Lord Young of Cookham
Main Page: Lord Young of Cookham (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Young of Cookham's debates with the Home Office
(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Baroness’s clarification of these probing amendments is very helpful. As we have heard, a competent authority in this context of the Bill means a person as specified in Schedule 7, to the extent that the person has functions for law enforcement purposes.
Amendments 124Q and 124R would add useful clarifications that the persons listed in Schedule 7 come under the same classification as “any other person” referred to in Clause 28(1)(b) and the persons listed in Clause 28(3)(b). That would be a useful clarification in the Bill.
I do not support Amendment 124S in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but support the three government amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde. As I say, I do not support Amendment 124S, which makes the case for Amendments 124Q and 124R even more important.
I support the amendment that would add police and crime commissioners to the schedule, and the other amendments in the group which would widen the definitions, as that would be very useful. I look forward to the noble Baroness’s response to the points that have been raised.
The co-pilot is in charge of this leg of the legislative journey, so there may be some turbulence.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her explanation of these amendments. I particularly welcome what she said at the beginning of her remarks—namely, that these were probing amendments designed to improve the style. We are all in favour of improving style. Having read previous Hansards, I know that there has been broad cross-party support for the Bill’s provisions, particularly this part of it. I know that the Liberal Democrat Benches are particular enthusiasts for enshrining in UK law the provisions of the EU law enforcement directive.
As the noble Baroness has indicated, this group of amendments relates to the definition of various terms used in Part 3, including that of a competent authority and the meaning of “profiling”. I also welcome the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, in support of some of the amendments.
The scope of the law enforcement processing regime is provided for in Part 3 of the Bill. Unlike Part 4, which applies to all processing of personal data by the intelligence services, the scheme in Part 3 is purpose-driven. The Part 3 scheme applies to processing by competent authorities, as defined in Clause 28, for any of the law enforcement purposes, as defined in Clause 29. This approach is clear from a reading of Part 3 as a whole. For example, each of the data protection principles in Clauses 33 to 38 refers to processing for any of the law enforcement purposes.
The definition of a competent authority needs to be viewed in that context. Competent authorities will process personal data under the scheme in Part 3 only where such processing is for one of the law enforcement purposes. If they process data for another purpose, as the noble Baroness indicated—for example, for HR management purposes—the processing would be undertaken under either the GDPR or applied GDPR scheme, as the case may be. That would be the default regime. I am not sure there is a case for yet another regime on top of the two we already have. As paragraph 167 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill makes clear, a government department will be a competent authority for the purposes of Part 3 only to the extent that it processes personal data for a law enforcement purpose. For example, where DWP processes data in the course of investigating criminal offences linked to benefit fraud, it will do so as a competent authority.
The approach we have taken in Schedule 7 is to list all the principal law enforcement agencies, including police forces, prosecutors and those responsible for offender management, but also to list other office holders and organisations that have law enforcement functions supplementary to their primary function. For example, the list in Schedule 7 includes some significant regulators. We should remember that the definition of “law enforcement purposes” includes the “execution of criminal penalties”, as set out in Clause 29. That being the case, it is entirely appropriate to list contractors providing offender management services. I hope this explanation deals with Amendment 129A. As I explained a moment ago, where such contractors process data for a non-law enforcement purpose—again, an example given by the noble Baroness—they will do so under the GDPR or applied GDPR scheme.
Schedule 7 is not, and is not intended to be, a wholly exhaustive list, and other organisations with incidental law enforcement functions will come within the scope of the definition of a competent authority by virtue of Clause 28(1)(b). Police and crime commissioners, to which Amendment 127A relates, may be a case in point, but if they process personal data for a law enforcement purpose, they will do so as a competent authority by virtue of Clause 28(1)(b). The government amendments in this group should be viewed against that backdrop.
Since the Bill was introduced, we have identified a number of other organisations that it would be appropriate to add to the list in Schedule 7, and Amendments 125, 126, 128 and 129 are directed to that end. Government Amendment 127 modifies the existing entry in respect of the independent office for police conduct in recognition of the fact that under the reforms we are making to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the director-general will be the data controller of the reformed organisation.
The amendments to Clause 31 all seek to amend the definition of profiling. First, Amendment 129C seeks to include “attributes” in the definition of profiling, which currently refers to “aspects”. The existing wording reflects the terminology used in the LED, which is clear. In any event, the two words do not differ much in substance, so little is gained by the proposed addition.
In Amendment 129B and Amendments 129D to 129F the noble Baroness seeks to widen the definition of profiling so that it is not restricted to “certain” areas of profiling or to the aspects listed. However, the personal aspects itemised in the definition are not intended to act as an exhaustive list, and the inclusion of the words “certain” and “in particular” do not have this effect. The list refers to those aspects considered of most importance to profiling. Again, for these reasons, these amendments are not necessary. I think the noble Baroness conceded that we were simply replicating the existing terminology.
I hope I have been able to reassure her on these points and that she will be content to withdraw her Amendment 124Q and support the government amendments.
My Lords, to take that last point about certain areas of profiling first, obviously I did not make myself clear, as I want the opposite of what the Minister read me as wanting. I want to be clear that I do not want to leave areas for doubt, so I sought to restrict rather than to extend.
On police and crime commissioners, I am a little baffled as to why, if so many other organisations which have some functions that are about law enforcement are included, police and crime commissioners should be left to rely on Clause 28(1)(b) rather than being included specifically.
Finally, yes, we are enthusiasts for incorporating the directive. We want to be clear that the incorporation works. Should I talk for another moment or two in case a message is coming? There was a thumbs up to that suggestion. We are great enthusiasts for certain things that the EU is proposing—I am being a little flippant and this will read terribly badly in Hansard. As I said at the start, all this is so that we may be assured—and this is the stage at which to do it—that what is being incorporated works in the way that reading the words as a sort of narrative suggests.
Some in-flight refuelling has arrived. The noble Baroness made a valid point about why we had added certain organisations to Schedule 7 but not the police and crime commissioners. We will reflect on that between now and Report.
I am grateful for that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Clause 56 anticipates that competent law enforcement authorities may work together, and designates them as “joint controllers”. Clause 56(2) allows them to “determine their respective responsibilities”, although there is an exception when the responsibility is,
“determined under or by virtue of an enactment”.
Amendment 137A would, I suggest, take us a step further by providing that, in any event, if there is a failure to comply with a controller’s statutory obligations, each joint controller is liable—or does this not need to be spelled out? I beg to move.
My Lords, these are narrow but important amendments relating to the liability of joint controllers. I agree with the noble Baroness that there should be clarity as to where liability rests when a controller contravenes the provisions of the Bill. The concept of joint data controllers is not new; indeed, it is recognised in the Data Protection Act 1998. In a similar vein, Clause 56 makes provision for joint controllers under Part 3—the shared responsibility for the police national computer by chief officers is a case in point. Upholding the rights of data subjects is dependent on the clear understanding of responsibilities. Clause 56 requires joint controllers to determine transparently their respective responsibilities so that data subjects know who to look to in order to access their rights or to seek redress. There should be no ambiguity as to who is responsible for compliance with the provisions of Part 3.
The issue of liability is dealt with elsewhere in the Bill. For example, Clause 160 provides that an individual has the right to compensation from a controller if they suffer damage because of a contravention of this legislation. Subsection (4) makes specific provision for joint controllers: it provides that liability for damages flows from the legal responsibility for compliance as determined by an arrangement made under Clause 56. These types of arrangement already exist, and this is as it should be. What matters to the data subject is that the legal position in relation to joint controllers is clear, and Clause 160, read with Clause 56, provides such clarity. I also refer the noble Baroness to Clauses 145, 149 and 158, which make like provision in respect of enforcement notices, penalty notices and compliance orders.
The government amendments in this group, which are technical, address much the same point. As I have indicated, the Bill adopts the principle that a court order in relation to controllers operating under a joint controller arrangement may be made only against the controller responsible for compliance with the relevant provision of data protection legislation. That has to be right, whereas under the noble Baroness’s amendment, they would all be liable, whether or not they were responsible for compliance with the relevant provision. Amendments 143, 147 and 148 are needed to ensure that the principle is carried through when joint controllers are operating under Clause 102 and that the liability of such controllers is clear. Providing such clarity is in everyone’s interests, including data subjects.
I hope I have been able to satisfy the noble Baroness that the position on the liability of joint controllers is clear and that she will be content to withdraw her amendment and support the government amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for explaining these amendments, which relate to intelligence services processing.
Amendment 137R would provide that sensitive processing for a condition under Schedule 10 was lawful when the condition was not also a condition in Schedule 9. Clause 84 provides that processing is lawful only as long as one of the conditions in Schedule 9 is met, and for sensitive processing one of the conditions in Schedule 10 must also be met. We consider that the two-stage consideration process when processing sensitive personal data is important, as it requires the controller to ensure that conditions in both schedules can be satisfied.
We accept that there is a degree of overlap between some of the conditions provided for in the schedules, but that is necessary. For example, consent is a condition for processing in both schedules, but that reflects the fact that consent may often be the most appropriate grounds for processing personal data, such as when people consent to their sensitive personal data being processed for medical purposes. That position is not new: Schedules 9 and 10 reflect the equivalent Schedules 2 and 3 to the Data Protection Act, both of which provide that consent is a condition for processing. The amendment adds nothing, but has the potential to reduce clarity and is likely to confuse by departing from a well-established, two-stage consideration process.
Amendment 138A, which the noble Baroness said was probing, would restrict the power of the Secretary of State to amend the conditions for sensitive processing set out in Schedule 10 to adding conditions rather than also varying or omitting. The issue was debated in the context of other parts of the Bill last Monday, and I repeat the commitment given by my noble friend to take account of the noble Baroness’s amendment as part of our consideration of the report from the Delegated Powers Committee.
Amendment 139A would remove as a condition for lawful processing under Schedule 9 processing that is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller. In the case of the intelligence services, their legitimate interests are dictated by their statutory functions, including safeguarding national security and preventing and detecting serious crime. I should also add that this is a condition currently provided for in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 1998, so it may not surprise noble Lords that we could not support an amendment that would preclude the intelligence services from processing personal data in pursuance of their vital functions.
Amendment 139B would preclude the processing of personal data by the intelligence agencies in pursuit of their legitimate interests—that is, their statutory functions—whenever the processing prejudices the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subjects, rather than the current drafting, which prevents such processing in circumstances where it would be unwarranted in any particular case because of prejudice to those rights or interests. This more restrictive approach would mean that the intelligence services would be unable to process personal data in pursuit of their legitimate interests—for example, safeguarding national security—since it could be argued that such processing is likely to engage such rights, in particular the right to respect private life. It would prevent data processing that was otherwise lawful, necessary and proportionate and carried out in full compliance with the Human Rights Act. The ECHR provides that some rights, including the right to private life, are qualified rights, recognising the fact that while a right may be engaged, lawful interference with that right should be permissible in certain circumstances. As a result, this amendment would appear to go further than that required by the ECHR as, whenever a right was engaged, interference would not be possible, even if such interference were lawful, proportionate and necessary. Again, the condition in the Bill replicates the existing condition in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 1998. Given this, I am not aware of any powerful reasons for changing the existing established approach.
Amendment 139C would require the Information Commissioner to be informed when processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject in circumstances, for instance, where consent cannot be given by or on behalf of the data subject or the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject. Such processing is a condition for sensitive processing under Schedule 10 and it mirrors precisely the equivalent provisions in Schedule 3 to the Data Protection Act 1998. The amendment does not add to a data subject’s rights nor does it strengthen protections. The processing of personal data in these circumstances already attracts the protections and safeguards provided for in the Bill, including the general oversight of the Information Commissioner. It is therefore in our view unnecessary and, I might add, I am not aware that the Information Commissioner has asked for such a provision.
Amendment 139D—which the noble Baroness was gracious enough to concede that she had not thought through—would limit the processing of personal data in connection with legal proceedings related to an offence or alleged offence. This amendment would have an extremely damaging effect, preventing processing in connection with all other legal proceedings, such as court or tribunal proceedings under this Bill, complaints to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal about unlawful conduct by the intelligence services and assistance with other civil proceedings and inquiries. I am sure that this was not the noble Baroness’s intention. Furthermore, the wording at paragraph 5 of Schedule 10 reflects that currently provided for at paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 to the Data Protection Act, so the Bill goes no further than existing legislation in this respect.
Amendment 140A would remove from Schedule 10 processing personal data necessary for medical purposes as a condition for sensitive processing. However, this is relevant for the intelligence services for straightforward processing of medical data by medical professionals processing the services’ data. An example would be an intelligence service’s occupational health services carrying out fitness for work assessments and providing medical advice. In such circumstances the intelligence service would likely rely on this condition as a lawful basis for the processing. This is to the benefit of both the services as employers and to their employees.
Finally, Amendment 140B relates to Clause 85, which provides for the second data protection principle: the requirement that the purposes of processing be specified, explicit and not excessive. Subsection (4) of the clause provides that processing is to be regarded as compatible with the purpose for which it is collected if the processing is for purposes such as archiving and scientific or historical research. This amendment has the effect of rendering processing compatible only if it was for those specific purposes. I am sure that was not the noble Baroness’s intention given that the amendment would prevent the intelligence services processing personal data in pursuance of their vital statutory functions.
I hope that noble Lords will agree that in relation to these amendments the Bill, with possibly one exception, adopts the right approach. In relation to the possible exception, namely the delegated power in Clause 84, I have reiterated the commitment that we will take account of Amendment 138A when we respond to the report from the Delegated Powers Committee. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, almost all these amendments were probing, except for Amendment 138A, which is how the noble Lord described it—it was distinctly not probing, so I am glad to have had his assurance in that regard. I commented on an earlier group about either the intelligence services or law enforcement—I cannot remember which—being advantaged as against other employers outside their immediate job. It seemed to me from the noble Lord’s comments about medical data that the services would be advantaged as against employers in completely different fields. He gave a long answer, and I am grateful for that; it of course deserves reading and I will do so. I thank him for this comments on Amendment 138A and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.