operator, or air navigation service provider, including delay, cancellation, denied boarding, baggage, and accessibility for disabled passengers;

(b) complaints about the conduct of the Civil Aviation Authority in exercising its regulatory functions, including airspace change decisions made under the process set out in the Civil Aviation Authority’s Airspace Change Process;

(c) such other matters as the Secretary of State may by regulations specify.

(5) Before investigating a complaint, the Ombudsman must be satisfied that the complainant has first exhausted the internal complaints procedure of the regulated person, unless the Ombudsman considers it would be unreasonable to require this.

(6) Following an investigation, the Ombudsman may—

(a) make a determination in favour of the complainant, including a direction that the regulated person pay compensation, take remedial action, or both;

(b) publish the determination and the reasons for it.

(7) A determination made under subsection (6)(a) is binding on the regulated person and enforceable, on the application of the Ombudsman, as if it were an order of the county court in England and Wales and Northern Ireland or of the Sheriff Court in Scotland.

(8) The Ombudsman must, at least once a year, prepare and lay before Parliament a report on the exercise of the Ombudsman’s functions, including the number and nature of complaints received, upheld, and resolved.

(9) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.

(10) In this section—

“regulated person” means a person holding an operating licence, an airport operator, or a licensed air navigation service provider;

“the Civil Aviation Authority” has the meaning given in the Civil Aviation Act 1982.’”—(Luke Taylor.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Luke Taylor]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I thank the Minister for the meetings he has held with my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (John Milne) to discuss his new clause. However, there are still some concerns and issues that we would like to address on behalf of his constituents.

To be clear, the Liberal Democrats, including my hon. Friend, do support airspace modernisation. Communities across the country support it too, but modernisation works only if people trust the process that delivered it. At the moment, there is a risk that that trust is missing and that consent is not necessarily fully collected at the beginning of the process. Communities are asked for their views only once a draft design exists and, unfortunately, by that point—I have spent time in the aviation industry and know this full well—although choices have not necessarily been made, the direction and likely outcomes have been narrowed down to what is feasible, and there is often not a huge amount between many of the options.

The new CAP 1616 update, in force since 1 October, makes that feedback and collection of consultation and input more difficult still. Residents affected by proposed changes are not included in the earlier stakeholder reference groups, and locally agreed design principles have been replaced by national priorities. The sponsor decides who is consulted and how, and the gateways in the process have fallen from three to one, with post-implementation reviews removed. Although we understand the need to speed up the process, we feel that this has tilted too far towards expediting the process rather than allowing communities to meaningfully feed back. Before, during and after a proposal, there is no accessible independent route for a community to be heard. The only challenge available after a decision is made is judicial review, and that is not a realistic option for a village, residents’ association or group of residents wanting to bring its points forward.

Some will say that an independent review function existed, but was barely used and the CAA scrapped it. However, new clause 1 proposes something different. Low use of an old process is not an argument against producing a better one. Nor is this about slowing change: the purpose is to let communities feed in early so that problems are caught before decisions are made, rather than having to be fought afterwards. The Government have given conflicting signals on whether the Public Service Ombudsman can deal with regulatory decisions. A written answer in the other place said that it cannot, but on Second Reading, the Minister suggested that it could.

I have three questions to ask the Minister, which I hope he can respond to today. Were the PSO route and the first-tier tribunal route examined, and if not, why not? Why is aviation excluded from that tribunal? How do the Government plan to ensure in practice that communities are included throughout the process and that their voices can truly be heard?

[Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)]

I understand entirely what the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are seeking to do in new clause 1, but what assessment have they made of the financial implications of setting up this new route on a per annum basis?

[Luke Taylor]

That is a good question, and I think the principle there would be to shift it on to the Government to say what the assessment of the cost would be. The cost was used as a reason to push back on this, but it did not appear to have been calculated. If the cost is unknown, I would suggest that that slightly weakens the argument that it is excessive.

There will obviously be a trade-off between the cost, the delay and the additional time taken to deliver these changes with the ability of communities to meaningfully feed back. Ultimately, this is about taking communities with us, because as we have said a number of times today—and different colleagues have made this point at different stages—we have to take communities with us in the changes that we are making to airspace, flightpaths, and approach and departure routes so that everybody can feel like their input is being considered. In that way, we do not lose that public consent and engagement with the process, and people are still encouraged to apply and feed back in future consultations. I am interested in hearing the Minister’s responses to my three questions.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Member for Horsham (John Milne) for tabling new clause 1. The Government agree that passengers and communities should have access to effective complaints and redress, but I do not believe that the case for a new aviation ombudsman has been fully made. I have had productive conversations with the hon. Member, and I understand that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam is raising this issue in order for us to tease out some of those difficulties, so I hope I can address those to some extent in this debate. Whatever I cannot address now, I can set out to the hon. Members in writing.

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[Olly Glover]

We have heard enough. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 8

Passenger Luggage Minimum Sizing: Duty to produce regulations

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, lay before Parliament regulations providing for ‘British Standard’ luggage for Air Travel.

(2) The regulations specified in subsection (1) must set out the following definitions—

(a) ‘British Standard Hand Luggage’, namely a hand bag or personal item form of carry-on luggage; and

(b) ‘British Standard Suitcase’, namely a form of large carry-on bag.

(3) Regulations made under this section must provide for a minimum size, both in terms of dimensions and weight, for both the British Standard Hand Luggage and the British Standard Suitcase, and require airlines to allow luggage which meets the definition of a British Standard Hand Luggage to be taken on board by passengers without charge.

(4) The regulations made under subsection (1) may permit airlines to charge passengers who wish to carry a British Standard Suitcase aboard, however airlines may not impose a restriction on ‘carry-on luggage’ which would be smaller than the definitions of a ‘British Standard Suitcase’.

(5) Regulations made under this section must establish a cap on any fines or penalties that airlines may charge for luggage that does not meet the definitions of either ‘British Standard Hand Luggage’ or ‘British Standard Suitcase’.”—(Luke Taylor.)

This new clause makes provision for a minimum standard for hand luggage and carry-on bags and establishes a cap on any fines or penalties that airlines may charge for luggage that does not meet those standards.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Luke Taylor]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause returns to my overarching theme, and that of all of us, which is how to make flying slightly less horrible for all involved—for families, the disabled, those who need to drive to the airport. The new clause would take a huge step towards making flying marginally less stressful and, importantly, less expensive for anyone who brings hand luggage aboard a flight.

To explain the new clause as clearly as possible, I will start by defining the difference between the British standard hand luggage in subsection (2)(a) and the British standard suitcase in subsection (2)(b). Those admittedly somewhat overly theatrical terms simply act as minimum standards and not, sadly for any aspiring baggage entrepreneurs among us, as required suitcase models or dimensions.

Regulation EU261 has recently been agreed for passengers departing from inside the EU. That regulation will entitle passengers to carry a personal item that fits under the seat in front of them, which corresponds roughly to my British standard hand luggage item. Under EU261, that has a maximum dimension defined as 40 cm by 30 cm by 15 cm, adding up to 85 cm combined. EU261 also defines one piece of hand luggage, which corresponds roughly in concept to my British standard suitcase, as weighing up to 7 kg and requiring a maximum of 100 cm in combined dimensions.

We are all very aware that the UK is no longer part of the EU. Opinions on the wisdom of that may vary, but it means that British passengers may be entitled to a free cabin bag only when returning home on a carrier covered by the new EU regulation. For example, easyJet has confirmed that the changes will apply to flights returning from EU countries and not to departures from the UK. Passengers flying out of the UK will therefore not benefit from a free item of hand luggage, despite the new rules in Europe. The airline easyJet said that the rules will apply to UK passengers only on return flights.

That demonstrates the need for the new clause. It would avoid streams and streams of passengers potentially being fined by airlines on their way home to Europe, because of different rules on one leg of the trip from another. If we do not address the issue, we risk tourists being put off visiting our country due to the lack of parity, costing our fragile economy and hospitality industry huge amounts of revenue.

Today, we have already heard about how passengers run a gauntlet of fees, charges, fines and mistakes: as they travel from home, through the drop-off curve where they are forced to pay a charge or are fined; at check-in, where they may be forced to pay a fee to guarantee that they can sit near their children or to check a bag; and then at security, where they might have their perfume or purchased drink taken away if slightly over the limit. Having navigated our way to the gate, we can see the fragile aluminium or carbon-fibre tube, mere millimetres thick, which, together with the wings full of extremely flammable jet fuel, will convey us at 600 mph at 40,000 feet through storms and turbulence, lightning and rain, to a far-off land while we stew in 200 strangers’ halitosis and flatulence, surrounded by other people’s screaming children—while ours sit at the far corner of the plane, because we did not pay the fee to guarantee we would all sit together.

Before boarding, however, we must face the most terrifying hurdle of all: the gate agent and the handbag sizing frame. We look down and suddenly realise that we have packed our hand luggage in our easyJet bag, instead of the Ryanair bag—easyJet, alongside British Airways and Jet2, allow the most generously sized bag for large airlines, at 56 cm by 45 cm by 25 cm, which compares with 55 cm by 40 cm by 20 cm for Ryanair. The 1 cm-height, 5 cm-width and 5 cm-depth exceedance of that bag clearly means that it cannot fit on the 40-metre long aircraft I longingly gaze at through the terminal window. I shuffle forward with my bag. I am now past the point of no return, because I could have dealt with my error at check-in by paying £45-ish to check the bag into the hold.

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[Edward Argar]

I hesitate to interrupt the hon. Gentleman’s flow of rhetoric highlighting the golden age of air travel, as he may or may not characterise it. I do not disagree with the challenges that can be faced and the fact that people make ordinary mistakes, but is there not a simple way of doing this? Before going to the airport and getting on a plane, people should check the requirements on the website and make sure that the bag fits them.

[Luke Taylor]

The right hon. Gentleman is correct that checking the website could protect the passenger, but the problem is that these are arbitrary sizing decisions so they can be changed at any moment. Should Ryanair need to prop up its bottom line this season by taking another 5 cm off its baggage sizing, there is nothing to restrict it from doing so. The Bill offers the opportunity to set minimum standards for passenger service and to give passengers power and protection from predatory practices. I think we should grasp that opportunity, and that is why the new clause is so necessary.

To begin to conclude, the race to the bottom that Lord Hendy described is not the worst-case scenario; it is what is actually happening today. We live today under the tyranny of the gate agent’s sizing frame. The new clause would throw off that yoke and release us into a free market of airlines competing on passenger experience, service and price, rather than on their fear at sea level before they even board that terrible, fragile, flammable metal fart tube of misery. Please support new clause 8 today—not just because it is right, but maybe so I do not have to subject Members to this rant all over again during the Bill’s remaining stages.

[Keir Mather]

When I recently visited the Bayeux tapestry, I learned that the British Museum was the first institution to ever have “British” applied to its name, and I am now reflecting on the fact that we have an entire classification of luggage named after our beautiful country. It is hard not to be filled with a flood of patriotism at the prospect, and it is hard not to be moved by the reflections of the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam.

In my youth—some say it has not yet ended—I also experienced just the thing that the hon. Gentleman described. When I was on the way back from a rowdy holiday in Portugal, I flew on a carrier that will remain nameless, and I also felt the trepidation of looking down the line and thinking, “Oh no, I’m not sure my bag is going to fit.” Having to put on two hoodies and two pairs of jeans is not something that anyone should be subjected to, and in that respect, I feel his pain.

However, although the Government support clear information for passengers, and we expect airlines to communicate baggage allowances transparently, I feel that the new clause would impose what is a highly prescriptive statutory regime governing baggage sizes, weight limits and charging practices across the sector as a whole. Such matters are closely linked to airlines’ operating models and their commercial offerings, and any intervention of this scale would require careful consideration of its impacts on competition, consumer choice, operational efficiency and fares.

[Luke Taylor]

I sympathise with the Minister’s experience on holiday—and the experience of his rapidly decreasing youth. This point was potentially buried at the beginning of my speech, but the introduction of asymmetric EU regulations could present a challenge. Our passengers departing from the UK might not be protected by—I do see this as being “protected”—the same mandatory minimum standards that would support our European brethren on their journeys here. It really is a challenge to remove that disparity and ensure that there are not different rules at either end, which could then be exploited by carriers imposing charges and different conditions in each direction of a trip.

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. Regulatory alignment does not have to catch consumers out, and it can also provide regulatory certainty for business. Of course, the Government keep developments in the European Union under close watch and advisement, and I saw the ones made in relation to both baggage sizes and family seating. The beauty of this legislation is that it allows us, where appropriate, to align with European rules when it is in the best interests of both British business and consumers. He pre-empts a point that I was just about to make on clause 1, which, as the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage rightly reflected, has done a great deal of the heavy lifting: it allows us to make these changes once we have had time to consider matters carefully.

I have absolutely no doubt that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam will continue to make a full contribution to those discussions. I do have sympathy with what he says, but I do not believe that now is the right moment to put what is quite a prescriptive regime on the face of this legislation. I thank him for what has been a very thought-provoking debate.

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Brought up, and read the First time.

[Luke Taylor]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause is intended to ensure that the economic regulation of NATS contains effective incentives to prevent avoidable disruption and strengthen operational resilience, as we recognise the impact that major system failures have on airlines, passengers and the wider economy. It would establish the principle that NATS’s regulatory framework should incentivise the prevention of major disruption events, particularly those arising from operational and technology failures. It should not simply focus on the recovery of costs. Recent NATS outages have demonstrated that the consequence of operational failures are borne overwhelmingly by airlines and passengers through cancellations, delays and the loss of economic activity, but the existing regulatory incentives are primarily focused on delay metrics and do not adequately address resilience, software assurance and major cancellation events.

The new clause would not alter NATS’s role as the UK’s air navigation service provider or undermine resilience. Instead, it would ensure that the regulator considers the economic consequence of major failures and whether the existing incentives are sufficient to drive operational performance. It would place those principles on a firm statutory footing and enhance the role of the CAA regarding the role of NATS in mitigating the impact of major cancellation events.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause, which seeks to ensure that the economic regulatory framework incentivises resilient and reliable air traffic services and efficient and cost-effective operations. Although we fully agree that resilient air navigation services are critical, particularly in the light of recent disruptions, I cannot support the new clause for reasons that I will outline.

In the first instance, safety must remain the overriding priority for air traffic controllers. Air traffic control decisions must be taken solely on safety grounds; they should not be based on other considerations, such as financial penalties. The CAA already regulates NATS with an existing regime that provides accountability, with delay-related targets and a penalty mechanism that reduces airline charges.

In addition, the new clause risks prejudging the results of ongoing work. The Secretary of State for Transport has commissioned the Civil Aviation Authority to lead an independent investigation into the air traffic control disruptive events in September. It will examine the cause of the incidents and broader questions relating to NATS’s resilience, capital investment and modernisation plans, and will help to identify any lessons needed to strengthen the resilience of the UK air traffic management system. It will also review the findings, recommendations and actions arising from previous significant UK disruption, such as in August 2023. It will assess the extent to which they have been effectively implemented and whether they remain adequate for addressing system resilience, and the consequences of major disruption for airlines and passengers in the wider aviation sector.

The new clause assumes that the appropriate response to recent disruptions is to alter the statutory framework for economic regulation. However, it is not yet clear that the underlying issues relate to deficiencies in the CAA’s economic regulatory duties. The CAA’s investigation is intended to establish precisely what caused the incidents and what lessons should be learned. It would be premature to conclude that legislative changes to economic regulation are required before that evidence is available. If the CAA’s investigation identifies a case for changes to the economic regulatory framework, those proposals should be considered through the normal policymaking process so that any reforms are carefully developed, properly tested and coherent, rather than pre-empting the outcome of that work now. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam that work is ongoing on this important issue and gives him leave to withdraw the new clause.