UK Nuclear Deterrent

Debate between Luke Pollard and Ben Obese-Jecty

Monday 2nd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman’s question comes from a heartfelt and personal belief in nuclear disarmament. On this side of the House, we support international disarmament obligations to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. I gently say to him, however, and to all hon. Members, that we are facing increased nuclear threats as a nation not just from established nuclear powers, but from the risk of proliferation of nuclear technology, especially as that technology becomes more mobile, portable and miniaturised. It was precisely for that reason that that featured as part of the strategic defence review that the Defence Secretary will detail further shortly.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

We are not due to hit 2.5% of GDP for two years, and 3% is by no means guaranteed. With the continuous at sea deterrent ringfenced, spending on conventional forces is well under 2% and in the bottom third of NATO countries. Introducing an air-launched nuclear weapon into our arsenal is a significant change to our doctrine and might fundamentally change the way that all our forces operate. We spend less on defence than other NATO nations with a nuclear deterrent, so when will we achieve parity regarding spending on conventional forces specifically?

[Luke Pollard]

I am normally reasonably impressed by the hon. Gentleman on defence matters, but let me say politely that we have £5 billion extra in the defence budget this financial year thanks to the decisions by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. By 2027, we will have over £13 billion more in cash terms compared with the situation that his party left. When it comes to increasing defence spending, we are doing it three years earlier. It is worth reminding him that the last time this country spent 2.5% of GDP on defence was under the last Labour Government. It is something that his party never achieved for a single day when it was in power.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Luke Pollard and Ben Obese-Jecty

Monday 10th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

The hon. Lady is right that we need to speed up the recruitment process. We inherited a situation where it takes, on average, more than 250 days from the point of application to turning up at a training establishment, often without any understanding of how long that will take. That is why the Secretary of State introduced the 10/30 policy, which means a provisional offer within 10 days of starting, and a provisional start date within 30 days of application. We are doing that to reduce the time of flight, including working cross-Government to improve speed of access to medical records. There will be further announcements in due course. We are making progress on that, but there is a lot more to do to fix the damage to the recruitment process that was run by the last Government.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

9. How many Afghans who worked directly for British forces have been relocated to the UK under the Afghan resettlement programme.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Luke Pollard)]

The Afghan resettlement programme is a cross-Government delivery programme that will bring existing resettlement schemes into one single pipeline. Under such schemes, more than 30,000 eligible Afghans have relocated to the UK. As confirmed in my recent written parliamentary answer to the hon. Gentleman, it is not possible to provide a breakdown of relocation figures by job role, including those who worked directly for British forces.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Having admitted 30,000 Afghans into the country as part of the Afghan resettlement programme, it is concerning to learn that the Ministry of Defence has no idea how many of them actually ever worked for British forces. The Government’s own figures estimate the total number of local Afghans employed by British forces during Op Herrick to be around 7,000, only 2,850 of whom worked as interpreters and translators on the frontline—a fraction of the 30,000. If the MOD does not know why they are eligible to be let into the country, the MOD presumably also does not know who they are or what they have been doing in Afghanistan over the past decade. Can the Minister confirm that the Afghan resettlement programme has not been exploited by criminal, terrorist or hostile state influence?

[Luke Pollard]

Can I thank the hon. Gentleman not just for that question, but for his ongoing interest in this area? We owe a debt of gratitude to those people who served alongside our forces in Afghanistan. This programme was started by the last Government, and this Government are proud to continue it. Everyone who is brought to safety in the UK from the Taliban under the Afghan schemes has been vetted in relation to that. There are a variety of roles that cover support to our armed forces in relation to our UK mission in Afghanistan, but I can reassure him that I pay close attention to this area. If he would like to meet to discuss this further, to deepen his interest and to help him in his inquiries, I am happy to do so.

Ukraine

Debate between Luke Pollard and Ben Obese-Jecty

Thursday 19th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I thank my hon. Friend for his questions. It is certainly true that the assessment we have made of troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engaging in combat is a concerning development. It is a dangerous escalation and expansion of Putin’s illegal war against Ukraine, and is further proof that he has no interest in peace. We will continue to monitor what takes place there. My hon. Friend will understand if I do not go into the precise collection methods as to how we came to that assessment, but it is certainly a sign of further Russian weakness that it needs to rely on North Korean troops in the operations it is undertaking in Kursk oblast.

Secondly, on why this matters, I would pose a question that is always useful when thinking about this conflict: do we think Putin would stop if he won in Ukraine? I think we all know the answer. His illegal war would continue against the Ukrainian people, as would his threats against NATO allies, especially those on NATO’s eastern flank. His malign influence would continue to extend to subversion of democracies through attacks on critical infrastructure and cyber-attacks on NATO allies, including the United Kingdom. That is why we have cross-party unity in our support for Ukraine: Ukraine’s security is the United Kingdom’s security.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the nature of warfare in the 21st century. We are now a generation away from the operations I conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even the conventional warfare I trained for throughout my time in the infantry only a decade or so ago. We have seen how the use of drones has revolutionised the battle space in Ukraine—by that, I very much mean the handheld disposable end of the spectrum, rather than a platform like Watchkeeper—with the pace of their development necessitating a more agile approach to procurement and development. Given that the conflict has evolved over just 1,000 days to be unrecognisable from its initial phases, to what extent are we ensuring that the forthcoming strategic defence review keeps pace with the rapidly evolving nature of aspects of contemporary warfare?

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question and for his service to our country. He is right that we are seeing huge changes in the way that war is conducted in Ukraine, but we are also seeing developments in how technology and different skills can be brought together. A few years ago, I am not sure that many in uniform would have welcomed the suggestion that playing on a PlayStation could train people for military combat, yet we do now see gamers in Ukraine applying their skills to flying first-person view drones through difficult scenarios on the frontline in support of their freedom. It is precisely those lessons that the SDR is seeking to capture. We are using not just lessons from the war in Ukraine, but experience with Russian malign influence elsewhere around the world to inform the SDR. My hon. Friend sitting next to me on the Front Bench, the Minister for Veterans and People, feels—how shall I put it?—incredibly strongly about drones, and I am absolutely certain that the SDR will include a greater role for not only drones warfare but training around drones and modern warfare, as well as a greater role for autonomy in all domains.